A Critique of the Defender of Peace

 

 


The historic writings of political thinkers in the Western world history can be viewed as sometimes being a systematic expression of support for the legitimacy of a government in power or one that is envisioned to replace the current government. Political thought, however, must be viewed within the context in which it is developed. While modern historians have ascribed to the development of modern political ideas certain designations, such as the separation of powers, obligation, rule of the people, etc., one must be careful in imposing such designations too loosely. Modern political values, when applied to historic writings, can distort the meaning of the author and suggest ideas are present that may not have been the intention of the author. Furthermore, one must ask by what criterion a particular writing can be rightly described as political.

One criterion is that historic writings have been labeled as political in nature because they are viewed as precursors of the development of modern political expressions and values. These writings generally can be viewed from several directions. Some political writings, such as Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, can be viewed as being written to support the existing political power. In this case, Aquinas was attempting to justify the rule of the Catholic Church in temporal and spiritual matters. Other political writings, such as Aristotle’s Politics, can be viewed as arising out of a deductive reflection on the nature of order in this world. A third genre of political writings can be viewed as arising to challenge the existing status quo and offer a justification for change. This is seen in Marsilius’s Defender of Peace.

Another criterion for labeling a writing political is that these writings tend to arise out of the struggle to interpret order in society. They represent a specific response to the social and political questions that are peculiar to a particular period in history. In this criterion, writings become political in nature due to their historic significance to the political events of the day. This criterion thus uses literature, such as Dante’s poem the Divine Comedy, to understand the development of political ideas. It includes writings that are directed to give advice to magistrates and princes, one of the most famous being Machiavelli’s The Prince. Thus it can be concluded that writings that are labeled as political are determined to be this because of their connection to the questions of order and authority during the period in which they are written.

Having determined the nature of a writing as political, modern historians tend to compile a history of political thought as it developed over the years. This analysis generally tends to expose trends in thinking and the connections between different political ideas. The avowed purpose is to grasp an understanding of how modern political values and ideas have developed. Unfortunately in this endeavor, political writings can lose their significance in the systematic exposition of political history. Unique political ideas and writings are stripped from their historic context and are viewed only as they are connected to other political thoughts in prior or subsequent generations.

One such political writing is the Defender of Peace by Marsilius of Padua. While the uniqueness of the writing has been acclaimed by historians, little attention has been given to context in which this writing developed. Of interest is the fact that this writing did not receive much attention until hundreds of years later. Yet throughout this writing, Marsilius has managed to present a coherent and logical argument about the nature of order, and in particular the place of church governance or authority in temporal affairs. While the Defender of Peace may offer glimpses into the arguments that would appear after the Reformation, one must not try to impose these later historic political ideas as originating in Marsilius. Given that one historian has called the collapse of the medieval Papacy as occurring with the Fall of Boniface VIII in 1303, historians must ask why Marsilius’s unique ideas on governance did not gain more support for hundreds of years.

In seeking to answer this question, this paper will focus upon the unique ideas that Marsilius presents with regard to governance or political order. These ideas will be connected not only to the political crisis that existed during his day, but also to the influences that might have shaped them. Particular attention will be given to three areas of Marsilius’s life. His personal experiences with the Italian republics, his educational experiences at the University of Paris, and his involvement in the Fraticelli controversy. From these experiences it will become clear that many of his ideas on church governance were directly influenced by the events of his day. Also, an analysis of Marsilius’s actions after the publication of the Defender of Peace can also show why his ideas did not become of significance to hundreds of years later.

The purpose of the Defender of Peace

The first step in understanding Marsilius’s ideas on church governance one must examine to whom and for what purpose the writing was developed. The Defender of Peace is clear on this matter. Marsilius addresses the book to Ludwig of Bavaria saying, “and beholding in you especially, most exalted Ludwig, emperor of the Romans, God’s servant, who shall give to this task that external fulfillment of it which you desire...” Furthermore, in chapter nineteen of discourse one, Marsilius mentions directly the false excommunication over “the ruler of the Romans.” This excommunication was directed at Ludwig by Pope John XXII in March of 1324. Clearly whatever purpose is drawn from the Defender of Peace, it must be related to the Roman emperor Ludwig.

