Dominant Logistics
Stryke Out! - The Logistics Case Against the Stryker Program
The Army is now well on it's way to completing one of the most insane projects it has ever engaged in - fielding the Stryker "combat vehicle" as an interim step in the Brigade Combat Teams. Many have had their say on the problems that have occured with this program, but I'd like to offer a view from a somewhat different perspective. I'm no combat expert but the Stryker, and any similar design, presents so many problems from a logistics perspective that these concepts need to be relegated to the ash heap of history as soon as possible.
Let's start by defining the vehicle concept we are talking about here because these problems are by no means limited to the Stryker - they are equally applicable to all combat vehicles of similar design. What we are talking about here are large wheeled vehicles in the weight range of around 20 tons that are intended to be used as combat vehicles. These include infantry carriers, mobile gun systems, mortar carriers, air defense systems, and other ground combat roles. All of the following problems are endemic to the Stryker program but are equally applicable to current proposals for the Future Combat Systems.
Strategic Deployment
The inability of existing units to rapidly deploy abroad was the driving force behind adopting a future plan to "lighten" the Army by converting to Stryker-type combat vehicles. The theory was that by using lighter vehicles than the Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Abrams tanks, effective forces could be deployed in less time to deal with arising threats. While this seems appropriate at first glance, it ignores critical issues that must also be addressed.
Chief amongst these critical issues is size. To retain the ability to deploy by air, combat vehicles must remain relatively small in size as the aircraft transporting the vehicles have a limited area in which to carry cargo. Wheeled vehicles, by design, tend to be taller and wider than comparable weight tracked vehicles due to the inherent differences in suspension design. The use of wheels invariably increases vehicle height, which in turn requires a corresponding increase in width to maintain the vehicle's center-of-gravity to prevent rollover. Larger size means fewer vehicles can be carried on a given aircraft, regardless of weight.
Another critical problem is weight in that a wheeled vehicle requires the use of complex drivetrains and suspensions that increase weight considerably. For example, a tracked vehicle requires only two driveshafts, one for each drive sprocket. An eight wheeled vehicle like the Stryker will typically require 12 driveshafts (one per wheel plus one for each axle) in addition to 24 universal joints to allow for suspension travel (which are not required on the tracked vehicle because the drive sprockets are fixed). These requirements push vehicle weight up while tracked counterparts can use that weight gain as armor or firepower improvements to remain at the same weight while providing greater capabilities and survivability.
As an example, consider the Stryker with regards to the C-130 aircraft. While it's weight puts it on the high side of C-130 transportability, it's size makes it impossible for the C-130 to carry anything else, regardless of vehicle weight. It has so little room to spare that even though the vehicle may be capable of being air dropped, the C-130 could never engage in this practice as there is simply no room available to rig a parachute to the vehicle. The Stryker actually required modifications just to fit inside the C-130 and even with these changes, most Strykers cannot be carried by C-130 due to weight limitations. This means that the only aircraft available for future use in transporting Strykers will be the C-17, which is available in very limited quantities. And even here, only three Strykers can be carried per C-17 at it's maximum load. To deploy a single brigade would require the entire fleet of C-17s once it is built and this allows for no other system or equipment deployment.
To put this into perspective, consider the Mechanized Infantry formations being proposed by some, including myself, that are based upon improved designs and groupings of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. By converting some BFVs into medium tanks and others into dedicated infantry carriers, we can achieve a brigade that could deploy in roughly the same number of C-17 sorties with greater firepower and survivability. Another comparison that must be considered is the use of M113s which weigh little more than half the Stryker but offer comparable protection and greater mobility. A C-17 can carry five of these vehicles while all M113s can also be carried on C-130s in a useful fashion as well. So clearly, the Stryker offers no advantage whatsoever to strategic deployment capabilities. This was the single most relevant factor to its existence and yet it clearly fails to achieve any improvements.
Strategic Sustainment
While it is easy to evaluate the deployment end of the strategic issue, the sustainment end becomes a little more challenging. Here, we are talking about our abilities to keep the force operational and functional once deployed. In short, this means providing sufficient fuel and parts for the duration of the deployment. The knee jerk response to this topic is that since the Stryker will generally use less fuel than tracked equivalents, it must be more sustainable. This assumption is dangerous in that it ignores issues such as sources, costs, and weights of the other items necessary to meet sustainment needs.
For example, consider the matter of tires. All military wheeled vehicles use tires that will require replacement whether the vehicle is used or not. Tires rot even if the vehicle isn't used at all. Tires also get cut and worn out during use. They also account for a significant amount of weight and cost. But most importantly, tires must be manufactured by a specific contractor whereas items like fuel can be purchased from countless sources. The gains we achieve in sustainability by improving fuel efficiency are lost by having to stock and ship massive quantities of tires to the theater of deployment to keep the vehicles operational.
