The present article was
published in “Transactions. Royal Asiatic Society. Korea Branch”. Vol. 76-2001,
pp. 31-43.
P.G. FON MOELLENDORFF’S
“PRO-RUSSIAN” ACTIVITIES IN KOREA (1882-1885): OPINIONS OF RUSSIAN
HISTORIOGRAPHERS
T.M.Simbirtseva
International
Center for Korean Studies
Moscow
State University
German
Oriental studies scholar and diplomat baron Paul George von Moellendorff
(1847-1901, Korean name Mok Rin-dok) was the first in Korean history European,
who was invited by this country for official service. From the end of 1882 till
summer of 1885 he worked there in different high ranks from that of
Inspector-General of the Customs up to vice foreign minister (ch’amp’an)
and actively participated in the most important political events, connected
with the opening of Korea to the outer world and its search of a new place in
the system of international relations. In the South Korean and Western
historiography he is usually estimated as a “pro-Russian” politician because
his activities were aimed at making Russia the new “elder brother” of Korea
instead of crumbling China in order to protect Korean sovereignty and security.
This idea came to him after the military mutiny of the Imo year (1882), as he
was greatly indignant of the severe conditions (Inch’on Treaty), which Japan
forced on Korea after the suppression of the mutiny. He consistently followed
the policy of strengthening Korean-Russian relations till he was dismissed in
1885. Nevertheless Russian historians do not consider Moellendorff’s activities
as “pro-Russian”. The author shares their opinion. At the same time almost
every Russian historian, who wrote on this subject, usually gives his/her own
interpretation of Moellendorff’s role in Korea. In the following article the
author presents the specter of opinions of Russian historians and explains the
reasons for her own conviction that Mok champ’an was not “pro-Russian”,
relying on the latest research of South Korean historians and the book by Lee
Yur-Bok “West Goes East”[1].
* * *
Russian
historiography of the Soviet period mentioned P.G. von Moellendorff rarely and
usually negatively. From one side, it can be explained by Marxist theory of the
role of individuals in history, which prevailed at that time. According to this
theory mass of people play the main role in the historical process while the
role of individuals is insignificant. On the other side, it was a reflection of
the typical for the Soviet period suspiciousness towards foreigners, especially
to such “ideologically alien elements” as barons from imperialist countries.
P.G.
von Moellendorff’s name appeared in a Russian historical work for the first
time in 1947. It was Mikhail Pak’s candidate dissertation “Sketches of the
Korean history in the second half of the 19th century”. It was not
published and remained known only to a narrow circle of Oriental scholars.
In
1956 A.L.Narochnitsky introduced
Moellendorff’s activities in Korea to Russian readers in his ample book
“Colonial Policy of the Capitalist Countries in the Far East. 1860-1895”[2].
He thoroughly described the German diplomat’s contacts with Russian officials
in the Far East from August 1884 till July 1885 relying on the materials from
Russian archives. Those Russian officials were: Military agent in Peking
colonel Shneur (August 1884, Peking), the Chief of fleet in the Far East,
counter-admiral M.Crown (August 1884, Chefu); Consul in Nagasaki (December
1884); Secretary of the diplomatic mission in Tokyo A.Shpeer (January 1885,
Seoul); the head of the same mission Davydov (March 1885, Tokyo).
Narochnitsky
presented in brief and in a chronological order the reports of the
abovementioned officials about their meetings with Moellendorff and thus showed
the development of the latter’s concept of the future Russian-Korean alliance:
from the adoption of Korea under a joint protectorate of Russia, Britain and
other European states to creation of the bilateral Russian-Korean alliance and
invitation of Russian officers for training the Korean army.
Most
of historians usually presume that Moellendorff sought Russian protectorate
over Korea. It seems appropriate to analyze if it was really so not only from a
political and historical point of view, but also from a cross-cultural
perspective. Moellendorff was the first high-ranking Korean official who ever
got in contact with Russian officials. It was him who started the dialogue of
two completely different cultures (that is Korea and Russia), which had no any
notion of each other and a very small experience of communication. The scarce
literature, which had been written in Korea about Russia and in Russia about
Korea by 1880-es provided too few knowledge. Russian diplomatic documents prove
that Moellendorff’s first contacts with Russian officials took them by surprise
and made Russian Foreign Ministry send their representative to Seoul to get
some knowledge about Korea and the political situation in this country. For
Russian officials in the Far East P.G. von Moellendorff was a messenger from a
completely unknown world, who tried to express the realities of that world by
means of European languages (he contacted with Russian counterparts mainly in
German and sometimes in English and French), in which those realities had no
definition.