Having established to whom the book is written, the purpose of the book can be discerned from two facts. The first has to do with the conflict between Pope John XXII and Ludwig. The death of Henry VII in 1313 lead to a controversy in Germany over who would be the legitimate ruler of the Roman Empire. The Hapsburgs elected Fredrick the Handsome, son of Albert I, to the monarchy. At the same time five electors gave their vote to Louis of Bavaria, also known as Ludwig. When a double coronation took place, with Fredrick being crowned at Bonn and Louis being crowned at Aachen in November of 1314, the result was an eight year civil war. The issue was finally settled in 1322 with Louis defeating his opponent. The problem that remained, however, was that Pope John XXII would not sanction the legitimacy of his reign. After demanding recognition, Pope John XXII responded in 1324 by excommunicating Louis. At issue was Pope John’s insistence that no claimant could assume the imperial office without his sanction. This issue would start a conflict that was to last during the next quarter century.

The second issue that lies at the heart of understanding the Defender of Peace is in the concept of plenitude of power (plenitudo potestatis). The concept came into play by the Papal jurists as providing justification for rule not only in spiritual, but also temporal matters. The idea began with Gratian in the 1100s, was further defined in decrees by Innocent IV, and reached its culmination in the reign of Boniface VIII with his Bull of 1302, Unam Sanctam. This final bull explained specifically that the Church possessed two swords, one spiritual and one temporal. This doctrine of plenitude of power had been used by the Church to increase its wealth and power over the governments of Europe. By 1300, it also had come under attack from rulers wishing to exercise their royal power in the affairs of the empire. This last fact is best exemplified in the struggle of Philip IV of France against Boniface VIII in which Philip resisted the Papacy’s tactics of taxation and was seeking to extend the national power of France.

From these two facts, an understanding of the purpose of the Defender of Peace can be grasp. Marsilius, who in 1326 fled to Ludwig’s court with John of Jandun, immediately set out to legitimize the rule of Ludwig. The book, finished on “Baptist’s Day, 1324,” was a direct support for Ludwig’s claim of the crown and also gave a systematic and coherent argument that the Papacy had no power in temporal affairs. It was this interference in temporal affairs that Marsilius saw as the “singular cause of strife” among temporal powers. This is further specified by Marsilius when he states, “ This wrong opinion of certain Roman bishops, and also perhaps their perverted desire for rulership, which they assert is owed to them because of the plenitude of power given to the, as they say, by Christ - this is that singular cause which we have said produces the intranquillity or discord of the city or state.” The question remains, however, what influences or experiences did Marsilius have in arriving at his understanding of church governance? Equally, why did he dedicate the book to Ludwig who, as far as historians have been able to discern, was not known to be an associate of Marsilius before their meeting in 1326? Also, why did he support Ludwig in his fateful march into Italy in 1327? In the sections that follow, three significant events will be outlined: Marsilius’s understanding of the Italian republics, his classical studies at the University of Paris, and his connection to the Fraticelli controversy in France. Taking statements from the Defender of Peace, one can see how each of these experiences shaped Marsilius’s ideas and his subsequent actions with Ludwig.

Early years in Italy

One of the central themes that underlies Marsilius’s understanding of governance is his notion of power being derived from the legislator. In Chapter IX of Discourse 1, Marsilius describes an elected kind of government as “superior to the non-elected.” This form of government had developed in Italy during the middle of the twelfth century. Skinner characterizes this government as being an elective government centered around on one official called the podesta. This individual was elected by the citizens and ruled usually with the advice of two councils. The podesta usually was a citizen of another city to encourage impartial administration. His status, unlike a monarchy, was that of a salaried officer that held office for a specific period of time, usually six months. By the end of the twelfth century, this form of government became the dominate means of governing in the northern cities of Italy.

The problem lies in the fact that the cities of Northern Italy were still part of the Roman Empire. This being the case, throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Roman Empire, centered in Germany, tried to continuously exert power over the Regnum Italicum. While emperors tried to dominate the rich and independent cities of northern Italy, the citizens of these cities were able to withstand the imperial armies, or at the very least, take back their towns once the emperor had left. Also important in this defense was the Papacy that supported the Regnum Italicum in repelling the infringements of the empire. This was exemplified by the use of papal forces to attack Imperial garrisons and by bulls of excommunication.

