Drugs as funding for terrorism
The experience had a significant impact on Moscow's military plans. drugs as funding for terrorism North korea terrorism. From then on, Soviet doctrine called for germ weapons to be employed not at the front, but deep behind enemy lines. The Soviet germ warfare effort really came of age, however, when the program went underground in the early 1970s. From that point on, the Soviet Union systematically violated the 1972 treaty banning offensive biological weapons activities on a mind-boggling scale. drugs as funding for terrorism Effects-of-terrorist-attacks. Soviet leaders from Leonid Brezhnev to Mikhail Gorbachev personally authorized prohibited development, testing, and production efforts. Gorbachev's involvement with the covert program appears to have been as considerable as that of his predecessors. Alibek cites several Gorbachev decrees stepping up the pace of work within the biological weapons complex, directing the creation of mobile production facilities so that inspectors could not uncover the program, and, incongruously, ordering the destruction of some offensive capabilities at the same time that others were preserved. drugs as funding for terrorism Terrorism in israel. Alibek states that at its height in the 1980s, more than 60,000 people were employed in the Soviet biological weapons program. Biopreparat provided civilian cover for about half of the program's personnel. Soviet scientists counted among their achievements the successful weaponization of anthrax, smallpox, Marburg, and the plague. In the calculated manner that apparently governed the entire program, in the mid-1980s they jettisoned HIV as a possible agent because it took too long to blossom into aids. According to Alibek, by 1990 his colleagues were putting the "finishing touches" on Ebola and Lassa fever weapons. Several of the diseases in the Soviet stockpile do not have cures and thus constitute a death sentence for virtually anyone exposed to them. Infectious disease specialists do not even fully understand where some of these lethal microbes originated or how they mutate and spread. These factors did not dissuade those directing or working in the Soviet biological weapons complex. Alibek insists that his fellow bioweaponeers were working on chimeras-weapons that cross the properties of two biological agents to create even deadlier concoctions. He describes two chimera projects in which scientists attempted to cross the brain-attacking Venezuelan equine encephalitus and the body-melting Ebola viruses with smallpox. Alibek says this work continued under the government of Boris Yeltsin, despite Yeltsin's April 11, 1992 order halting offensive biological weapons activities. Alibek points to recent journal articles by Russian scientists from Obolensk and Vector, two of Biopreparat's premier germ research institutes, suggesting that research on chimera agents is still under way. Some passages in the book address technical matters-how various germs are cultivated and their effects. The lay reader need not be intimidated by these very comprehensible discussions.
Drugs as funding for terrorism
Chemical || Effects-of-terrorist-attacks || Hearing on kids and terrorism || Terrorism in the middle east