Dominant Logistics
Vol. V: Reorganizing Defense
For all of the discussions of military transformation, the lack of any substantial talk of reorganizing the overall force is striking. How can any organization truely transform itself without changing its organization in any way, shape, or form? Even in discussion of overhauling individual branches, there remains an absence of evaluation of the need to reorganize the collective military.
What makes this particular element of reorganization so important is that many of the problems commonly cited with defense in the United States are the inevitable resort of a force structure that is organized around the bureacracy of the force and not the operations of the force. For example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the top advisor to the Congress and the President on military matters, and yet the holder of this position does not lie within the military chain of command, nor does this person have any operational authority within the military they supposedly head. This person, as is the case with the other Chiefs of Staff as well, holds control over the bureacracy of the military only and yet is advising the rest of the government on the operational aspects of the military, concepts totally unrelated to the position held.
To put this into a civilian perspective, this is the equivalent of the President of a corporation getting information on the manufacturing capabilities of the corporation from the Vice President of Sales and Marketing, or of getting corporate tax advice from the Vice President of Operations. Equally troubling is that this structure places all of the bureaucratic power of a branch of service into the hands of one, and only one, man. This invites a situation where a particular head of service may have goals that are not the best for the force, but these goals can be inflicted upon the force without any effective check against the power. As an example, consider the current debate within the Army over transitioning to wheeled combat vehicles. There is tremendous opposition to this concept within the Army and yet as Chief of Staff, General Shinseki was able to force the issue even though better equipment could've been had in greater quantities at a fraction of the cost of the ongoing Stryker debaucle. Similar examples have occured in the past in other branches, with the Air Force grossly overemphasizing heavy bombers in the 50s and the Navy's ever-present addiction to nuclear attack submarines, no matter how negatively it is affecting the service.
If we are to truely transform the military, it is imperative that we start at the top and reorganize the collective force. I'm not a fan of the notion of merging all the branches into a single branch, but I believe that our existing branches can, and should, be reorganized into a more effectively managed Department of Defense. The taxpayers deserve nothing less.
JCS Overview
What I envision for leading a transformed force is a Joint Chiefs of Staff that consists of a total of 15 members. There should continue to be a joint staff that supports this group, however the component commands and the bureaucrats should be merged into a single level at Chief of Staff. Simply put, there should be a single person heading up each branch of service, but there must also be additional members of that branch on the JCS that can either offer an alternative view or lend additional support where needed.
Of the positions on the JCS, six of the seats will be operational elements from within existing commands. This includes the heads of each branch of service as well as some of the existing joint commands, with the heads of service taking on the existing combat command roles. The remaining nine positions will be of bureaucrats representing each of the three main elements (Strike Forces, Battle Forces, and Operational Forces) of each of the three main services. There need to be bureaucrats on the JCS, but we must never lose sight over who needs to be running the shows - those who are actively engaged in the operational art and not those who are pushing pencils.
The heads of each service will serve a total of six years, rotating up the JCS. For the first two years, the officer will be the head of their branch and responsible for either Eastern or Western theaters of war. For years two through four, The head retains the existing responsibilities but also serves as vice chairman of the JCS. For the final two years, the head transitions to Chairman of the JCS and oversees operations in the Americas. The remaining members of the JCS should also serve on a six-year rotational basis. Instead of being appointed directly into the top jobs, senior officers should be appointed to the vice-chief position for a three-year term instead. Upon completion of the three-year term, the officer would then automatically ascend into the chief position. This gives the officer three years to study and learn the job so that their three years as chief can be productive and effective.
Joint Operational Commands
Chief of Staff, Logistics Command
The first member of the JCS should be the head of the overall logistics capabilities of the force. As mentioned elsewhere, we need to establish a joint Logistics Command, and the head of this organization should sit on the JCS. Someone once said that amatuers talk tactics; experts talk logistics. It simply makes no sense to have a JCS devoid of this critical area of warfare and leaving these critical issues to a subordinate command with no power to ensure logistics issues are addressed and managed properly.