This alliance with the Church, however, began to prove costly for the Italian cities. By 1250, the papacy was beginning to assert its power by seeking to manipulate the internal politics of the Regnum Italicum. This exertion of control began in the Lambardy region where Ezzelino da Romano had brought a large area under his control, including Padua. This was threatening to the Papacy because of the pro-imperial position of Romano. In an effort to end this threat, Pope Alexander IV commissioned a crusade to liberate this region of Italy from pro-imperial leaders. By 1259, this crusade had succeeded in bringing the area of Lambardy under papal control. This in turn lead to further crusades in other parts of Italy. The result was that by the end of the thirteenth century, most of Regnum Italicum had come under the control of the papacy.

To counter this aggression, Italian cities began to fight back. Of interest is the city of Padua, Marsilius’s home, where a dispute began in 1266 when the churches refused to pay their taxes. This controversy continued to escalate until 1282 when Padua's leadership began depriving the clergy of the protection of the civil law. Since Marsilius is estimated to have been born sometime between 1270 and 1275, he clearly became exposed to the controversy between his city and the Church. At issue was the fundamental right of the cities to govern themselves. Gerwith describes this struggle in which four forms of sanctions were taken against the clergy in Padua. While an analysis of this controversy is not the subject here, Gerwith does agree that these events provided a “fundamental background of the Defensor pacis.” Equally important in the power struggle against the empire and the Church, the northern cities began to abandon their Republican constitutions and began to accept the rule of despotic signore who promised to bring peace to the cities. The republican character of the Regnum Italicum that had been so highly praised at the beginning of the thirteenth century was being replaced by internal strife and a decline in tranquillity. Also during this period, the Church’s doctrine of plenitude of power in both spiritual and temporal matters was reaching its zenith. It found its fullest expression in the Unam Sanctam issued by Boniface VIII in 1302.

How did Marsilius incorporate this immediate experience of his youth into the Defender of Peace? For sure, the idea of the republican government that had preceded him is clearly identifiable in his writing. First, the idea of an elected ruler is central to the argument which Marsilius uses in describing how the best government becomes established. In the spirit of the former republican cities, Marsilius establishes that the ruler and the law are given legitimacy by the legislator. The legislator for Marsilius is “the whole body of citizens, or the weightier part thereof.” Furthermore, the elected monarch, whether one or more persons, has the primary function of acting as the highest judicial officer acting under the law. In Chapter XIV, Marsilius gives two qualities that are necessary for this position. One is prudence and the other is moral virtue, “especially justice.” Prudence is necessary so the ruler can be successful in “matters of civil benefit and justice.” This prudence will be necessary in guiding the ruler in making judgments on affairs that are not clearly expressed by the law. Moral virtue is necessary because if it is not present in the rule “the polity will be greatly harmed.” In chapter XVI where Marsilius is talking about the difference between hereditary and elective monarchies, he states that the novelty of an elected ruler “gives rise to greater admiration and respect, especially when the newly elected ruler is from another region or province.”

Clearly in these statements one finds an expression of the Italian form of republicanism that was prevalent at the beginning of the thirteenth century. As Skinner has noted, the ruler or podesta was expected to be the “supreme judicial as well as administrative officer.” This ruler was equally elected by the “weightier part of the citizens.” The ruler also was usually chosen from another region to encourage impartiality. That Marsilius is familiar with this form of government and finds it as the best form of government is clearly presented in the Defender of Peace. Marsilius, seeing the instability and lack of peace of his day, looks back to the history of the Italian cities to find the best example of government.

This is not to suggest that Marsilius had formulated the basic argument of his writing at this early stage of his life. His experiences at Padua do however expose him to the longings of the Italian cities to regain the fame and peace that they had experienced previously. He also saw firsthand the problems between the governance of the cities and the meddling of the Church in the affairs of the Regnum Italicum. The fact that he was born to Bonmatteo dei Mainardini, the notary to the University of Padua and a lawyer, indicates that his family was probably aware of and active in the political struggles of his day. With this personal history and experience, Marsilius’s ideas as expressed in the book were shaped by two other experiences in his life. In these experience's one will find the forces that shaped his final political ideas that found expression in the Defender of Peace.

