




Victory Briefs presents . . .
2002-2003 Jan/Feb Topic



**Resolved: when in conflict, globalization ought to
be valued above national sovereignty.**

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**By Charles Dahan, Stephanie Davis, Orijit Ghoshal, Leah
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Topic Overview – Joe Hoelscher

Joe Hoelscher is a graduate student at St. Mary's University in San Antonio, Texas, where he is frantically trying to complete the requirements for a second Master's degree (Communication Arts, the other one is International Relations with focuses in Inter-American Affairs and Conflict Resolution). His BA is in Political Science, also from St. Mary's. Joe has most recently served as the Director of Forensics at the Texas Military Institute, where he learned how to live with interpers. He coached Steven Babb (see his bio) but had some success coaching collegiate debate (as the Asst. Coach at St. Mary's) even before then (coaching two national champs).

Resolved: when in conflict, globalization ought to be valued above national sovereignty.

I spent most of my time at the University of Texas tournament discussing this topic with other judges. I had plenty of time since I was only able to pick up 5 ballots the whole weekend, all in novice L-D. Not that I begrudge the measly \$50 the tournament paid me, but that barely covered gas (I don't live in Austin) and parking (at least I didn't get towed this year). The upside is that Babb and I finally came to terms over the books he owed me (Merry Christmas, Babb!). Another upside, for y'all, is this topic analysis. My suspicion is that very few people read my topic analysis. :) This time, you might urge your teammates (I assume that you're already reading it) to do so. Not only do I have a Master's Degree in International Relations, not only have I spent a weekend discussing the topic with some of the brightest debate types around, not only do I keep Foreign Affairs and International Studies Review in my bathroom magazine rack, but I love IR so much that I'll answer any questions y'all may have. But, I'm only making the offer to people who can tell me, specifically, what they did or did not like about my topic analysis. Y'all get an M.A. and Texas State Champion Coach at your beck and call, I get feedback. Interested? I will reply to posts on the VB message boards in the L-D section (www.victorybriefs.net).

Definitional Analysis

The idea of globalization is still in the process of being defined, but it typically is taken to refer to the condition of increasing economic, political, social, cultural, and technological interdependence between human societies. Affirmatives should be clear about what they mean by globalization while constructing their cases. It is not enough to simply offer a clear definition, cases on such ambiguous topics need to be coherent and clearly linked to that definition. A failure to clarify ground in the constructive speech will lead to bad rounds (as rebuttals devolve into arguments by definition instead of arguments of value) and unpredictable decisions (as judges get confused).

When deciding on a definition to use, y'all shouldn't just take something from a dictionary. Dictionaries aren't written for debaters; they ignore context. Moreover, dictionaries must, for logistical reasons, offer definitions that cover a wide range of ground. These are often unsuitable to use in debate rounds. Affirmatives should be offering definitions that are more than merely accurate. They must establish fair and reasonable ground for debate while making the affirmative position explicit. There is nothing wrong with definitions that are "made up" or pulled from your reading on the topic instead of a dictionary. For particularly complicated ideas, it is also acceptable to offer "contextual definitions," where the body of the case clarifies what a term means. When defining contextually, just remember to leave fair negative ground.

One last thing on globalization: it is not a value. That is, globalization is in no way normative. Instead it is viewed alternatively as a means of achieving realization of values or a state or condition that happens to exist. For example, some scholars claim that globalization is a mechanism for the realization of human rights in the Third World. Others would say that it is nothing more than a manifestation of technological innovation. So, you must use some value system outside the scope of the resolution to justify globalization. Your cases should answer the question "what moral reason(s) justify the tool or condition called 'globalization'?"

The concept of national sovereignty is also ambiguous and changing. It is generally understood as the right of a nation-state to regulate behavior within its own borders free from the interference of other nation-states. However, many scholars take issue with that understanding of sovereignty. Some see sovereignty as a particular status in the international community or as the aggregate will of individuals. How y'all understand sovereignty will greatly affect your cases.

Strategic Advice

Neither globalization nor national sovereignty necessarily imply or represent particular value systems. They are both properly understood only in the context of specific value systems. Some scholars do view sovereignty as an end in itself, but I think that is a very poor position. This means that it is possible for some cases to have no real clash. Negatives should prepare multiple cases for different definitions or construct generic positions. Otherwise, y'all will end up arguing over whose definitions are best. I think that can be a good thing, but in my experience, it never is. Definitional debates tend to be dry, rely on very clear semantics in-round, and often end up being unclear because few high school students (and judges) have the necessary vocabulary, especially within certain academic fields. Worse, L-Ders are rarely trained for these kinds of debates. Judges, too, are often poorly equipped to adjudicate rounds that turn into a "he said, she said." Affirmatives, though, should have blocks ready on definitional questions in case negatives fail to offer substantive clash.

Affirmatives on this topic are at special risk because of the inherent vagueness of the term "globalization." Just as "academic freedom" became a lodestone for many affirmatives on the last topic, vague definitions of globalization on this topic will open the affirmative to extreme claims by the negative. Indeed, a vague affirmative position can be grounds to negate in and of itself. If "globalization" is not well-defined, it cannot be evaluated. Additionally, an ambiguous definition of "globalization" will allow the negative to argue that globalization is always in conflict with national sovereignty, eliminating any claim that some level of sovereignty will be respected. At a minimum, an over-broad definition will make for difficult 1ARs as the affirmative is forced to cover a great deal of ground.

Resolutions of comparative value that do not inherently weigh competing values often come down to empirical effects. These rounds involve only competing harms and benefits. If y'all find yourselves in this type of round, y'all MUST impact well. It is not enough to ask the judge to weigh an "increase in human rights violations." Y'all need to be more specific and tell the judge HOW that increase should be weighed. Wherever possible, impacts should be quantified. For example, y'all could note that globalization has led to x amount of unemployment, endangering the livelihood of y people globally. Affirmatives arguing that the idea of national sovereignty leads to an international arms race should explain not only that this wastes money, but how much money, and how that money might otherwise be spent (say, feeding all of Africa). Judges need you to do their job for them as much as possible. Otherwise, they must decide how much value to assign to competing harms and benefits and this will necessarily require them to intervene.

Lastly, I see many blocks. Negs should prepare blocks for different affirmatives (based on the different aspects of globalization). A labor-saving device would be to create the blocks as negative contentions, especially for harms cases, and swap them out each round instead of writing completely unique cases. Affs need to have blocks ready for topicality. I also think that negs should be ready to run some burdens. Vague affirmatives are susceptible to burdens because burdens force clarification and that happens to be time consuming, especially if there is a lot to clarify.

Case Ideas

Affirmatives

My first idea for the affirmative relies on the argument that globalization is net beneficial. To get away from straight "harms" rounds, this case should view globalization as a necessary stage of human social evolution. Doing so will allow you to focus on long-term benefits and short-term harms of globalization to weigh against the short-term or illusory (you will claim) benefits and long-term harms of giving primacy to national sovereignty. Such a case could value "human progress" or "global welfare." Criteria include Utilitarianism, economic development, protection of human rights, or the Marketplace of Ideas.

My second idea is essentially a free trade case. Globalization is defined in purely economic terms. It encourages economic efficiency (a possible criterion) for all the usual reasons (fewer trade barriers, specialization, innovation, etc.). Economic efficiency is good because it means that people can get the products they need at a price they can afford. It also means that available resources go further. This case will require blocks against arguments claiming that free trade will lead to cultural imperialism (quick line of CX: can you name any non-tribal societies that lacked market forces at every level? So, if all non-prehistorical societies contained markets (or, if markets are universal. . .), how are markets inherently imperialistic?) or increase inequality (lots of possible refutation here - contact me if you

need help). Values include progress, human welfare, anything that allows a big picture view of cost-benefits analysis. Don't forget to impact. Some good sources are Ricardo, Hayek, and Milton Friedman.

My third aff position, and favorite, contends that globalization actually enhances sovereignty. This is a bit tricky. If you argue that globalization is good because it enhances sovereignty, then your case should be turned on a means v. ends argument. Instead, the argument is that globalization restricts the use of sovereignty so that the powers of sovereignty can be better enjoyed in practice. This is a sort of social contract case for nation-states. Just as people enter into society to enjoy the protection of some authority and the guarantee of civil rights, nation-states yield some sovereignty to international institutions in exchange for stability and a greater ability to cope with new, transnational problems. While they lose sovereignty in traditional terms, they gain greater power over their environment allowing them to better meet their needs. Under this case, power is not an absolute or zero-sum quantity in the international arena. Power is relative to the problems that nation-states face, such as the environment and organized crime. Sovereignty is more of a tool that has become obsolete than an end in and of itself. Values include "(social) justice," "freedom," "human welfare," and "dignity." Criteria include "opportunity" and "defense of human rights."

Negatives

My first neg idea is a protest case. I'm going to flesh this one out a bit and will be happy to help (joe@victorybriefs.com) debaters who decide to run it because I actually happen to believe it. This is a crummy resolution. I suspect it was chosen because few coaches have an understanding of international relations. The dichotomy it implies is a false one and few scholars would pose the globalization issue in the resolution's terms. Even political globalization, where the resolution's conflict is sometimes discussed, more often examines globalization as conflicting with democracy or governmental legitimacy. Sovereignty is mostly seen as an extension of individual consent to be governed or cultural self-determination, not so much in national terms. The resolution is not worthy of discussion and is next to useless if debate is supposed to involve truth-seeking, as the resolution clouds important issues and advocates a silly way of conceptualizing the world. I think dumb resolutions ought to be rejected and I hope that a case like this will also send some sort of signal to the framers to get their act together.

Basically, this case says, like I did above, that the resolution is just too bad to be debated. It is deeply and inherently flawed, in terms of debate theory. It is bad for L-D as an activity. As concerned participants in the L-D community, we have a burden to defend the event from recurrent stupidity, specifically badly framed resolutions. Judges should act to protest and change the attitudes that lead to stupid resolutions both by valuing debaters' voices in protest and by creating the empirical ammunition needed by opponents of bad resolutions (a deluge of negative ballots bigger than Texas and as undeniable as the fact that Jerry Jones ruined the Cowboys).

The reason the resolution is so bad is the inherent ambiguity of "globalization." The affirmative is effectively a "moving target" because affirmatives have too much ground from which to choose. This means that negatives have an undue burden of clash, requiring them to prepare a multitude of cases in hope that one will clash with whatever the affirmative decides to advocate. When affirmatives fail to narrow the resolution down, the negative faces a moving target in rounds, as affirmatives can "clarify" their way out of many attacks. Affirmatives who don't resort to these tactics, on the other hand, should expect to lose, since time constraints prevent them from defending all aspects of globalization. The resolution necessarily encourages bad debate. The negative side has traditionally been considered the side of protest and it sends the clearest signal of disapproval. While the implication of this position, if applied in all rounds is that affirmatives always lose, this is still better, over the long term, than meekly accepting a crummy resolution. If applied universally, an unlikely occurrence, records could still be decided on speaks and overmatched competitors could still expect to be dropped because they would be unlikely to respond well (say by running a protest case) or would be less likely to make even good responses stick. But, all the protest needs to work is a significant number of negative ballots or a few high-profile advocates (preferably who get decisions based on their protest).

My second neg position is that globalization is colonialist. The West has too many advantages, it isn't a level playing field. Since the West is so much stronger than the rest of the world, increasing interpenetration of societies ensures that Western ideas and values will have a massive competitive advantage in the global Marketplace of Ideas. That increasing globalization carries cultural messages is unavoidable. Every aspect of communication, even trade, involves values. Then you run a bunch of harms like dependency or cultural homogenization. Values could include "cultural autonomy," "happiness," or "truth." Criteria include "diversity," or "cultural self-determination."

A third position is that globalization doesn't exist. You could run an empirical case, but that would probably be based on some pretty nutty scholarship. I like the position that globalization is really nothing more than an excuse or proxy for nation-states' squabbling. Various nation-states try to increase their own power and serve their own interests under the guise of multilateralism. In this view, international organizations are the tools of specific nation-states or alliances of nation-states. The IMF does what the United States wants, as does NATO. European nation-states fight back with the E.U. The U.N. General assembly is the tool of the Third World, the West owns the Security Council. In CX, you need to establish that all international authorities are controlled, at least influenced, by special interests. It shouldn't be hard. It would be silly to value something that doesn't exist, negate. You don't even need a value or criterion.

Lastly, I think you can run a balance negative. Sometimes globalization should win out, sometimes sovereignty. Unless the affirmative can prove, at the most ridiculous minimum, that globalization should win most often, then judges must vote neg to avoid supporting a moral rule that cannot be proven net beneficial. The aff can't, of course, because there is no practical way to empirically test the theory that globalization should usually supersede competing claims of national sovereignty. Until there is, we should try to assess the issue on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, that is the only moral way to proceed.

Topic Overview – Orijit Ghoshal

Orijit was a debater for four years at Grapevine High School in Texas. He finished 3rd at TFA state and broke at TOC his junior year, broke to quarterfinals of Saint Mark's twice, placed 3rd at the 2002 NFL Nationals, and was champion of the Greenhill Tournament and Round Robin his senior year. He was an instructor at Victory Briefs Institute this past summer and is a freshman at Yale University.

Resolved: when in conflict, globalization ought to be valued above national sovereignty.

Ahh.....January-February-Quasi May. Snow falls, Super Bowl and the Dallas Mavericks winning the NBA title. A good time for all, and the beginning of a great time for debaters. This topic will provide for many *interesting* rounds at big name national tournaments, especially at the Tournament of Champions. Before delving into the arguments for and against globalization, a little resolitional analysis is necessary..

“When in Conflict”

Scholars debate over whether or not globalization and sovereignty actually conflict at all. Hell, I had to write a term paper about it. Thus, debaters can take two approaches to such an argument:

1. Accept that globalization and sovereignty *do not* conflict and run critical observations about the validity of the resolution. (Not going to win many “traditional” judges). A good warrant for such claims comes from the concept that sovereignty is a zero-sum game. That is to say, even when a country globalizes, the sovereignty it gives up *goes* to other actors. As such, sovereignty never conflicts with globalization, rather, globalization is a means to transfer sovereignty somewhere else.

“Sovereignty remains a feature of the system, but it is now located in a multiplicity of institutional arenas: the new emergent transnational private legal regimes, new supranational organizations (such as the WTO and the institutions of the European Union), and the various international human rights codes.”¹

Or

2. Determine the narrow grounds of conflict to use as a starting ground for determining the standards of the debate. (Just about every judge I know will buy this).

Hence, the uniqueness of this resolution comes from the fact that the standards debate can be hotly contested, debaters can even have full rounds over the idea that “my value is better than yours”. Such debate is not the current national-circuit style, but is still conducive to constructive argumentative strategies. It seems this topic lends itself to constructing the standard in two different ways:

1. Narrowing the grounds of argument to a specific issue due to the term “when in conflict” (e.g. Your value may be the reduction of poverty with a criterion of maximizing employment). You could justify such a standard with analysis, both empirical and analytical, that proves that globalization and sovereignty conflict *most of the time* in developing nations that have high rates of poverty.

Or 2. Utilizing a broad standard (Governmental legitimacy, Social welfare, etc.) to encompass economic, political, and cultural issues that arise from the conflict. Such a standard would use an appeal to generality to lend its connection to the resolution and would have to have broad and vague criteria to support it. (Not necessarily a bad thing).

¹ Sassen, Saskia. “Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization“. New York: Columbia University Press. 1996.

McDonald's Good (Affirmative Arguments)

Arguments for globalization tend to center around the concepts of open economics and free trade. Here are some general arguments for why globalization is a “good” thing:

First, globalization helps people through economic freedom.

A. When a country chooses to globalize, it opens its doors to multinational corporations that employ individuals who were previously jobless. In strict economic terms, globalization introduces capital to a previously closed system, expanding the possibilities for general improvement (e.g. one can use the capital to build a house or feed their family).

“The benefits of export-led economic growth to the mass of people in the newly industrializing economies are not a matter of conjecture. A country like Indonesia is still so poor that progress can be measured in terms of how much the average person gets to eat; since 1970, per capita intake has risen from less than 2,100 to more than 2,800 calories a day. A shocking one-third of young children are still malnourished--but in 1975, the fraction was more than half.”²

B. Export-oriented production supports the flow of capital, increasing the chances for the reduction of poverty. In a closed system, when countries choose to produce products that would have been imported (known as ISI, or Import Substituting Industrialization), then countries lose labor for markets in which they are efficient producers since they employ people to produce things they normally could have bought from other countries. When these developing nations use their capital and labor to produce things they are inefficient at producing, they are not using their resources at the optimal level, fostering more poverty and less development.

C. Globalization allows for countries to produce *exclusively* products with which they have marginal superiority. For example, since Japan imports wheat from the United States, it is able to focus its labor and capital in producing technological products, a market in which they are superior. Doing so allows Japan to have extraordinary levels of growth, helping alleviate problems like poverty and illiteracy.

Second, globalization increases transparency and government accountability

A. The multinational corporations that invest in developing nations are most often based in the developed world. As such, they are susceptible to the pressures of non-governmental organizations, advocate groups and lobbyists. Such groups often have agendas such as human rights protection or environmental friendliness, thus, nations that globalize have third-party checks on the fairness of their procedures.

“*Third-party certification* involves an external group, often an NGO, imposing its rules and compliance methods onto a particular firm or industry. The Council on Economic Priorities (CEP), the pioneering New York-based NGO, has collected data on corporate activities since its creation in 1969 and publishes reports on corporate behavior. The CEP (recently renamed the Center for Responsibility in Business) created an accreditation agency that designed auditable standards and an independent accreditation process for the protection of workers' rights, dubbed Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000). As of April 2001, the group certified 66 manufacturing facilities around the world that mainly make toys and apparel as SA8000-compliant.”³

B. When globalized, developing nations often have to answer to the terms of agreements like the UN Declaration of Human Rights or other international rights agreements. They answer due to the concerns of investors in developed nations who have pressures from lobbyists as explained above, or are concerned with the stability of the developing country in terms of an investment. There are many cards in the evidence packet which explain how developing nations must compete for MNC's and thus they have to “clean up their acts.”

² Krugman, Paul. “In Praise of Cheap Labor.” <http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/smokey.html>.

³ Gary Gereffi, Ronie Garcia-Johnson, and Erika Sasser, “The NGO-Industrial Complex,” *Foreign Policy*, July/August, 2001.

C. Loans from the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank are most often conditional. That is to say, the loans are given to developing countries on the conditions that they usually improve rights standards and attempt to alleviate poverty. Thus, capital transfers act as another check on the governing body of developing nations that are globalized.

Third, globalization leads to world peace

A. Nations who choose to open their borders to trade have to concentrate resources and effort to attract MNC's to invest in their nations. Doing so takes away resources and effort from the defense budget, and leads to a less-militarized global arena.

“The new game of competing for world market shares alters the order of importance of the functions of the state. In the long run, the defensive function wanes as the welfare function waxes in importance. Armed forces increasingly take on the role of internal policemen - as they often have in several countries. Where states need armed forces to maintain internal order, as in China or South Africa or Northern Ireland, the military will continue to play a political role.”⁴

B. Trade between nations promotes stability in areas that are war-torn because corporations do not want to invest in a country where people are dying and other nations threaten to impose measures like sanctions or embargoes. Since developing countries need trade partners to survive in the international arena, it is important to avoid things like sanctions and embargoes, thus globalization encourages peace.

C. The transfer of capital and technology also accompanies the transfer of cultural practices when globalized nations interact. Therefore, nations are better able to understand one another after globalization as opposed to two isolated nations having views that the “other” nation is backwards. Cultural understanding is a pre-requisite for peace, just think about 9/11.

Fight the Power (Negative arguments)

The most obvious place to start for the justification of sovereignty is in social contract theory. Hobbes especially will give powerful arguments for the need of a strong, internal, state authority. Besides that, there is a wealth of literature that is anti-globalization, or better yet, try anti-sweatshop. A few arguments for sovereignty..

First, compromising sovereignty leads to chaos

A. The people of a nation, especially one that is developing, need a strong central authority to establish unified policy objectives. Globalization necessitates a multitude of actors who have power over the people of the developing country, providing often contradictory messages and codes of conduct to be adhered to. Such confusion only exacerbates problems of poverty since instability is fostered without promise of future benefits, since MNCs often pull out of a nation once enough losses are sustained.

“..there is no guarantee that the most effective standards—in environmental or labor terms—will win these battles. Some observers even fear that certification driven by activists and corporations will preempt or supplant altogether the role of states and international organizations in addressing corporate accountability as free trade expands around the globe.”⁵

B. When nations globalize, they depend on external agents for capital and economic advice. Such dependence is dangerous for the future, since those external agents could change or disappear. This is called the “moral hazard” argument, that nations will become reckless when they believe that they can just fall back on IMF loans or MNCs to bail them out. When the IMF and MNCs don't bail those nations out though, such a nation is screwed. “Proper” screwed, if you will.

⁴ Stopford, John; Strange, Susan. Rival States, Rival Firms. Cambridge Press. 1991. Pg. 56.

⁵ Ibid.

C. Developing nations simply become pawns in the game of “global managerialism” played by developed countries. As such, developed countries can “afford” to incur losses in a few countries, so long as they even out with other countries. Thus, some nations may be used knowing that losses are going to happen, facilitating higher levels of poverty. Look up Phillip McMichael for more on “global managerialism.”

Second, sovereignty retains cultural identity

A. By not succumbing to the pressures to globalize, nations ensure that their cultural identity remains intact. The global world fuses cultures to the point where identity is no longer meaningful. When that occurs, people have no real reason to feel patriotic towards their country, compromising democratic participation and allegiance for defense purposes.

“The cultural message we transmit through Hollywood and McDonald’s goes out across the world to capture, and also to undermine, other societies.... Unlike more traditional conquerors, we are not content merely to subdue others: We insist that they be like us.”⁶

B. Compromising national sovereignty also compromises the developing country’s cultural notion of “rights” or whatever they deem their political entitlements to be. Doing so is a heteronymous (conforming to the will of another, as opposed to “auto”nomous) act, an act which is considered one of the, if not the, highest moral crimes by philosophers like Hegel. The basic implication is the trivialization of moral standards, but that is an oversimplification. Hegel is fun reading.