Achievement of
Russian-Korean military cooperation was the most important part of
Moellendorff’s efforts, aimed at preserving Korean independence. In modern
diplomacy such notions as “military cooperation” and “independence” are
incompatible with the notion of “protectorate”. Russian military
representatives supported this idea, as it can be seen from Colonel Shneur’s
report (See the attachment). Russia did not have any intention of interfering
in Korean affairs, not speaking about ‘protectorate’. In 1854 Russian Foreign
Ministry elaborated an instruction, which envisaged the direction of the
Russian policy towards Korea for the future when relations with it would be
established. The main content of that policy was preserving “status-quo”, that
is China’s suzerainty over Korea, which was considered by Russian policy-makers
as the guarantee of stability of Russian borders in the Far East[3].
This policy was implemented since 1860,
when Russia got a common border with Korea, and was consistently followed by
Russia till the end of the war between China and Japan in 1895.
King Kojong had little
knowledge of the realities of European policy and searched for a new “elder
brother” in accordance with sadae – the traditional policy of revering
elder (that is China), which embodied his notion of relations with a stronger
neighbor. His main aim was to preserve the status quo – that is the position of
the country as it had existed for many centuries. Thus, it is sure that King
Kojong could not ask for ‘protectorate’, which meant loss of Korean sovereignty and limitation of his
absolute power. Moellendorff knew the difference of approach of the negotiating
sides and had many difficulties while translating. It can be seen from the full
text of his letter to the Russian envoy in Tokyo Davydov (dated March 1885),
published by Narochnitsky. In this letter Moellendorff, while avoiding the word
“protectorate”, wrote, that the Korean state “could normally develop only in
case if a third state – stronger than China and Japan – would take it under the
protection”. “It is difficult to formulate the suggestions from the Korean
side, - wrote Moellendorff. – That is why the Russian government should define
the contents of its relations with Korea and elaborate an agreement, which
would guarantee the neutrality and integrity of Korea”. “In any case it would
be useful to increase Russian influence in Korea”[4],
he added.
Narochnitsky presumed
that Moellendorff’s activities in 1885 showed sympathies towards Russia of King
Kojong, Queen Min and a part of close to the throne representatives of the Min
clan. “This court and Kojong hoped that tsarist Russia would be able to protect
Korea from English and Japanese encroachments and also from China’s attempts to
put the Korean court under its complete control. English diplomacy and press
tried to use Moellendorff’s intentions to use Russian support as a
counterbalance to England for involving the Ch’ing government and Japan into a
controversy with Russia and for diverting their attention from Great Britain’s
aggressive policy”[5], Narochnitsky
resumed.
Two-volume “History of
Korea” (1974) mentioned Moellendorff only once, in connection with the steps of
the Chinese government after the Imo military mutiny (1882). The book described
Moellendorff as a Chinese protégé, who was sent to Korea along with Chinese
officers and officials to strengthen the Chinese political and economic
influence[6].
Boris D.Pak who is
considered the main specialist in the history of Russian-Korean relations in
the 19th century, did not mention Moellendorff’s name even once in
that part of his famous book “Russia and Korea” (1979), where he described the
conclusion of the Russian-Korean Treaty of 1884. Moellendorff appeared in the
part of that book, which was devoted to king Kojong’s attempts to regulate the
complications, which arose after the coup-de-tat of 1884 (Kapsin
chŏngbyŏng). “As China and Japan were increasing their military
presence in Korea Kojong and his court decided to ask Russian protection in
order to preserve independence of the country through the services of a German
P.G.Moellendorff, who was a foreign advisor of the Korean government”[7],
B.D.Pak wrote. According to him, in general Moellendorff intrigued against
Russia and protected not the Korean interests but mostly that of Germany.