Studies in Canada indicated that the costs associated with operating the Stryker, when compared to operating M113s, ranged from equal to four times as high. And this was for a military that doesn't generally engage in the types of expeditionary activities the U.S. military undertakes routinely. In the U.S. Army, we should expect Stryker operating costs to be considerably high than those identified by the Canadians because of the differences in operational use. Odds are, sustainablity issues will not be improved at all when compared to Bradley Fighting Vehicles and they will be far worse than what is possible with M113s.
Tactical Mobility
Another factor often used to promote wheeled combat vehicles is their higher potential speeds when compared to tracked vehicles. Here again, this is a simplistic observation that bears no relationship to actual situations. Too many issues are left out of the equation altogether.
For example, as demonstrated in recent actions in Iraq, the "slower" tracked vehicles had little difficulty out running their support lines. There are advantages to speed, but there are also severe disadvantages, like running out of fuel in a location where your support systems cannot reach you. As I have outlined in other articles, these problems can be overcome but other issues arise as well.
While the original LAV design included amphibious capabilities, these were scrapped in order to meet the weight requirements outlined for the Stryker program. Even at this lighter weight, the Stryker still lacks the ability to be transported by helicopter as no helicopter exists today capable of carrying a vehicle of this weight. As a wheeled vehicle, the Stryker is also less capable in most off-road operating conditions than a comparable tracked vehicle. It is more likely to flip over and it is more likely to get stuck or otherwise hung up in off road situations.
What this means in the end is that a Stryker-based force will require more support from engineering assets than a comparable tracked vehicle force based on the Bradley or M113. This means more bridging systems, more mine clearing systems, and more road building systems will be required for a Stryker force to maintain its capabilities. Any advantage in tactical speed is lost while waiting for the engineers to prep the area for Stryker operations. The Stryker force will also require substantially more recovery assets to keep the force moving forward and operational. So here again, we have a bad situation that is only getting worse, not better.
Maintenance Issues
The final logistics segment we need to evaluate is maintenance, and once again, the Stryker fails miserably. The most obvious problem is that of tires. What people fail to grasp is that the tires on large wheeled vehicles are quite heavy and are not easily replaced. This is especially the case in a field environment where you rarely have level ground from which to work.
In other areas, such as turret electronics, the Stryker should fair no better than other alternatives. Electronics are typically the bulk of repair requirements for most combat vehicles and the Strykers are just as loaded down with electronics as any other combat vehicle. So while it may not fair worse in this area, it certainly isn't going to fair better either.
There is also the matter of the Stryker simply having more components, and thus a greater likelihood for one or more of these components to fail. As a rule, the more complex a given system is, the more likely it is that the system will experience failure as a matter of odds. In this regard, the Stryker with its eight-wheel drive and automated suspension system is far more likely to experience mechanical difficulties than a comparable tracked vehicle. Plus we must also factor into the equation the increased need for supporting assets like engineering and recovery vehicles as these require maintenance as well.
So, once again, with the Stryker we are moving backwards, not forwards. While the claim is that we are transforming the force into a lighter and more agile force, we are in fact loading the force down with greater support requirements, greater costs, and fewer capabilities, all at great expense to the taxpayer.
Alternatives
While this may appear to be one huge slam against the Stryker, it isn't meant as such - I am only pointing out that this vehicle is being pushed into a role for which it is improperly designed. Personally, I think if the powertrain were adapted to a hybrid arrangement, electric amphibious systems added, and a rear view camera for the driver installed, along with mine survivability improvements, the Stryker would make an outstanding Military Police vehicle. It would also make an excellent Escort and Patrol vehicle for some situations and would also be a better vehicle for OOTW. That having been said, this is not an appropriate combat vehicle.
For heavier, mechanized forces, we should modify Bradley Fighting Vehicles to function in the various combat roles. Logistically, it is no worse than the Stryker while offering greater mobility and survivability. The vehicles are already available and many of them already have the expensive electronics upgrades. They also feature a nominal amphibious capability so we won't need the level of engineering support required for a Stryker force.
For lighter forces, particularly air mobile units, its hard to go wrong with upgraded M113s. The M113 is the combat equivalent of the Chevy Camaro or Ford Mustang - so many people have done so many different things with it that you can now do just about anything for very little cost. Name the weapon, and odds are, someone already makes a mount compatible with the M113. A wide array of armor schemes are available as are hybrid powertrains and various electronic packages. And all of this is truely air mobile via C-130, the most prevalent cargo aircraft in the world and in most configurations, it is possible to transport the M113 by helicopter.
For those applications where speed really IS more important than survivability, HMMWV derivatives like the Turkish Cobra should be used. Smaller wheeled vehicles are much easier to maintain in a field environment in addition to being more difficult for the enemy to locate and engage. And like the M113, you can do a lot of different things with a HMMWV chassis and it is very cheap.
Give the Strykers to the MPs and replace the autocannon with a water cannon - much better PR than spraying civilian crowds with small arms fire. Give the combat units vehicles that are meant for combat and leave the big wheels in the rear with the gear.