Let us not forget!
BLACK JULY 1983!
Extracted from the Report of The Presidential Truth
Commission on Ethnic Violence (1981-1984)
On the night of 23rd July, around 11.30 p.m. 13 soldiers on a routine
patrolling in the North, travelling in a jeep and a truck came under
terrorists' attack and all 13 soldiers were killed. This was at this time
the largest number of army men killed so far in any incident in the North.
"News
of the killing spread instantly on Sunday in the country. Unknown and
unannounced, the army in Thinnavely retaliated, killing on Sunday nearly
10 civilians.
By evening, there were 51 reprisal killings by the armed forces in the
entire North. News of the counter killings by the government forces never
appeared in print. Evidence was placed before us that if the news of the
avenging of the killing of the 13 soldiers had been published, the major
conflagration that engulfed Sri Lanka thereafter, would very likely have
been avoided. The country's media went totally silent on this, namely that 51 (Tamils)
had already been killed in response to the killing of the 13 (Sinhalese).
No doubt the terrorist attack on the 13 soldiers was totally unforeseen.
It was in all probability the happening of the unexpected. It was in fact
a news that shocked the country. It was also a news that the country found
difficult to accept. But what happened thereafter are matters of the
greatest consequence to this country.
Why did the government fail to use on Sunday (24.07.1983) the
censorship brought into force, only the previous Wednesday, to prevent the
countrywide splash of the news of the killing of 13 soldiers? This was the
very question Mr. Sarath Muttetuwegama, M. P. raised in Parliament on 4th
August, 1983.
As much as publicity to the reprisal killing of 51 Tamils could have
saved the unfortunate events that followed, the censorship of the death of
13 soldiers would have equally well-prevented the cycle of events that
ensued.
Government
defaulted
The whole of Sunday was available for the government to anticipate
trouble and take precautionary measures, as preparations went under way
for a Sate sponsored funeral for all 13 soldiers together, in the city's
main crematorium and cemetery - the Kanatte at Borella. Why were no such
precautionary measures taken?
If the government's intelligence services were at work and if it had
been known that the government may not have an effective control over the
army, knowing the growing anger and frustration, why did the government
fail to change plans and call up the Navy and the Air Force to take over
the security in the city or to organize 13 separate funerals in the
respective villages of the deceased? Either way, the government was in
default.
It was only 9 months earlier that at the conclusion of the voting for
the Presidential Elections of 20th October, 1982, the government declared
a State of Emergency to prevent 'post-polls violence'. Though there were
no major incidents, the government imposed a precautionary curfew that day
(20th October) from 6 p.m. onwards.
This showed the government had tremendous experience to judge
anticipated troubles and possible breakdown of law and order and to impose
at the right time precautionary curfews.
The government had adequate opportunity, as it prepared for the Kanatte
funeral to decide on a precautionary curfew to be imposed soon after the
funeral, which the government failed to do resulting in, the eruption of
violence in Borella that same evening, following the funeral.
As the fire in Borella, raged throughout the night, easily visible from
the Ward Place residence of President Jayewardene, hoodlums from nearby
Wanathamulla saw truck loads of armed soldiers in the affected areas,
watching the inferno without a single shot being fired. The message that
night was clear, there was no question of preventing trouble-makers
creating trouble.
Further, the question arises as to why the government failed to declare
the curfew in the morning of Monday 25th July, when trouble had already
broken out in several parts of Colombo, in addition to the troubles that
had occurred in Borella, the previous evening?
This was another question that Mr. Sarath Muttetuwegama raised in
Parliament on 4th August, for which no satisfactory response came from the
government.
We have the evidence of the Sarvodaya leader, Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne
referred to later on in greater detail, that when he spoke with President
Jayewardene on the morning of 25th July, he pleaded with the President to
impose a curfew immediately.
The Government however declared a curfew only in the afternoon of 25th
July, which came into effective operation late in the evening. Mr.
Muttetuwegama said in Parliament.
"Everybody knows Sir, the houses and the areas that were attacked,
that State CTB buses came with thugs. Surely, I am not telling this to
score some point. If you go and ask your friends in those areas you will
know. Electricity Board vehicles brought thugs to Agalawatte.
I am not saying the Electricity Board Chairman or somebody else or the
Minister gave an order. That is not the point. The state apparatus was
used ....."
Ten
days of widespread of violence
From Monday 25th July, for ten days, widespread violence directed
against the Tamils sent Tamil men, women and children nowhere to go except
the refugee camps and the homes of kind Sinhala and Muslim neighbours.
It is necessary to emphasise the difficulties of giving a complete
picture of these events, firstly because no official records of any
investigations are available; secondly, almost all reports were censored
at that time from publication and thirdly most of the victims are still
living outside the country - some in South India, most of the others in
Western countries.
We have restricted these records to those who made representations,
almost all of which were verified by a complement team of investigators
appointed by the Commission and to the accounts of those who were able to
give oral testimony before the Commission.