“Proposing to the Korean king to turn for protection to Russia, Moellendorff
decided to counterpose tsarist Russia to Japan, China, England and the USA and
to give an opportunity to Germany to give services to Russia and thus to share
rights for Korea with it”[8],
B.D.Pak argued.
Bella B.Pak, a
recognized specialist in the history of Russian diplomacy in Korea in the 19th
C., completely shares his opinion[9].
The abovementioned
opinion seems ill-founded if we take into consideration baron von
Moellendorff’s attitude to the question of inviting foreign military
instructors. Although the Chinese expressed the wish that Korea hired German
military instructors to train the Korean army, Moellendorff himself never
recommended it to Kojong. As Lee Yur-bok points out, “Moellendorff thought that
whatever country provided military instructors to Korea should also be the one
that would play a dominant role in the diplomatic and political matters of
Korea. In his opinion, that country should be nearby Russia, not far-away
Germany”[10].
Boris Pak stresses that
Moellendorff was, in the first place, the executor of king Kojong’s schemes and
that the frame of his official duties limited the degree of his independence in
actions[11].
The Russian scientists refutes the opinion of some South Korean historians[12],
who insist that during the stay in Seoul of Alexey Shpeer, the secretary of the
Russian diplomatic mission in Tokyo in January 1885, Moellendorff tried to
persuade the Korean government to conclude a treaty with Russia and to cede 10
districts of the Hamgyong province to it in exchange for Russia’s obligation to
protect Korean ports with its fleet. Dr. Pak relies on Shpeer’s detailed
reports about his visit to Korea. There is not even a hint of such a treaty in
there[13].
Dr.L.V.Zabrovskaya,
specializing in the history of China of the new period, considers Moellendorff
a mercenary, who had no intentions of protecting Korean interests. She insists
that he used his high position of King Kojong’s political advisor for his
personal enrichment and secretly informed the representatives of foreign states
in Seoul about plans of the Korean government concerning foreign policy and
also about the projects of giving concessions to foreigners”[14].
Dr. Zabrovskaya resumes, that Kojong dismissed Moellendorff because his activities
“caused anger of all the states”[15],
and this conclusion seems contradictive to her previous estimation of him as of
paid secret agent of those foreign states.
In the post-Soviet
period information on Moellendorff in Russian historiography became more
detailed. In 1998 Bella B.Pak published (with insignificant reduction) the
texts of the reports of Russian officials in China and Japan about their
meetings with Moellendorff in 1884-1885. She published not only those
documents, which were briefly introduced by A.L.Narochnitsky in 1956, but also
presented the new ones, for example, a secret telegram of Governor-General of
the Amur region baron von Korff dated May 30, 1885. In this telegram the latter
reported the contents of Moellendorff’s letter, which he had received. In that
letter the Korean vice-foreign minister proposed to send 4 officers and 16
sub-officers for training 2000 Korean soldiers[16].
Also for the first time Bella Pak introduced the contents of the instruction,
which was approved by the tsar on June 7,1885 and then given to the first
Russian Charge d’Affairs in Korea Karl I.Waeber. In this instruction the
Foreign Ministry expressed confidence that all Moellendorff’s proposal to the
Russian government had been done by him under the order of the Korean king”[17].
In spite of detailed
information on a variety of subjects, B.Pak does not inform that on October 16,
1885 Karl Waeber decorated P.G. von Moellendorff with one of high orders of the
Russian Empire, namely with Order of St.Anna (2nd grade) for
cooperation in conclusion of the Russian-Korean Treaty of 1884. This event
seems very important. It proves that the Russian government of that time highly
appreciated the German diplomat’s activities and considered him neither the
Chinese marionette, nor German spy, nor a mercenary. I would be interesting to
know who of Russian officials recommended Moellendorff for the decoration and
what arguments he used. Unfortunately, the documents from the Russian archives
concerning the matter are not published yet.
The presented above
sketch of Russian historiography proves that in Russia Moellendorff is not
considered as “pro-Russian” politician. It can be explained by the fact that
the word “pro-Russian” in the Russian language is perceived mainly as “acting
for Russian interests”. Russian historians reason that the German diplomat in
his activities in the rank of Korean vice foreign minister acted for other than
Russian interests – Korean, German or personal. Lee Yur-bok explains that
Kojong and Moellendorff “were pro-Russian in that they all believed that Russia
might be in a position to help Korea to become truly independent of China”[18].