Third, opening borders leads to more conflicts

A. Iran, Zimbabwe, and Bangladesh are all examples of backlash against foreign imposition. Allowing developed countries to have more access to developing countries often creates resentment amongst those in the developing nations who are not benefiting (and even in some of those who do benefit). Such backlash is then used as a rally-flag for any sort of “anti-Western” movements. Thus, globalization causes more conflict.

B. Globalizing does produce more capital in developing countries, but that capital is usually slanted towards benefiting the already wealthy. Thus, globalization increases inequalities in nations that already have massive problems with poverty. “Trickle-down” economics are only applicable to nations that already have sufficient infrastructure and organized labor, things that don’t exist to a high degree in developing nations.

“Rising inequality after 1980 is the rule in this data, with limited exceptions mainly in Scandinavia and in Southeast Asia before 1997. The patterns strongly suggest that forces of globalization, including high global interest rates, debt crises, and shock liberalizations, are associated with rising inequality in pay structures. Pay is, of course, the major component of income, and if pay inequalities are rising, it is a good bet that broader income and social inequalities are rising too.”⁷

C. Opening borders leads to more immigration. When too much immigration occurs, nations often militarize their borders to keep illegal aliens out. Doing so has two clear implications, people who are crossing illegally are “dealt with”, and people who are in the developed nation legally that are part of the same ethnic group are alienated and often backlash against anti-immigration policies. Between 1993 and 1997, 1000 people died who were trying to cross the border between Mexico and the United States, the numbers are even worse for nations who are not under as much international scrutiny.⁸

⁶ Watson, James L. “Transnationalism, Localization, and Fast Foods in East Asia.” Pg. 5.

⁷ Galbraith, James. “Is Inequality Decreasing?” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002.

⁸ Bair, Jennifer (Yale Professor of Latin American Studies). “Globalization and Migration.”

Case Studies

Such a topic lends itself to many examples, being familiar with the history of globalization and the projects associated with it will be key to winning rounds. Here are a couple case studies that can be used for background knowledge on the topic:

Bangladesh: Shrimp farming was introduced as a means for Bangladeshis to get out of poverty. It succeeded in providing capital for the people of the country, however it also caused mass destruction by eroding the soil and removing hundreds of thousands of acres of bamboo roots that protected the land from torrential floods.

<http://www.globefish.org/presentations/bangshrimpindustry/sld006.htm>

http://www.idrc.ca/reports/read_article_english.cfm?article_num=186

Mexico: “Maquiladoras” are factories close to the border with the United States that are essentially sweatshops. They employ children and pay low wages to workers in dangerous factory conditions, but are exempt from taxes under the guise of job-creation and development. They do not really add to the development of Mexico, and are thus seen as an example of the evils of globalization.

<http://www.globalexchange.org/education/california/DayOfTheDead/maquiladoras.html>

<http://www.madeinmexico.com>

<http://www.environmentalhealth.org/maquiladoras.html>

Have fun with this topic, there is a wealth of literature. Don't be close minded, and don't ever bet against the Mavericks.

Topic Overview – Charles Dahan

Charles currently attends UC San Diego, majoring in Political Science and Philosophy. He taught at the Iowa Debate Institute and Stanford National Forensic Institute in 2002. He debated for three years at Los Altos High School, traveling with his mother during his junior year.

Resolved: when in conflict, globalization ought to be valued above national sovereignty.

As shown by the wording of this resolution, the topic of globalization is amazingly broad and affects nearly every sphere of our lives. Globalization is blamed for famine, death, a lack of workers rights, slave labor, sweatshops, crappy coffee, and generic hamburgers mutating and actually destroying “culture” over an entire geographic region. While it’s most often thought of in economic terms, nearly anything can become ‘globalized’—otherwise thought of as that thing being shared or being the topic of interaction for people around the world. Some possible definitions of globalization:

- 1) Globalization can ... be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. - (Anthony Giddens, 1990)
- 2) “Global networking that has welded together previously disparate and isolated communities on this planet into mutual dependence and unity of ‘one world’. - (Emanuel Richter, translated from German—note the ‘mutual dependence portion of the definition—this is a key element linking nearly every definition of globalization)
- 3) Globalization refers to the process whereby social relations acquire relatively distance-less and borderless qualities, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place. - (Jan Aart Scholte, 1997)

Areas of Conflict and a Wee Push in the Right Direction:

Tariffs, Tariffs, Tariffs...and other frivolity

Below are three possible areas of conflict under the resolution. They’re good places to start in terms of conceptualizing the topic and doing some preliminary research, however you already have enough background knowledge to think about each of them.

- 1) Globalization tears down restrictions nations place on free interactions between individuals. In this sense, the debate comes down to what exactly the obligations of a nation are. One aspect of this is whether the government should ‘help’ exporters, or those usually thought of when we mention the term ‘globalization’, or whether it should help its own citizens who work in industries with competition in other nations. The way a government usually does this is through trade sanctions and tariffs. This provides another good starting point for research, because the actual impacts of tariffs are less biased than much of the other literature you’ll find. Examining exactly who is helped and who is hurt, and to what degree they’re helped and hurt, will prove invaluable.
- 2) For the past millennium, societies have invested amazing time and money into attempting to open new trade routes. From Columbus’ attempt to trade with the West Indies to Marco Polo’s expeditions, acquiring new resources, or acquiring resources more cheaply, has been a chief goal of entrepreneurs. While none of those negative connotations are actually part of the definition of ‘globalization’, national sovereignty does carry a number of negative consequences under this resolution. The main point of conflict under the resolution is trade, and who should have control over it—those actors directly involved in transactions, or the governments of the countries? While on the affirmative you can easily point out the virtues of easier, cheaper trade, on the negative you have plenty of ground to point out the harms which opening new trade routes (in this case, colonizing other lands in order to gain goods cheaply—which some say is the actual of globalization via cheaper labor, etc.) cause.
- 3) Should arbitrary borders limit trade? A key point to ask is what, exactly, is the difference between trade within a nation and trade ‘under the rules of globalization’? Why should a nation be allowed to restrict trade within its borders and not from actors wishing to operate inside of them?

The Affirmative and Other Good Ideas

First off, I think you need to merely ask what the harms of globalization actually are. Weaker affirmatives will merely discuss a “loss of culture”, “exploitation”, and “homogenization”. Throwing out such terms may cause the ears of your Che-T-Shirt wearing college student judge to perk up, and that is about the only way these cases should win rounds. To combat that, explain that you don’t have to defend forced labor, for that isn’t what globalization actually entails (Slavery vs. National Sovereignty may be a more interesting debate, but may also be a tautology—we’ll leave that for later though). Rather, if these factories in places like China really are so bad, why are people clamoring to get jobs at them? If globalization and industrialization really do harm the environment, why are the citizens in industrialized nations living under the cleanest conditions, and living the longest lives? Note, these sort of negatives merely provide blanket, anti-globalization arguments that could be made by any linguistics professor at an engineering school.

William Saletan of Slate Magazine writes a column titled, “The Frame Game”, which exclusively discusses how different sides ‘frame’ a topic for debate, and how doing so can end a debate even before it starts. While skewing definitions, making abusive, unwarranted claims, etc. are obviously unethical, setting the grounds for the debate by choosing which assumptions to make when structuring your case can give you a great advantage. In the case of globalization, instead of getting stuck talking about the ‘cultural devastation’ which it causes and that corporations are making decisions instead of a nation’s “citizenry”, taking an offensive approach will be much more successful. Globalization increases freedom because it allows for individuals to increase their choice set. No one is forced to work in a “sweatshop”, just as no one is forced to eat at McDonalds. Previously the producers vs. consumers debate was mentioned—with globalization, everyone is, in one way or another, benefited. When a nation sets a minimum wage for example, many people who would otherwise work for a wage below that minimum are hurt—in effect, the government is STOPPING PEOPLE FROM WORKING and stopping a company from paying them for their services. With international trade, when a farmer in Iowa is paid to destroy their crop, the price of grain increases, thus not allowing for an individual overseas to sell their crop to individuals within the United States because we already have a ‘surplus’. By falsely increasing the price of grain, the government in fact is causing starvation overseas due to both destroying goods and stopping individuals from selling their goods here.

Who exactly is deciding national policies? This would seem to be a great place to break out those criticisms of government, etc. Globalization, in its truest form, wouldn’t have restrictions placed upon individuals who wish to trade across borders, thereby getting you out of a lot of the “Non-Governmental Organizations (such as the WTO) control the world” debate. Globalization makes goods cheaper for folks in every nation, and the main reason tariffs are usually implemented are due to political action committees and special interest groups—the benefits therefore of a nation deciding policies for itself seems to be negated by the “nation” that’s deciding consisting of those with economic and political clout. (This is yet another good way of turning the neg contention that those in favor of globalization destroy culture, hate poor people, and eat babies).

Finally, what does globalization look like? Robert Cox explains, “The characteristics of the globalization trend include the internationalizing of production, the new international division of labor, new migratory movements from South to North, the new competitive environment that generates these processes, and the internationalizing of the state ... making states into agencies of the globalizing world.”⁹ For thousands of years people have been looking for easier and cheaper ways to engage in commerce. Mercantilism, the most extreme rejection of globalization, caused nations to only use what they themselves could produce. In Europe this left small nations, take Luxembourg for example, without a lot of things they’d probably want to have. In other words, globalization lets people get cool stuff cheaper. It also allows for people within a nation to create a product or start a business and have a global marketplace for their good, instead of merely within their own nation. Tariffs hurt the exporters of one nation too by causing governments in other countries to create retaliatory tariffs, thereby stopping global trade for their good and eliminating a large market.

⁹ Approaches in World Order, Robert Cox, 1994

The Negative ... That's Right, All of It ... In Half a Page

Below are a list of possible conflicts under the resolution and some ideas for forming case positions. Each of the positions put forth assumes 'globalization' in an economic sense, and is different enough that it may warrant becoming a case position. However, the fact that INSTITUTIONS MATTER¹⁰ in economics should become prevalent throughout the next page.

The Finest Match Since Dylan and Kelly...

The main assumption most affs are going to make is that the implementation of globalization requires little more than allowing for folks to communicate, trade, dance the hokey-pokey, etc. across borders without government interference as they please. Unfortunately for entrepreneurs and the cavorting-inclined alike, things are a bit more complicated. Some problem areas (these would be good places to begin research) include how currencies are established and agreed upon (check out the debate on whether or not nations should adopt the Euro—good arguments can be found on both sides), national security concerns, and as stated previously, what the role of a government is. The latter of these is based upon what end you wish to pursue is, thus should be discussed when establishing the framework for the debate.

Who puts forth the ground rules by which international commerce and communication operates? An international body, which would seem to be logical for some matters such as fraud, contract enforcement, etc. While other things, like uniformity in production guidelines—such as measuring systems—would probably be better solved by markets, objective courts would be necessary to provide assurances to actors. Merely looking at authors (Samuel Popkin and Mancur Olson come to mind) who discuss the problems inherent to systems of trade in peasant society, which didn't have such court systems, would prove why courts both are a) necessary and b) very hard to establish for elaborate and complex transactions. Now that you've established that courts are necessary, what goes better with international courts than international law? (see heading—if you still don't get it, watch more Beverly Hills 90210 episodes) Thus, the problems of forming, implementing, and enforcing international law provide yet another avenue for argumentation.

Conclusions

Obviously, framing the debate (also known as "ball parking") is important. Proving what the end goal of the state is can provide you with a lot of ground. If the goal of the state is to provide national security for example, opening borders to unfettered trade probably isn't the best option. On the other hand, opening a "rogue" or oppressive nation to trade and influence from the outside world often has the effect of making the country more democratic. Even in nations with less obvious prejudices, opening a nation to influence from other societies via trade and communication often can decrease hostilities in the long term (even if there is the short term possibility of backlash). For a good overview of globalization, Thomas Friedman ([The Lexus and the Olive Tree](#), see NY Times archives), Jan Scholte ([Globalization: A Critical Introduction](#) and [International Affairs](#), v73 n3, July 1997 pp.427-52), Tomas Larsson ([The Race to the Top](#)), and the CATO Institute publish some good material. Remember, how the judge understands and in what light he or she views what your defending is as important as why your arguments outweigh your opponents.

¹⁰ [Public Choice and Rural Development](#), a collection of essays edited by Clifford S. Russell and Norman K. Nicholson, provides a good start for learning about how institutions alter the economic interactions between actors. In particular, Chapter 3, "Freeriders, Lemons, and Institutional Design" by Samuel Popkin explains the establishment of certain institutions and their effect on markets.

What is Globalization?

The January/February topic deals with an issue that, in social science, economic, and political circles, has been a very hot topic – globalization. The great thing about this is that there is a vast body of literature on the topic, many opinions on the issue, and many different arguments to explore. The topic is HUGE.

Kosmicki, Eugeniusz, "Shaping Globalization—A Challenge for 21st-Century Ethics and Politics," *Dialogue & Universalism*, 2001, v. 11, no. 3.

Globalization emerged as a major economic and political issue after 1989 and the disappearance of the dichotomy of the "socialist" and the "free" world. As a result of this, many previously concealed political and economic contradictions came to light and began to gain importance. Globalization in its present form is about 30 years old, the term first appearing in an English-language dictionary in 1961 (it did not, however, become widely known until 1981). In result of economic globalization, markets and production in individual countries became increasingly interrelated. This was accompanied by the globalization of technology, especially IT. Today we may already speak of "one world", as described by I. Wallerstein's world system concept. According to Wallerstein, there is only one world, very diversified but nevertheless a single entity. This world consists of central, transitional, and peripheral areas of social and economic activity, closely linked together to form a system based on economic, social, and ecological domination. Globalization is mainly enhanced by the dynamic growth of national markets, the emergence of transnational corporations, new (global) production technologies, the growth of the international financial market, and revolutionary developments in communications, particularly the transition to today's information society model.

Because of the size of the topic, it will be absolutely critical for debaters to have a clear understanding of what globalization is. Definitions are going to be very important. It will also be very important for debaters to be prepared to deal with all different aspects of what globalization may mean, or else many debates may become ships passing in the night.

First, it's important to realize that globalization refers to a PROCESS.

Shaw, Martin, Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 2000, pp. 9.

If we are to understand the global revolution, we must first extricate the idea of the global from simple concepts of the process of globalization. As I have already suggested, the latter term logically implies an understanding of the former: globalization must be the way in which things are made global.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. "Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society," *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 118.

The term 'globalisation' has become quite fashionable today, so much as that it almost gives the impression of expressing a completely new concept. Not only that, but one also wonders whether, in its noun form, it contains any new significance or still retains the old meaning derived from its adjectival and adverbial forms. That its meaning is not taken for granted is demonstrated by the many attempts to define it whenever necessary because, unlike the adjective 'global,' the noun 'globalisation' is not an abstract concept. Rather, it describes concrete developments or undertakings.

Definitions

Barrientos, Stephanie, "Globalization and Ethical Trade: Assessing the Implications for Development," *Journal of International Development*, May 2000, v. 12, no. 4, pp. 562.

Globalization is often discussed, but there is a lack of agreement over its definition and extent. Broadly globalization relates to a shift away from the predominance of nation states, and increased integration among countries. This is both economic and social, linked to economic deregulation and technological innovation. These have led to the lifting of trade barriers and expanding trade flows, rapid expansion of global financial markets and financial flows, and the increased activity of large multi-national companies. Information and communication systems have developed at a phenomenal rate (especially through the Internet). Consumption patterns have changed, fuelled by increased global sourcing. At the same time there has been a reduction in the role of government in both economic and social policy, with increased emphasis on the free market as the main mechanism for development, and global governance as a basis for policy. Barriers between nations have been broken down, global processes have allowed a conflating of time and space, and we are all now participants in a 'global village' (Amin and Thrift, 1994).

Guilbernau, Montserrat, "Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, and Democracy: An Interview with David Held," *Constellations*, December 2001, v. 8, no. 4, pp. 427.

DAVID HELD: Globalization is fundamentally a spatial phenomenon; it lies on a spectrum with the local and national at one end, and the (supranational) regional and global at the other. It is about the stretching of connections, relations, and networks between human communities, an increase in the intensity of these, and a general speeding up of all these phenomena. Globalization denotes transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and power. It is, in short, about the interconnections between different regions of the world – from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the environmental – and the ways in which they change over time.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. "Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society," *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 119.

As a historical phenomenon, globalisation generally refers to the sharing and spreading of ideas, values and utilities to individuals and nations across the globe. Such ideas and utilities include developments in areas such as communication, education, technology, science, economics, politics, transport, migration, and ecology. This kind of sharing that takes place in globalisation is an implicit admission that, as Pobee (1997: 69) puts it, 'no one group can go through it alone.

Tangwa, Godfrey B. "Globalisation or Westernisation? Ethical Concerns in the Whole Bio-Business," *Bioethics*, vol. 13, no. ¾, 1999, p. 219.

Globalisation, as a descriptive process, has been made possible and inevitable by advances in science and technology, especially in loco-motion and communication technologies. The net result of these advances has been increased contact between the various peoples and cultures that populate the world. Thanks to this state of affairs, the world is today, unlike yesterday, aptly described as a 'global village'.

Tangwa, Godfrey B. "Globalisation or Westernisation? Ethical Concerns in the Whole Bio-Business," *Bioethics*, vol. 13, no. ¾, 1999, p. 219.

Globalisation, as a prescriptive process, arises from increasing awareness of both the diversity as well as interdependence of the various parts, peoples and cultures of the world. Globalisation in this sense, is essentially a moral concept.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Introduction," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 2.

Globalism is a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances. These networks can be linked through flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances (such as acid rain or pathogens). Globalization and deglobalization refer to the increase or decline of globalism.

Kosmicki, Eugeniusz, "Shaping Globalization—A Challenge for 21st-Century Ethics and Politics," *Dialogue & Universalism*, 2001, v. 11, no. 3.

Globalization is a rapidly-developing process, with all the countries of our planet moving towards social, economic, and ecological unity. Globalization should be understood as the expansion of socially interrelated activities beyond national borders and towards a more global dimension.¹ It is, therefore, a phenomenon that extends beyond traditional social, political and economic frontiers. Globalization has also brought about major changes regarding the state's role in the economy (although state structures continue to have some importance in the process).

Kosmicki, Eugeniusz, "Shaping Globalization—A Challenge for 21st-Century Ethics and Politics," *Dialogue & Universalism*, 2001, v. 11, no. 3.

Globalization is frequently understood as broad scale liberalization based on the introduction of world-scale market relations, the abolition of restrictions in international trade, and, finally, the creation of a single, global market.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part I)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 1, pp. 3.

When precisely defined in a particular way, the concept of 'globalisation' can elude jargon and capture a distinct and key development in contemporary history. In a word, to invoke Roland Robertson's felicitous phrase, the world has in many respects become a single place (1992). Not only has the density of contacts between locations worldwide greatly increased on the whole, but also, in a qualitative break with the past, many of those connections have become well-nigh instantaneous. 'Globalisation', then, is the process whereby a supraterritorial, distanceless, borderless realm has been added to social space.

In many ways, the concept of globalization begs the more basic question – what are we globalizing?

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. "Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society," *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 118-119.

The Oxford dictionary describes the adjective 'global' as: 'worldwide, pertaining to or embracing the whole of a group of items etc; total; ...' The dictionary does not provide a noun form for the word. It is perhaps in this sense that 'globalisation' can be regarded as a new concept. Nevertheless, its meaning is not far removed from its adjective but simply gives it flesh. It may thus be said to refer to the act of making worldwide or global. As such, however, it cannot be separated from its object in practice. It must necessarily answer to the question concerning what it is that is being made worldwide or to pertain to the or embrace a whole group of items. Thus whereas the term 'global' tells us that something is regarded as worldwide, 'globalisation' informs us of the process of making worldwide. In this process the object of globalisation – that is, what is being made worldwide – is necessarily implied. It now becomes clear why it is found necessary to define the term in the many writings about globalisation. Before proceeding with the topic before us, therefore, we need to move a step further and ask the question, What exactly is the object of globalisation?

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

Everyone is talking about globalization -- a phenomenon all the more significant because it is generally considered inevitable and beyond anyone's control. What does it mean? Although there are many works on this subject, the concept remains unclear. For some, globalization is a development beyond the nation-state. For others, it defines a new type of opposition between capital and labor brought about by the rise of finance capital, or a new separation between skilled and unskilled labor. Some see it as the expansion of world-trade with the inclusion of new players from the South (accompanied by the globalization strategy of multinational corporations), while others emphasize the broadening of exchange caused by the information revolution. What is it really?

Globalization – in today’s world – proceeds along many dimensions.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. "Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society," *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 120-121.

Today more attention on globalisation is focused on developments in the fields of communication and information, as well as science and technology, as reflected in the worlds of television and other mass media; in the worlds of computers, the Internet and their related programs, as well as the boom in cellphones and other forms of telecommunications media. In addition to these areas and that of culture reflected above, globalisation is also strongly manifested in the areas of politics and the economy. Ideally, interaction in all these forms should benefit people all over the world. For instance, few people would deny the benefits of cultural influences described by Marzui. Through developments in aspect of globalisation such as communication and information technology, we are able to keep abreast of what is happening in other parts of the world and can also communicate nationally and internationally within seconds. We have television and radio, the Internet and telephone (including cellphones) to thank for that. Sciences such as medical research and new inventions and developments in technology should be of benefit to people all over the world. Politically, the multiparty democratic system of penetrating all areas of the world and is replacing traditional systems of governance, one-party states and dictatorial regimes, making them unpopular and obsolete. Finally, the world’s economy is certainly clearly dominated by capitalism, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the last decade, though even long before then.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Introduction," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 3.

Interdependence and globalism are both multidimensional phenomena. All too often, they are defined in strictly economic terms, as if the world economy defined globalism. But other forms of globalism are equally important. The oldest form of globalization is environmental: climate change has affected the ebb and flow of human populations for millions of years. Migration is a long-standing phenomenon. The human species begin to leave its place of origin, Africa, about 1.25 million years ago and reached the Americas sometime between 30,000 and 13,000 years ago. One of the most important forms of globalization is biological. The first smallpox epidemic is recorded is Egypt in 1350 B.C. It reached China in 49 A.D., Europe after 700; the Americas in 1520, and Australia in 1789. The plague of Black Death originated in Asia, but its spread killed a quarter to a third of the population of Europe between 1346 and 1352. When Europeans journeyed to the New World in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries they carried pathogens they destroyed up to 95 percent of the indigenous population. Today, human impact on global climate change could affect the lives of people everywhere.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Introduction," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 5.

