Dominant Logistics

The Future Submarine Force

The Current Problem

Today. we're wasting billions every year to build attack submarines that serve no useful purpose in any potential warfare scenarios for today or years from now. The Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines are highly capable submarines but they are an example of applying technology for technology's sake - their abilities serve no useful military purpose. The biggest concern with today's sub force is not a lack of capability but a lack of relevance. We need them to be performing missions for which they have no ability to perform anymore because they are designed for a different type of war. Much like the Heavy Armor crowd, they refuse to let go of Cold War ideologies and doctrines to adapt to modern realities. But this doesn't mean that attack submarines are obsolete any more than the design flaws of the Abrams tank mean that tanks are obsolete.

What needs to happen is we need to develop a new concept of the attack submarine. As with most other military assets, we need to develop a design that is more flexible and multi-role than traditional designs. In the past, intel capabilities have been a secondary role of the attack sub; today, it needs to play a major role. In the past, land attack played either no role at all or a minimal role; today it needs to be at the forefront. There is still a place for anti-ship and anti-sub roles, but realistically we need to look at a two-pronged force structure with one side emphasizing the traditional naval role and the second placing a stronger emphasis on intel, surface ops, and land attack.

A New Tactical Attack Submarine (NTAS)

A New Tactical Attack Submarine is going to look a lot different than existing modern submarines. For one, it should be powered by an Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system. This system runs on diesel like the submarines of old but unlike the older submarines, they can operate their engines to recharge their batteries without surfacing and giving away their locations. With some good engineering, we should also be able to develop a system allowing these subs to refuel underwater.

Unlike modern attack submarines, the NTAS should feature a fairly limited arsenal of torpedoes and other weapons for front tubes. There should continue to be an ability to deploy weapons to the front but we also need to place a greater emphasis on the ability to deploy vertical weapons as well. Current subs can do both but we need a greater level of balance and verstility in these abilities. Future subs will be needed more than ever for some of the most challenging roles in military action.

To improve our capabilities in these new roles, we need to develop what I call a modular systems bay. This would be something similar to what was used on the USS Parche as well as on the last of the Seawolf class. What I envision is a bay that would open on the upper forward section of the hull when surfaced or at very shallow depths. This design would not be used at extreme depths like those current attack subs are designed for. The modules would be swappable in relatively short periods of time and could include a selection from the following:

A dual cannon, 8-inch gun turret
A 32-cell VLS that could carry Tomahawk, LASM, SLAM, ASROC or AA missiles
An MLRS launcher with a number of reloads. With this system, ATACMS would also be available.
An open bay for stealth deployment of commandos or for boarding parties with zodiacs and smaller cannons
A deployable deep-water submersible to retrieve missile wreckage and accurately map underwater terrain
Weapons for use in mine clearing, such as an underwater mine clearing line charge. These charges could be deployed in advance of a given force and then detonated at the appropriate time. This provides mine-clearing performance in a manner that the enemy cannot observe.
Intel packages that could latch onto the hull of a ship and monitor communications on board. Similar devices may be able to scan the interior for nuke or other weapons cargo. Another option would be a listening device that would attach to the hull of a vessel to listen in on communications with an antenna that would float up to the surface. Comms would be recorded and then transmitted in periodic bursts. At a set time, the device would detach and fall to the sea floor.

The Future Submarine Force

The basic structure of the submarine force I am proposing would look something like this:

Strategic Sub Force (based in CONUS)

8    Ohio-class SSBN w/ 16 Trident II missiles demirved to 5 warheads each
4    Seawolf-class SSN   (we will need to build one more)
8    Virginia-class SSN    (built as currently designed)

Tactical Sub Force (based in Forward Areas)

12    Los Angeles-class   (modified to include a modular systems bay)
48    New Tactical Attack Subs (an AIP diesel design w/ modular systems bay)
6    Ohio-class modified to serve as tankers for NTAS and naval groups

This would give us a small but very robust strategic force that would remain serving in the traditional roles of the existing sub force. It is important to maintain the ability to deal with the strategic threat if need be but that should not be the driving concern behind the entire sub force. The strategic elements would remain far and away the most advanced of any in the world as well as the most powerful. This is also consistent with proposed reductions in the size of our nuke inventory.

On the tactical side, what we are developing here is a capability I call discrete presence. With the ever-improving capabilities of missiles and aircraft, we really need to get out of the habit of sending an entire carrier battle group in every time some piss-ant two-bit dictator gets his panties in a bundle. With the modular systems bay, the subs can be tailored to the missions that are needed, allowing for a handful of subs with less than 600 total sailors to perform missions that would otherwise require a dozen surface vessels and nearly ten thousand sailors. This tactical package would be a much greater asset to deployed battle groups but is also a highly capable force independently. It also gives us the ability to rapidly reconfigure our tactical assets to meet the changes in evolving threats. This is very important given that modern subs have a potential service life on the order of 40 to 50 years.