Western historiography
usually represents Moellendorff’s position in Korea as independent enough and
tends to exaggerate the degree of his influence on Kojong. Lee Yur-bok’s book
“West Goes East” can be considered as an example. The author highly praises the
efforts of the German diplomat to protect Korean sovereignty, but expresses the
opinion, that his intention to rely on Russia was a misconception caused by
lack of knowledge of Russian real intentions and opportunities and that it
turned unfortunate for the future of the Korean people[19].
Explaining the reasons, which made Kojong agree with Moellendorff’s secret
proposal to make Russia the senior ally of Korea, Dr. Lee writes as follows: “
Kojong, deeply resentful of China’s unprecedented interference in his country,
clearly disappointed with the Japanese behavior towards his country during and
after the coup (Kapsin chǒngbyǒng, 1884), and grossly
misinformed about Russia’s capability and willingness to become involved in
Korean affairs, gave tacit but strong support to von Moellendorff’s pro-Russian
policy”[20].
Dr. Lee stresses, that “it was von Moellendorff who had been mainly responsible
for causing King Kojong to become and remain pro-Russian”[21].
According to his logic it can be concluded that Moellendorrf’s misconception
and misinformation laid foundation for the Korean monarch’s pro-Russian
sympathies, which (as it is widely known) were preserved by him for about 40
years (till his death in 1919).
In connection with the
abovementioned Lee Yur-bok’s statements it seems necessary to consider 3
following questions: 1) what was the real degree of Moellendorff’s influence on
the “alert, flexible and pragmatic”[22]
Kojon; 2) to what extent Moellendorff, and consequently Kojong, were
misinformed about Russia’s capability and willingness to become involved in
Korean affairs; 3) why the Kojong’s decision to rely on Russia, which was taken
under Moellendorff’s influence, was “unfortunate” and “fatal” for Koreans.
Moellendorff was the
first Westerner, with whom Kojong personally met. As the Korean traditional
distrust of Westerners and their conservatism are widely known, it is difficult
to believe that the proposals of one of them (even of such an outstanding
person as Moellendorff) could make the Korean king within a very short period
of time decisively change the line of his foreign policy and to confront not
only its “elder brother” China, but also Western countries and many high Korean
officials, who (by diverse reasons) opposed establishing close relations with
Russia. We also should not forget that big, although short-timed, influence,
which was caused on the Korean court and its foreign policy by the book by a
Chinese diplomat Huang Tsun-hsien “Chao-hsien ts’e-lüeh (A Policy for Korea)”
(1880), where Russia was described as the most dangerous and aggressive
country. The recent research of South Korean historians give the idea that
apart from Moellendorff’s influence there were other (more substantiated)
reasons, which contributed to the Korean king’s and his closest advisors’
decision to rely on Russia in order to protect Korean independence and
integrity.
The first literature,
which touched upon Russia to some extent, appeared in Korea in the beginning of
the 18th C. It were the works by Kim Gi-hong, Pae Si-hwang, Lee Ik,
Sin Nyuk, Lee Guyn-ik, Chong Won-yong, Yi Gyu-gyong and others, devoted to the
participation of the Korean detachments (413 soldiers all together) in
Russian-Chinese military clashes on the Amur-river in 1654 and 1658 (nasǒn
chǒngbǒl). Those literary works were mainly of anti-Manchurian
orientation, but at the same time they contributed to the formation of the
Koreans’ alert attitude towards Russia[23].
The diaries of the Korean envoys to Peking, who regularly met Russians there in
the period from the end of the 17 till the middle of the 19th C.,
reflected the same alert attitude.
In 1860 when a common
border appeared between Russia and Korea and real contacts of the two countries
started, that alert attitude changed into fear of Russia (conno uisik)[24].
According to a historian from Seoul National University Won Jae-yon, that
transformation was stimulated by Western countries and Korean Catholics. The
former (China should also be included) did not want Russia’s rapprochement with
Korea as it could strengthen Russian influence on the Korean peninsular. The
latter used the thesis of “Russian danger” to Korea in order to speed up the
conclusion of treaties with the European countries, as they hoped that such
treaties would provide freedom of religion for them[25].