Social and cultural globalism involves movements of ideas, information, and images, and of people – who of course carry ideas and information with them. Examples include the movement of religions or the diffusion of scientific knowledge. An important facet of social globalism involves imitation of one society's practices and institutions by others: what some sociologists refer to as "isomorphism." Often, however, social globalism has followed military and economic globalism. Ideas and information and people follow armies and economic flows, and in so doing, transform societies and markets.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part I)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 1, pp. 3-4.

As the term is understood here, then, globalisation refers to the emergence and spread of a supraterritorial, transworld dimension of social relations. In institutional terms, the process has unfolded through the proliferation and growth of so-called 'transnational' corporations, popular associations and regulatory agencies (sometimes alternatively termed global companies, global civil society and global regimes, respectively). Ecologically, globalisation has taken place in the shape of planetary climate change, atmospheric ozone depletion, worldwide epidemics and the decline of Earth's biodiversity, amongst other things. Economically, in what Karl Marx anticipated as capital's 'annihilation of space by time' (1847-8: 524), globality has been realized *inter alia* in twenty-four-hour round-the-world financial markets, transworld production lines and a host of global consumption articles. Normatively, globalisation has occurred through the expansion of worldwide standards (e.g., common scales of measurement and so-called universal human rights) as well as through networks of collective solidarity that span multiple countries (e.g., amongst women, the disabled or indigenous peoples). Psychologically, globalisation has developed through growing consciousness of the world as a single place, an awareness reinforced by everyday experiences of diet, music and dress, as well as photographs from outer space showing planet Earth as one location. In these various ways, the rise of supraterritoriality has been comprehensive, in some form and to some degree spanning all aspects of social relations.

Many of these aspects converge in modern-day globalization.

Jacobsen, Michael and Stephanie Lawson, "Between Globalization and Localization: A Case Study of Human Rights Versus State Sovereignty," *Global Governance*, April-June 1999, v. 5, no. 2.

Contemporary manifestations of globalization are observable in a variety of contexts--social, political, economic, technological, corporate, demographic, cultural--that are not neatly separable. Indeed, it is in the nature of globalization that these spheres are becoming more closely intertwined--as are the human communities that give them meaning and substance. Commentators have noted both positive and negative aspects of globalization. On the one hand, the phenomenon seems to hold promise for the further development and strengthening of international norms, especially in terms of human rights standards. On the other hand, analyses of certain manifestations of globalization have highlighted a number of negative social effects linked to structural adjustment, migration, criminal activities, and ethnic conflict. The enmeshment of human communities and their spheres of activity in global dynamics, however, is but one important trend. At the same time, localization and/or fragmentation is also a significant phenomenon. But such tendencies are not necessarily contradictory to at least some aspects of globalization. It has been suggested, for example, that processes leading to the strengthening of local and regional identities may in fact contribute to a cosmopolitan global culture.

Despite the multidimensional nature of globalization, most authors focus on economic globalization.

Apel, Karl-Otto, "Globalization and the Need for Universal Ethics," *European Journal of Social Theory*, v. 3, no. 2, 2000, pp. 137.

Globalization in our day has become a key word for a process that is primarily concerning an international expansion of economy, or more precisely, a systemic intertwining of financial capitalism and communication technology that seems to exceed any control by the nation state and hence by social policy so far.

Kosmicki, Eugeniusz, "Shaping Globalization—A Challenge for 21st-Century Ethics and Politics," *Dialogue & Universalism*, 2001, v. 11, no. 3.

Thus, we can safely say that economic globalization is determined by market competition and the drive towards maximum profit. Economically, globalization is visible in five areas that are not always easy to separate: the rapid growth of international trade, the rising number of foreign investment projects, the expansion of international financial markets, the rising importance of international share capital, the emergence of global production sourcing and integrated international production resultant from new developments in communications and transport, and the transformation of traditional, national states into "competitive" states whose liberal, decentralized and privatized economies offer favorable conditions for foreign investment.

The Inevitability of Globalization

Bauman, Zygmunt, "The Ethical Challenge of Globalization," *NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly*, Fall 2001 (October), v. 18, no. 4, pp. 4-5.

Nothing can be done to reverse globalization. One can be "in favor" or "against" that the new globality of our inter-dependency with an effect similar to supporting or resenting the next solar or lunar eclipse.

Bauman, Zygmunt, "The Ethical Challenge of Globalization," *NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly*, Fall 2001 (October), v. 18, no. 4, pp. 8.

Retreat from the globalization of human dependency, from the global reach of human technology and economic activities is, in all probability, no longer in the cards. Answers like "circle the wagons" or "back to the tribal (national, communal) tents" won't do. The question is not how to turn back the river of history, but how to fight its pollution and to channel its flow toward more equitable distribution of the benefits it carries.

Others argue that globalization is not inevitable, and is a contested political process that can be evaluated.

Rosenburg, Tina. "So far, globalization has failed the world's poor. But it's not trade that has hurt them. It's a rigged system. The Free-Trade Fix." Pg. 30.

"It is often said that globalization is a force of nature, as unstoppable and difficult to contain as a storm. This is untrue and misleading. Globalization is a powerful phenomenon- but it is not irreversible, and indeed the previous wave of globalization, at the turn of the last century, was stopped dead by World War I. Today it would be more likely for globalization to be sabotaged by its own inequities, as disillusioned nations withdraw from a system they see as indifferent or harmful to the poor."

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

There is a line of thinking that regards globalization as a compression of time and space (Giddens, 1990; Harvey, 1990; Robertson, 1992). In other words, with new technologies that speed transactions and shrink distances, both time barriers and spatial constraints are lessened. Anthony Giddens sees this process as part of the inherent unfolding of modernity and as a spur towards interconnectedness. Elaborating the concept of time-space compression, David Harvey shows the radically different ways that thinking about, and the representations of, the ordering of time and space have changed. Both Harvey and Roland Robertson view time-space compression as a cultural force and, for Robertson, it is driven by global consciousness. Importantly, one must look at the links between this compression and social relations, for globalizing processes are not socially or politically neutral. Rather, they are both constitutive of and constitute social relations. Of course, the argument mounted by these theorists becomes entangled with the debates over modernity and the postmodern critique. In my view, it is useful to separate analysis of globalization from any notion that it is necessarily an outcome of a process such as modernity, as if it had its own laws. To think otherwise runs the risk of positing an end-point, a teleology (Albrow, 1996: 99). Rather, if globalization is a contested and a political phenomenon, then it cannot have a predetermined outcome. A political agenda of inevitability overlooks the fact that globalization was made by humans and as such can be unmade or remade by humankind.

Globalization should be critically examined.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part I)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 1, pp. 8.

[T]he modern world system has produced widespread violence, arbitrary hierarchies and avoidable deprivation. Critical discourse recognizes that, given this historical record, the rise of supraterritoriality could well involve an extension and reinvigoration – perhaps in new forms – of imperialism, xenophobia, patriarchy, racism, militarism, authoritarianism, fundamentalism, nihilism and other recurrent predicaments of modernity. Globalisation's transformation of the space-time dimension of social life should therefore be greeted not with conservative disavowals or liberal confidence, but with vigilance. There are no obvious or unambiguous, let alone necessary, connections between globalisation and freedom. Rather, it is the task of critical knowledge to maximize the trend's emancipatory potential: by exposing the inadequacies of orthodoxy – conceptually, empirically and ethically – and by imaginatively restructuring the theory and practice of globalisation.

Globalization should be distinguished from Westernization.

Tangwa, Godfrey B. "Globalisation or Westernisation? Ethical Concerns in the Whole Bio-Business," *Bioethics*, vol. 13, no. 3/4, 1999, p. 219.

But between globalisation as a descriptive process and globalisation as a prescriptive ideal, there is a difference which involves the danger that globalisation might end up as or, in fact, might not and never has been more than, mere Westernisation, given the history and reality of Western industrial-technological power, colonization of non-Westerners, domination and insensitivity to all things non-Western.

Even the studies about globalization are biased.

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

One of the reasons for undertaking this special issue of *Third World Quarterly* is that globalization studies are not really global. For the most part, globalization research has centered on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, not the developing world.

National Sovereignty and Interdependence

Sovereignty gives a nation control over its own affairs.

Arntzen, Sven, "Kant's Denial of Absolute Sovereignty," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, March 1995, v. 76, no. 1, pg. 2.

An absolute sovereign is one who has the sole authority to decide all questions in the commonwealth, including the question of whether or not to stay in power.

Gelber, Harry G. Sovereignty Through Independence. Kulwer Law International, Cambridge, MA, 1997 pp. 74-75.

Sovereign status implies, at least in principle, the exclusiveness of that sovereign's authority within his own territory, a right to nonintervention in the affairs of one's state and the equality of states in terms of status and law. It involves the unique right of every independent state entity to control its own destiny, without undue external pressure. This sovereign state is the protector of territorial and economic security, the provider of safety, continuity and stability, and the supreme lawgiver. If a state is a complete legal order, and the writ of its municipal law runs throughout its territory, it is legally and formally sovereign. It possesses external legitimacy and prestige. All subordinate organizations, however large and powerful are legally the citizens of some state or states.

A sovereign, though, not only possesses authority but has obligations.

Husak, Douglas N., "Sovereigns and Third Party Beneficiaries," *Journal of Value Inquiry*, Summer 1979, v. 79, no. 13, pg. 153.

Any version of social contract theory that succeeds in accounting for political obligation cannot fail to treat the sovereign as a party to the social contract. Hence the sovereign cannot be insulated from demands made upon him by citizens who seek to require him to perform his contractual obligations.

Sovereignty can be further divided into separate concepts.

Quiggin, John. "Globalization and Economic Sovereignty," *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2001, p. 56.

In assessing claims about globalization and sovereignty, it is useful to begin by observing that sovereignty is itself a complex term. Krasner usefully distinguishes four different concepts of sovereignty. *International legal sovereignty* is the acceptance of a given state as a member of the international community, and is, in most cases, relatively uncontroversial. *Westphalian sovereignty* is based on the principle that one sovereign state should not interfere in the domestic arrangements of another. *Interdependence sovereignty* is the capacity and willingness to control flows of people, goods and capital into and out of a country. *Domestic sovereignty* is the capacity of a state to choose and implement policies within its territory.

National sovereignty is a foundational concept of international relations.

Gelber, Harry G. Sovereignty Through Independence. Kulwer Law International, Cambridge, MA, 1997 pp. 1.

The dominant institution of the political world has, for the last two or three hundred years, been the nation-state.

Claudio Grossman, Acting Dean and Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University; Raymond I. Geraldson Scholar in International and Humanitarian Law; member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and Daniel D. Bradlow, Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University, "ARE WE BEING PROPELLED TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?" The American University Journal of International Law & Policy (Fall 1993), page 1.

Sovereignty is the fundamental concept around which international law is presently organized. This principle holds that "except as limited by international law or treaty, each state is master of its own territory." n1 Consistent with this conception of absolute sovereignty, international law has traditionally been concerned with the relations between co-equal sovereign states. Each sovereign state can only be legally bound by those commitments it willingly makes to other sovereign states, and by those few principles which are viewed as binding on all states. Those issues that arise from the relationship between the state and its citizens, and between those citizens inter se, are viewed as part of the domestic affairs of each sovereign state and thus outside the scope of international law. p. 1.

The existing nation states have a inherent and vested interest in maintaining the primacy of sovereignty.

Gelber, Harry G. Sovereignty Through Independence. Kulwer Law International, Cambridge, MA, 1997 pp. 75.

Moreover, states have a common interest in maintaining the basic principles of sovereign statehood, a system which is only possible in an environment in which there are common understandings of its meaning, at least in outline. The existence of states thus defined is logically as well as in practice, prior to the creation and maintenance of any international legal order in which they are the chief participants and the dominant albeit not sole, interpreters and enforcers of substantive rules. It involves a presumption by the international community of the sovereign state's competence to act. The sovereign's own consent is a condition for binding international adjudication. Sovereigns also retain the traditional rights of *jus ad bellum*, or the right to go to war. As James Crawford points out, international law has to do almost entirely with powers of action, even *contra legem*, or against legal rules. The implications, inevitably include rights of intervention against another.

National sovereignty is also linked to notions of government legitimacy.

Sassen, Saskia. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. Columbia University Press. 1996. Pg. 2.

"By the end of World War II, the notion of sovereignty based on the will of the people had become established as one of the conditions of political legitimacy for a government."

Kilby, Christopher, "Aid and Sovereignty," *Social Theory and Practice*, Spring 1999, v. 25, no. 1, pp. 83-84.

There is, however, a philosophical tradition that views state sovereignty as a right that derives from the rights of the individual citizens and the legitimacy of the state. Based on natural law or other arguments, most modern philosophers place the individual's right to self-determination high on the list of human rights. Viewing the state as a collection of individuals, the domestic analogy translates respect for self-determination of the individual into respect for sovereignty of the legitimate state (i.e., one considered legitimate by a substantial majority of its citizens—a government not maintained by continual threat of force against its citizens—and that does not engage in criminal activities such as the widespread violation of human rights, including subsistence rights). Although we may favor a particular form of government, we must accord any legitimate state the right to sovereignty over its territorial domain and domestic policies.

Respect for national sovereignty permits an international system based on tolerance of different government systems.

Blaney, David L. and Naeem Inayatullah, "The Westphalian Deferral," *International Studies Review*, Summer 200, v. 2, no. 2, p. 49.

In contrast with "multinational empires," as discussed in the introduction, international society ideally achieves a form of toleration among equals—among a society of sovereign states. As Walzer (1997: 19-20) describes this regime:

"Sovereignty guarantees that no one on *that* side of the border can interfere with what is done on *this* side. The people over there may be resigned, indifferent, stoical, curious, or enthusiastic with regard to practices over here, and so may be disinclined to interfere. Or perhaps, they accept the reciprocal logic of sovereignty: we won't worry about our practices if you don't worry about ours. Live and let live is a relatively easy maxim when the living is done on opposite sides of a clearly marked line. Or they may be actively hostile, eager to denounce their neighbor's culture and customs, but unprepared to pay the costs of interference."

Though sovereignty has its limits—barbarism is unacceptable—it secures substantial tolerance precisely because it is such a "weak regime." A stronger regime places heavier demands on its members, justifying greater intervention in their "internal" affairs (Walzer 1997: 19, 21-22).

Blaney, David L. and Naeem Inayatullah, "The Westphalian Deferral," *International Studies Review*, Summer 200, v. 2, no. 2, p. 50.

To sustain international society as a "regime of toleration," this boundary must be policed. On the one side, this means a constant battle to expose the pretensions of a globalist ethics. Because the idea of a global society is chimerical, the national political community dominates our "bonds of commonality" and is good in itself (Walzer 1983:29-30). Thus, we are justified in resisting the kind of category mistake that occurs when we speak of humanity or the globe. Walzer (1998:232) suggests we "fight against the propensity of [critics] to think that when they look in the mirror they see the entire world"—a propensity that provides an alibi for imposing such imagined commonalities on others. Walzer's warning is very timely, but we wonder if the choices he poses—either the nation-state or the globe—adequately describes our alternatives. Even Bull doubts that the choice is that simple. We will return to this issue below.

Challenges to Sovereignty: The Fact of Global Interdependence

Technology has made the world a smaller place.

Frankel, Jeffrey. "Globalization of the Economy," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 45.

The two major drivers of economic globalization are reduced costs to transportation and communication in the private sector and reduced policy barriers to trade and investment on the part of the public sector. Technological progress and innovation have long been driving the costs of transportation and communication steadily lower. In the postwar period we have seen further cost-saving advances, even within ocean shipping; supertankers, roll-on-roll-off ships, and containerized cargo.

Frankel, Jeffrey. "Globalization of the Economy," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 45.

Between 1920 and 1990 the average ocean freight and port charges per short ton of U.S. import and export cargo fell from \$95.00 to \$29.00 (in 1990 dollars). An increasing share of cargo goes by air. Between 1930 and 1990, average air transport revenue per passenger mile fell from \$0.68 to \$0.11. Jet air shopping and refrigeration have changed the status of goods that had previously been classified altogether as not tradable internationally. Now fresh-cut flowers, perishable broccoli and strawberries, live lobsters, and even ice cream are sent between continents.

What happens in one part of the world inevitably affects what happens in another part of the world.

Claudio Grossman, Acting Dean and Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University; Raymond I. Geraldson Scholar in International and Humanitarian Law; member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and Daniel D. Bradlow, Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University, "ARE WE BEING PROPELLED TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?" The American University Journal of International Law & Policy (Fall 1993), page 20.

As the world is becoming more integrated, the range of factors that influence both national and international peace and security has expanded. Threats to national and international well-being can arise from environmental, social, economic and human rights problems, as well as from traditional military sources. n49 For example, social conflict in one area of the world can interrupt the supply of goods and services to countries across the globe, as well as cause human migrations that overtax the resources of other countries and internationalize local conflicts. In addition, global integration has enhanced the general awareness of the interconnectedness of human beings. On occasion this awareness has stimulated a sense of solidarity in the international community. As a result, the international community has taken a growing interest in local conflicts that directly affect only the internal peace of sovereign states. p. 20

Camdessus, Michel, "Church Social Teaching and Globalization," *America*, October 15, 2001, v. 185, no. 11.

Because of the intricacy of globalized relationships between countries, what affects one country affects many others in the new world economy. The crisis in Thailand in 1997 and the string of subsequent catastrophes in Korea, Indonesia, Russia and Brazil clearly demonstrated that whether a country is large or small, any economic crisis can now become systemic throughout the global marketplace. Domestic economic policy must, therefore, take into account its potential worldwide impact. Every country, large or small, is responsible for the stability and quality of world growth.

Singer, Peter, "Navigating the Ethics of Globalization," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 11, 2002, v. 49, no. 7.

CONSIDER two aspects of globalization: first, planes exploding as they slam into the World Trade Center, and second, the emission of carbon dioxide from the exhaust of gas-guzzling sport-utility vehicles. One brought instant death and left unforgettable images that were watched on television screens all over the world; the other makes a contribution to climate change that can be detected only by scientific instruments. Yet both are indications of the way in which we are now one world, and the more subtle changes to which sport-utility--vehicle owners unintentionally contribute will almost certainly kill far more people than the more visible aspect of globalization. When people in rich nations switch to vehicles that consume more fuel than the cars they used to drive, they contribute to changes in the climate of Mozambique or Bangladesh--changes that may cause crops to fail, sea levels to rise, and tropical diseases to spread.

Singer, Peter, "Navigating the Ethics of Globalization," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 11, 2002, v. 49, no. 7.

Terrorism has made our world an integrated community in a new and frightening way. Not merely the activities of our neighbors, but those of the inhabitants of the most remote mountain valleys of the farthest-flung countries of our planet have become our business. We need to extend the reach of the criminal law there and to have the means to bring terrorists to justice without declaring war on an entire country in order to do it. For that we need a sound global system of criminal justice, so justice does not become the victim of national differences of opinion.

Bauman, Zygmunt, "The Ethical Challenge of Globalization," *NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly*, Fall 2001 (October), v. 18, no. 4, pp. 4.

"Globalization" means that we are all dependent on each other. Distances matter little now. Whatever happens in one place may have global consequences. With the resources, technical tools and know-how we have acquitted, our actions span enormous distances in space and time. However locally confined our intentions might have been, we would be ill-advised to leave out of account global factors, since they could decide the success or failure of our actions. What we do (or abstain from doing) may influence the conditions of life (or death) of people in places we will never visit and of generations we will never know.

One nation cannot solve problems by itself.

Claudio Grossman, Acting Dean and Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University; Raymond I. Geraldson Scholar in International and Humanitarian Law; member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and Daniel D. Bradlow, Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University, "ARE WE BEING PROPELLED TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?" *The American University Journal of International Law & Policy* (Fall 1993), page 15.

In the past fifteen to twenty years, developments in information technologies and telecommunications have revolutionized the world economy and the way in which human beings conduct their day to day affairs. n27 These developments are "globalizing" the international economy and creating transnational linkages between private actors. In short, these technological developments have so undermined the concept of sovereignty that, on some issues, effective rule making and enforcement cannot take place, either at the domestic or the international level, without the full participation of interested private actors. Moreover, the globalized nature of these issues suggests the need for a coherent set of rules that will be applicable at both the domestic and the international level.

There is no such thing as a strictly domestic issue.

Claudio Grossman, "ARE WE BEING PROPELLED TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?" *The American University Journal of International Law & Policy* (Fall 1993), page 22-23.

Second, international law must adapt to the reality that the instantaneous transmittal of information around the globe ensures that the impact of all significant social, economic, cultural, and political issues transcend national boundaries. This development transforms all of these issues into either domesticated international issues or internationalized domestic issues in the sense that they simultaneously affect all societies and are influenced by the national debates in each of these societies. Furthermore, this concept reveals that the belief in a clear distinction between domestic and international legal issues is fundamentally flawed. p. 22-23

The salient problems of our times are not local.

Ruiz, Pedro Ortega and Ramón Mínguez, "Global Inequality and the Need for Compassion: issues in moral and political education," *Journal of Moral Education*, June 2001, v. 30, no. 2, pp. 158.

During the last few decades it could be though the relationships and obligations of the citizen started and finished in their local community, in their *polis*, or at most in their national community. Now, on the other hand, we are concerned by problems occurring far from our frontiers or the conventional established limits. We have become aware that we are immersed in problems of such magnitude (environmental, pollution, poverty and marginalisation of a large part of the world's population, ethnic-cultural conflicts, etc.) that we seriously question localist attempts and have thrown to the winds the recipes so long applied to solve our problems. A new concept of citizenship and the citizen has been imposed on us. Our *polis* has become too small. The diversity of cultures and national frontiers are not longer barriers to the recognition of our inter-dependency and implication in problems which we now must share.

Beam, Craig. "Liberalism, Globalization, and Cultural Relativism," *Dialogue*, vol. 73, 1999, p. 110.

Social issues that once dealt with by countries and provinces now require global solutions. The same goes for the latest crop of environmental issues: acid rain, global warming, and the depletion of the ozone layer are all "problems without frontiers."

The fact of interdependence also means that if atrocities happen in one part of the world, other parts of the world cannot claim complete innocence.

Bauman, Zygmunt, "The Ethical Challenge of Globalization," *NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly*, Fall 2001 (October), v. 18, no. 4, pp. 6.