Chief of Staff, Special Operations Command
While many reformers propose eliminating the Special Operations Command, I personally favor the idea of expanding the concept. SpecOps forces are ideally suited to many roles that are expected to be critical to success in future conflicts. These are transient forces, extremely deployable and flexible. They are designed to perform specific tasks, not to engage in full on extended warfare. To me, it only makes sense to retain this special force but to expand upon it by removing the Marine Corps from the Navy and placing them amongst the Special Operations Command as well.
In essence, what this would give us is a relatively large assembly of personnel trained and equipped to operate in small groups on very specialized tasks. Some have called for developing specialized "patch" forces and these can come from the SOC. Another way of looking at this is it places all the ultra-hardcore chest thumpers in one place where we can keep a better eye on them (just kidding, guys!). Giving this group a seat on the JCS ensures that these critical capabilities can be maintained and updated over the long haul.
Chief of Staff, Strategic Forces Command
Something that has never made sense to me is the arrangement used to address strategic military matters. While there have been some efforts of late to merge some of the strategic elements of the military, I don't believe these efforts have gone far enough. As with logistics and special operations, this is one of those areas where the whole nine yards needs to be removed from the general force into an entirely distinct command. This includes all nuclear forces including defensive forces, all missile defense forces, all DOD homeland defense assets, all DOD space assets, and all DOD intelligence assets.
While there is currently an operational Strategic Forces Command, it is subordinate to the separate branches and consequently is mismanaged and dysfunctional on a good day. Simply put, somebody needs to be focusing their efforts on the "Big Picture" so to speak and this is the position to do that. It is patently absurd that each branch of service has its own intel groups, missile defense programs, nuclear programs, and space programs. These are the most expensive elements of defense and yet we think nothing of having dozens of programs, all overlapping each other and duplicating efforts and expenses while ignoring the existence of similar programs. The groups need to be merged under a single authority that can focus on the strategic side of war allowing the branches to focus on the tactical side.
Strike Forces Commands
Strike forces are those that are typified by the phrase "hit-and-run." These groups do not hang around securing an area - they hit the enemy and either move on or go home. When people talk of "Cruise Missile Diplomacy", they are talking about one particular use of strike forces. In special operations, forces are focused on specific tasks, larger battle forces are more suited to extended warfare - strike forces or designed to win the separate and distinct engagements that make up a war. Each of the branches has elements that fall into the classification of strike forces.
Chief of Staff, Cavalry Forces
In the Army, cavalry forces are the units that engage in strike force missions. They are mobile and able to hit hard and fast but are not particularly well suited to sitting back in a defensive role. People have been talking about restructuring the Army into an "expeditionary" force - at the end of the day, this is the job of cavalry forces and is inherently a strike force mission. It is important to recognize that this is a very different type of force from traditional military designs. Everything from equipment and training to organizational structures needs to be different in order for units of this type to function effectively.
Chief of Staff, Naval Strike Forces
Naval strike forces combine a number of different concepts because we are dealing with both undersea and surface warfare. Recent naval missions have included launching cruise missiles in limited strikes while some have proposed bringing back submarine gunboats. These are strike force type missions but so are most littoral operations. Therefore, our naval strike forces should include the Maritime Strike Forces in addition to the proposed conventional submarine fleet.
Chief of Staff, Long Range Strike Groups
On the Air Force side of the house, strike forces are best represented by long-range bombers. All conventional long-range (intercontinental) bombers should be assigned to Long Range Strike Groups. I am still a firm believer in keeping conventional and nuclear bombers as separate and distinct entities - if anything, we should scrap the nuclear bomber concept altogether as technologically, it has really outlived it's usefulness.
Battle Forces Commands
Battle forces are those that are designed more for extended warfare engagements. Strike forces engage in transient operations - they are not equipped to operate for long periods in the field. Battle forces are there for the long haul. These units feature greater logistical support and are not as deployable as strike forces, but tend to be more survivable.