The real contacts
between Russia and Korea, which started in 1860, were the wide-scaled
immigration of Koreans to the Russian Maritime Province and the development of
border trade. For the first 7 years those contacts were illegal and were
severely suppressed by the Korean government. The attempts of the Russian
border administration to regulate those contacts were rejected by the Korean
side. The end of 1860-es – beginning of 1870-es was the peak of the
isolationist policy, proclaimed by the Korean government in response to the
direct aggression of Western countries in 1866-1867. In 1869 the Korean
immigration to the Russian territories became extremely intensive: 6,543
Koreans crossed the border because of hunger and high taxes in the Hamgyong
Province. Russian administration was not ready to accept so many hungry people
without any means of existence and started measures to restrict the
immigration. The decreasing number of their people worried Korean authorities
too. As a result, the Korean authorities had to violate their own ban and for
the first time in Korean history agree for negotiations with a Western country
(Russia), namely with the administration of South Ussouri Region[26].
The first official negotiations between the Russian and Korean border
administrations were hold in top secret in a town of Kyonghun in the end of
1869 – beginning of 1870. Their result was that the Korean government in order
to prevent people from en mass crossing the border undertook some measures for
improvement of their material position and also for strengthening control of
the border[27].
It should be mentioned
that in 1869-70 Korea negotiated with Russia not through China but directly as
the Chinese Tsungli Yamen (the Foreign Office) refused to negotiate with
Russians on behalf of the Korean government[28].
As Won Jae-yǒn points out, “the pragmatism, which the T’aewongun’s
government showed when it began independent settlement of the emigration
problem with Russia was a big achievement. Later king Kojong continued that
independent policy (towards Russia – author) relying on the information
from border officials. The T’aewongun’s Russian policy was kept in high secret
as officially his government was against opening the country to the outer world
and stood for preserving status quo and isolation. It was its main difference
with the policy of Kojong, who sought the opening of the country”[29].
A researcher from Kyujangak (the former Royal Library, now preserved at Seoul
National University) Yǒn Gap-su concludes that the absence of clashes at
the Korean-Russian border within more than 10 years after the negotiations in
Kyonghun laid a firm foundation for the future development of Korean-Russian
relations[30].
On the basis of the
abovementioned conclusions of South Korean historians one can suppose that
while planning his foreign policy in 1880-es Kojong relied on the positive
experience of the negotiations of 1869 with Russia, which were held not because
of military threat or political pressure but because of objective social and
economical reasons. Kojong also relied on the more than 20-year long experience
of peaceful relations with Russia at the border. It seems, that this positive
experience was the main reason why Kojong agreed so quickly for Moellendorff’s
proposal to conclude an alliance with Russia.
Lee Yur-bok insists that
Moellendorff’s opinion that the alliance with Russia was the best way of
preserving Korean independence was fatal and unfortunate for Koreans. While
explaining why it was “unfortunate” and what about Kojong was “grossly
misinformed” concerning Russia, Dr. Lee calls Russia “a paper tiger”[31].
P.G. von Moellendorff
was a Prussian aristocrat. For many years his native country had traditionally
been supporting close dynastic relations with the Russian Empire. Thus from his
childhood he got enough notion about this state. Russia significantly fell
behind England and other European countries, as its economic and social
development was concerned, but the fact that its army was the biggest in the
world[32]
proves that Russia was not “a paper tiger”. During the Crimea war (1853-1856)
Russia alone fought at the three fronts against a coalition of European
countries led by England and also against Turkey. At the Far East Russian
military strength was insignificant. Nevertheless in 1858-1860 through the
conclusion of Aihun and Peking Treaties with China it included the Amur and the
South Ussuri regions into its possessions, and it was the biggest event of the
Far Eastern history in the second half of the 19th century. An American historian G.Lensen wrote that
Russia at that time was “a surprising conglomerate of might and weakness”[33].