Whenever human beings suffer indignity, misery or pain, we cannot be sure of our moral innocence. We cannot declare that we did not know, nor can we be certain that there was nothing we could change in our conduct that wouldn't avert or at least alleviate the sufferers' fate. We might have been impotent individually, but we could do something together, and togetherness is made of and by individuals.

The trouble is—as another great 20th-century philosopher, Hans Jonas, complained—that although space and time no longer set limits on the effects of our actions, our moral imagination has not progressed much beyond the scope it had acquired in the times of Adam and Eve. Responsibilities we are ready to assume have not ventured as far as has the influence that our daily conduct exerts on the lives of ever more distant people.

The Effect on Sovereignty

Clarke, John N. "Ethics and Humanitarian Intervention," *Global Society*, vol. 13, no. 4, 1999, p. 491.

Over the past three decades, the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention have been subject to pressure from two different realms. First, from empirical developments such as increasing economic interdependence, and second, from the expanding scope of normative claims about human rights and other "duties across borders."

Globalization has impacted national sovereignty in many ways.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part II)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 65.

That said, globalisation has brought several important changes to the position of the state in social relations. First, sovereign statehood, always to some extent mythical, is now indisputably untenable. A state's claims to exercise ultimate and absolute authority over a particular territory are empty when global factories, global financial markets, global information flows, global broadcasting, global regulatory regimes, global coalitions, global knowledge forms and global ecological changes utterly disregard custom posts. In global space, power relates chiefly to control of flows rather than control of places, and in this respect sovereignty has become irrelevant as well as illusory.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part II)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 65.

Second, warfare – military struggle between states for territorial occupation, historically one of the state's principal activities – has arguably been discouraged in the more intensely globalised parts of the world as supraterritorial interests have gained greater sway. States today more often deploy armed force for internal suppression (Haiti, Indonesia) or to bolster another state under threat of collapse (Lebanon, Liberia) than for external territorial conquest. Two-thirds of the world's states have recently used their armies against peoples they claim as citizens (Nietschmann 1994).

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part II)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 65.

Third, in the present period of globalisation the survival of the state has become partly contingent upon serving suprateritorial flows, at times possibly to the detriment of traditional, territorially circumscribed constituencies.

NOTE: what Scholte is saying is that globalization often pressures states into serving more global concerns, to the detriment of the concerns of its own constituencies.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part II)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 65.

The state's accommodation of global forces has frequently entailed some form of deregulation of economic activity, especially during the 1980s. The removal, through the GATT/WTO and various regional customs unions, of numerous state-imposed trade barriers has facilitated both global-scale production and the concentration of global capital. In addition, many state controls on banking, stock markets and foreign exchange transactions have been relaxed to appease global financial markets, whose cyberspace cannot be effectively regulated at a national level in any case. As already mentioned, many states, socialist as well as corporatist, have reduced workers' protection, welfare services, corporate taxation and anti-monopoly measures in order to entice global companies that might otherwise locate elsewhere. In consequence of such cuts, many poor and otherwise marginalised people have been compelled to turn more to informal arrangements rather than to the state for personal and group security (Cox 1994: 22).

The Moral Irrelevance of National Sovereignty

An overemphasis on national borders prevents us from acting morally.

Pogge, Thomas W., "The Moral Demands of Global Justice," *Dissent*, Fall 2000, v. 47, no. 4, pp. 40.

This response—that children must have their basic needs met—is one we would give unquestioningly in a domestic context. We would find it intolerable if, somewhere in the United States, infant mortality were 20 percent because of lack of food, safe water, basic sanitation, basic health services, and primary education. Why are similar conditions abroad seen as so much more acceptable? Obviously, the national border around our country plays a significant role in our moral thinking.

Pogge, Thomas W., "The Moral Demands of Global Justice," *Dissent*, Fall 2000, v. 47, no. 4, pp. 42.

The U.S. government has gone far out of its way to deny that the World Food Summit pledge, which calls hunger "intolerable" and "unacceptable," gives rise to any international obligations. This great moral error, shared by most governments and citizens of the developed countries, is the principal obstacle to eradicating world hunger. Without a sense of moral responsibility for the global economic order we are imposing, there will not be the political will to reform this order, nor sufficient readiness by governments and individuals to mitigate its worst effects.

Moral issues necessarily must transcend national boundaries.

Coglianesse, Cary. "Globalization and the Design of International Institutions," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 300.

A third type of global problem involves the protection of core, or transcendent, values. Moral principles such as equality, liberty, and democracy can be said to transcend current political practices. Principled claims about rights to treatment with dignity and respect inhere in human beings as human beings, and not as citizens of a particular country. Hence, ensuring at least a minimal amount of respect for human rights is almost by definition a global problem. Moreover, the current period of globalization may be creating conditions under which important social values are becoming more widely accepted across the world

The nation-state is not sacrosanct. Other forms of political organization are possible.

Krasner, Stephen D., *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NY, 1999, pp. 228.

Alternatives to states have always existed. Some have been short-lived or of limited import, such as the French Community proposed by de Gaulle in the late 1950s or the Commonwealth of Independent States organized by Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Others have been more durable, such as the Holy Roman Empire, which lasted from the ninth century until 1806, and the British Commonwealth. While some older institutions have virtually, although not completely, disappeared, such as protectorates, new ones have appeared, such as the European Union. Some alternatives to sovereignty have endured for hundreds of years, virtually unnoticed, such as Andorra.

National sovereignty has permitted tremendous injustice and oppression.

Barzani, Massoud, "Hope Restored: An Interview with Massoud Barzani: Benefits of Humanitarian Intervention," *Harvard International Review*, Fall 1993, v. 16, no. 1.

For years, dictators have barricaded themselves behind the sovereignty of their states to justify gross human rights violations and have considered their mistreatment and abuses as purely internal matters out of reach of the civilized world. The Kurds, who are unrepresented at the "club of nations," have been the victims of this attitude. In Iraq, the Kurdish people, numbering 3.5 million, were the target of a genocidal campaign by the Iraqi regime. They had nowhere to go to make their voices heard and present their case except for the UN Human Rights Commission, chaired at the time, ironically, by the Iraqi representative at UN Headquarters in Geneva.

Barzani, Massoud, "Hope Restored: An Interview with Massoud Barzani: Benefits of Humanitarian Intervention," *Harvard International Review*, Fall 1993, v. 16, no. 1.

In 1988, Iraq used poison gas to decimate whole communities of Kurds. Our cries and pleas over this flagrant violation of international law went unheard except by a few decent Western journalists who called for intervention.

The Kurds are proud that through the cruelty and barbarity perpetrated upon them by the Iraqi regime, they have moved the consciousness of the world to introduce the principle of humanitarian intervention as a precedent in international relations. This historical and unique principle now has a legal foundation embodied in UN Security Council Resolution 688, which demands an end to repression of civilian populations by their sovereign governments.

The myth of the nation-state has permitted humanitarian disasters.

Stewart, Don, "Democratic Sovereignty," *Dialogue*, Winter 1988, v. 27, pp. 579-80.

When the concept of the sovereign nation-state (and with it the legitimating concept of the social contract) came into play during the transition from feudal to modern society, it was *assumed* that individuals were essentially all alike and that states made up of such individuals would be culturally, linguistically and religiously homogeneous. Nothing, of course, was further from the truth. France, perhaps the exemplar of the nation state, was a pastiche of Basques, Bretons, Burgundians, Catalans, Corsicans, French, Gascons, Normans, Occitans, Provençals and Savoyards in the seventeenth century. Today, the culturally homogeneous nation state is equally mythical. Only countries like the United States which haven been based upon immigration and which have followed strong integrationist policies even approach the ideal of a state which is national in character and even it has significant Black and Hispanic minorities with some claims to national status. The concept of the nation state has been and remains, for the most part, little more than a legitimating myth of government.

Stewart, Don, "Democratic Sovereignty," *Dialogue*, Winter 1988, v. 27, pp. 580.

Myths, of course, should not be shunned simply because they are myths. The myth of the nation-state, however, though it has been remarkably successful in legitimating state regimes, has had results which are anything but morally edifying. Here is what I am sure is only a partial list of oppression and war over the past fifty years, legitimated in large part by the concept of the sovereignty of the nation state: the suppression of almost all of the non-Russian minorities in the Soviet Union; the annexation of Tibet by China; the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel, the Ammanese hegemony over Cambodia and South Vietnam; the repression of minorities in Cyprus, Fiji, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Malaysia, Namibia, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, the Philippines, Ruanda, Syria, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda and Zimbabwe; almost constant rebellion by Nagas and Shans in Burma, Kashmiris and Sikhs in India, Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Turkey, Kanaks in New Caledonia, Basques in Spain, Eritrians and Somalies in Ethiopia, Christians and Animist in the Sudan and by Tamils in Sri Lanka; and, finally, anti-colonial wars in which countries such as Algeria, Angola, Kenya, Mozambique and Zaire have managed to secure their independence. The myth of state sovereignty has worked rather poorly.

State consent should not matter.

Buchanan, Allen, "From Nuremburg to Kosovo: The Morality of Illegal International Legal Reform," *Ethics*, July 2001, v. 111, no. 4, pp. 691.

What is called state consent is really the consent of state leaders. But in the many states in which human rights are massively and routinely violated and where democratic institutions are lacking, state leaders cannot reasonably be regarded as agents of their people. Where human rights are violated, individuals are prevented or deterred from participating in processes of representation, consultation, and deliberation that are necessary if state leaders are to function as agents of the people capable of exercising authority on their behalf.

Evaluating Political Globalization

As explained earlier, the resolution begs the question – what are we globalizing? This section focuses on the idea of globalizing political institutions. What does that look like? In the ultimate, it would refer to the creation of a world government. Short of that, we are talking about the emergence of international organizations like the United Nations, the Criminal Court, NATO, etc. We are also talking about the creation of international norms and rules.

Political globalization is necessary because we need global solutions and cooperation.

Allison, Graham. "The Impact of Globalization on National and International Security," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 84.

Among the consequences: transnational problems, including economic, environmental, terrorist, cultural, criminal and other threats to national security cannot be resolved by national means alone. Solutions require regional and even global mechanisms of cooperation and coordination. Thus, technologically driven creation of linkages among points around the globe on dimensions including information, communication, finance, trade, and the use of military power, create demands for supranational governance.

Guilberneau, Montserrat, "Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, and Democracy: An Interview with David Held," *Constellations*, December 2001, v. 8, no. 4, pp. 429-30.

DAVID HELD: A second set of pressures for change concerns the emergence and increasing awareness of huge global challenges such as ozone depletion, global warming, and so on. These problems transcend the capacity of individual states to deal with them. This realization has created a new political agenda, and a new set of political circumstances. So here we have a second reason for why cross-border collaboration is possible: the emergence of massive new social problems which transcend the borders of states and which can only be dealt with by states if they work together.

The existence of nuclear weapons makes political globalization particularly important.

Somerville, John, "World Authority: Realities and Illusions," *Ethics*, October 1965, v. 76, no. 1, pp. 35.

In the contemporary world all governments understand the unprecedented destructiveness of the weapons developed during and since World War II. They realize that the use of these weapons could wipe out not only human civilization but the human race. Indeed, this very fact was one of the chief considerations leading to the creation of the UN in 1945.

We should see ourselves as global citizens.

Dower, Nigel, "The Idea of Global Citizenship – A Sympathetic Assessment," *Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations*, October 2000, v. 14, no. 4.

So what the conditions of the modern world suggest is that whilst a purely moral conception is inadequate and misleading, and a fully fledged conception in terms of adequately functioning institutions (whether world government or of other alternative kinds) is unrealistic, what is realistic and appropriate is an account along the following lines: "we are world citizens" 5"because of the nature of our global situation, we ought to work for global goals, and this involves using existing institutions appropriate to this and creating and strengthening institutions to the same end". This would be the conception offered by the theorist. Corresponding to this, we can define the agent who sees herself as a world citizen as "someone who sees herself as ethically committed to global goals, to using existing institutions appropriate to this and/or to creating and strengthening institutions to the same end". These conceptions (which may be seen as the objective and subjective conceptions, respectively) have sufficient anchorage in existing and intended institutions beyond the nation-state to provide an account of global citizenship which is both ethically robust and pragmatically appropriate to our global situation as we enter the third millennium.

A globalized polity is more moral than the present system based on national sovereignty.

Hehir, J. Bryan, "The Limits of Loyalty," *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2002, no. 132.
The international community is important and valid primarily as a moral concept that in turn can shape institutions and inform policy choices. Perhaps this moral meaning is better expressed in the notion of a "human community," which exists prior to the sovereign state and is a more appropriate point of reference for analyzing world politics. The moral reality of the international community is rooted in a shared human nature, and its normative imperative is one of solidarity--a conscious conviction that common humanity sustains a minimal number of moral obligations across cultures, national boundaries, and geographical distances.

Globalization reflects an ethic of participation and accountability.

Claudio Grossman, "ARE WE BEING PROPELLED TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?" *The American University Journal of International Law & Policy* (Fall 1993), page 23-24.
. . . two of the principles that should shape the new legal process can be identified. The first of these principles is that of participation. Essentially, all parties that will be directly affected by the decisions and actions taken, regarding any particular issue, should be able to participate in the formulation of those decisions. n53 While the form of participation may vary according to the nature of the issue involved, all affected parties should be assured of meaningful participation in the fora in which decisions are made. The second principle is that all affected parties should be able to hold [*24] those who make and implement policies that affect them accountable for their actions. The form of the accountability may vary, but generally a sustainable legal order must provide all those affected by a particular decision with the ability to hold those who make and implement the decision responsible for the consequences of their actions. The fact that sovereignty is irrelevant to these two principles means that they will help shape an international legal order that is people-centered, rather than state-centered. This focus creates the possibility for a much more cooperative and rights based legal order than exists under the present state-centered international order. p. 23-24

This ethic makes sovereignty less important.

Claudio Grossman, "ARE WE BEING PROPELLED TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?" *The American University Journal of International Law & Policy* (Fall 1993), page 23-24.
The fact that sovereignty is irrelevant to these two principles means that they will help shape an international legal order that is people-centered, rather than state-centered. This focus creates the possibility for a much more cooperative and rights based legal order than exists under the present state-centered international order. p. 24

Claudio Grossman, "ARE WE BEING PROPELLED TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?" *The American University Journal of International Law & Policy* (Fall 1993), page 24-25.
The new international legal order, therefore, needs a means to distinguish between legitimate international action in solidarity with other members of the global community and the unjustified use of power. The two basic principles offer a good starting point for finding a solution to this problem. Participation establishes the duty of every state or group, that seeks to intervene in the affairs of any other state or group, to obtain authorization for its actions through a decision-making mechanism in which all interested parties will have the right to participate. Account- [*25] ability establishes the right of the target state or group to hold the intervenors responsible for the consequences of their actions. p.24-25

Globalization can be seen in the emergence of international organizations and norms.

Somerville, John, "World Authority: Realities and Illusions," *Ethics*, October 1965, v. 76, no. 1, pp. 34.

The process of growth here in question is already under way and has already had some moments of grand decision on a world scale. We are speaking, of course, of the existing United Nations organization. It would seem quite clear that in any responsible empirical reckoning, the vast preponderance of probability is that if any fuller or stronger world authority is ever to emerge, it must take the form of a further growth, a widening, deepening, and strengthening of the present UN structure. Careful examination of the UN's legal framework and charter, and what may be called the moral premises necessarily implied by that framework and charter, leads to the conclusion that there is nothing about the present organization that would prevent, or be incompatible with, its development into a world authority on the fullest scale.

Somerville, John, "World Authority: Realities and Illusions," *Ethics*, October 1965, v. 76, no. 1, pp. 35.

As now constituted, membership in the UN involves the giving up by the separate governments of a portion of their sovereignty to the world authority. Some of its decisions have already been enforced through physical measures, to a certain extent in policing actions like those in the Congo, and even in large-scale military operations like those in Korea.

This trend redefines the role of the state, compromising national sovereignty.

Claudio Grossman, "ARE WE BEING PROPELLED TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?" *The American University Journal of International Law & Policy* (Fall 1993), page 1.

Even though the organizations were originally founded upon the principle of sovereignty, the establishment of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions constituted a movement away from an international legal order based solely upon absolute sovereignty. Both the United Nations and the IMF created a super-structure which operates above the level of the individual member states, and to which each member state agreed to surrender some aspect of its sovereignty in return for the political, economic or social benefits to be derived from membership in the organization. For example, by joining the United Nations, member states agreed to limit their ability to use force and to submit decisions relating to international peace and security to the U.N. [*5] Security Council. p. 4-5

Guilbernu, Montserrat, "Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, and Democracy: An Interview with David Held," *Constellations*, December 2001, v. 8, no. 4, pp. 429.

DAVID HELD: The rights, duties, and powers of states are being rearticulated in a much more complex way, involving the development of a world of multilayered power, multilayered authority, and complex forms of governance. Forms of governance are being diffused below the level of the nation-state to sub-national regions, and above the level of the nation-state to supranational regions and global institutions – the WTO, the IMF, and so on. A shift is taking place from states as simple 'containers of political power' to states as just one layer, albeit an important layer, in a complex political process in which state sovereignty is a "bargaining chip" for use in negotiations over extensive transnational phenomena.

Claudio Grossman, "ARE WE BEING PROPELLED TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?" The American University Journal of International Law & Policy (Fall 1993), page 22.

The deficiencies of the present international legal order based on the de jure sovereignty of the nation-state and a relatively clear distinction between international and domestic legal issues are obvious. The nationstate is no longer functionally "the master of its own territory." Some private actors and international organizations have at least as much power as the sovereign state. They are able to use their power to influence the decisions and policies of the individual nation-state in the domestic realm and of the community of states in the international arena. This shift in power is beginning to produce an international civil society, based on shared interests and new loyalties, the members of which are beginning to demand the right to be full participants in the formulation of international rules and decisions. n51p. 22

A more global government ought to be valued as the goal.

Singer, Peter, "Navigating the Ethics of Globalization," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 11, 2002, v. 49, no. 7.

I have argued that as more and more issues increasingly demand global solutions, the extent to which any state can independently determine its future diminishes. We therefore need to strengthen institutions for global decision making and make them more responsible to the people they affect. That line of thought leads in the direction of a world community with its own directly elected legislature, perhaps slowly evolving along the lines of the European Union.

Singer, Peter, "Navigating the Ethics of Globalization," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 11, 2002, v. 49, no. 7.

To rush into world federalism would be too risky, but we could accept the diminishing significance of national boundaries and take a pragmatic, step-by-step approach to greater global governance. There is a good case for global environmental and labor standards. The World Trade Organization has indicated its support for the International Labor Organization to develop core labor standards. If those standards are developed and accepted, they would not be much use without a global body to check that they are being adhered to, and to allow other countries to impose trade sanctions against goods that are not produced in conformity with the standards. Since the WTO seems eager to pass this task over to the ILO, we might see that organization significantly strengthened.

Something similar could happen with environmental standards. It is even possible to imagine a United Nations Economic and Social Security Council that would take charge of the task of eliminating global poverty, and would be voted the resources to do it. These and other specific proposals for stronger global institutions to accomplish a particular task should be considered on their merits.

Global institutions are emerging.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Introduction," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 20.

The global role of international institutions dedicated to protection of human rights is increasing – a trend that will be accentuated if the International Criminal Court becomes a reality. At the global level, what we find is not world government but the existence of regimes of norms, rules, and institutions that govern a surprisingly large number of issues in world politics. The islands of governance are more densely concentrated among developed states, but they often have global extension.

Beam, Craig. "Liberalism, Globalization, and Cultural Relativism," *Dialogue*, vol. 73, 1999, p. 123.

Nevertheless, a liberal world order appears to be emerging. The process has been driven by economic globalization, and by agreements and treaties between liberal countries in Europe, the Americas, and East Asia. As Fukuyama observes, "a Kantian liberal international order has come into being willy-nilly during the Cold War under the protective umbrellas of organizations like NATO, the European Community, the OECD, the Group of Seven, GATT, and other that make liberalism a precondition for membership" (1992, 283). This emerging political-economic order is not fully global. But it is a more promising basis for liberal internationalism than the U.N., for its leading members are free states who are committed to democracy, markets, and individual rights.

Of course, there is room for improvement in this new liberal world order.

Beam, Craig. "Liberalism, Globalization, and Cultural Relativism," *Dialogue*, vol. 73, 1999, p. 123.

Several challenges remain. We must ensure that the emerging political-economic order is Moderately Perfectionist Liberal (not neoconservative), that it is as inclusive as possible, and that its benefits do not merely accrue to the corporate elite. In recent years, we have succeeded in reducing trade barriers and opening up markets by means of binding international agreements. We must try to reach the same sort of agreements on welfare rights, labor standards, and environmental protection. This would make it harder for multinationals to play jurisdiction off against jurisdiction in the futile quest for greater "competitiveness" (i.e. to see who can offer corporations the sweetest deal). Such agreements could take many forms, from a set of provisions in a trade deal to the partial delegation of sovereignty to institutions resembling the European Union. Perhaps the concept of "unfair trade practices" could be expanded beyond subsidies to include the violation of a basic labor and environmental code. If both rich and poor countries were involved, the terms of the agreement would have to be asymmetrical (for reasons set out in the Argument for Development). Wealthy nations could agree to set higher standards for themselves, while allowing their poor trading partners a bit of leeway.

Beam, Craig. "Liberalism, Globalization, and Cultural Relativism," *Dialogue*, vol. 73, 1999, p. 124.

Ideally, such agreements would strike a balance between the interests of the various stakeholders. Developing nations would benefit by obtaining secure access to North American and European markets. But agreements on labor and environmental standards would help to protect the jobs of Western workers and to set limits on exploitation and pollution in "less advantaged" parts of the world. These sorts of agreements are probably our best hope of creating an international order in which the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could be more fully realized. For if such "controlled globalization" was to succeed, the number of stable and prosperous liberal democracies would be almost certain to grow. Eastern Europe could be integrated into Western Europe, Latin America could draw closer to North America, and more Asian nations could follow the example of Japan and Hong Kong. This would lead to a wider distribution of welfarist and perfectionist goods. Such developments would also be conducive to international peace and security, bringing us closer to the ideal of a liberal order which is truly global.

The emergence of political globalization is the solution to the problems of economic globalization.

Kosmicki, Eugeniusz, "Shaping Globalization—A Challenge for 21st-Century Ethics and Politics," *Dialogue & Universalism*, 2001, v. 11, no. 3.

