The capture on 1 April of an enemy soldier and the rallying of another was to have an immediate effect upon the five maneuver battalions. In widely separated engagements, a reconnaissance insert detained a Master Sgt. from the 8th Co., 2nd Bn., 141st NVA Regt., and Co. K, 3rd Bn., 7th Marines captured a warrent officer from the 18th Co. of the 31st NVA Regt. Both enemy soldiers identified specific sites within the area of operations where their retimental base camps were located; the Master Sgt. being most definite in locating his base camp during a lelicopter reconnaissance flight.
This firm and timely information posed two alternative courses of action: the attacking units could continue their present movement toward the central high ground, conducting a through search of draws and ravines within their areas of responsibility: or the maneuvering battalions could advance rapidly toward the base camps, bypassing other suspected camps or, at least, preventing them from evacuating materiel. Col. Nichols decided to pursue the latter course and directed Lt. Col. Allison and Snelling's battalions to close as rapidly as possible (His idea and my idea of, "as rapidly as possible" differ somewhat. We were on Hill 502 (LZ Buckskin until about April 5th, we then went to Hill 785, about 3-4 clicks away and sat there for several days.) on the area believed to contain the base camp of the 141st Regt. Concurrently, he initiated planning for second phase of the operation in order that all units might reverse their direction of advance, and conduct detailed searches of the areas bypassed.
After completing FSB Rattlesnake (Hill 749), two kilometers southwest of Robin, Snelling's 3rd Bn., 26th Marines moved as quickly as terrain and vegetation would permit up the long ridgeline towards Hill 1166 and the base camp of the 141st. As Co. I with L in trace, swept up the ridge using the enemy's trail network, small groups of NVA soldiers repeatedly attempted to slow the Marines' advance without success.
To the northeast, Allison's battalion accelerated its movement to the west along Charlie Ridge in an effort to reach the enemy base camp while it was still occupied. At the same time, Nelson's 2nd Bn., 7th Marines reached the western extreme of its 105mm howitzer coverage from FSB Stallion, and was forced to halt and begin construction of FSB Buckskin (Hill 502) to support it move further west. (Now see, they could have told us this.)
By late afternoon on 7 April, Co. K, 3rd Bn., 7th Marines reached its intermediate objective, Hill 1062, with Co. L a kilometer behind. Simultaneously, Co. I, 3rd Bn., 26th Marines reached its objective, Hill 1166, with Co. L not far to the rear. The forward elements of both battalions continued to close on the deep revine below both objectives, believed to contain the base camp of the 141st. At first light on the 8th, it appeared that Snelling's Marines were in the best position to close rapidly on the main objective. Consequently, Lt. Col. Snelling assumed operational control of Co. K 3rd Bn., 7th Marines, and led the battalion on a coordinated attack on the enemy base area.
As Co. L moved down the ravine, its lead element uncovered the first of what were to be many enemy base camps. Advancing into the camp area, subsequently identified as the Q-79 Dispensary, they observed and engaged approximately 20 North Vietnameses soldiers attempting to flee to the southwest. The camp, like those later discovered, was, "cleverly put together." Col. Nichols noted:
It was not uncommon to go into a bunker which was reinforced with logs, 8 to 15 inches
of earth, another layer of logs, well covered...and find in turn a trap door and a sub-
terranean space below that, dug into the earth, providing additional individual
protection. These generally would accommodate anywhere from 4 - 10 enemy soldiers,
and in some instances tunnel complexes connecting these, running very extensively
throughout the camp. Very careful preparations were made to ensure that cook houses
were well camouflaged and that smokke conduits to abort any evidence of smoke from
coming up through the jungle had been laid throughout.
The following day, Companies I and L, on line with squads in column, swept deeper into the complex from the north and west, while Co. K, 3rd Bn., 7th Marines remained above on Hill 943, prepared to block any enemy escape to the south. Movement during the next several days was exceedingly slow due to numerous skirmishes with small bands of enemy soldiers, the oppressive heat, rugged terrain, and the number of separate camps to be searched.
While Lt. Cols. Allison and Snelling's battalions combed the base camp of the 141st, Lt. Col. Nelson's 2nd Bn., 7th Marines continued to search the valley floor north of Worth Ridge. Once completed, Nelson's Marines then moved up the ridge toward Hill 745, into an area suspected to harbor the base camp of the 31st Regt, as revealed in the interrogation of the warrent officer captured on 1 April. On the 11th Co. E discovered the base camp, approximately four kilometers southwest of FSB Buckskin. As the lead platoon entered, it received a burst of machine gun fire as the residents departed. Initial reports indicated the camp to be the largest yet discovered, containing well in excess of 200 structures.