University of Paris

From Padua, Marsilius traveled to the University of Paris. The exact date of his arrival and his prior educational experiences are uncertain. However, historians do know that he was Rector at the University of Paris in 1312. Of greater importance is the influence of Aristotle in his writing. Skinner has identified the influence of Aristotle’s Politics as being disseminated into Italy through two influences. The influence of interest is the scholastic curriculum that was being taught at the University of Paris. During the later half of the thirteenth century, a number of Italian students were attracted to study in Paris. That Marsilius was influenced by the writings of Aristotle is seen in his use of Aristotle’s philosophy. While the history of the republican cities may have provided Marsilius the ideal form of government in action, the philosophical legitimacy of these republics can be found in the works of Aristotle.

Marsilius’s idea that government is a natural institution that develops out of necessity is taken directly from Aristotle’s Politics. Marsilius used the idea of the natural development of secular government to establish his ideas of civil and church governance. For Marsilius, the normal desire of the community for peace and tranquillity is the primary cause of the development of government. Using Aristotle’s idea that the perfect community came into existence for the sake of living and living well, Marsilius in Chapter IV of Dictio I divide this “living well” into two kinds, one earthly and one eternal. From this division, Marsilius develops the idea that civil governance is superior to church governance, since the civil deals with the earthly end of “living well” and the present state of the community. The church’s governance, on the other hand, deals with spiritual matters in which “living well” receives its end in eternity. Since civil governance deals with this life and its ends, it is over the church because the church is simply a voice that points to how living well in this world will receive its peace and reward in the next.

This last point is further elaborated by Marsilius when he borrows from Aristotle the idea of how distinctions among the populace occur. In Dictio I, Chapter V, Marsilius describes how the six parts of state come into existence. These different parts are the agricultural, artisan, military, financial, priestly and judicial or deliberative. On the subject of the priestly part, the reason for their existence is to act as a regulator on human thoughts. Marsilius states, “For there are certain acts which cannot be proved to be present or absent to someone, but which nevertheless cannot be concealed from God.” Since it has existed in communities since their inception, the notion of God has acted as a check on the behavior of man. The priestly part therefore arises to handle the “sacred objects,” to relay the “correct views concerning God,” and to provide fear of the eternal so that men will “eschewed wrongdoing.” In this understanding of natural order, the priestly is still subjected to the judicial because it is not to be concerned with spiritual judgments in this world. As Dictio II will elaborate in detail, spiritual judgments can only be given by Christ in eternity.

Important in this order of society and in connection to the judicial part of society is Marsilius’s use of law. Borrowing from Aristotle again, he shows how law is established by the “legislator” or "the weightier part” in Dictio 1, Chapter XII. The legislator is described as the “people or the whole body of citizens, or the weightier part thereof.” This law is given coercive power by the legislator who alone has the power to grant this power. Furthermore, coercive power is given legitimacy by the legislator by “cognition” of the citizens who have determined the “punishment or reward to be distributed in the present world.” These ideas of Aristotle are used by Marsilius to lay down a foundation from which he will demonstrate that the Church has no coercive power in this world.

Many other arguments based on Aristotle’s works are used by Marsilius in Dictio 1. The significance being, Aristotle gave Marsilius a philosophical basis for his understanding of order in society. By being able to make the Church a “part” of society instead of being its head, Marsilius was able to take the next step in his argument and show how church governance cannot have rule over temporal matters. Equally, he was able to argue that the republican form of government, that had been the glory of Italian history, was a natural form of government and superior to others. Also important to this form of government was idea of unity. For Marsilius, if two governments or rulers claim to have judicial power, the populace will be divided. This division in judicial power means the church and the civil ruler cannot rule at the same time. Having systematically proved this, at the end of Dictio I, Marsilius begins to show that the church was never given coercive power over temporal matters and that this is the cause of untranquillity within the state. Of interest in this argument, however, is another influence that shaped the ideas of Marsilius.

