Why and why not the USSR won the war

          How the Soviet Union won has been explored extensively but why they won is not the case.[1] Many accounts of the war stretched the truth on this area.

• Distorted Truth: The German Army was stopped by the Russian Winter

            The most common reason given for the German inability to take Moscow was the cold, severe, and early Russian winter. While this is definitely true to an extent (no one in his right mind can deny that) it has been greatly exaggerated in history books. Moscow would still have been taken if not for the Soviet Siberian division transferred over from the Far East. Though the Germans were experiencing terrible conditions in the first days of December 1941, they were still making local successes, and by the time spring arrived, they probably would have completed an encircling manoeuvre. It was the winter, yes, which made the Siberians ‘more effective’.

 

• Distorted Truth: Hitler made a lot of mistakes

            Many historians have stressed that Hitler's mistakes were the downfall of his army, and eventually, his country. Most glaring, they point out, is his decision to halt before Moscow.

            While their accounts contain not a shred of falsity, it distorts the truth greatly. The Soviet side made numerous, and in fact more mistakes, than the Germans did. Who could defend Stalin's refusal to withdraw 665,000 soldiers in the Kiev pocket? What about the pockets in Bryansk, Orel, and Vyazma? What about Stalin's belief that Hitler would not invade?

            All the accounts show and demonstrate convincingly that Hitler's mistakes were terrible. But even more so were that of Stalin's. (In fact, as a Russian chess proverb goes, more mistakes will be made when defending than when attacking.) The fact is that the Soviet Union's spatial advantage allowed for more mistakes to be made than the Germans. Even after Hitler's mistakes, the Germans still could recover [especially because of the big protection that the Dneiper River gives].

             It was not that Hitler had made many mistakes. It was just that Stalin made the second last mistake.

• Distorted Truth: The Germans invaded the USSR while outnumbered

            This fact has once again been manipulated to prove that the war was lost at June 22, 1941. While it is true that there were only 3.4 million German against 4.7 million Soviet soldiers, most of the Soviet armed forces were ill equipped and hardly any tanks and aircraft had radios. Moreover, encircling manoeuvres took some 2.5 million Soviets for the lives of only 1 million German. The only thing which kept the Soviet Union alive in 1942 were the addition of military age males into the army, which raised the Soviet total to some 360 divisions. Yes, the Germans invaded the USSR while outnumbered, but that was not the reason why Hitler was defeated. Fresh reinforcements (and a drastic improvement in technology and quality of the Red Army) did.


• Distorted Truth: The German Army was modernised but the Soviet Army was not

One popular explanation for why the Germans advanced so deeply into the Soviet Union so fast was because the German Army was modernised while the Soviet Union was still using horses. This is true to only a very slight extent.

The German Army relied heavily on horse-drawn transport for most of the war (refer to History of Op. Barbarossa: 625,000 horses). They had only modernised a small part of their army. That was why the Germans were able to subdue Poland and France so quickly. It was with this big enemy (Soviet Russia) that they encountered gigantic problems e.g. supply.

• Myth: Hitler alone misjudged that he could win the war in a matter of weeks

            Hitler mistakenly thought that the internal system and the popular support for the war in the Soviet Union would collapse in a matter of weeks. After all, he had said, "We just need to kick the door, and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."

            But London, Washington D.C. and surprisingly Moscow also shared this thought. Churchill told his staff many times that if "England lost, America too would be encircled and beaten." Unofficial predictions in the United States also anticipated the collapse of the USSR. When Roosevelt signed a bill for Lend Lease to Russia, he said that it was to save Russia from total collapse. 'Save' probably meant 'delay'.

            In Moscow, the situation was even gloomier. The scorched earth policy only indicated that the Soviets knew that the reoccupation of the Ukraine and the Baltic were a long time away. Stalin had his moments when he felt like signing an armistice (like Lenin in 1918) and in the middle of October sent envoys to the Germans to request for an armistice. Luckily for the Soviets, the Germans refused to sign the agreements. Stalin meanwhile requested, almost begged the British and the American embassies to send expeditionary forces to the Russian front.

            The decision to not to postpone Barbarossa to 1942 did not prove fatal, but made sure that Hitler and his High Command had to be much more careful with the element of time in the vastness and treachery of the Russian country--something which they were not.

• Myth: Hitler had a good relationship with his generals but Stalin did not (which was why the Germans advanced 700 miles into the USSR)

            It is not true that Hitler had a good relationship with his generals but Stalin did not. In fact, the reverse was true. The reason why the Germans advanced so far ahead into the USSR was because incompetent leadership led the Red Army in the early months of the war (until Stalin recalled his generals exiled into Siberia and the Russian Far East)

            Mistrust was common in the German High Command. Hitler was suspicious of the intentions of his generals. That was why Hitler overruled his generals over Directive No, 34 (to halt the advance towards Moscow in 1941). Towards the end of the war, this mistrust had grown so much that Hitler took command of the more important fronts, and transferring or promptly sacking commanders for retreating voluntarily (when it was actually beneficial).

            Stalin, however, used 1941 fruitfully with his generals. Gaining the trust of Gen. Zhukov (for hastily organising the successful defence of Leningrad and then Moscow) and Rokossovski (finishing off the doomed 6th Army) and others like Chuikov, the list of generals remained fairly constant except for some additions (when more territory e.g. Byelorussia) was taken.

            The mistrust between Hitler and his generals was one of the factors leading to the German failure and the Soviet success. (Also refer to Manstein's drive to relieve the 6th Army)

• Myth: The Germans had high popular support for the war effort but the Russians did not

            When war was declared on Poland in 1939, it was announced from the Reichstag's loudspeakers. 'The crowd there just bent there and wept', an American journalist noted (the USA was neutral). 'Some just stood there, stunned'. It was obvious, that unlike the First World War, the people did not want the war. Hitler urged Goebbels' propaganda ministry to keep the population feverish about the new war. Only large amounts of propaganda, and explaining 'why we fight', kept the population going. 

            In 1941 when the Germans invaded Russia even Goebbels himself found it hard to find a bad quality about the Soviets. Therefore, he linked Bolshevism with Jewry, portraying the Russian as a Jew. It did not achieve the desired results. After 1943, large doses of terror saying that the Allies wanted to turn Germany into a potato field (which was true) kept the population going. During the battle of Kursk, a joke was circulating in the Reich: "Anyone who recruits five new members into the Party gets to leave it. Anyone who recruits ten gets a certificate that he never was in the Party." By 1944, despite propaganda efforts, support for the war effort had declined to a mere 30%.
            In Russia, most of the population working in the industrial Ukraine was evacuated to the Urals, where they worked in the Soviet industry. Stalin cleverly announced German casualties only. Awards kept Soviet morale high in a hitherto classless army, especially after Stalingrad and Kursk. Everyone talked about the guy who fulfilled his quarterly quota in just five weeks and had got the State Award. The new award, 'Hero of the Soviet Union', was given to ace pilots and tank commanders who survived against debilitating odds. People and organisations also gave money to buy tanks. In return the donator's name was painted on the vehicle. Stalin's speeches calling the people to defend 'holy Russia' in the autumn were effective. As a result, many volunteers dug antitank trenches on the approaches to the Soviet capital, which helped slow the German advance.

            Morale was also one big factor in the defeat of the Nazis.

 



[1] Strictly speaking, Hitler lost the war against the USSR but won the war against the Russian people. The casualty ratio was 4:1 on the Russian side. The Russian people also suffered immensely, not to mention that both sides were forced to implement a 'scorched earth' policy, which left a trail of destruction throughout most of the European USSR and especially the Ukraine.