Ethiopian News and Views
December 23, 2005

RELATED ARTICLE: I didnt write it for you - Review of Ms. Wrong's 2005 book on Eritrea.

Michela Wrong, a journalist, wrote an article for the BBC that purported to explain the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict. Her analysis focuses on psychological portraits that portray a deep, unbridgeable gulf between the Eritrean national character and the Ethiopian (Tigrayan) national character.

But the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a conflict between two states with opposing interests. It is not a conflict based on hatred between different peoples, cultures etc. Analyzing the conflict and its persistence requires a careful examination of the differing national interests of each state.

Elsewhere, experts apply scholarly concepts and techniques to analyze conflicts. In Africa, lightweights such as Michela Wrong who lack the ability to move beyond silly anecdotes and bogus psychological profiles are given prominence by the media.

Hidden Transcripts

"in every conflict, in addition to their "public transcripts" (what they say to each other and in public), parties also have their "hidden transcripts." Those are either unconscious (the parties are not aware of them) or carefully concealed, for they invariably contain feelings and intentions toward the other party that are much more negative and nastier than the publicly declared ones."

- Psychological Explanations of Conflicts Between Ethnocultural Minorities and Majorities Dimostenis Yagcioglu

There is a place for psychological theories, and there are hidden transcripts in the Ethiopia-Eritrea case, but they do not relate to psychology. There are no deep-seated prejudicies that divide the peoples and cultures of Eritrea from that of Ethiopia.

The elites of Ethiopia and Eritrea have intimate knowledge of each other; they know each others' weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Among the hidden transcripts could be Eritrea's belief that it can precipitate Ethiopia's demise by fomenting strife, rebellion and war, and a similar belief in Ethiopia about Eritrea's ruling party. There is "dialogue" between Ethiopia and Eritrea, but it takes place in a parallel universe of liberation fronts, refugee camps, and covert operations ranging across Sudan and Somalia.

Other hidden transcripts relate to the national identity of the Eritrean people, and the threat that the Eritrean elites feel from a competing Ethiopian or Tigrean identity. For example, in the summer of 1996, even Isaias Afeworki was feeling secure enough to state:

"If we base ourselves on realistic history, it would only be an exaggeration to say that the generation before us had no Ethiopian feelings. To claim that Eritrea existed as a political and geographical entity before 100 years, and there existed an Eritrean national feeling would be an utter fallacy."

- Asser, June-August, 1996.

Things have changed now, and this statement is unlikely to be repeated anytime soon.

Tigreans, Eritreans, and Ethiopians

Prior to WWII, Eritrea was subjected to an apartheid system by the Fascist Italian government. All Eritreans were confined to manual labor and little else. Thus there was no real basis for asserting an elite superiority complex in Eritrea, although some Eritrean figures did so for political reasons. In fact the close identity between the two groups led to the Tigray-Tigrigne political movement which sought to unite all Tigrinya speakers in one country. Other Eritreans, motivated by pride in Ethiopia's independence, formed the "Love of Country" association to promote union with Ethiopia as soon as the Italians were defeated in WWII.

But Ms. Wrong presents things completely differently:

after Eritrea was forcibly annexed by Ethiopia's Haile Selassie in 1962, poor Tigrayans flooded into Asmara in search of work as janitors, cleaners and labourers. If a job was dirty and demeaning in Eritrea, it was probably done by the "Agame", as the Tigrayans were dismissively known.

This statement by Ms. Wrong is offensive on many counts and a dishonest distortion of the facts. After the 1952 federation, the two largest cities in Ethiopia were Asmara and Addis Abeba. Asmara's position was enhanced because it lay on the route to Massawa, Ethiopia's historical sea outlet. In a pattern typical of developing countries, people from the countryside migrated to Addis Abeba and Asmara, because these areas received the most government investment and were developing the fastest. Furthermore, large numbers of Eritreans migrated to the Arab countries and looked for work as manual laborers.

This migration continues. Kjetl Tronvoll notes in his book: "Mai Weini, a village in rural highland Eritrea:"

In the spring of 1992, with minimal food resources among the peasants, many young men temporarily migrated from Mai Weini to seek employment in Asmara and in neighboring countries. Young male households left to look for work in Asmara, Mekelle (Tigray), Addis Ababa, Massawa, and on the Arab peninsula.