Fraticelli Controversy

Probably one of the most significant experiences that Marsilius had was his connection with the Fraticelli. While history does not elaborate on how or when Marsilius became associated with this group of Franciscans, many of the significant arguments in Dictio II are similar to those held by the Fraticelli on evangelical poverty. The issue in this controversy is that the Fraticelli declared the apostles and Christ as having owned nothing and having lived in total poverty. This faction of the Franciscans had become disillusioned with the wealth and corruption that had begun to characterize the Franciscans. They began to advocate that the Church was bound to follow in the steps of the Apostles and Christ and own no property corporately or individually. This provokes Pope John the XXII to renounce this Franciscan doctrine as heretical. He was joined by the Dominicans who also sought to have this doctrine declared heretical. This lead to a dispute in which the Fraticelli, the Spiritual Franciscans, became antagonistic to the Pope and supportive of the imperial intentions of Ludwig. Emerton describes how the Ludwig and the Fraticelli made good allies. Ludwig needed every legal and philosophical weapon in his fight for supremacy. The Fraticelli needed to have security against physical persecution by the Pope.

It is interesting, however, that historians have given little attention to this connection. Gewirth in his comprehensive study of the Defender of Peace does not even mention the Fraticelli controversy. There are two significant reasons, however, why this controversy is important for understanding Marsilius’s ideas. One deals with the time at which the Fraticelli group became friendly with Ludwig. The other is that Marsilius in Chapters XI through XIV in Dictio II uses the issue of evangelical poverty as one of his central proofs that the church can have no governance over temporal matters. Douie has noted that Ludwig’s friendship with the Fraticelli was rather sudden. In a Declaration of Nuremberg at the end of 1323, Ludwig complained about the Franciscans violations of keeping the secrets of the confessional. In April or May of 1324, however, Ludwig in the Declaration of Sachsenhausen states that Pope John XXII’s new decretals are an “insult to the poverty of Christ and His blessed mother, whose utter lack of worldly goods had been for many years part of the faith of the Church.” He further upheld the Franciscan mode of living as in harmony with the example of Christ and that the pope’s position was heretical. No doubt this sudden shift in friendship was due to Ludwig’s excommunication in April of 1324. Also of interest, this occurred just a month or two before the Defender of Peace was completed. As has been already noted, Marsilius would flea to the court of Ludwig in 1326 after his authorship had been exposed and he was excommunicated also.

That Marsilius was reacting to this controversy can be seen in the chapters mentioned above in Dictio II. In one clear statement about the controversy, Marsilius writes that “it is insane heresy to assert that a thing or its use cannot be had apart from the aforesaid ownership.” This is a direct statement that concerned a central theme of the Fraticelli argument over the meaning of ownership. For John XXII, he would use the contradictory argument of using a thing and yet not having ownership of it to refute the Fraticelli basis for evangelical poverty. In another statement, Marsilius argues against the bull of John XXII, Cum inter nonnullos of November 12, 1323, in which he is arguing for the “meritorious poverty” of Christ. In this bull, the pope had more or less declared this idea to be heretical. The Pope went on to argue in this bull that charity, not poverty, was the basis of a “perfect life. This statement is taken up by Marsilius in Chapter XIII of Dictio II where he states, “Whence too it manifestly follows that this virtue is not the habit or act of charity, as some seem to think.” In this section, Marsilius is arguing that evangelical poverty is the highest virtue because it represents a vow that is voluntary and is not a command. The arguments that are put forward in these chapters clearly demonstrate a Fraticelli influence. Of more importance, a casual look at the titles of these chapters reveals that they are clearly central for proving the arguments of chapters I through X and asserting the basis that the church is not to possess kingdoms, lands, and temporal wealth.

The connection between Marsilius and the Fraticelli can further be collaborated by the writings of Bonagratia of Bergamo. Bonagratia was the official representative for the Franciscan Order at the Curia. Douie describes some of the central arguments of his written protest to the Pope. In the first part Bonagratia speaks on the meaning of ownership. He points out that the power of administering wealth was committed to the ministers who “held it in trust for the poor.” He also argued that the apostles and the Fraticelli, in releasing all title to temporal goods, did retain a “natural right to the necessities of life even though this claim was not supported by civil law.” Bonagratia also spoke of the “vow” to observe a certain way of life as having an “especial merit of its own.” In the second part of his treatise, Bonagratia lays down the legal position of the order and centers on use of goods without ownership.