Globalization should be understood as the expansion of interrelated economic and social activity beyond national borders and towards more world-encompassing dimensions. Unrestrained globalization has already led to the emergence of "one world" -- which, however, is still economically and socially divided into central, transitional, and peripheral areas. The globalization process is tied to international economic rivalry and frequently has adverse economic, political, social, cultural, and environmental effects. At the threshold of the 21st century it has become evident that globalization has to be shaped by political means in order that its negative impact be limited. First and foremost, globalization requires the emergence of a new, world-encompassing culture of cooperation. National interests, although still of major importance, have to be streamlined into mankind's global interests. The recently-developed global governance concept underscores the need to influence the processes of globalization both by political and ethical means. The creation of new institutions to control globalization will be a major intellectual challenge in the 21st century.

Does There Need to be a Conflict with National Sovereignty?

There are those who argue that sovereignty does not have to be eliminated by globalization.

Hollis, Duncan B., Attorney-Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State., "Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty." *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* (Spring 2002): 235.

"Indeed, taking a broader view, it is not accurate to say that either the current frenzy of private actor participation in international fora or the law-making functions of international organizations at which such activity is directed supplants or erodes state sovereignty in some zero-sum game paradigm. As the case of the amicus illustrates, both private actor participation and the law-making authorities of international organizations have occurred, and can only continue to occur, with the consent of states. States remain at the epicenter of international law--their activities continue to dictate not only what the law is today, but also who determines what the law is tomorrow."

Hollis, Duncan B., Attorney-Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State., "Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty." *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* (Spring 2002): 243.

Although states and, to a lesser extent, public international organizations create, implement, and enforce international law, private actors play some role in that process. n33 Looking at the activities of individuals, and more specifically NGOs, one finds evidence of an influence both in the formation and the application of international law, albeit one that is qualitatively and quantitatively less than that of states and international organizations."

Hollis, Duncan B., "Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty." *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* (Spring 2002): 250.

It is [the] concept of international sovereignty--the notion of states having international legal personality--that is reinforced rather than eroded by recent examples of private actor participation and international institutional law-making. As Schermers and Blokker emphasize in their classic treatise, *International Institutional Law*, "the fact that during the twentieth century public international law has imposed substantial limitations upon the freedom of states does not take away their legal status as sovereign entities as long as the essence of state functions are retained." p. 250

Hollis, Duncan B., Attorney-Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State., "Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty." Boston College International and Comparative Law Review (Spring 2002): 255.

When debating globalization, it is important to recognize that, although it may be fair to say that it has eroded sovereignty in the sense of absolute domestic jurisdiction vis-a-vis an earlier time, the international sovereignty of states remains fundamentally unchanged. The international legal personality of states is untrammelled. States not only continue to have the authority to create, implement, and enforce international law, they also have the authority to determine who else may participate in that process. p. 255.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part II)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 65.

Given that the state has quintessentially territorial, many observers have suggested that globalisation would sound its deathknell. Already in 1957, John Herz predicted that nuclear weapons, with their disregard for sovereignty, signaled the state's demise, while Charles Kindleberger declared a decade later that the state was, in the face of expanding transborder capital, 'just about through' (Herz 1957; Kindleberger 1969: 207). Yet such globalist arguments have mistakenly supposed that globality replaces territoriality, when in fact, as emphasized above, it supplements preexisting spaces and creates a more complicated, four-dimensional geography of social life. We might therefore expect globalisation to alter patterns of governance, but these shifts need not involve a dissolution of the state.

Sovereignty, though, can remain by requiring nation-state consent.

Hollis, Duncan B., Attorney-Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State., "Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty." Boston College International and Comparative Law Review (Spring 2002): 250.

Indeed, if private actor participation or international institutional law-making were eroding a state's international sovereignty, then presumably their views and their consent would matter less. One would no longer be able to say that the general consent of states creates rules of general application. One would no longer need to see if states accept the legitimacy of international organization activities or the participation of private actors in the formation or application of international law. The truth, however, is that no such state of affairs exists. The general consent of states creating rules of general application remains the operating principle of the international legal order. n67 By treaty or by practice, it is states whose conduct determines the rules of international law. What has changed is that states have opened the door to allow others some limited level of international sovereignty. p. 250.

Gelber, Harry G. Sovereignty Through Independence. Kulwer Law International, Cambridge, MA, 1997 pp. 75.

Especially in the case of major powers many, and certainly most of the important limitations on external sovereignty have been by choice. It has been the state, acting through its government, which accepted a series of international obligations. Indeed it has, with some very few exceptions, been the state which was the only entity competent to do so. Given that states acknowledge no superiors, that circumstances change and that governments cannot entirely bind their successors, treaties are limited in the restraints which they impose. They are inherently temporary arrangements. Even the majority decisions of the European Union have ultimately rested upon an acceptance by individual states of a membership which remained, in practice if not in legal principle, revocable. It is true that the treaty which created the community, the 1957 Treaty of Rome, and its subsequent amendments and additions, contain no provision for a member's withdrawal. Moreover, any attempt to do so would doubtless in most cases involve heavy economic and other costs. Yet there exists no machinery by which any Community member could be prevented from withdrawing if it insisted upon doing so.

States have always been subject to external influences.

Hollis, Duncan B., "Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty." Boston College International and Comparative Law Review (Spring 2002): 248-49.

As a corollary to this theory, the term sovereignty came to describe not only the relationship between a supreme authority and its subjects within a state, but also the relationship of that authority with other states. n53 Simply put, sovereignty could be considered a form of absolute domestic jurisdiction--the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures within a given territory. n54[*249] Ultimately, however, as Stephen Kramer argues in Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, it is a fallacy to say that there ever was such a system of sovereign states, each having absolute domestic jurisdiction over its territory to the exclusion of all other states. n58 To the contrary, states have always been subject to external normative influences. The Peace of Westphalia, most often cited as the source of the notion of sovereign states operating within their domestic jurisdictions free from the influence of outside actors, itself included derogations from this principle. n59 The Treaty of Osnabruck contained conditions by which the parties agreed to allow religious minorities under their respective jurisdictions freedom of religion. n60 The reality of state interaction further belies the notion that states have ever been free from external interference. The Gunboat Diplomacy of the 19th century serves as a stark example of how the domestic jurisdiction theory of sovereignty reflected a theoretical construct more than a practical reality. n61

Nation-States remain very robust despite globalization.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part II)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 65.

Indeed, for the moment there is little sign that globalisation is leading either to a centralised, universal, sovereign world government, in tune with cosmopolitan visions, or to world-scale anarchical governance through local communities, as promoted by radical ecologists. With the exception of a few countries like Somalia, the state is proving to be highly robust during the present period of globalisation. In fact, many states have during recent decades increased their personnel, budgets, and interventions. New information technologies – so central to contemporary globalisation – have greatly enhanced the state's surveillance capacities. True, the 'new world order' of the 1990s has seen numerous fragmentations and reconfigurations of states, as well as a host of disputes over territorial boundaries; however, the state itself, as a social structure, has in most instances not been fundamentally undermined.

Krasner, Stephen D., Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NY, 1999, pp. 223.

Rulers have always operated in a transnational environment; autarky has rarely been an option; regulation and monitoring of transborder flows have always been problematic. The difficulties for states have become more acute in some areas, but less in others. There is no evidence that globalization has systematically undermined state control or led to the homogenization of policies and structures. In fact, globalization and state activity has moved in tandem. The level of government spending for the major countries has, on average increased substantially since 1950 along with increased trade and capital flows. Government policy has not been hamstrung by the openness of international capital markets; there has been no empirical relationship, for instance, between government spending and capital flows. Levels of investment have not been inversely correlated with corporate tax rates. Corporate investment decisions depend on many factors, including the quality of infrastructure—education, telecommunications, transportation—provided by state funds. The organization of firms has varied across countries with regard to financing, governance structures, and suppliers. Social welfare policies and tax policies are not the same across the advanced industrial states, the entities most affected by globalization. The state has provided collective goods and social safety nets that have made higher levels of trade and capital flows politically tolerable.

A Critique of Political Globalization

Political globalization is biased to powerful states.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. "Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society," *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 122.

While globalisation in its economic form is the most insensitive, exploitative and destructive, there are also disadvantages in its other aspects. Not only is the West domineering in economic affairs; it is also domineering in politics, with the United States assuming the role of world leadership. In this role, the US influences world developments through its dominance on decisions taken at bodies such as the United Nations. In most cases, these decisions impact negatively on policies adopted toward Third World countries, both individually and collectively. The UN was originally established to help in the peaceful resolution of world conflicts and to minimise resort to war by countries. It seems that its success in this mission has been minimal as it is continually undermined by the powerful nations through exercising their veto powers. The same powerful countries, under the leadership of the United States, lately seem to have transferred their primary allegiance and reliance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) in working toward their own political and economic interests.

Such globalization rests on intimidation.

Farazmand, Ali. "Administrative ethics and professional competence: accountability and performance under globalization," *International Review of Administration*, vol. 68, 2002, p. 128-129.

The phenomenon of globalization of capital also has aggravated these problems, as its financial, marketing, production, cultural and coercive state powers have transcended national boundaries and made states irrelevant to a considerably extent (Ohmae, 1990; Fukuyama, 1992). Globalization of capital has violated territorial sovereignty and threatened communities' democratic rights in a trans-border world (Korten, 1995; Mele, 1996; Farazmand, 1999c). With the US unilateral declaration of a global war on terrorism since 11 September 2001, a new phase or wave of globalization has emerged with a feature of militarization and intimidation of the entire globe. This new phase leaves no room for any choice for any people or nation but to succumb to the dictates of the globalizing corporate power structure. Any voice of opposition is being labeled as supportive of terrorism and subject to arbitrary detention and persecutions, a scary prospect for the future ahead.

A globalized polity is not as accountable.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Introduction," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 28.

IGOs can move incrementally and can interpret their mandates – insofar as their secretariats and leading states can build alliances with crucial private sector and third sector actors. But they cannot make large formal moves forward in the absence of support either from a broad consensus about their proper purposes or from political institutions that can give them definitive guidance, based on a wide expression of social views. As a result of the constraints and opportunities that they face, international organizations, like the WTO, tend to be dominated by small networks of professionals who can modify their informal rules and practices and sometimes develop a body of case law. The club model helps to overcome deadlock that accompanies the diffusion of power. What is missing? The legitimating activity of broadly based politicians speaking directly to domestic publics. This may have mattered less in the past when issues were less linked, and accountability of trade ministers to parliaments was sufficient to provide legitimacy. But with the linkage of issues, there is a need for the involvement of politicians who can link specific organizations and policies with a broader range of public issues through electoral accountability. In that sense, some global institutions are accused of developing a "democratic deficit" that could become a source of political weakness.

Globalized politics is less transparent.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part II)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 67.

Taken in sum, the developments described in the preceding paragraphs have worrying implications for democracy. Much global governance unfolds in utter secrecy, and is subject neither to formal public scrutiny nor even to extensive press coverage. Direct elections to multilateral agencies are unknown except in the case of the European Parliament, whose competences are severely restricted. Quota-based votes in the Bretton Woods institutions and the veto in the Security Council flagrantly violate the principle of equality, and the practice of one-state-one-vote in other institutions likewise distances the citizen from decision taking. Nor has the growth of supraterritorial social movements given contemporary globalisation much of a democratic foundation. Global civil society, such as it is, remains for the most part the domain of a small, North-centred, propertied constituency.

Beck, Juliette and Kevin Danaher, "Top Ten Reasons to Oppose the World Trade Organization," from *Globalize This!: The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule*, Danaher, Kevin and Roger Burbach, eds., Common Courage Press, Monroe, ME, pp. 98.

The WTO is not a democratic institution, yet its policies impact all aspects of society and the planet. WTO rules are essentially written by corporations who have inside access to the negotiations. For example, the U.S. Trade Representative relies on its 17 "Industry Sector Advisory Committees" for input on trade talks. These committees are made up of business representatives. Citizen input by consumer, environmental, human rights and labor organizations is ignored and requests for information are denied.

Nation-states need to be able to implement their own policies.

Claudio Grossman, Acting Dean and Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University; Raymond I. Geraldson Scholar in International and Humanitarian Law; member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and Daniel D. Bradlow, Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University, "ARE WE BEING PROPELLED TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?" *The American University Journal of International Law & Policy* (Fall 1993), page 21-22.

These developments also pose an important challenge to international law: to balance the ability to intervene so as to maintain peace and [*22] security with concerns about undue interference by the most powerful members in the international community. As a result, the international legal process needs to redefine the respective rights and obligations of the different actors in the international community in a way that promotes both effective peacekeeping and the ability of all actors to determine and implement peacefully their own social, political, cultural, and economic policies. p. 21-22

There are those who argue that it simply impossible to have a meaningful political entity on the global level. Nigel Dower identifies these arguments. (LDers should recognize a striking similarity to the decentralization debate earlier this year. What level should government exist at?)

Dower, Nigel, "The Idea of Global Citizenship – A Sympathetic Assessment," *Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations*, October 2000, v. 14, no. 4.

Miller's argument in "Bounded Citizenship" is as follows: genuine citizenship is such that cosmopolitanism is either utopian (and thus unrealistic) or really about something different from and weaker than citizenship. His account of national citizenship and its value is, he contends, consistent with the acknowledgement of international obligations of political communities and their individual members and is not a support for international realism.

Dower, Nigel, "The Idea of Global Citizenship – A Sympathetic Assessment," *Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations*, October 2000, v. 14, no. 4.

What makes citizenship a valuable practice is its having four features characteristic of the "republican" conception rather than what he calls the "liberal" conception, which is altogether weaker. If we only accepted the liberal conception of citizenship, we might be tempted to think that citizenship exists at the global level.

The four features are: (a) equal rights: we all have equal rights within our political community; (b) corresponding obligations: everyone has duties to respect the rights of fellow citizens; (c) commitment: citizens have duties to take active steps to defend the rights of others and promote the common good of the whole political community; (d) participation: citizens have duties to participate actively in political life. Only the latter two belong to the republican conception (following Rousseau), whereas the liberal conception stresses rights and duties. Active citizenship still exists in modern political communities, though its forms may have changed to less formal institutional modes of expression. Citizenship is demanding both because of the commitment to take on tasks beyond one's own interest and because one needs to exercise responsibility in listening to other perspectives with a view to reaching agreements. This is an ideal which is never fully realised, but it can at least be partially realised because there is a shared public culture and established community in which it can occur.

Miller then criticises the cosmopolitan conception. Cosmopolitanism combines two claims which need to be kept distinct--the empirical claim about globalisation and the moral claim about global obligations. These claims, properly understood, do not on Miller's account, if they are accepted, undermine the distinctive character of citizenship within a nation-state, though they no doubt frame the ways in which that citizenship is exercised. That is, globalisation does not create global structures appropriate for citizenship, and on the other hand the moral arguments are in no way dependent on any such institutional structures.

Democracy must take place locally.

Gelber, Harry G. Sovereignty Through Independence. Kulwer Law International, Cambridge, MA, 1997 pp. 229.

There is yet a broader point. The greater the pluralism and individualism on which society insists, the more essential becomes not only the role of the state in providing protection and reinsurance, but also the idea of democracy as both a creed and an organizing principle. And democracy requires the rule of law which in turn assumes the existence and preservation of a legitimate law giving entity. It is these operating principle which make possible not just civil cohesion but capitalism and the production of wealth and welfare.

However, the more pluralistic the democratic or quasi-democratic state becomes, the more it requires a strong bureaucratic infrastructure. If all institutions and sources of authority become questionable and decisions are taken in abstract, the non judgmental terms, then the ever more detailed and convoluted bureaucratic procedures by which a path through uncertainty might be sought themselves come to constitute certainty. The very febricity of constant questioning not only makes the "New Class" incapable of creating and maintaining any alternative institutions or authorities but give it no defense against the massive power of the official engineers and guardians of procedure and routine. The more cacophonous and confused a public discussion of social principles and patterns becomes, then more of the most effective political decisions must be sought in the judicial, administrative and regulatory arena; then more the operational principles become those albeit often undeclared and even unexamined of the administrators. Naturally, all of this has also produced very large vested interests in maintaining these practices.

Politics is more natural and meaningful at the nation-state level.

Gelber, Harry G. Sovereignty Through Independence. Kulwer Law International, Cambridge, MA, 1997 pp. 77.

Moreover, while new developments and inventions are of course, always possible, all historical evidence suggests that the number of possible systems for organizing power or arranging the relationship between society and its politics is rather limited. With minor exceptions, sovereignty in the contemporary sense is claimed or wielded by states and not other entities. All alternative loci of legitimate and effective power seem to be either cooperative efforts by states or sub-national or else of lesser importance. Real challenges to the state and its authority invariably fall under one of three headings: challenges to the legitimacy of the ruling group and demands for a separatism which, if successful, would lead to the formation of a separate state, whose internal and external characteristics would be very similar to those of the state that from which the new entity had separated. None of that is meant to obscure the obvious point that states are by no means that only actors or influences in global politics. But it is around them and their policies that the system-or the confusion-chiefly revolves.

There is no world community.

Baudot, Jacques, ed., Building a World Community: Globalisation and the Common Good, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2001, pp. 14.

Today the world is not a community. Plagued by violent conflicts and violations of fundamental human rights, it lacks the political institutions and the shared values that could replace a culture of competition and mistrust with a culture of cooperation and peace. Such a community has to be carefully constructed with deliberate effort. It would be imprudent to rely on the "natural" evolution of humanity from group to global solidarity to achieve this end.

Paradigm Conflict: Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention

A key example of conflict between political globalization and national sovereignty concerns human rights and humanitarian intervention. The emergence of international human rights norms suggests that there are global rules which limit what particular nations may do. Intervention gives other nations – or international organizations – to intervene in the affairs of other countries when those norms are violated.

Human rights transcend national borders.

Frost, Mervyn, "Migrants, Civil Society and Sovereign States: Investigating an Ethical Hierarchy," *Political Studies*, v. 45, no. 5, pp. 871.

First, fundamental human rights are rights which we have by virtue of our being human. We do not have them by virtue of our membership of some nation, ethnic group or religious community. The rights we have as humans are ours to deploy against anyone, or any group, that infringes them. Second, our rights, being rights, are considered to be claims which trump other claims. Consider a core of 'first generation' rights such as the right to integrity of the person, free speech, freedom of association, free movement, freedom of conscience, academic freedom, and so on. We who claim these rights consider ourselves to hold them against all comers. Thus I believe my fundamental rights prevail against counterclaims from my neighbours, my government, foreigners, foreign governments and international organizations. Third, we believe that the set of basic human rights which each of us holds is equal to the set held by every other person. Fourth, we consider that our basic set of rights is not derived from our membership of this or that kind of association -- in particular it does not derive from our being a citizen in this or that state.

Frost, Mervyn, "Migrants, Civil Society and Sovereign States: Investigating an Ethical Hierarchy," *Political Studies*, December 1998, v. 46, no. 5.

First, fundamental human rights are rights which we have by virtue of our being human. We do not have them by virtue of our membership of some nation, ethnic group or religious community. The rights we have as humans are ours to deploy against anyone, or any group, that infringes them. Second, our rights, being rights, are considered to be claims which trump other claims. Consider a core of 'first generation' rights such as the right to integrity of the person, free speech, freedom of association, free movement, freedom of conscience, academic freedom, and so on. We who claim these rights consider ourselves to hold them against all comers. Thus I believe my fundamental rights prevail against counterclaims from my neighbours, my government, foreigners, foreign governments and international organizations. Third, we believe that the set of basic human rights which each of us holds is equal to the set held by every other person. Fourth, we consider that our basic set of rights is not derived from our membership of this or that kind of association -- in particular it does not derive from our being a citizen in this or that state.

Human atrocity is one of the main impetuses to globalization

Guilbernau, Montserrat, "Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, and Democracy: An Interview with David Held," *Constellations*, December 2001, v. 8, no. 4, pp. 429.

HELD: One of the great impetuses to global collaboration and international change were the First and Second World Wars, and in particular the Holocaust. The Holocaust (and later Stalinism) were phenomena of such horror that they provided enormous impetus to create new and different forms of regional and global governance, based on and locked into human rights.

Human rights conventions represent an instance of globalization taking precedence over sovereignty.

Claudio Grossman, "ARE WE BEING PROPELLED TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?" *The American University Journal of International Law & Policy* (Fall 1993), page 17.

A good example of this fundamental evolution is the United Nations' growing involvement in the promotion and protection of human rights. This involvement has resulted in the recognition of the universality of human rights n39 as well as the development of instruments to supervise the protection of human rights. The present system of supervision provides individuals with opportunities to hold their governments accountable in myriad arenas. n40 While this system does not yet assure redress to all victims of human rights abuses, it has succeeded in making human rights performance an essential attribute for political legitimacy and respectability at the international level. n41 The system promotes and is stimulated by an international movement of private actors that reflect the emerging international civil society. p. 17

Jacobsen, Michael and Stephanie Lawson, "Between Globalization and Localization: A Case Study of Human Rights Versus State Sovereignty," *Global Governance*, April-June 1999, v. 5.

Since the inception of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, and especially the two covenants on political and civil rights and on economic, social, and cultural rights in 1966, the spread and promotion of human rights has been closely connected with the gradually intensifying processes of globalization. This is evidenced by the ever growing number of resolutions and covenants, covering almost every aspect of human life and human relations. And in order to entrench international human rights standards at the state level, nationally based human rights commissions have been established wherever possible. These institutions are designed to monitor human rights situations within individual states on the basis of internationally established standards. They do not have formal reporting mechanisms, but they do bring the practices of individual states under international scrutiny. And despite some concerns about the ability of national governments to control or manipulate these commissions, this has not necessarily been the case, even in places such as Indonesia, Which generally has a poor human rights record.

Jacobsen, Michael and Stephanie Lawson, "Between Globalization and Localization: A Case Study of Human Rights Versus State Sovereignty," *Global Governance*, April-June 1999, v. 5, no. 2.

It may be somewhat premature to announce the end of sovereignty, but the dynamics of globalization have certainly contributed to the weakening of the principle of state sovereignty. An emergent international moral order in the form of internationally recognized human rights standards is clearly part of this process. Moreover, this is occurring not just in the minds of intellectuals and academics. Intervention on humanitarian grounds, including in situations where human rights violations are at issue, has been endorsed at the highest level of the United Nations despite the apparent homage paid to principles of state sovereignty in its official charter. Those in control of the apparatus of states are therefore increasingly sensitive to the fact that they face judgment from the international community about how responsibly they exercise the power of the state and that sovereignty "devoid of human values increasingly appears illegitimate."

