The Cheat Machine
Destroying
Democracy in the USA
The
use of paperless electronic voting systems
means that the actual vote of the population can
be manipulated too easily and undetectably. It's
the ideal way to rig the elections, and thwart the
will of the people.
Here's the letter already
sent, at the beginning of August 2004:
Courthouse, Third Street Beaver PA
To Your Most Immediate
Attention:
Respectfully,
[...]
* http://www.ascribe.org/cgi-bin/spew4th.pl?ascribeid=20040707.082302&time=08%2034%20PDT&year=2004&public=1
** http://www.blackboxvoting.com http://www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html
..."
That
was the letter which they, and others at the state level, received.
Find out
more online. Note the websites I mentioned:
"How much faith
should we place in companies which promise
"100% accuracy" and yet screw up completely? Just asking..."
http://www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html
"…[S]trong
recommendation that all election officials REFRAIN
from procuring ANY system that does not provide an indisputable
paper ballot."
Another good site on the
issue is:
"…[T]here are certain people within the
election process who
don't want that scrutiny on how elections are run…"
The use
of paperless electronic voting machines benefits only
those who intend to tamper with the vote counts.
Another Important Thing to Know:
"…[T]he Help America
Vote Act of 2002 requires that
any voting system used in an election for Federal office
must produce a paper record of the vote cast by each
voter that has been seen and verified by the voter.
HAVA further requires that this voter verified paper
record be available for a manual audit of the voting
system, and for any recount."
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/documents/HAVA_Requirement_for_VVP_Record.pdf
"HAVA requires that voting
systems produce a
"permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity." "
"Section 301(a)(2)(B)."
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/equipment_machines.html
"Audit capacity.--
In general.--The voting system shall produce a record with an audit
capacity for such system.
Manual audit capacity.--
The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record with a
manual audit capacity for such system. The voting system shall
provide the voter with an opportunity to change the ballot or correct
any error before the permanent paper record is produced.
The paper record produced under subparagraph (A) shall be available
as an official record for any recount conducted with respect to any
election in which the system is used."
Okay
so I admit I'm an optimist. I really allowed myself to believe, somewhere in
the most generous niche of my mind, that they'd get the idea. They'd see the
need to make sure everyone's vote is verified and secure and take immediate
action to solve the problem. I hadn't requested a personalized response of any
kind, and felt that seeing the press release of the upgrade in the local
newspaper would be more than thanks enough. I'd made sure to notify them in
early August, so they'd have time to make sure the required alterations would
be done by November. I pondered the way truly honest people would be grateful
for the constructive criticism and pleased to be able to do what's right for
the people. I gave them the benefit of the doubt and was willing, too-
generously as it turns out, to imagine that they would respond to my advice
with thoughtful decency. Was I ever wrong about that.
I should have known better. I'd telephoned them, weeks previously. The people
who spoke with me at that time didn't seem at all aware of the technology or
the issues known to exist with it, in any meaningful way. I was told the brand,
the non-networked status, and that not only were these "not Diebold",
but that it was still quite possible to tamper with paper ballots, anyway! They
sent me the same irresponsibly stupid drivel in a letter.
I've included it here:
There it is: that's it.
That's exactly what they sent me, no more, no less, just those two pages.
Notice that the first page
starts a sentence at the bottom which somehow just trails off and isn't
completed on the second page.
In essence, these public
officials can't even prepare a simple piece of correspondence with a computer
without losing some of their data!
Furthermore, they don't
know it.
Should they be trusted
with votes?
Let's have a look at this
statement from the Commissioners. It says "you stated your concerns",
but that's not correct. I cited a Federal Court ruling stating that voting
systems are to have paper trails to be consistent with fair elections.
I stated that
professionals and educators at the highest levels of the computer and
information science industry have shown that paperless electronic voting
systems are not secure.
That's not just me (though
I have decades of experience with management of computer systems and teach
college courses on the subject). That's Harvard and MIT professors and a
Federal Court whose findings I've mentioned in my letter.
I'm also speaking for
voting citizens who don't want to be disenfranchised from the electoral
process.
The statement goes on to
point out that the systems in question are the "Patriot" by
"Unilect". That doesn't mean they'd be secure. In fact, the problems
of secret proprietary software apply to that make and model. The problems of
random hardware and software glitches apply to that make and model. The
problems of hacking and tampering apply to that make and model. The problems of
paperless operation apply to that make and model. There is no paperless system
that qualifies as secure to date.
The statement attempts to
imply that the number of times a system has been used would mean it would be
secure, when that is just illogical. There are other inexcusably faulty systems
which were in use for years.
The Commissioners actually
write "There have been no major problems with the voting system".
They can't know that, so they're either in error or deliberately lying. It's a
major problem if so much as one vote is discarded or altered in such a manner
as to fail to represent the voter's intent. The very nature of this type of
system allows for problems to be undetected.
The Commissioners try to
claim that the system would somehow be "successful" and
"accepted", when there is no way to determine if it were working
properly, and the people never got to make a choice at all on the matter, much
less an informed one, which does not constitute acceptance.
They go on to say that
they are saving "thousands of dollars" by having implemented
electronic voting. That's obviously another mistake or a lie. They'd have saved
the price of the systems by staying with paper ballots. There is no value to
the voting public when the voting system isn't secure. The abuse of elections
would lead to vastly greater waste of resources.
The Commissioners next
claim that the system is "certified by the Department of State" and
"is in compliance with current state laws". The problem there
is that the Pennsylvania Department of State still certifies equipment which
has been decertified elsewhere, by those who are up-to-date on the problems
involved. The current state laws don't exclude the HAVA rules, and should be
updated to reflect technological reality.
The Commissioners also try
to claim that because the voting system isn't connected to the internet or the
county computer system it would somehow be secure, but that doesn't change the
vulnerabilities of the software at all.
They try to claim
"our system is not vulnerable to hackers" but that's either another
error or another lie. Hackers can do the harm at the factory where the
equipment is produced or on site.
The 'review page' can show
one thing, while the count is otherwise.
The statement comments on
the use of battery backups, which do not eliminate all the risks from power fluctuation
issues. For example, there is no way to protect such equipment from certain
types of surges. Other problems with the battery backups losing charge have
occurred as well.
Then there's the sentence
that got lost, followed by a statement that the Commissioners "have great
confidence" in the system and security measures. It means nothing when the
ignorant have confidence.
It is obvious that the
Commissioners do not have the knowledge to manage this situation properly. They
don't even have the ability to discern that they need to find out more.
The Commissioners are also
the potential beneficiaries of election fraud.
They all stand to gain personally from manipulation of the vote counts. There
is a conflict of interest involved. There is no loss to the people in assuring
that their votes are recorded on recountable paper ballots.
This problem is not
occurring only in this one location.
Three
The vendor Unilect, whose
self-serving false claims have been accepted as if gospel truth by the
Commissioners - who seem to be incompetent for doing so - actually had a
Vice-President who was involved in a bribery scandal. Why would anyone
have any "faith" in these people?
http://www.ncvoter.net/briberyNC.html
Notes:
Original letter was sent to the
It was also sent to the Secretary of the Commonwealth and the Bureau of
Commissions, Elections, and Legislation. There has been no response from the
latter two recipients as of this date.
It is necessary to use
whatever legal means are necessary to stop the use of voting systems which do
not offer a voter-verified paper trail, at the state level. An example of such
a lawsuit in PA is available under "Latest News" at http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingSecurity.htm
http://www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/documents/HAVA_Requirement_for_VVP_Record.pdf
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/equipment_machines.html
Thank you for being here.