Turning to the Defender of Peace, Marsilius uses many of these same arguments for his proof that the church should not possess temporal goods for its benefit. In chapter XII of Dictio II, Marsilius explains the meaning of the terms right, ownership and possession. In chapter XIII, he then shows how “a person may lawfully handle” a thing that can or cannot be consumed and still have no ownership of the thing. In another part of this chapter, Marsilius shows how “a person can have lawful use of something that belongs to another man, even to the extent of consuming the thing itself, if he exercises this use with the consent of the owner.” Marsilius also shows that the temporal things that are given to the church are not done so because of some civil law, but because of a spiritual law that says that those who are ministered unto should provide for the ministers. This is not a civil law that is to be enforced by the ruler, but a spiritual law that is judged in eternity. Many of the arguments that he is using are very similar to the legal arguments found in the Fraticelli controversy. Moreover, Marsilius takes up the issue of vows and “meritorious poverty” that are two themes that are expounded by Bonagratia in his defense of the Fraticelli. Overriding throughout these chapters on evangelical poverty is the notion that the church held possessions in trust to be given to “the poor” during the days of Christ and the Apostles.

There is little doubt that the Fraticelli controversy provided Marsilius another tool in his argument against the governance of the church. By espousing the doctrine of evangelical poverty for the whole church, and using Scripture to back this doctrine, Marsilius was cleverly providing another reason why the Church could not have temporal dominion and exercise plenitude of power. Taking his experiences in Padua, at the University of Paris, which included a thorough examination of Aquinas and Aristotle, and his association with the Fraticelli, Marsilius was able to produce a political argument to destroy the Church’s contention of plenitude of power. Ludwig in turn received a powerful political argument for the legitimacy of his imperial intentions. This, no doubt, is the reason why Ludwig received Marsilius warmly two years later when he fled to his court for protection.

Other possible influences

A word must be said about other influences that have been suggested to be significant in Marsilius’s life. Gewirth identifies Averroism and John of Jandun as having possible influence. At best he concludes that if Averroism had any effect on Marsilius it consisted in “his completely secular approach to all aspects of the state, including those connected with religion, theology, and the church.” Emerton also dismisses the argument that the Defender of Peace was co-authored by John of Jandum due to scanty evidence that the two collaborated in the writing of the book. Equally, Emerton shows that the idea that Marsilius was a pupil of William Ockham has little support.

Historians also know that Marsilius took part in a failed mission under Can Grande della Scala, ruler of Verona, and Matteo Visconti of Milan, in which Charles of La Marche was offered the captaincy of the Ghibelline League in 1319. Other than this fact, little is known of his thoughts and association with the Ghibelline League. No doubt, the three influences that have been discussed above, represent the major influences in Marsilius’s life of which, admittedly, we have very little direct information.

Conclusion

Rather than being an anomalistic or an anachronistic view of political order, Marsilius’s views on church and civil governance represent a timely expression of how order and authority is to be organized. Given his personal reflections about the ideal government and the influences of Aristotle and the Fraticelli, historians should view the Defender of Peace as a natural expression on how to deal with the political crisis of his day. While other influences certainly played a part, the significance of the Defender of Peace lies not in its uniqueness, but in how Marsilius was able to legitimize the imperial desires of Ludwig and provide a political and legal basis for Ludwig’s rulership. No doubt, Marsilius saw in the excommunication of Ludwig another encroachment against civil government by Pope John XXII’s. Equally, one can detect that Marsilius saw in Ludwig the opportunity to bring peace and tranquillity to the Regnum Italicum. The fact that Marsilius saw Ludwig as bringing the “external fulfillment” of tranquillity only confirms that his hopes and ambitions laid with Ludwig. For this reason historians can view his subsequent acts as merely an external acting out of the hope for the realization of tranquillity among the Italian cities. As historians have noted, Marsilius became one of the great propagandists during Ludwig’s expedition into Italy in 1327.