Thus, to single out Tigrayans and imply that they were incapable of being anything but "janitors, cleaners and labourers" is a deliberate ethnic slur. Ms. Wrong goes on to assert, without providing any evidence, that Tigrayans were "despised by the dominant Amhara."

In fact most Amhara regard Atse Yohannis and Ras Alula with reverence. Atse Yohannis was the defender of Ethiopia who died at Metemma to protect Gonder from the dervishes. When Menelik was still King, there was a strong faction ("Gondare faction") at his court that was pro-Tigre. An Italian envoy with Menelik reported that "the enthusiasm of the Abyssinians approached to delirium" when news of Ras Alula's victory at Dogali reached Entotto (Marcus, Life and Times of Menelik II, 1975).

The false idea that Amharas 'despise' Tigrayans is part of the 'hidden transcript' that guides Eritrean policy toward Ethiopia but it has no merit and is offensive to most Ethiopians.

Glorifying Italian Colonialism

For Ms. Wrong, Eritrean nationalism represents the fruit of Italian colonialism; a vindication of the efforts of her ancestors. Thus she writes without shame "Eritreans were proud of their 1890 colonization by Italy."

Ms. Wrong is continuing the project begun by the Italian colonialists to denigrate Ethiopia and portray Eritreans subject to Italian rule as more advanced. Tekeste Negash refers to

…the growing racist ideology which began to draw a distinction between the Eritreans who were fortunate enough to be under the civilizing umbrella of Italy and the inhabitants of the Ethiopian empire. This policy, though devised to bolster Italian imperial or colonial ego, appeared to have trickled down to the Eritrean literati. The language of many Eritrean politicians in the 1940s betrays the pervasiveness of the colonial racist ideology of the 1930s.

- Eritrea and Ethiopia, The Federal Experience.1997.

Thus we can see the roots of the silly stories that Michela Wrong relies on to frame her view of the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict.

But there is no poisonous hatred between the peoples and cultures of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The issue at hand is a conflict between two states. The leader of one is a maximum dictator. Dictator's worldwide are known for being rigid and unwilling to compromise. Think of Saddam, North Korea, Hafez Assad of Syria, or Siad Barre. Their behavior is not due to the 'Syrian culture of stubbornness' or the 'North Korean culture of secretiveness'. The persistence of the war obviously has nothing to do with overblown Eritrean stories of Tigrayans.

These bogus stereotypes and meaningless anecdotes have no relevance for the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. Those that continue to perpetuate them, do so out of ignorance, malice, or obnoxious racism. The writings of Michela Wrong exhibit all three.

The reasons for the persistence of the conflict are simple, and similar to the factors that underlie persistent conflicts elsewhere in the world. If Michela Wrong had any worthwhile academic credentials in political science, anthropology, history, etc. she would have been able to recognize these factors and would have a written a completely different article.

The Solution

Most Ethiopians strongly reject the Arbitration Decision, not because of psychological defects or mutations in our DNA, but because of far simpler reasons.

• The decision is flawed and unworkable
  
• The decision is inconsistent with the mandate given to the commission
  
• The Algiers Agreement did not reflect the reality on the ground - Ethiopians feel that having won the war, we should change the terms of reference and insisted on demarcation according to different criteria

The outlines of a permanent solution are quite clear. On the eastern sector there is no problem (Assab will be dealt with later at the appropriate time). In the central sector the Irob areas will never be transferred to Eritrea. It is beyond discussion. The Commission's many errors and deviations from the mandate given to it, invalidate the result.

The obvious compromise is to allow Eritrea to keep the areas north of the Tsorona river that were awarded to Ethiopia. Thus there will be no change from the de-facto border established after the battle of Adowa.

The western sector should be off the table. Non-negotiable. Eritrea does not have the power to alter the result of the 1998-2000 war and Ethiopia is entitled to the translate its victory to the negotiating table, by dictating new terms of reference.

CONCLUSION

Appendix - Reference to conflicts elsewhere in the world

• The Kashmir stalemate has persisted for decades. Why? Because of some worthless stereotypes or bar-room talk?

• The Falklands case also remains unresolved. Is it because of psychological differences between the British and Argentines?

• In Western Sahara the impasse between Polisario and Morocco has entered its fourth decade. Why? Because of problems with the Arab mentality?

• Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war - it is still unresolved. Again why? Psychological defects of Armenians? Azerbaijani superiority complex?