Frost, Mervyn, "Migrants, Civil Society and Sovereign States: Investigating an Ethical Hierarchy," *Political Studies*, December 1998, v. 46, no. 5.

We are participants in an increasingly global human rights practice. The following provide evidence of this. Most states belong to the United Nations Organisation and are thus formally committed to the rights specified in the Charter. In international law there are many instruments specifying the human rights which states and individuals are obliged to respect. It is widely accepted that the legitimacy of states and their governments derive from their citizens who have a right to confer legitimacy on them (or not, as the case may be). When states are criticized for human rights abuses by such organizations as Amnesty International, they go to lengths to deny the charges or to specify counter-claims justifying their actions. In doing this they signify that they do, indeed, accept the human rights criteria in terms of which they are being charged. Many liberation movements justify their campaigns with reference to past human rights violations against them. In opposing liberation movements governments often seek to portray them as abusers of human rights. They label them 'terrorist' movements. This sequence of charge and counter-charge indicates broad agreement on a human rights domain of discourse. This conclusion is supported by the fact that there is no global initiative pushing in an anti-human rights direction. Were a group to attempt the establishment of such a movement it could be anticipated that it would find little support in a world dominated by the language of human rights. Finally, it would be difficult for anyone to put the case that he/she was fundamentally opposed to human rights, for we would suppose that anyone attempting this would at least claim some human rights for him or herself. There may be some people who claim 'I have no rights, I am the chattel of my husband (my king or my chief).' This kind of claim, though, is not common.

Buchanan, Allen, "From Nuremburg to Kosovo: The Morality of Illegal International Legal Reform," *Ethics*, July 2001, v. 111, no. 4, pp. 673.

Optimism about practice and in theory—Most would agree that the international legal system has undergone significant moral improvement since 1945. The veil of sovereignty has been pierced: a burgeoning human rights law affirms that how a state treats its own population is no longer its own business only. Slavery, genocide, and aggressive war are prohibited.

Buchanan, Allen, "From Nuremburg to Kosovo: The Morality of Illegal International Legal Reform," *Ethics*, July 2001, v. 111, no. 4, pp. 673.

Widely discussed goals for further improvement include better compliance with human rights norms; a more consistent, effective, and morally defensible international legal response to secession and other self-determination conflicts; more effective support for democracy; impartial and effective procedures for the prosecution of war crimes; and greater equality among states as actors in the creation and application of international law.

Military intervention is justified to prevent humanitarian disaster.

Barzani, Massoud, "Hope Restored: An Interview with Massoud Barzani: Benefits of Humanitarian Intervention," *Harvard International Review*, Fall 1993, v. 16, no. 1.

Military force should be used to deter a government from committing gross violations of human rights and to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians under siege through the protection of supply lines and the provision of physical security for aid workers and aid agencies' installations and centers, whenever they are threatened by combatants. Military force should also be employed to prevent a conflict from spreading into a volatile area where the interests and stability of other nations are threatened. It can be applied to guarantee compliance with UN resolutions or international criteria, particularly to stop a nation from illegally acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

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Doyle, Michael W., "The New Interventionism," *Metaphilosophy*, January 2001, v. 32, no. 1 / 2, pp. 228.

Multidimensional, second generation peacekeeping pierces the shell of national autonomy by bringing international involvement to areas long thought to be the exclusive domain of domestic jurisdiction.

Nations that commit atrocities forfeit their sovereignty.

Doyle, Michael W., "The New Interventionism," *Metaphilosophy*, January 2001, v. 32, no. 1 / 2, pp. 213.

Systematic starvation targeted against specific social groups constitutes genocide. Governments that direct such crimes are as guilty as those who turn their guns on their own people, and governments so weak that they cannot prevent starvation have a consequent duty to accept and assist international assistance.

Javier Perez de Cuellar, quoted in Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 1, 1993, p. 3.

We are clearly witnessing that is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents.

Doyle, Michael W., "The New Interventionism," *Metaphilosophy*, January 2001, v. 32, no. 1 / 2, pp. 232-33.

Reliance on the United Nations can help us avoid the dangerous and often counterproductive effects of unilateral armed imposition and the equally dangerous effects of untrammelled national autonomy in the midst of gross abuses of human rights. Fortunately, in the right circumstances, the United Nations can be the legitimating broker in the making, keeping, and building of stable peace that takes the first steps toward the opening of political space for human rights, participatory communal self-expression, and basic human welfare.

How about the argument against intervention? One fundamental problem is that intervention assumes infallibility – it assumes that our vision of what is good is necessarily right. Bad examples of intervention abound.

Tharoor, Shashi, "Humanitarian Intervention," *World Policy Journal*, Summer 2001, v. 18, no. 2.

Humanitarian intervention, like justice, may be easy to define in theory but problematic to identify in practice. It is particularly hard to distinguish from undesirable (or "un-humanitarian") types of intervention. Intra-state conflicts frequently present a melange of security, political, economic, and humanitarian problems, all interconnected. Political tools, such as sanctions, and humanitarian tools, such as food aid, can undermine each other's effectiveness. Even nonviolent humanitarian action can itself constitute a political intervention or influence the military balance in a civil war situation.

A recent publication by the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs argues that in practice humanitarian intervention has never been free of both good and bad effects: "Humanitarian intervention saves lives and costs lives. It upholds international law and sometimes breaks international law. It prevents human rights violations and it perpetrates them."

Many moral beliefs are cultural.

Schuman, Frederick L., "The Ethics of Politics of International Peace," *International Journal of Ethics*, January 1932, v. 42, no. 2, pp 156.

To apply, then, to whole national communities in their contracts with one another, the same moral standards which are observed by individuals within each national group is to overlook completely the social bases of all morality. An international morality is a contradiction in terms in a State System in which mankind is still, as Dante termed it six centuries ago, a beat of many heads, and in which the great majority of the inhabitants of each national State are fused into social solidarity by values and interests which they share with their fellow citizens in opposition to those of the aliens across the boundary. There are few general values and interests which the "community of nations" has in common. The individual attains the fullest development of his own personality, the fullest realization and integration of his social self by virtue of experiences and common values and standards shared with other members of the national community. But the national community itself, unlike the individuals who compose it, has thus far in Western civilization developed its own personality, it owns integration and solidarity, its own nationalism by virtue of competition and conflict with other national communities. The ethical values developed within the group have little meaning when applied to intergroup contacts. Attempts to make them apply in the interest of peace are doomed to futility.

Whitman explains John Stuart Mill's argument against intervention in the affairs of other countries.

Whitman, Jeffrey P. "An End to Sovereignty?" *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 1996, p. 147.

The limited success of U.S. military intervention in Somalia, the inability of the Western Powers (those nations which hold permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council) to enforce a settlement in Bosnia, and the U.N.'s failure to end the massacres and civil war in Rwanda are only the three most recent and visible failures of interventionist policies. In other areas of the world where media attention is slight (Sudan, Liberia, Yemen, East Timor, Nigeria) there has been virtually no attempt by the international community to intervene, or even threaten, on behalf of human rights. The reason for this state of affairs is a simple one. Military intervention, whether taken unilaterally or under the auspices of the U.N., dearly costs the intervening power(s) in terms of economic treasure and the lives of soldiers. And even if the cost is seen as acceptable (which is rarely is), there is no guarantee that the intervention will accomplish its purpose.

Whitman, Jeffrey P. "An End to Sovereignty?" *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 1996, p. 147-148.

I want to argue that adequate moral justification does not exist for setting human rights above the sovereignty of the state. The apparent conflict between human rights and sovereignty is just that – appearance rather than reality. The conflict disappears once we recognize the proper relationship between *human rights*, *sovereignty*, and *self-determination*. On my view, the cause of human rights is actually supported and not hindered by respect for sovereignty and not hindered by respect for sovereignty and self-determination.

Whitman, Jeffrey P. "An End to Sovereignty?" *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 1996, p. 148.

Turning first to the concept of *sovereignty*, the very word harks back to the feudal era when states were governed by a single individual – the sovereign. The vestiges of this original meaning of the word remain in our modern usage with the tendency to treat sovereign states as individuals. However, with the emergence of the political theories of Locke and Rousseau, the power of the state has gradually been seen to rest with the people or the commonwealth, and not with an individual sovereign. The people's acknowledgement of a central governing authority within a specified geographical territory confers on the state its sovereignty. However, and this is a key point, the population's recognition of a central authority does not imply approval of that government. An unpopular and oppressive totalitarian regime is no less sovereign than popularly elected, democratic republic. Sovereignty flows from the "population's recognition of the legitimacy of some central governing power" and not the "acceptance of the moral or legal validity of the acts carried out by the central authority."

Whitman, Jeffrey P. "An End to Sovereignty?" *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 1996, p. 148.

Sovereign states are, by international law, equal, and sovereign equality is the basis upon which the United Nations operates. This principle of sovereignty equality is what guarantees equal participation by all states in international relations. This sovereign equality has as its content the following elements: 1. States are legally equal. 2. Every state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty. 3. Every state is obligated to respect the fact of the legal entity of other states. 4. The territorial integrity and political independence of a state are inviolable. 5. Each state has the right to freely choose and develop its own political, social, economic, and cultural systems. 6. Each state is obligated to carry out its international obligations full and conscientiously and to live in peace with other states.

Whitman, Jeffrey P. "An End to Sovereignty?" *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 1996, p. 149.

According to Mill, foreign military intervention, in the long run, rarely works to the advantage of the people whose right to self-determination is thus violated. While this point is obvious in those situations where a foreign power is engaged in a war of conquest or when the purpose of the intervention is to assist the government of another country in subjugating its citizenry, Mill is critical of other types of intervention as well. In particular, when the situation is one where the oppressors are not foreigners and do not have foreign military assistance, "[w]hen the contest is only with native rulers, and with such native strength as those rulers can enlist in their defense," outside military intervention is, as a general rule, not justified. In such a case, "if [the people] have not sufficient love of liberty to be able to wrest it from merely domestic oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on them by other hands than their own will have nothing real, nothing permanent."

Whitman, Jeffrey P. "An End to Sovereignty?" *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 1996, p. 149.

On Mill's view, the problem with interventions in the name of liberty and human rights is that the people have no vested interest in maintaining these newly acquired rights. They were not in the first place "willing to brave labor and danger for their liberation," but rather chose to rely on the good offices of an outside power to secure these rights for them. However, by failing to engage in an "arduous struggle to become free by their own efforts," they are denied the opportunity to "become attached to that which they have long fought for, and made sacrifices for." The intervening power has usurped their right to self-determination, and the freedoms they have so easily gained will too easily disappear once the intervening power departs. And it is this violation of self-determination that Mill finds morally objectionable.

Whitman, Jeffrey P. "An End to Sovereignty?" *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 1996, p. 152.

The United States' history of intervention in Latin America (to include the recent occupation of Haiti) is also instructive in this regard. All too often the result of the intervention is either to prolong the state of war that exists between the various groups or to make one party so dependent on foreign power that its moral legitimacy as a governing power becomes suspect in the extreme.

The problem, as Mill so clearly points out, is that violating a people's right to self-determination, even when that violation is meant to be a case of benevolent paternalism, actually leads, in the long run, to greater suffering and hardship. Furthermore, if the establishment of respect for human rights is the goal, using outside military power to enforce that goal is self-defeating. We cannot force governments and people to respect human rights by threatening their sovereign rights. Rather, they must be encouraged to earn and respect those rights on their own. Military intervention, no matter how benevolent the intentions, works to deny the people of the host nation the opportunity to establish a real and lasting respect for human rights.

Whitman, Jeffrey P. "An End to Sovereignty?" *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 1996, p. 154.

This pattern of intervention can have a negative rather than a positive effect on the goal of furthering human rights. The message it sends, to both the oppressed and the oppressors, is that human rights violations will be tolerated so long as they do not affect the national interests of the major global powers. While the intention of such interventions is to protect human rights, in those countries where intervention is not forthcoming, oppressive governments will be emboldened and the oppressed will become increasingly cynical about the value of human rights. So, not only does the military intervention often fail to attain the goal of protecting human rights (Stedman's point), but military intervention may actually make the human rights situation worse in those countries not under consideration for intervention. The recalcitrance of the Bosnia Serbs and the very limited success of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia illustrate, I think, the danger of this kind of halfhearted approach to protecting human rights. Given the very real, practical limits on the world community's power to intervene decisively whenever human rights are violated, perhaps the only morally defensible option is to forgo humanitarian interventions altogether. Not only are such interventions not morally obligatory, but neither are they morally permissible.

Whitman, Jeffrey P. "An End to Sovereignty?" *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 1996, p. 155.

To put the argument in Kantian terms, military intervention aimed at restoring human rights involves the intervening power in a kind of self-contradictory policy. Human rights can only be acquired and sustained by a self-determining polity. Insofar as a military intervention compromises the people's right to self-determination, such interventions are actually contrary to the cause of human rights.

Whitman, Jeffrey P. "An End to Sovereignty?" *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 1996, p. 155.

While there is something to be said for this view, the policy of putting human rights and other moral values ahead of self-determination, and then imposing these human rights and moral values through some kind of military intervention, has a long history of failure. More often than not, adopting such a policy endangers and weakens, rather than protects and fosters, the very moral values we hold dear. In the words of Arthur Schlesinger, "Laying down the moral law to sinning brethren from our seat of judgment no doubt pleases our own sense of rectitude. But it fosters dangerous misconceptions about the nature of foreign policy...Little has been more pernicious in international politics than excessive righteousness."

Whitman, Jeffrey P. "An End to Sovereignty?" *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. 27, no. 2, Fall 1996, p. 156.

Therefore, if the world community is truly concerned and committed to the establishment of human rights around the globe, let it first be committed to the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. Military intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations, no matter how well-intended the intervening power might be, rarely, if ever, serves the cause of human rights. Respect for sovereignty and self-determination does.

Michael Walzer gives a similar argument, explaining why it's important to let each nation evolve on its own.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 210.

The state is presumptively, though by no means always in practice, the area within which self-determination is worked out and from which, therefore, foreign armies have to be excluded.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 211.

The moral understanding on which the community is founded takes shape over a long period of time. But the idea of communal integrity derives its moral and political force from the rights of contemporary men and women to live as members of a historic community and to express their inherited culture through political forms worked out among themselves (the forms are never entirely worked out in a single generation).

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 212.

The state is constituted by the union of people and government, and it is the state that claims against all other states the twin rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Foreigners are in no position to deny the reality of that union, or rather, they are in no position to attempt anything more than speculative denials. They don't know enough about its history, and they have no direct experience, and can form no concrete judgments, of the conflicts and harmonies, the historical choices and cultural affinities, the loyalties and resentments, that underlie it. Hence their conduct, in that first instance at least, cannot be determined by either knowledge or judgment. It is, or it ought to be, determined instead by a morally necessary presumption: that there exists a certain "fit" between the community and its government and that the state is "legitimate." It is not a gang of rulers acting in its own interests, but a people governed in accordance with its own traditions. This presumption is simply the respect that foreigners owe to a historic community and to its internal life. Like other presumptions in morality and law, it can be rebutted and disregarded, and what I have called "the rules of disregard" are as important as the presumption itself. So long as it stands, however, the boundaries of international society stand with it. This first presumption entails a second: that if a particular state were attacked, its citizens would think themselves bound to resist, and would in fact resist, because they value their own community in the same way that we value ours or in the same way that we value communities in general.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 214.

Nothing in my book was meant to suggest that citizens are bound to one another to defend tyrannical states (and they certainly are not bound to their tyrants). They are as free not to fight as they are free not to rebel. But that freedom does not easily transfer to foreign states or armies and become a right of invasion or intervention; above all, it does not transfer at the initiative of the foreigners.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 214.

Hence states can be presumptively legitimate in international society and actually illegitimate at home. The doctrine of legitimacy has a dual reference. It is this dualism to which I referred when I wrote in *Just and Unjust Wars* that intervention is not justified whenever revolution is. The two justifications do not coincide because they are addressed to different audiences. First, then, a state is legitimate or not depending upon the "fit" of government and community, that is, the degree to which the government actually represents the political life of its people. When it doesn't do that, the people have a right to rebel. But if they are free to rebel, then they are also free not to rebel – because they (or the greater number of them) judge rebellion to be imprudent or uncertain of success or because they feel that "slowness and aversion...to quit their old Constitutions," which Locke noted in his *Second Treatise*. That is, they still believe the government to be tolerable, or they are accustomed to it, or they are personally loyal to its leaders. And so arguments about legitimacy in this first sense of the word must be addressed to the people who make up a particular community. Anyone can make such arguments, but only subjects or citizens can act on them.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 215.

When invasions are launched by foreign armies, even armies with revolutionary intentions, and even when revolution is justified, it is entirely plausible to say that the rights of subjects and citizens have been violated. Their "slowness" has been artificially speeded up, their "aversion" has been repudiated, their loyalties have been ignored, their prudential calculations have been rejected – all in favor of someone else's conceptions of political justice and political prudence.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 215-216.

The first kind of legitimacy is or is likely to be singular in character. The judgments we make reflect our democratic values and suggest that there is only one kind of legitimate state or only a narrow range of legitimacy. Given an illiberal or undemocratic government, citizens are always free to rebel, whether they act on that right or not, and whether they believe themselves to have it or not. Their opinions are not relevant, for whatever they think, we can argue that such a government does not and cannot represent the political community. But the second kind of legitimacy is pluralist in character. Here the judgments we make reflect our recognition of diversity and our respect for communal integrity and for different patterns of cultural and political development. And now the opinions of the people, and also their habits, feelings, religious convictions, political culture, and so on, do matter, for all these are likely to be bound up with, and partly explanatory of, the form and character of their state. That's why states objectively illegitimate are able, again and again, to rally subjects and citizens against invaders. In all such cases, though the "fit" between government and community is not of a democratic sort, there is still a "fit" of some sort, which foreigners are bound to respect.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 216.

Though the concept of state sovereignty is, as Luban says, "insensitive" to legitimacy in its first sense, it is not insensitive to "the entire dimension of legitimacy," for there is such a thing as an illegitimate state even in international society, and there are cases when sovereignty can be disregarded. These are the rules of disregard as I describe them in *Just and Unjust Wars*.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 216-217.

First, when a particular state includes more than one political community, when it is an empire or a multinational state, and when one of its communities or nations is in active revolt, foreign powers can come to the assistance of the rebels. Struggles for secession or national liberation justify or may justify intervention because in such cases there is no fit at all between government and community, and the state cannot claim, once the rebellion has reached certain proportions, even a presumptive legitimacy.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 217.

Second, when a single community is disrupted by civil war, and when one foreign power intervenes in support of this or that party, other powers can rightfully intervene in support of the other party. Counter-interventions of this sort can be defended without reference to the moral character of the parties.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 217.

Third, interventions can be justified whenever a government is engaged in the massacre or enslavement of its own citizens or subjects. In such cases, the usual presumption is reversed, and we ought to assume either that there is no "fit" between the government and the community or that there is no community. I think that I would now add to massacre and enslavement the expulsion of very large numbers of people (not simply the retreat of political opponents after a revolution or the transfer of populations that sometimes follows upon national liberation struggles – though these can be brutal enough).

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 225.

Institutions have histories; they are the product of protracted struggles. And it can't be the case that communities are protected against intervention only if those struggles have a single philosophically correct or universally approved outcome (or one of a small number of correct or approved outcomes). That would not be the same thing as protecting only free individuals; it would be more like protecting only individuals who had arrived at certain opinions, life styles, and so on.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 226-227.

Individual rights may well derive, as I am inclined to think, from our ideas about personality and moral agency, without reference to political processes and social circumstances. But the enforcement of rights is another matter. It is not the case that one can simply proclaim a list of rights and then look around for armed men to enforce it. Rights are only enforceable within political communities where they have been collectively recognized, and the process by which they come to be recognized is a political process which requires a political arena. The globe is not, or not yet, such an arena. Or rather, the only global community is pluralist in character, a community of nations, not of humanity, and the rights recognized within it have been minimal and largely negative, designed to protect the integrity of nations and to regulate their commercial and military transactions.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 227.

Political power within a particular community remains the critical factor in shaping the fate of the members. Of course, that fate (like all fates) is shaped within political and economic limits, and these can be more or less narrow; there are some states with relatively little room for maneuver. And yet, even economically dependent states, locked into international markets they can't control, can dramatically alter the conditions of their dependence and the character of their domestic life. Surely the histories of Yugoslavia since World War II, of Cuba since 1960, and of Iran over the last two years, suggest strongly that what actually happens within a country is a function, above all, of local political processes. An internal decision (or an internal revolution) can turn a country around in a way no decision by another country, short of a decision to invade, can possibly do.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 227-228.

So the political community with its government, that is, the state, is still the critical arena of political life. It has not been transcended, and there are two important reasons, I think, for hesitating a long time before attempting the transcendence. The first reason is prudential. If the outcome of political processes in particular communal arenas is often brutal, then it ought to be assumed that outcomes in the global arena will often be brutal too. And this will be a far more effective and therefore a far more dangerous brutality, for there will be no place left for political refuge and no examples left of political alternatives.

Walzer, Micheal. "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 3, Spring 1980, p. 228.

The second reason has to do with the very nature of political life. Politics (as distinct from mere coercion and bureaucratic manipulation) depends upon shared history, communal sentiment, accepted conventions – upon some extended version of Aristotle's "friendship." All this is problematic enough in the modern state, it is hardly conceivable on a global scale. Communal life and liberty requires the existence of "relatively self-enclosed arenas of political development." Break into the enclosures and you destroy the communities. And that destruction is a loss to the individual members (unless it rescues them from massacre, enslavement, or expulsion), a loss of something valuable, which they clearly value, and to which they have a right, namely their participation in the "development" that goes on and can only go on within the enclosure. Hence the distinction of state rights and individual rights is simplistic and wrongheaded. Against state officials, they have a right to political and civil liberty. Without the first of these rights, the second is meaningless: as individuals need a home, so rights require a location.

Evaluating Economic Globalization

What Economic Globalization Is, and What it Requires

What most people think of when they think of the debate over globalization is economic globalization. Economic globalization refers to the process of evolving towards one global market.