The question that remains is why did his writings receive no attention until hundreds of years later. Why did the so called “modernist” views that Marsilius expressed have no impact such as those of Luther? At this point one can only speculate as to why Marsilius’s writings received no attention. However, there are a couple of possibilities that may be offered to explain this fact. The first is the political climate in which Marsilius lived. Since the Defender of Peace was written to legitimize the imperial intention of Ludwig, at least presented for this reason, any influence that the writing could have would be tied to the nature of Ludwig’s rule. In other words, Ludwig’s use of Marsilius’s political arguments connected them closely to his success or failure. This fact was strengthened when Marsilius became the primary counselor to Ludwig on his expedition into Italy. When Ludwig was crowned Emperor in January of 1328, he was recognized mainly by the Franciscan group whom he had befriended. His subsequent declaration that John XXII was not the Pope and the nomination of Peter di Corvara as the anti-pope only alienated Ludwig and his followers from a large portion of the European population, especially France. In essence, you have a bunch of excommunicated individuals declaring the new head of the Catholic Church.

Of more importance is the attention given by the Italian rulers to this expedition. To the Regnum Italicum, this was merely another attempt, in a long history of attempts by imperial rulers, to re-establish rule over Italy. While some support was given by Ghibelline leaders, the majority of rulers in northern Italy had no desire for Ludwig’s rule. Skinner portrays this best when he says the attempt was an “abject failure.” He probably describes the situation best saying, “Perceiving that his (Ludwig) meagre funds could never match his grandiose designs, the cities simply bided their time, avoiding any large-scale engagements until the Emperor’s unpaid armies duly melted away.” From Marsilius’s association with Ludwig, one can speculate that his political arguments were seen as equally having no value to those in northern Italy.

Lodge perhaps offers two other reason why the Defender of Peace was not accepted. Speaking about the failure of Ludwig, he suggests that the Franciscan vow of poverty could never command support of the clergy since they were accustomed to wealth and the power that it gave them. He also suggests that the “corporate spirit of the Church” was alienated by a secular ruler “interfering in questions of dogma.” In an age when mercantilist ideas were beginning to develop, the idea of a vow of poverty as being the highest expression of Christian virtue must surely have been unacceptable to the clergy as well as the general populace. While support might have been expected to come naturally from citizens in Germany, Lodge has noted that Ludwig did not recognize that medieval Europe was in a stage of decline in the face of rising nationalism. Moreover, Ludwig’s dread of being excommunicated and his subsequent attempts to receive a pardon only alienated the German populace.

From this it can be deduced that the Defender of Peace provided no significant argument for those dealing with the problems of authority and order. The political struggles that were evolving in northern Italy, in England, and in Germany could not find legitimacy in the political arguments of Marsilius. Equally, the Defender of Peace was viewed as a heretical writing by the majority of the Church. This is particularly evident when Pope Clement VI in 1343 remarked that the writing was “the most heretical work which he had ever read.” No doubt this writing was banned from the political discourse that occurred during this period. Its significance being lost with the failure of Ludwig and the death of Marsilius. One can only speculate that its significance could have no meaning until after the Reformation when the political climate was more amendable to the arguments of Marsilius.

In conclusion, I must remark that much still remains unknown about Marsilius’s life. No doubt further information about his life from the period of 1280 to 1320 would shed more light on the influences that shaped the writing of the Defender of Peace. However, to view the writing as anachronistic is to fail to understand the social milieu in which Marsilius lived. As this paper has detailed, there are clearly some experiences and ideas present during Marsilius’s lifetime that can adequately explain how the writing came into existence. The belief that Marsilius should be viewed as the “forerunner and prophet of modern times” is probably more the product of modern historical optimism rather than the truth.


Bibliography

D’Entreves, A. P. (1959). The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought. New York: The Humanities Press.

Douie, D. L. (1932). The Nature and The Effect of the Heresy of the Fraticelli. Manchester: The University Press.

Emerton, E. (1951). The Defensor Pacis of Marsiglio of Padua. New York: Harvard University Press.

Gewirth, A. (1951). Marsilius of Padua: The Defender of Peace. New York: Columbia University Press. Vol. I-II.

Lodge, S. R. (1928). The Close of the Middle Ages: 1273-1494. Edinburgh: University Press. Period III in the Periods of European History, A. Hassall (Ed.).

Morrall, J. B. (1958). Political Thought in Medieval Times. London: Hutchinson University Press.

Skinner, Q. (1978). The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Volume I: The Renaissance. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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