When Moellendorff
recommended to Kojong to turn for support to Russia, he proceeded from thorough
calculation and balanced estimation of the international situation. He was sure
that Russia being a neighbor and being interested in preserving stability and
peace at its borders could become Korea’s new “elder brother” in international
relations. Due to these calculations he actively participated in the conclusion
of the Russian-Korean Treaty of 1884, to which China and England seriously
opposed. In 1884- beginning of 1885 by the order of Kojong he sought the
establishing a kind of Russia “protectorate” over Korea, which was envisaged as
a modernized analogue of former Korean-Chinese relations. In 1885 he was
dismissed from all his positions and had to leave Korea after the Kojong’s
unsuccessful attempt to invite Russian military advisors for the modernization
of the Korean army and thus creating the basis for military alliance of the two
countries. Moellendorff’s forced dismissal was a personal failure of king
Kojong, who did not possess enough power for pursuing independent foreign
policy.
There is an opinion,
that Russia only “encouraged von Moellendorrf by using highly obscure and
diplomatic language” and thus created the basis for his own and king Kojong’s
unjustified illusions[34].
Was it really so? From 1860 till 1895 Russia consistently followed the course
of non-interference into the Korean affairs. The meaning of that course was the
preservation of status quo, that is of Chinese suzerainty. The tsarist
government considered it to be an obstacle for subjugating Korea by other
capitalist countries who could threaten Russian borders and interests at the
Far East. The non-interference did not mean indifference. When the situation in
Korea seriously aggravated after the coup-de-tat of 1884 and a danger of its
occupation by foreign troops emerged, Russia mobilized its military ships in
the Chinese Sea and the closest parts of the Pacific in order to demonstrate
its readiness to protect Korean integrity[35].
The tsar government did not want to violate the status quo on the Korean
peninsular and several times rejected king Kojong’s proposal of the
establishment of “protectorate” over Korea. At the same time it immediately
agreed to send military instructors for training and modernizing the Korean
army. One of those instructors, colonel Shneur, visited Seoul in July 1885, but
had to leave at once because king Kojong had been forced to give up that plan
by that time[36]. These
concrete steps of the Russian government refute the opinion, that Russia
confined itself to no more than encouraging Koreans by language.
As in the beginning of
1880-es Korea turned into an arena of the political struggle of the biggest
capitalist countries and China, and because of the variety of opinions among
the leading Korean political figures about the future of the country, non of
von Moellendorrf’s attempts to conclude a Korean-Russian alliance succeeded.
That is why the opinion that “his wish to protect Korean sovereignty relying on
Russia was his gross miscalculation unfortunate for the Korean people” can
hardly be justified. The author presumes that it was more the failure of his
projects that was fatal for Korea, than vice versa. The statement can be proved
by the behavior of the Korean soldiers in Kyongbokkun Palace at the night when
Queen Min was assassinated (September 8, 1895). It showed that the retired
American officers who had been invited by the Korean government for training
the Korean army failed to teach at least something to them.
P.G. von Moellendorff
was a man of the world, representative of elite bureaucracy. He worked for
Kojong honestly and dedicatedly, trying to do his best in the most difficult
situations. He was a prominent Oriental studies scholar and an experienced
diplomat, and his advice helped a lot to Kojong to adjust his political course
to the constantly changing international circumstances. At the same time his
influence in the Korean court should not be exaggerated. He served to an
absolute monarch in an Eastern country. It is obvious that he could undertake
steps only under the permission of the monarch. Making “fatal” decisions was
not his prerogative.
P.G. von Moellendorrf is
a tragic figure and did not receive due appreciation neither during his life
nor after his death. He had plenty of enemies among the Chinese, Japanese,
Korean high officials and Western and American diplomats. It was inevitable, as
anybody of those people pursued his own interests, which differed from the
interests for which von Moellendorrf stood.
His enemies intrigued against him, lied and spread rumors about him,
openly interfered and built obstacles for his work. Almost nobody believed in
his sincerity, even those, to whom he tried to help. The variety of opinions
about the Moellendorff’s political activities in Korea is reflected in
documents and historiography, and it seems that they can hardly be reduced to a
common denominator.
But if we leave politics
alone and look at von Moellendorff’s activities from the humanitarian aspect,
we should admit that his achievements in Korea were really enormous and can
hardly be over-estimated. The study of his unique experience of successful
adaptation to an unknown and alien culture seems interesting, challenging and
extremely vital nowadays, when people intensively communicate and travel all
over the globe and international contacts are constantly growing.