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

One of the most obvious features of economic globalization is the explosion of financial exchange. Today, international business is growing more rapidly than the various GNPs. In 1990 international exchange was already 15% of world business. In only five years, from 1985 to 1990, exports increased by 13.9%. Between 1960 and 1989, the exchange of manufactured products doubled while the flow of capital increased fourfold. During that time the nature of financial flow changed: the continuous development of direct foreign investment was accompanied by the ready availability of short term capital. These direct investments are also increasing more rapidly than world wealth. The annual rate of growth has gone from 15% between 1970 and 1985 to 28% from 1985 to 1990, during which time direct investments quadrupled in volume, going from \$43 billion in 1985 to \$167 billion in 1990. A global economy has emerged with an increasing share of GNP directly dependent on foreign exchange and international capital flow.

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

The other important factor is obviously the growing role of computers and electronics. By reducing the costs of long distance transactions and permitting communication in "real time" anywhere in the world, thus providing instantaneously information crucial to price structuring -- information that used to take weeks to reach a few financial centers -- the new communication technologies have made possible an unprecedented financial flow. The sun no longer sets on interconnected stock markets. Currency moves from one end of the globe to the other, searching for the best returns at the speed of light. This globalization, however, is exclusively financial: the currency market is the only one where instantaneous arbitrage makes sense.

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

Thanks to this increased mobility, made possible by computers, transactions on currency markets have experienced a fantastic growth. They now exceed a trillion dollars per day. These funds come from commercial bank holdings, multinational corporations, floating currency reserves held by central banks especially created for this type of transaction. The foundation of the system is the exchange of currency which, from day to day, or even hour to hour, may result in considerable gains, far higher than those derived from traditional industrial or commercial activity. In anticipation of moving exchange rates, computerization allows for the immediate virtual displacement of enormous amounts of currency, almost completely independent of the central banks. This is why this new phenomenon is called the "casino-economy."

On this topic, expect many debates to center on the distinction between (i) what globalization means in concept; and (ii) how globalization has actually occurred. Many affirmative debaters will try to avoid the evils of globalization by simply referring to them as problems of implementation. Negative debaters should force affirmatives to decide what they claim globalization is -- and not permit affirmatives to just continually shift ground. Indeed, don't let affirmatives claim benefits from what globalization is, and then avoid disadvantages by saying we're not talking about globalization as it is. On the other hand, affirmatives should take negative debaters to task if they try to force affirmatives to defend disadvantages that are not inherent to globalization.

Mark Neufeld explains how this economic globalization process has actually worked in real life.

Neufeld, Mark, "Theorising Globalisation: Towards a Politics of Resistance—A Neo-Gramscian Response to Mathias Albert," *Global Society*, January 2001, v. 15, no. 1, pp. 98-99.

Thesis I: Globalisation involves a change at the level of production from "tripartism" to "global enterprise corporatism." First, globalisation involves a change at the level of the mode of social relations of production, which is privileged in any given state formation. Following Cox, different modes of social relations of production can be identified within monopoly capitalism. One such mode is that of "tripartism" in which traditional bipartite relations between management and organised labour are supplemented by active state intervention general consistent with the conceptions and interests of the dominant employer class, but also supportive of concessions to labour as a means of retaining the acquiescence of established workers. It was this mode that was privileged in advanced capitalist states during most of the post-war period. Most recently, however, "tripartism" has been supplanted by a mode which can be called "global enterprise corporatism". This is an arrangement in which the acquiescence of established workers in core states is secured through promises of long-term work and organization-linked benefits, and through an ideology that denies the structural conflict between labour and capital (for example, in terms of the images of "teamwork" or "firm as family"). In exchange, firms seek concessions from labour, in the name of enhancing their competitiveness in the "global market place", to increase flexibility by contracting out important services to a growing class of peripheral, unprotected workers, and to enhance productivity through the intensification of work. It is this shift from "tripartism" to "global enterprise corporatism" that stands as the first characteristic of globalisation.

Neufeld, Mark, "Theorising Globalisation: Towards a Politics of Resistance—A Neo-Gramscian Response to Mathias Albert," *Global Society*, January 2001, v. 15, no. 1, pp. 99.

Thesis II: Globalisation involves a shift from a "liberal" to a "hyper-liberal" world order. The second fundamental change that can be identified is at the level of world order. Here again it is important to distinguish between different forms of world order. The capitalist world order established after 1945 through Bretton Woods was a "liberal" one. As such it involved an "international economy" in which economic relations were between national units, and in which states regulated the flow of goods and capital across their borders, either individually, or collectively, through state-created and directed international institutions. This liberal world order, however, has been supplanted by a hyper-liberal one, in which the market is not only central (as it was in the liberal order) but treated as all-determining and incontestable, and in which market forces determine exchange not only in goods and services, but in currency values as well.

Neufeld, Mark, "Theorising Globalisation: Towards a Politics of Resistance—A Neo-Gramscian Response to Mathias Albert," *Global Society*, January 2001, v. 15, no. 1, pp. 99.

The implications of this shift can be seen clearly in terms of the role of international regulation. In the liberal world order, calls for regulation of capital in the interests of under-developed countries (e.g., New International Economic Order; Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations), if not fully implemented, were at least raised. In the hyper-liberal order, regulation involves not codes of conduct for business, but codes of conduct for states in which the latter are obliged to work to create favourable conditions for the former. (e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, APEC, MAI). In sum, the international economy between states has been replaced by a world economy in which the latitude given to individual states to regulate is greatly constrained. This constitutes the second defining element of globalisation.

Neufeld, Mark, "Theorising Globalisation: Towards a Politics of Resistance—A Neo-Gramscian Response to Mathias Albert," *Global Society*, January 2001, v. 15, no. 1, pp. 99-100.

Thesis III: Globalisation involves a change in the form of state, from a welfare/mediator state to the national competitiveness/forced-adjustment state. The third fundamental change involves a change in the "form of state". This argument is not to be confused with one which postulates a shift from "strong" to a "weak" state, or from a "more" to a "less" state. The dominant form of state in the core in the post-war era was that of the "welfare state". What distinguished this form of state was the understanding that the role of the state was to mediate between two different sets of obligations – those from capital, which required freedom of movement and access to markets, and those from its citizens, who required employment opportunities and social welfare provisions. Accordingly, state action was two-pronged, marrying a foreign economic policy designed to reduce barriers to the flow of goods across borders (e.g., GATT) with a Keynesian domestic economic policy committed to the goal of high (if not full) employment. Accompanying this economic policy was domestic social policy in the areas of health, education and welfare designed to cushion any short-term adjustments that might be required. Indeed, the obligation of states to citizens was even extended to include a sense of obligation to the citizens of other states visible in Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Neufeld, Mark, "Theorising Globalisation: Towards a Politics of Resistance—A Neo-Gramscian Response to Mathias Albert," *Global Society*, January 2001, v. 15, no. 1, pp. 100.

This form of state, which predominated in the core countries in the post-war period, has been supplanted by that which Hirsch has termed the "national competitiveness state". What characterises this second form of state is the fact that it recognizes no obligations except those to capital. Its task is no longer to mediate between the conflicting needs of capital and its citizens, but rather to force its citizens – and by extension, those of other states – to adjust their needs and behaviour to the interests of capital. The consequences of this shift can be seen in the subordination of national policy-making to international agreements (noted in our discussion of Thesis II), the dismantling of social programmes, and the state's abandonment of its responsibility for job creation. One can note as well the systematic reduction of development assistance coupled with the imposition, by means of core state-controlled international institutions (IMF, World Bank), of similar adjustment requirements on dependent states (e.g. Structural Adjustment). In sum, it is the shift from the welfare/mediator state to the national competitiveness/forced-adjustment state that stands as the third defining element of globalisation.

Historical Framework

To get a proper understanding of globalization, it is important to know its historical development.

Gilleo, Margaret P., "Ethical Issues in the Global Economy," *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, August 2001, v. 21, no. 4.

The rise of the transnational and the concomitant movement toward globalization of trade began in the shock waves following the Great Depression of 1929. Economic policy makers proposed two ideas in the hope of preventing a recurrence. The first called for major reforms within the U.S. economy, including strong governmental intervention. The second ensured that the domestic American economy would have sufficient access to foreign markets and raw materials to sustain the continuous expansion required to maintain full employment without market reforms. In September 1939, the Council on Foreign Relations, a group of powerful members of U.S. corporate and foreign policy establishments, began discussions of long-range planning for U.S. dominance of the world economy following the war. The council believed this hegemony depended on openness to trade and foreign investment, and it initiated the creation of an institutional frame-work to facilitate a global economy.

Gilleo, Margaret P., "Ethical Issues in the Global Economy," *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, August 2001, v. 21, no. 4.

In 1941, world financial leaders set up the International Monetary Fund to keep currencies stable and liquid to facilitate world trade. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, now the World Bank, was spearheaded by President Franklin Roosevelt's secretary of the treasury Henry Morgenthau, his assistant Harry Dexter White, and British economist John Maynard Keynes. The World Bank was formed to expedite capital investments in "backward and underdeveloped" regions and open them for development. These strategies allowed the United States to have access to resources and markets of much of the world so that the country could create a sufficient export surplus to maintain full employment at home. Promoters of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund called them vital for maintaining peace and prosperity.

Gilleo, Margaret P., "Ethical Issues in the Global Economy," *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, August 2001, v. 21, no. 4.

In 1944, representatives of 44 nations gathered in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to decide on a direction for the postwar economy. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs became known as the Bretton Woods institutions. Their stated purpose was to unite the world in a web of economic prosperity and interdependence in order to prevent future armed conflicts.

As Margaret Gilleo points out, in the early 1900s, there were efforts at globalization. What we currently think of as globalization, though, is what characterizes the last three decades. Two important things happened: (a) the need of the U.S. to open new markets; and (b) the Third World debt crisis.

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

Whereas globalization has a long lineage, the last three decades of the twentieth century were a period of rapid structural change. In the 1970s the international economy consisted of a handful of industrial countries that exported manufactured goods to a multitude of developing countries, which in turn sent abroad their primary products, mainly agricultural commodities and natural resources. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1971, a deep recession began in the USA in 1973, the year of the first oil shock, and ramified widely, initially in the West and then in the socialist and developing countries. After the Vietnam War there was oversupply in primary commodity markets and, by the late 1970s, the hopes of a New International Economic Order, a package of proposals for international reform put forward by leaders from developing countries, were dashed. Marked by the simultaneous fall of commodity prices and the rise of real interest rates, the debt crisis of the early 1980s emerged. Although the USA was no longer the world's major creditor, but now its chief debtor, it maintained a position altogether different from that of developing countries, whose balance of payments reflected deep structural problems. Against this backdrop, the pile-up of large external debts allowed international creditors and donors to shape macroeconomic policy in many countries. Since the early 1980s structural adjustment programmes mandated by international financial institutions further opened national economies and oriented, or reoriented, development strategies.

Farazmand, Ali. "Administrative ethics and professional competence: accountability and performance under globalization," *International Review of Administration*, vol. 68, 2002, p. 134.

This process of globalization has been caused by a number of factors. They include the declining domestic economy in the 1970s of the major nations such as the United States, the increasing demands of citizens from governments, rising expectations of the workforce employees demanding power sharing in management as well as higher benefits, the imperialistic role of the globally dominant states, technological innovations of the information age, and the globalizing corporations in search of cheaper production factories, expanding global markets, and legally unrestrictive global environment conducive to higher surplus accumulation of capital (see Scholte, 1997; Farazmand, 1999b, c for details).

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 119-120.

During the 1970's, when interest rates were low, many developing countries engaged in massive borrowing to finance their economic and social development. When interest rates rose sharply at the end of the decade, most debtor countries had difficulty paying the interest on their loans and in the early 1980's a world debt crisis resulted, threatening the failure of U.S. banks and perhaps a collapse of the world economic system. In order to forestall default by large debtors such as Mexico, international lending institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank rescheduled many debts. At the same time, they imposed new loan conditions that mandated policies of so-called structural adjustment. Structural adjustment policies or SAPs are neoliberal economic policies that "adjust" the "structures" of local economics in order to orient local economies away from production intended to satisfy the needs of local people and toward producing goods for export.

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

Meanwhile, deeply concerned about declining rates of productivity, the emphasis in the US economy changed from the old Fordist system of mass production and mass consumption towards post-Fordism, which allows for a higher degree of specialization, greater flexibility and faster turnover time. With the spread of the post-Fordist system, facilitated by new technologies, especially in transportation and communications, the 1980s witnessed a spatial reorganization of production. While the West and Japan largely moved from capital-intensive towards technologically intensive industries, some developing countries upgraded their manufacturing industries, initially through labour intensity, and climbed to a higher position in the global division of labour. This coincided with a changeover from import substitution policies to export promotion. Centring on greater integration in the global economy, the Reaganite-Thatcherite idea of neoliberalism extended from Anglo-America to other parts of the world, eroding barriers, relaxing restrictive frameworks for cross-border transactions, and allowing information, goods and labour to flow more easily across national boundaries. Born in Anglo-America, neoliberalism is a culturally specific formula, one that has been extraordinarily mobile and propagated as a purportedly universal and moral proposition. But it has encountered other visions of social justice and the good, such as a universal code of human rights and the notion of 'Asian values'.

The globalization of the last few decades has been known as neoliberal globalization, with its own particular characteristics. This is what most people arguing against globalization are complaining about.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 121.

The term "globalization" can be interpreted broadly as referring to any system of transcontinental travel and trade. Such exchanges are as old as humankind; after the foremothers and forefathers of every one of us walked originally out of Africa. However, the contemporary system of globalization is distinguished by its integration of many local and national economies into a single global market, regulated by the World Trade Organization or WTO. This treaty organization was established in 1995 to determine the rules for global trade and it now has about 150 members, including many impoverished countries. WTO rules supersede the national law of any signatory nation and are rationalized by a distinctive version of liberal political theory, namely, neoliberalism.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 121.

Although its name suggests that it is something novel, "neoliberalism" in fact marks a retreat from the liberal social democracy of the years following World War II. It moves back toward the nonredistributive laissez faire liberalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which held that the main function of government was to make the world safe and predictable for the participants in a market economy.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 122.

Neoliberalism promotes the free flow of traded goods through eliminating import and export quotas and tariffs. It also abandons restrictions on the flow of capital.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 122.

Neoliberalism is hostile to government regulation of such aspects of social life as wages, working conditions, and environmental protections. Indeed, legislation intended to protect workers, consumers, or the environment may be challenged as an unfair barrier to trade. In the neoliberal global market, weak labor, consumer, or environmental standards may well become part of a country's "competitive advantage."

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 122.

Neoliberalism presses governments to abandon the social welfare responsibilities that they have assumed over the twentieth century, such as providing allowances for housing, health care, education, disability, and unemployment. Social programs, such as the Canadian health-care system, may even be challenged as de-facto government subsidies to industry.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 122.

The final feature of contemporary neoliberalism is its push to bring all economically exploitable resources into private ownership. Public services are turned into profit-making enterprises, sometimes sold to foreign investors, and natural resources such as minerals, forests, water, and land are opened up for commercial exploitation in the global market.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 122-123.

Neoliberals have appropriated the term "globalization" so successfully that many people regard the costs of global neoliberalism as inevitable consequences of modernization and progress. This perception obviously discourages attempts to question the justice of global neoliberalism or to envision alternatives to it. However, I believe that engaging in critical assessment of global neoliberalism is one of the most urgent tasks currently facing moral and political philosophy. It is certainly one of the most urgent tasks facing contemporary feminism because global neoliberalism has been extremely harmful to many, perhaps most, of the world's women.

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

After the Cold War, nonetheless, 'free markets', an ideal and a set of policies, propounded and monitored by some states, public intellectuals and international agencies, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have become an icon as well as a matter of faith throughout much of the world. Foreign assistance, loans, credit ratings and foreign investment are conditioned on implementing neoliberal policies, namely, deregulation, liberalization and privatization.

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

By the mid-1990s there were signs of danger in emerging markets. Financial turmoil, the meltdown of stock markets and in some cases (most notably, Indonesia) political turbulence struck parts of Asia. The contagion of economic decline threatened other locales: among others, and in different measure, South Africa, Brazil and Russia. At the turn of the millennium, what had been called 'the Asian crisis' escalated into a possible generator of global instability. Even if this crisis is a zigzag, not a complete breakdown, and notwithstanding apparent recovery in Asia, one can expect periodic financial crises to be a regular feature of neoliberal globalization.

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

Meanwhile, the power component in the new global configuration has triggered backlashes. At first, the impetus for resistance seemed to emanate from civil society, which began to scale up and thrust across borders. The ascendance of capital fragmented the identity of labour, and movements oriented to gender, the environment, religion, race and ethnicity asserted themselves singly or in combination. But backlashes against globalization appeared in other guises, including the groundswell of right-wing support for populist politicians, such as Pat Buchanan in the USA, Jean-Marie Le Pen in France and Pauline Hanson of Australia. Conservatives in the US Congress and renowned neoliberal economists, including Nobel laureate Milton Friedman and Jeffrey Sachs, expressed dismay over the workings of the market and the role of international financial institutions. While not opposing the market per se, some states, such as France, resisted the Anglo-American version of neoliberal globalization, instead maintaining a large public sector and generous welfare provisions while only partially deregulating and privatizing. In another permutation, Malaysia, after widely opening its economy to foreign investors during its economic growth spurt, adopted selective and, as it turned out, temporary capital controls in 1998, restricting outflows of funds.

Affirmatives will undoubtedly argue that many of the "harms" of globalization are actually the harms of "neoliberalism." The two concepts are not synonymous.

Fernandes, Luis. "Globalization and an Update on the National Question," *Nature, Society and Thought*, vol. 10, no 3, 1987, p. 407-408.

A conceptual distinction must be made between *globalization* (as an objective process of economic integration that is stimulated by the global expansion of capital terms of very concrete achievement such as routes of commerce, transport lines and communication, etc.) and the *(neo)liberal agenda* (as a collection of policies oriented to the privatization of public enterprises, the deregulation of economic activities, and the restriction of rights, according to what was discussed in the National Conference of the Party in 1995). The former actually constitutes an objective and irreversible process. It follows from this interpretation that combating globalization, as sections of the Left do, is complete nonsense. After all, no alternative to neoliberalism that is intended to be viable may propose as a general policy the destruction of satellites or the closing of ports and airports. The problem is that the dominant approach insists on including in the "conceptual pack" of globalization the second dimension that was mentioned above: the liberalizing propositions. These are but subjective political options that are absolutely liable to reversion and/or surmounting. It should be enough to remember that the liberal hegemony of the nineteenth century was followed in the twentieth century by a long period of global development polarized by distinct antiliberal (or nonliberal) arrangements. The intensification of objective processes of globalization in the terms above does not imply any liberal fatalism.

Economic Globalization is Good

Economic isolationism no longer works.

Stopford, John; Strange, Susan. Rival States, Rival Firms. Cambridge Press. 1991. Pg.2.

“Many developing countries are poorly placed to respond effectively, not for reasons of lack of factor-cost advantages, but because of deep-seated internal obstacles. These are born of traditional attitudes, political structures and often a lack of political will to confront and resolve inherent dilemmas of choice: policies aimed at enhancing internal welfare seldom sit comfortably with those designed to enhance the efficiency needed to compete in world markets. Development thus becomes a function of nations’ abilities to link and control their economic affairs cooperatively with others: policies of autarky are increasingly ineffective.”

Kosmicki, Eugeniusz, “Shaping Globalization—A Challenge for 21st-Century Ethics and Politics,” *Dialogue & Universalism*, 2001, v. 11, no. 3.

Isolated "national" economies have no chance for survival on today's market -- the only economies that can grow are those that are able to compete internationally. R. Reich says that the national economy concept has become as obsolete today as national enterprise, national capital, national products, or national technologies. Decisive today is the rivalry between "strategic" branches like biotechnology, chemistry, aviation, rocket construction, new mineral mining, robotics, automation, and IT. Those who wish to make it on the global market must have access to the latest technologies, ones which constantly have to be upgraded. Global economy is based on global competition, which, in turn, is enhanced by the development of new technologies and the race towards maximum productivity. One can say that in recent years the globalization of economic processes has given rise to a new form of competition -- the drive towards market hegemony. Thus, aggressive expansion strategies are becoming a characteristic feature of transnational corporations.

Globalization has led to worldwide prosperity.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Introduction,” in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 18.

Coupled with the welfare state was the development of international regimes in areas such as finance and trade, designed to promote cooperation among states. The result in the last half of the twentieth century was a remarkable period in which economic growth was remarkably strong, despite periods of recession, and in which many economies became progressively more open to others’ products and capital flows.

Smith, Stuart, “The Impact of Globalization on Sovereignty and the Environment,” *Canada—United States Law Journal*, v. 24, 1998.

In any event, we now have globalization of trade and investment moving ahead, and there is simply no end in sight. The market system has clearly swept aside everything before it. There are benefits to that. The most important benefit is higher average global prosperity. That is particularly true in the newly industrializing countries, despite the recent economic upheaval in five of those nations in East and Southeast Asia. There is no question that the movement to the market economy throughout the world and the globalization of markets has led to the greatest good for the greatest number. The advanced countries have now been able to receive cheaper goods, and they have also had pressures to keep wages down. Of course, if you are a wage earner, that is not very good news. On the other hand, the fact that we have been able to have sustained growth without wage pressures has probably allowed us to miss what would otherwise have been a scheduled downturn in our economy.

Vásquez, Ian, "Introduction: The Return to a Global Economy," from Global Fortune: The Stumble and Rise of World Capitalism, Vásquez, Ian, ed., CATO Institute, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 10.

The welfare of humanity is in large part tied to the fortune of capitalism itself. We must not again allow globalization to "stumble" because of a loss of faith in liberal institutions. The consequences of doing so would be devastating to world prosperity and peace.

Smith, Stuart, "The Impact of Globalization on Sovereignty and the Environment," *Canada—United States Law Journal*, v. 24, 1998.

We have had a period of almost unparalleled growth without an expected downturn and that has to be chalked up to the fact that we have not had any inflationary pressures. That, in turn, is due to the availability of cheaper goods and the pressure on our own companies and on our own workers to recognize their competitive situation with lower paid, attractive areas in other parts of the world.

Integration helps everyone by creating a larger market.

Dollar, David and Kray, Art (World Bank economists). "Spreading the Wealth." Pg. 122.

"As Adam Smith argues, a larger market permits a finer division of labor, which in turn facilitates innovation and learning by doing. Some of that innovation involves transportation and communications technologies that lower costs and increase integration. So it is easy to see how integration and innovation can be mutually supportive."