We are in no position sitting as we do, nearly 19 years after these
events of July 1983 to give even a reasonably complete picture of the
events of 1983.
The violations of human rights directed against the Tamils were
unquestionably the worst in Sri Lanka's modern history. Killings, tortures
and harassment of unarmed Tamils went hand in glove with the more
widespread destruction and damage to Tamil homes, businesses and
industries.
Over 75,000 Tamils in Colombo alone and nearly a 100,000 in all, were
temporarily located in nearly 27 refugee camps. Refugees in large numbers
were sent to the North by ships since the government had failed to stop
the violence which raged over a period of 10 days.
The government acknowledged a death toll of nearly 350 in all, but
Tamils claimed the number of deaths to be over a thousand. We have no
basis to report on the number of deaths or the extent of damage to
properties, with any degree of accuracy, for reasons referred to elsewhere
in this Report.
Amongst the more prominent of the events of July 1983 were the killings
of 51 Tamils in the North on 24th July by army personnel, the destruction
of 175 Tamil houses, with one death and a dozen injured in Trincomalee on
July 25 by Navy personnel, the killing of 35 Tamil prisoners by fellow
prisoners at Welikade Jail, Colombo on July 25, followed by the killing of
a further 18 Tamil prisoners at the same prison on July 27. We have dealt
with the killings inside the Welikada Jail elsewhere.
No
appeal to stop violence
We have faulted the then government, in several places of this report
for both acts of omissions and commissions, in the run up to the events
that resulted in the communal conflagration of July 1983. But more
importantly, the government was guilty of gross negligence in failing to
appeal to the people for restraint, peace and calm on July 25, 26 and
until the evening of July 27.
There was not a single leader of Cabinet rank to at least appeal to the
law breakers to stop violence apart from the government's failing to
perform its fundamental obligations to protect the life and property of
its citizens, even by recourse to force.
There were witnesses who testified that this was due to the complicity
of a section of the government in 'teaching the Tamils a lesson', for the
terrorism in the North.
The Government appears to have awakened to its responsibilities only on
the evening of 27th July - the third consecutive day of extensive violence,
perhaps following the call from the Prime Minister of India Mrs. Indira
Gandhi to the Sri Lankan president, informing him that she thought it fit
for her Foreign Minister Mr. Narasimha Rao to personally visit Sri Lanka
the following day, to get a first hand assessment of troubles in Sri
Lanka, which he did the following day.
President's
speech with no apologies
The Cabinet which met the same night of 27th July 1983, was apprised of
the Indian Foreign Minister's visit it was only on the evening of 28th
July, 1983 that President Jayawardena made a televised speech to the
nation and appealed to the people 'to lay down their arms.' The 'Dawasa' a
Sinhala daily of 29th July 1983, reported in banner headlines, the
President's speech as follows:
"I will fulfil Sinhala aspirations. I will not allow the country
to be divided."
In the President's speech there was no message to the victims and no
apologies. The President however acknowledged the Government's failure to
solve the Tamil problems as promised in the 1977 manifesto of his party.
In the President's speech there was a message that the government
understands the feelings of those who created trouble.
Shortly thereafter, on 20th July, Minister of State Mr. Anandatissa de
Alwis blamed the JVP, the Communist Party and Dr. Wickremabahu
Karunaratne's NSSP as being behind the violence, alleging the existence of
2nd Naxalite plot.
But, thee was no evidence of any left complicity in the events of July
1983 and the allegation was soon given up, without a single prosecution
but only after the detention of large numbers of left leaders and
activists.
If the Indian Prime Minister's despatch of her Foreign Minister to
Colombo did give a surprise to the Sri Lanka government, it did not appear
to have softened President Jaywardena's tough stand on the question of
Tamil terrorism.
Going by the text of the headline given by the 'Dawasa' daily, 'Sinhala
aspirations will be fulfilled and the country will not be a allowed to be
divided'. "~<1Ÿz RuOzœ}x Sf Yy¤. - yf "nYf Yhp%pf Sh
"pœ"n¤."
It would appear that four days of intense violence against innocent
Tamils in the country did not bring about any remorse or regret upon the
President to convey the apology of a nation to the plight of a section of
its people, even as a large number of well meaning Sinhala neighbours
protected the Tamils.
Indeed, the Dawasa lead story of the President's televised address to
the Nation itself would have given the trouble-makers encouragement and
comfort that the head of the State was truly with them, if there had been
any doubt about it.
The attacks on Tamils continued for five more days, even after the Head
of state addressed the Nation. Sad to record that the 'Dawasa' as well as
most of the other media failed to douse the flames by reflecting on the
horrors suffered by the innocent Tamils, in their hour of need.
To give prominence to 'Sinhala aspirations' at a delicate time when the
innocent sections of a minority were tying to escape the attacks, fleeing
as they did with their women and children would have doubtless given the
message that the media too was united with the political leadership and
the hoodlums in 'teaching lessons'.