[1] Lee
Yur-Bok. West Goes East. Paul Georg von Mollendorff
and Great Power Imperialism in Late Yi Korea. Honolulu,
1988.
[2] Narochnitsky
A.L. The Colonial Policy of the Capitalist Countries in the
Far East. 1860-1895. Мoscow,
1956.
[3] Pak
B.D. Russia and Korea. Moscow: The “Nauka” Publishers,
1979, p. 34-35.
[4]
Davydov’s report from Tokyo dated March 8 (February, 24) 1885. Archive of the
Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, Main Archive 1-9, 1885, # 7, page 3 and
attachment. Cit. by Narochnitsky A.L. Cit.op., p. 372-373.
[5] Narochnitsky
A.L. Cit.op., p. 388-389.
[6]
“History of Korea (from ancient time till modern days)”. In 2 vols. Moscow: The
“Nauka” Publishers, 1974. Vol. 1, p. 339.
[7] Pak
B.D. Cit.op, p. 81.
[8] Ibid, p. 256.
[9] Pak
B.B. Russian Diplomacy and Korea (1860-1888). Book 1.
Moscow-Irkutsk-St.Petersburg, 1998, p. 87-88.
[10] Lee
Yur-bok. Cit.op., p. 93.
[11] Pak
B.D. Cit.op., p. 91.
[12] Sohn
Pow-key, Kim Chol-choon, Hong Yi-sup. The History of
Korea. Seoul, 1970, p. 203.
[13] Pak
B.D. Cit.op., p. 91.
[14] Zabrovskaya
L.V. Ch’ing
China’s Policy in Korea 1876-1910.
Moscow: The “Nauka” Publishers, 1987.p. 35-36.
[15] Ibid,
p. 42.
[16] Pak
B.B. Cit.op., p. 130.
[17] Ibid,
p. 152.
[18] Lee
Yur-bok. Cit.op., p. 69.
[19] Ibid,
p. 95.
[20] Ibid,
p. 4.
[21] Ibid,
p. 5.
[22] Ibid,
p. 18.
[23] Pak
T’ae-kun. Bibliographic comments in: Sin Nyu. “Diaries
of Service in the Northern Lands, translated into Modern Korean”. Songnam,
1980, p. 27-47.
[24] Choe
Muh-hyǒng. The
Ground and Conditions for Establishing Diplomatic Relations between Korean and
Russia // “One hundred years of the history of Korean-Russian Relations” (in
Korean), p. 49-73.
[25] Won
Jae-yǒn. The Perception
of Russia in Korea in the 19th Century and the Theory of Opening the
Country // “Hanguk munhwa (Korean Culture)”, vol. 23, 1999, p. 201.
[26] Pak
B.D. Cit.op., p. 39. Pak B.B. Cit.op., p. 24-25.
[27] Ching
Young Choe. The Rule of the
Taewŏn’gun. 1864-1873: Restoration in Yi Korea. Harvard University Press,
1972, p.89-90.
[28] Lee
Yur-bok. Cit.op., p. 12.
[29] Won
Jae-yǒn. Cit.op., p. 204.
[30] Yǒn
Gap-su. The Reply of the T’aewongun government (1863-1873) to
the Challenge of the West and the strengthening of the Army. Ph.D.Paper (in
Korean). Seoul National University, 1998.
[31] Lee
Yur-bok. Cit.op., p. 95, 210.
[32] In
the middle of 1880-es the Russian army at peace time consisted of 1 million 384
thousand people, while the French army consisted of 600 thousand and the German
– of 620 thousand. Russian military budget was also the biggest in Europe (Brokhaus
& Efron. New Encyclopaedic Dictionary. St.Petersburg, 1981, Vol. 3, p.
630).
[33] Lensen G.A. Balance of Intrigue. International Rivalry in Korea
& Manchuria. 1884-1899, in 2 vol., University Press of Florida, 1983. Vol.
2, p. 5.
[34] Lee
Yur-bok. Cit.op., p. 111.
[35] Pak
B.D. Cit.op., p. 82-83.
[36] Ibid, p. 91.