The enemy reacted violently, even before the infantry attack began. As Company G moved into positions from which it was to provide supporting fire, the North Vietnamese went into action. Heavy fire drove Company G to cover. Company F attempted to carry out a flank attack from the north to relieve the pressure, but, according ot Captain Ronald R. Welpott, the company commander, "due to sporadic enemy contact, boobytraps, and difficult terrain," it could not find a place to ford the stream separating it from the enemy bunkers. Once again, the attack bogged down and ground to a halt.
The next day, 22 November, BLT 2/7 launched a third attack on the Horseshoe. Following essentially the same plan as the previous day, Company G established a base of fire while Companies D, 1st Marines and E, 7th Marines attacked from the north, crossing the stream to strike the enemy's right flank. The North Vietnamese hid in their bunkers during the preparation fire, then, when the fire lifted, assumed mutually supporting fighting positions. They usually attempted to keep a rice paddy or other natural barrier between them and the Marines, and in this case, caught Company E at the stream and poured on extremely heavy fire from a range of 100 meters. In 10 minutes, the company lost 7 killed and 23 wounded, company E broke contact and withdrew to the north bank of the stream.
Meanwhile, Company D crossed the Song La Tho and attacked south along the railroad berm, about a mile east of where the BLT 2/7 attack had stalled. The North Vietnamese within the Horseshoe pounded the advancing Marines with machine guns, rifles, and mortars, but Company D advanced to within 300 meters of the Communist positions as casualties continued to mount. Enemy fire struck down the radio operators for the forward air controller and the battalion tactical radio net, greatly compounding communications problems. Finally, with 2 Marines dead and 17 wounded, Company D withdrew to the stream, but remained on the south bank, setting up an LZ to evacuate the wounded. Medevac helicopters arrived, only to have the North Vietnamese drive them away under heavy fire. Only after dark could Company D begin to medevac its casualties, even then still under heavy fire. Another night fell with the Horseshoe still in enemy hands.
During the morning hours of 23 November, while BLT 2/7 remained in position, still evacuating casualties from the previous day's action, the 3rd Bn., 26th Marines advanced from the southwest corner of the cordon into Dodge City. With its right flank anchored on the railroad berm, the battalion attacked across Route 4, moving north. As the battalion approached the Horseshoe, the NVA opened fire and the Marines took cover.
BLT 2/7 joined the attack once again. Company G opened fire on the Communist positions, and Company H, now on the left of the 3rd Bn., 26th Marines swept northward and overran one group of enemy positions. BLT 2/7 recovered the bodies of the six Company G Marines missing from the initial attack. To restore the integrity of the cordon, Company H withdrew and linked up with the 3rd Bn., 26th Marines. Although the attack had been partially successful, many enemy positions remained within the Horseshoe.
Determined to eliminate the enemy bunker complex, Col. Lauffer reinforced BLT still again, placing Company K, 3rd Bn., 26th Marines under Nelson's control. On the 24th, after a morning of preparatory fire, Companies H, BLT 2/7 and K, 26th Marines attacked from the south, in the Marines' fifth attempt to eject the North Vietnamese from the Horseshoe. At 1530, the two companies came under extremely heavy fire from enemy troops in bunkers and a treeline 100 meters to the front. Unable to force the position by frontal assault, both companies tried to drive in an enemy flank, but to no avail. Col. Lauffer added yet another unit, Company C, 1st Bn., 7th Marines, to the attack. Company C moved in from the north, but not in time to help. At 1830, once again frustrated by the enemy's stiff restance, the Marines broke contact and withdrew with 5 dead and 31 wounded.
On the morning of the 25th, the Marines near the Horseshoe pulled back and began pounding the area with artillery. Low clouds over Dodge City precluded aristrikes. Following the preparation, BLT 2/7 surged forward, encountering no resistance. By noon, the Marines overran the entire Horseshoe and the battalion consolidated its position along the railroad berm. A search of the area revealed bunkers constructed of reinforced concrete, railroad ties, and rails, covered with six feet of earth. Lt. Col. nelson, the BLT commander, remembered an order "to destroy" the railroad berm, but "after many tons of explosives being wasted the destruction was called off."
It was apparent that the enemy forces trapped within the cordon was somewhat larger than originally anticipated. At the Horseshoe, the Marines had encountered regular enemy troops, specifically the 3rd Bn., 36th NVA Regt. While pushed back, the NVA battalion remained a formidable fighting force.
Since the geginning of the operation, South Vietnamese troops and police had worked to evacuate 2,600 civilians from Dodge City to interrogation centers. With these civilians out and the Horseshoe finally cleared, Col. Lauffer launched the next phase of the operation. BLT 2/26 and the 2nd Bn., 5th Marines ataacked from the eastern edge of the cordon toward the Suoi Co Ca to relieve the 51st ARVN Regt. which had earlier established blocking positions at the river.
Over the next 4 days, the Marine battalions tightened the cordon as they advanced. Using probes fashioned from metal stock especially for Operation Meade River, the Marines located many caches of enemy arms and supplies. Enemy troops attempted to evade at night, but almost continuous flare illumination and Marine ambushes turned them back. When engaged, the enemy would break contact and flee. Captain James F. Foster, the commander of Comapny A, 1st Bn., 7th Marines, later related that his Marines not only found several enemy caches, but also captured "13 North Vietnamese soldiers who all had automatic weapons and a large amount of South Vietnames Piasters."