The six tanker subs add to the assymetrical capabilities of the force. Basically, I would simply seal up the missile tubes on these subs and use the tubes to hold bulk fuels. This may be fuel for aircraft, surface ships, or diesel subs. These could refuel diesels while remaining hidden underwater or they would allow us to preposition fuel supplies in a location without giving away our intentions. For that matter, it could even be used in support of amphibious ops by carrying the fuel the landing force will need and surfacing once the smoke has cleared to off-load. And if push came to shove, these could ultimately be converted back into missile carriers if that were required.

This would also make a highly capable diesel sub available for export to our allies. The current sub industry in America is hurting from lack of purchases because there are no sub designs in the US that are really exportable. Numerous countries including Israel, Taiwan, and Canada have expressed interest in purchasing diesel subs but we have nothing to sell them. The exportable version should forego the modular systems bay and instead have a fixed 24-cell VLS.

Even if the NTAS cost $1 billion each (very high for a diesel sub), this plan would still come in at $10 - 20 billion less than building only 40 of the Virginia-class. And that would be for a combined force of 72 of the best attack subs in the world. Moreover, the operating costs would also be competitive with other proposals. We'd still be eliminating 4 Ohio-class but the bulk of the force would be diesel boats and diesels cost a fraction of what a nuke does to operate. We would still have 24 of the best nukes in the world for blue water missions but the bulk of the force would be designed specifically for the new generation of naval warfare.

Our current Navy places far too much emphasis on the roles and capabilities of the supercarriers. While these ships are very capable, there are extensive problems with their use and with the systems that support them. Consider a few items:

The justification for needing 12 supercarriers is a complete and total fraud. The Navy refuses to use double crews on the carriers (as the Ohio subs use) and they insist that "Forward Presence" must be maintained, even in areas where it serves absolutely no purpose. By any legitimate measure, the US Navy requires no more than a maximum of 8 supercarriers, with one of those being in reserve.
The insistence on 12 supercarriers also meant the premature retirement of every nuclear-powered escort in the Navy. Carriers can't travel alone so now they are tied down to escort ships that are slower and have range limitations (Aegis ships have a long range cruise speed of only 20 knots). They've negated the greatest capability that they provided to the force. And the sad part is that the nuke escorts were retired with less than half of their service life completed. Not only did they wipe out our naval land attack capabilities (by forcing the premature retirement of the Iowa battleships), they also greatly limited their own capabilities and for no legitimate reason.
The A-12 fiasco wasted billions of taxpayer dollars and never even got a working prototype off the ground. But instead of stopping there, the Navy went on to kill the best option presented as a replacement - Tomcat 21. But since apparently they still had plenty of stupidity to spare, they instead latched on to the Not-So-Super Hornet, wasting further billions while the combat capabilities and survivability of the supercarriers are now placed in doubt. After all, the Tomcats were the only chance in hell that the Navy had to protect carriers from cruise missiles and its now relegated primarily to bombing duties. The only other potential option for defense against cruise missiles that would actually work is the 16 inch guns of the BBs but they're gone too.
What in the hell was the whole CVX thing any way? I can understand wanting to improve on the carriers and decrease the crew requirements but every time one of these carriers comes in for refueling it undergoes a major overhaul, including replacing many major systems like the catapults. As new as these carriers are, what in the hell are we trying to design a replacement one for? And who is the moron that dreamed up the idea of a "stealthy" aircraft carrier? That's a special kind of stupid.

In an average year, counting nothing more than the excess carriers in the fleet (not counting their aircraft costs), the supercarrier portion of the Navy is responsible for around $2 billion in wasted operations costs. Over the past decade, they've squandered another $25 to $30 billion in wasted R & D and unnecessary procurement. To put this into perspective, the ENTIRE SUB FLEET has an annual operating cost of about $1.7 billion total for all boats.

And for what? Carriers can't carry enough aircraft to play a major role in anything other than the most minor of engagements. Even most Third World countries now have air forces that outnumber the aircraft on a carrier by a factor of 3 or 4 to one. Most of their assets must be devoted strictly to protection of the carrier just to keep it safe. They no longer carry any real attack aircraft and there are no plans to field any for the carriers. They can still carry helicopters but the Navy fights this tooth and nail because LHDs are far better suited to this role.

If the Navy is going to continue to function as a military branch, it needs to transition away from its reliance on the supercarrier as its only major naval warfare system. The most cost effective way to accomplish this is through an overhaul of the submarine fleet and the incorporation of a true multi-role diesel submarine.

Dominant Logistics Home || Supporting Articles