Chief of Staff, Infantry Forces
As can be found in my articles on light and mechanized infantry units, I believe we need our divisions to be more manpower intensive. At the end of the day, wars are not won by fighters, tanks, and ships - they are won by men on the ground with guns in hand. Our emphasis in the Army must be these men with guns and giving them a singular voice on the JCS should ensure that we retain a strong focus on this most critical element of the overall military.
Chief of Staff, Naval Battle Groups
There should be two types of battle groups in our Navy to deal with the variety of critical missions that fall into this category of warfare. Whether we are talking Carrier Battle Groups or Surface Battle Groups, these are the formations for engaging in extended naval operations. Unfortunately, today this is all the Navy really has and the roles have been overrun both those who consider the supercarrier to be the end-all, be-all of naval vessels. The objective here is to focus the Navy leadership on the mission instead of the ship.
Chief of Staff, Expeditionary Air Groups
The Air Force has already been working towards reorganizing their conventional warfare assets into units they call Expeditionary Air Wings. These units are ideal to accompany other battle forces as these air wings are designed to provide the type of aerial support required for extended warfare engagements.
Operational Forces Commands
Operational forces are those units that are engaged in long-term, semi-permanent operations to include peacekeeping forces, training forces, garrison forces, and the logistics forces that remain within the various branches of service.
Chief of Staff, Land Operational Forces
Land operational forces perform the day-to-day missions that are required of the Army. The most critical of these is the proposed peacekeeping units that will take the burden of peacekeeping and nationbuilding off of the traditional combat forces.
Chief of Staff, Naval Warfare Groups
Naval warfare groups are built around ships that are more multipurpose in design and better suited to supporting the normal requirements of the Navy. In particular, these groups are better suited to carrying out humanitarian missions and have a variety of services that are not as prevalent in other naval groups.
Chief of Staff, Air Operational Forces
The units of Air Operational Forces are those aircraft that support the various missions of the Air Force. These include refueling aircraft, cargo aircraft, and electronic warfare aircraft. These missions are often forced to take a backseat to combat aircraft and giving them a strong voice on the JCS should help to resolve this problem.
Summary
By expanding the JCS to include more senior personnel from each branch as well as as few joint positions, it will become more difficult for individual programs that are opposed by many to be inflicted upon the force. For any given program, a minimum of eight members of the JCS will need to support the program for it to survive - but no branch will have nearly that many members on the JCS. With today's staff, there is no real opposition, even to heavily disputed programs, because a handful of senior officers can sit down and play the "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" game and get anything they personally desire, whether the branch wants it or not (it is, after all, a violation of UCMJ to military members to publicly criticize the senior brass). This structure will make these backroom agreements a lot more difficult to pull off.
For example, consider programs like the V-22 Osprey and B-2 bomber within the context of this reorganized JCS. Even if all of the members from your own branch are onboard with a concept, you still have to get others from outside the branch to support it without one of the many other senior officers raising a stink. Would the chiefs of Expeditionary Air Forces and Air Operations Forces even support a program like the B-2 given the amount of funds it drained from the Air Force at the expense of other programs? Unlike with the current leadership arrangement, they wouldn't be forced to support this program if they didn't agree with it - the branches cannot define a "party line" and force the senior officers to adhere to it whether they actually support it or not.
This structure may also be a way to end the tendency of the forces to be constantly rebuilding to fight the last war. There is a tendency within the military to see a successful concept and to determine that this successful concept is now the ultimate concept and force it throughout the force. A great example of this is how the Air Force has determined that virtually every aircraft in use must be a stealth aircraft. On a good day, this technology is only marginally useful and yet the Air Force is expending tremendous sums to take the stealth concept throughout the force. Even future cargo aircraft are expected to be "stealthy" even though this will waste billions of dollars every year for virtually no real gain in capabilities. The Army and Navy are no better in this regard and this JCS arrangement should help to prevent these types of problems in the future.