Competition for firms forces countries to improve their conditions.

Stopford, John; Strange, Susan. Rival States, Rival Firms. Cambridge Press. 1991. Pg. 23.

"For states, a sickly corporate partner may be just as damaging as an alliance with a weak or vacillating state. The other side of the coin is the firm's choice of national site. Before the 1980's, corporations looking for compatible hosts shopped for tax breaks and docile, low-paid labor. More recent experience has demonstrated that neither could compensate for administrative incompetence or for official intervention, either by internal price control or tariffs or other barriers to efficient operations."

Technology transfer allows production specialization.

Stopford, John; Strange, Susan. Rival States, Rival Firms. Cambridge Press. 1991. Pg. 34.

"'The International Division of Labor' is only a fancy way of describing what people do when they go to work. It is no more than the sum of forces – institutions and markets – which determine who is going to produce what goods and services, on what terms and by what combination of the four major factors of production: land, labor, capital and technology. Of these, technology has had by far the greatest impact, by permitting structural changes in internationally linked production systems."

Globalization facilitates transfer of capital.

Sassen, Saskia. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. Columbia University Press. 1996. Pg. 13.

"Stock markets worldwide have become globally integrated. Besides deregulation in the 1980s in all the major European and North American markets, the late 1980s and early 1990s saw the addition of such markets as Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo, Bangkok, Taipei, etc. The integration of a growing number of stock markets has contributed to raise the capital that can be mobilized through them."

Globalization reduces unproductive waste.

Lindsey, Brink, "The Invisible Hand vs. the Dead Hand," from Global Fortune: The Stumble and Rise of World Capitalism, Vásquez, Ian, ed., CATO Institute, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 50.

It allows poorly used resources to be redirected to more productive pursuits, and it signals to other enterprises what mistakes to avoid. When economic institutions do not recognize and respond to failure, growth and vitality can be undermined by buildup of rot in the system. Specifically, unresolved bad debts and chronically loss-making state-owned enterprises plague today's world economy and threaten traumatic collapse and dislocation when the burden of necrosis becomes unbearable. For example, bad debt is at the root of Japan's economic malaise, while a wealth-destroying state-owned sector imperils China's continued rapid growth.

Global competition is good and reduces monopoly power.

Frankel, Jeffrey. "Globalization of the Economy," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 60.

Not only does this work to reduce distortionary monopoly power in the marketplace (which is otherwise exercised by raising prices), it can also reduce distortionary corporate power in the political arena (which is exercised by lobbying). Most importantly, new trade theory offers reason to believe that openness can have a permanent effect on a country's rate of growth, not just the level of real GDP. A high rate of economic interaction with the rest of the world speeds the absorption of frontier technologies and global management best practices, spurs innovation and cost-cutting, and competes away monopoly.

How can affirmatives deal with the purported "harms" of globalization. First, some argue that the harms are the result of globalization that is not done right. Globalization, if done right, will be good.

"A Different Manifesto," *Economist*, September 29, 2001, v. 360, n. 8241.

The protesters' main intellectual problem is that their aversion to capitalism—that is, to economic freedom—denies them the best and maybe the only way to attack and contain concentrations of economic and political power. The protesters do not need to embrace laissez-faire capitalism. They need only to discard their false or wildly exaggerated fears about the mixed economy; that is, about capitalism as it exists in the West, with safety-nets, public services and moderate redistribution bolted on.

Under this form of capitalism, economic growth does not hurt the poor, as skeptics allege; indeed, for developing countries, capitalist growth is indispensable if people are ever to be raised out of poverty. Growth in mixed economies is compatible with protecting the environment: rich countries are cleaner than poor ones. And if prices are made to reflect the costs of pollution, or allowed to reflect the scarcity of natural resources, growth and good stewardship go hand in hand. Above all, free trade does not put poor countries at a disadvantage: it helps them.

"A Different Manifesto," *Economist*, September 29, 2001, v. 360, n. 8241.

If some of the protesters could accept these tenets of mixed-economy capitalism, a narrower but far more productive protest manifesto would come into view. Its overriding priority would be to address the scandal of third-world poverty. To that end, it would demand that rich-country governments open their markets to all developing-country exports, especially to farm goods and textiles. (Concerns about displaced workers would be met not by holding down the poorest countries, but by spending more on training and education in rich countries, and by cushioning any losses in income there.) It would insist that western governments increase spending on foreign aid, taking care that the benefits flow not to rich-country banks or poor-country bureaucrats, but to the poor, and especially to the victims of disease. To protect the environment, it would call for an end to all subsidies that promote the wasteful use of natural resources, and for the introduction of pollution taxes, including a carbon tax, so that the price of energy reflects the risk of global warming.

Any problems are attributable to not enough globalization.

Lindsey, Brink, "The Invisible Hand vs. the Dead Hand," from Global Fortune: The Stumble and Rise of World Capitalism, Vásquez, Ian, ed., CATO Institute, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 49.

Globalization is a consequence an uncertain and uneven process, and subject to sudden and traumatic reverse and dislocations. Critics of globalization blame the distortions and volatility on free markets run amok; in fact, however, these problems are overwhelmingly due to the continuing bulking presence of anti-market policies and institutions.

Problems are also caused when governments enact bad policies.

Lindsey, Brink, "The Invisible Hand vs. the Dead Hand," from Global Fortune: The Stumble and Rise of World Capitalism, Vásquez, Ian, ed., CATO Institute, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 50.

Critics of free markets blame the recent financial crises in Asia and Latin America on unregulated capital movements. This charge is partly true, in that the crises could not have occurred if capital flows had not been liberalized. But the whole story is that currency crashes happen when governments abuse their access to international capital markets by pursuing unsustainable monetary policies.

Those governments need to be held accountable.

"A Different Manifesto," *Economist*, September 29, 2001, v. 360, n. 8241.

Among other things, accountability means accepting rather than denying responsibility. Corrupt or incompetent governments in the developing countries deny responsibility when they blame the IMF or the World Bank for troubles chiefly caused by their own policies. Rich-country governments, notably America's, also use the Fund, the Bank and the WTO--institutions which in practice could never defy their wishes--to deflect blame. Worst of all, governments everywhere deny responsibility when they explain broken promises, failures of will or capitulations to special interests as the unavoidable consequences of globalisation. That is no harmless evasion, but a lie that rots democracy itself. Critics of economic integration should be striving to expose this lie; instead, they greet it as a grudging endorsement of their own position.

Globalization should not be scapegoated.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. xxiv.

Establishing that the winners from globalization are far more numerous than most people realize—and, surely (although it is impossible to count) far more numerous than the losers—is all very well. But what about those losers? The truth is that globalization is rarely the underlying cause of their problems. Globalization is usually a scapegoat for economic distress that has much more to do with the introduction of new technology or the repetition of old mistakes.

"A Different Manifesto," *Economist*, September 29, 2001, v. 360, n. 8241.

Whenever governments use globalisation to deny responsibility, democracy suffers another blow and prospects for growth in the developing countries are set back a little further. Anti-globalists fall for it every time, seeing the denials as proof of their case. They make plenty of other mistakes, but none so stupid as that.

Even if globalization does generate some harms, on balance it is still preferable.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization*, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 335.

Throughout this book, we have tried to build a measured defense of globalization. Yes, it does increase inequality, but it does not create a winner-take-all society, and the winners hugely outnumber the losers. Yes, it leaves some people behind, but it helps millions more to leap ahead. Yes, it can make bad government worse, but the onus should be on crafting better government, not blaming globalization. Yes, it curtails some of the power of nation-states, but they remain the fundamental unit of modern politics. Globalization is not destroying geography, merely enhancing it.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization*, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 335.

In most cases, the bulwarks of our defense have been economic. The simple fact is that globalization makes us richer—or makes enough of us richer to make the whole process worthwhile. Globalization clearly benefits producers by giving them greater choice over their raw materials, production techniques, and human talent, not to mention over the markets where they sell their goods. Equally clearly, globalization benefits consumers by providing them with better goods at better prices. Globalization increases efficiency and thus prosperity.

Critique of Economic Globalization

It has not helped everyone.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. “Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society,” *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 121.

Ideally globalisation, in the sense described, should benefit all people and nations of the world. In practice, however, this is only partly true. Among the five major forms of globalisation the dominant ones are political and economic forms of globalisation, and even political globalisation is in the service of economic globalisation. Normally political policies are developed and formulated to facilitate economic and social developments. The focus of economic globalisation as applied from Western countries is primarily on promoting the consumption of their economic products through trade. Among these are products that contribute to globalisation itself, such as items of communication and information, science and technology as well as culture. Since the world’s economy is dominated by Western countries, this means that the chief aim of the West is to open channels globally for the consumption of goods produced by Western industries. The result is that the main beneficiaries of economic globalisation are the Western countries and industries. Other countries of the world participate in globalisation mainly through consumption. Their own contribution to the West in trade is limited to agricultural products and raw materials. Even these, however, are highly restricted as well as undervalued by the West.

Barrientos, Stephanie, “Globalization and Ethical Trade: Assessing the Implications for Development,” *Journal of International Development*, May 2000, v. 12, no. 4, pp. 559-60.

The growth in ethical trade has taken place in the context of a globalized economy, in which the neo-liberal economic paradigm has been predominant for nearly two decades. From this perspective, government deregulation, free markets, the private sector and export-led growth were seen by some as the most efficient route to both economic and social development, with globalization benefiting all. But during the 1990s, the complexities of globalization and deficiencies in the neo-liberal approach have become more apparent. Many have not benefited, even where they have directly participated through employment in the global export sector, and social and economic problems in many developing countries have increased. The role of government in the development process has diminished and new actors have become increasingly important, especially NGOs. In this context pressure for greater corporate social responsibility has grown, and ethical trade has evolved.

Barrientos, Stephanie, "Globalization and Ethical Trade: Assessing the Implications for Development," *Journal of International Development*, May 2000, v. 12, no. 4, pp. 563.

In much of the northern debate of globalization, the role of developing countries has often been sidelined, yet these countries contain the majority of the world's population and have been heavily affected by economic liberalization and global integration through the imposition of stabilization and structural adjustment programmes. Where focus is placed on developing countries, it is clear that globalization has led to winners and losers, and has been far from a homogeneous process (Hoogvelt, 1997; Sklair, 1994). The implications of global integration have varied significantly between different countries. Some have been able to develop export markets and participate in global financial and trade flows, whilst others have found it exceedingly difficult to do so.

Barrientos, Stephanie, "Globalization and Ethical Trade: Assessing the Implications for Development," *Journal of International Development*, May 2000, v. 12, no. 4, pp. 563.

The social implications have also been complex. In many developing countries, even the more successful, there have been those unable to participate in the process, with increasing levels of poverty and social deprivation, and greater marginalization for large sections of the population. But there have also been winners able to benefit from the expansion of external ties, and participate in the global consumer market.

Globalization does not represent a single, unified process.

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

Also, if globalization theories offer the advantage of seeing the parts from the perspective of the whole, and if the whole global political economy has its own dynamics, then the parts are subject to systemic effects. However, what bears emphasis is that the system affects the components in very different ways. Globalization is a partial, not a totalizing, phenomenon. Countries and regions are tethered to some aspects of globalization, but sizable pockets remain largely removed from it. Globalization contains a dialectic of inclusion and exclusion.

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

It is worth stressing that globalization is not a single, unified process, but a set of interactions that may be best approached from different observation points. First, it may be seen as a complex of historical processes. The trajectories differ in various regions of the world, although all are directly or indirectly tied to the central institutions and growth mechanisms of the world economy. Second, globalization may be understood as material processes closely related to the accumulation of capital. It is caught up with the innovations in capitalism, especially the inner workings of competition, pressures that may be called hypercompetition. Third, globalization may be regarded as an ideology--the neoliberal belief in free markets and faith in the beneficial role of competition (Cox, 1996; Mittelman, 1996a) Hence, globalization is an extensive set of interactions, dialectically integrating and disintegrating economies, politics and societies around the world. Capital is in ascendance, while labour and nationality--the two major identities of the twentieth century--are fragmented into multiple identifiers, including gender, religion, race and ethnicity. Furthermore, the globalization trend offers gains in productivity, technological advances, higher living standards, more jobs, broader access to consumer products at lower cost, widespread dissemination of information and knowledge, reductions in poverty in some parts of the world, and a release from traditional social hierarchies in many countries. Yet there is a dark side to globalization: the integration of markets threatens tightly knit communities and sources of solidarity, dilutes local cultures, and portends a loss of control, particularly in very poor countries. This massive sociohistorical transformation warrants more empirical exploration of, and theoretical precision regarding, its underlying dynamics.

Globalization can cause great harm.

Kosmicki, Eugeniusz, "Shaping Globalization—A Challenge for 21st-Century Ethics and Politics," *Dialogue & Universalism*, 2001, v. 11, no. 3.

Contemporary globalism is to a large extent competition-bound and at times even destructive in its frequently negative impact on the economy, on politics, society, culture, and the natural environment.

Ruiz, Pedro Ortega and Ramón Mínguez, "Global Inequality and the Need for Compassion: issues in moral and political education," *Journal of Moral Education*, June 2001, v. 30, no. 2, pp. 160.

Frequently co-operation has been invested with a miraculous power to solve the problems of underdevelopment and marginalisation that for centuries have characterized life for the people of the South. The fact is that no all co-operation leads to development, advancement or liberation of poor people, and there exist immoral forms of co-operation which prolong the dependency of underdeveloped countries.

Global institutions have become slanted towards the developed world.

Rosenberg, Tina. "So far, globalization has failed the world's poor. But it's not trade that has hurt them. It's a rigged system. The Free-Trade Fix." Pg. 30.

"The World Trade Organization was designed as a meeting place where willing nations could sit in equality and negotiate rules of trade for their mutual advantage, in there service of sustainable international development. Instead, it has become an unbalanced institution largely controlled by the United States and the nations of Europe, and especially the agribusiness, pharmaceutical and financial-services industries in these countries."

Globalization is based on hypocrisy.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. "Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society," *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 121.

Thus the West is vigorously campaigning for the globalisation of trade through the opening up of world markets, yet it is not quite willing to open up its markets for fear of harming its own economic interests and jobs at home (EATWOT India 1998:138). Open trade, for the West, does not mean globally or universally open – that is, for all countries. It means open trade for the West. For the rest of the world, especially the Third World, it means open buying or open consumption.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 113.

The use of "fair trade" in this context is particularly galling because the single thing that the developed world could do to help the third world most would be to remove its own deeply unfair barriers to trade. The children flocking to third-world cities go there in part because the local farms have so few export markets. Removing the rich world's restrictions on agricultural imports would give the poor world a huge new market.

Rosenberg, Tina. "So far, globalization has failed the world's poor. But it's not trade that has hurt them. It's a rigged system. The Free-Trade Fix." Pg. 30.

"No nation has ever developed over the long term under the rules being imposed today on third-world countries by the institutions controlling globalization. The United States, Germany, France and Japan all became wealthy and powerful nations behind the barriers of protectionism. East Asia built its export industry by protecting its markets and banks from foreign competition and requiring investors to buy local products and build local know-how. These are all practices discouraged or made illegal by the rules of trade today."

Globalization creates hierarchies.

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

The act of capturing establishes a hierarchy, an ordering of power and a division of labour, between the captor and the captive. The captors of course seek to stay on top, and the captured attempt to ascend from the bottom of the heap. This hierarchy constitutes a range of social relations in which there is some upward and downward movement, and should not be regarded as a binary distinction. Such structural forces must be contextualized and, today, are integral to an epochal transformation known as globalization.

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

More than a metaphor, the theme of capturing raises questions about large-scale historical change, and directs attention to some of the most vexing aspects of globalization: control, autonomy and agency. To what extent and how is the set of processes known as globalization being governed? If it is being governed, or if elements of it are subject to governance, then one would like to know whether there is effective management, what strategies are employed, and with what results. The tasks of control are both manifold and challenging in different arenas, namely, at the global, regional, national and local levels. Then there are the matters of defining the criteria of control, identifying who is doing the defining, and determining which interests are at stake.

Globalization benefits powerful governments.

Pogge, Thomas W., "The Moral Demands of Global Justice," *Dissent*, Fall 2000, v. 47, no. 4, pp. 41.

It is hardly surprising that the global order reflects the interests of wealthy and powerful states. Dependent on our votes and taxes, our government, with its allies, works very hard to shape the rules for our benefit, as we can see from its response to the World Foot Summit, from its successful renegotiation of the Law of the Seas Treaty, and from countless other examples. To be sure, the global poor have their own governments. But almost all of them are too weak to exert any real influence on the organization of the global economy. More important, such governments have little incentive to attend to the needs of their poor citizens, as their continuation in power depends on the local elite and on foreign governments and corporations. It is not surprising then, that developing countries with rich natural resource endowments area especially likely to experience civil wars and undemocratic rule and hence achieve slower (if any) economic growth (Lam). Their rulers can sell the country's resources, buy arms and soldier to maintain their rule, and amass personal fortunes. They like the global economic order just the way it is. And affluent states, too, have no interest in changing the rules so that ownership rights in natural resources cannot be acquired from tyrannical governments. Such a change would reduce the supply and hence increase the price of the resources we import.

Kosmicki, Eugeniusz, "Shaping Globalization—A Challenge for 21st-Century Ethics and Politics," *Dialogue & Universalism*, 2001, v. 11, no. 3.

Effective coordination in a global economy and society largely depends on that society's power structures. Currently, global power is concentrated in the hands of three economic giants, a fact which hampers all negotiations and consolidates existing conflicts. The asymmetry evident in global power structures forces weaker global players to accept solutions that are not optimally suited to their needs, while the stronger players are more successful in pushing their demands through. Moreover, the stronger players even manage to delay -- or outright veto -- solutions to important global issues if they see fit.

Globalization represents a new imperialism/colonialism.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part II)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 63.

For one thing, global capitalism has in several ways operated to the detriment of much of the South. To this extent globalisation has had the character of new imperialism, the latest twist in long-standing world-systemic dynamics of underdevelopment. On the one hand, the rise of supraterritoriality has bypassed much of the South, increasing its marginalisation and poverty in the present-day world political economy. Global factories, global financial markets, global information networks, global telecommunications and global consumerism have mostly developed in North America, Western Europe and the Pacific Rim (including a number of newly industrializing countries, or NICs). the South's share of transborder investment has declined, and surpluses resulting from global capitalism have accrued mainly in 'the triad' and not in Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and South and Central Asia. Between 1960 and 1991, countries with the richest 20 per cent of the world's population increased their share of world income from 70.2 to 84.7 per cent, while countries with the poorest fifth of the world's population saw their proportion diminish from a miniscule 2.3 to an almost imperceptible 1.4 per cent (UNDP 1992: 35; UNDP 1994: 63). Not have unprecedented capacities for global organization and management been exploited to prevent the current undernourishment of one-seventh of humanity, some 800 million people in all (UNDP 1993: 12). On the contrary, eurocurrency loans have saddled populations in much of the South with crippling transborder debts, now standing at over \$2 trillion. To ensure repayment, institutions of global governance such as the IMF and the World Bank have sponsored stabilization programmes and structural adjustment policies that have generally made the poor of the South even more destitute, with cuts in subsidies, imports, wages, jobs, health services, education programmes and infrastructure development.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. "Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society," *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 118.

While economic globalisation, accompanied by structural adjustment programs, is purported to enable economic development of the Third World, it has had the opposite effect, namely to tip the economic scales in favour of the West and thereby created further hardships in poorer Third World countries. Globalisation is therefore experienced as a new colonialism undergirded by exploitative political and economic relations.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. "Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society," *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 124.

Globalisation today, therefore, is nothing but a new, sophisticated form of colonisation. Its main component is the 'economic and political triumph of private capital and its presence throughout the world' (Koshy 1997:29; Kurien 1997:20)

Mothlabi details three ways in which globalization is simply a new form of colonialism.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. "Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society," *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 124.

Globalisation has a threefold series of consequences for Third World countries. These affect their political sovereignty, their economic development and viability, and the wellbeing of their peoples.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. “Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society,” *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 124.

Politically, Third World countries are experiencing a new form of colonisation or neo-colonisation under the pretext of globalisation. Because of their financial indebtedness to Western countries, they are directed or ruled indirectly from Washington DC through Western financial institutions, namely the World Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). The conditions imposed by these institutions for debt servicing, and ostensibly for economic development, amount to total loss of power and control by Third World governments over their peoples. Not only do these institutions monitor debt servicing in the name of stimulating development, they even take a leading role in determining Third World budgets and their priorities, in forcing these countries into trade liberalisation in the form of the removal of trade controls and open door trade policies; and in insisting on tight internal social and welfare policies. Third World countries are forced to comply with the terms of these institutions – called structural adjustment programmes and economic stabilisation terms – if they are to continue to qualify for more loans, and even for often much-needed aid, from the West. Hence many have helplessly abdicated their responsibility to their peoples for an empty dish to pottage.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. “Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society,” *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 124-125.

Economically, also, it is clear that it is the West that sets the pace for globalisation – the rest of followers. There is no consultation or sharing of ideas for mutual accommodation of countries in determining the objectives and process of globalisation. Western ‘standards and criteria of development reign.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. “Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society,” *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 125.

As far as wellbeing is concerned, globalisation has been described as ‘a case of people asking for fish and getting a scorpion’ (EATWOT 1998:139). For what globalisation hails as ‘success on the basis of some statistics and tough monetary policy is at the expense of human wellbeing’ (Pobee 1997:68). The poor are particularly hard hit by new policies resulting in price hikes, interest rises, and rises in taxation and inflation, while there is a reduction of expenditures on services such as health, education and welfare (EATWOT 1998:138-139, Swamy 1997:131). As Koshy points out, the freedom of the free market, advocated by globalisation, is not concerned about human beings but about commodities. ‘What is in peril is freedom that is part of democracy.’ Pobee goes on to warn that the wellbeing of societies is far from being the aim of globalisation. The ‘weaker ones of society,’ he notes, ‘are not infrequently disadvantaged, squeezed out.’ He refers to the parable of an elephant dancing on a chicken and shouting, ‘Freedom!’ (see Koshy 1997: 46, Pobee 1997:71). The outcome for the chicken is quite obvious.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. “Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society,” *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 125-126.

Other negative consequences of globalisation include the destruction of traditional norms and values because of negative cultural influences, particularly through the media. African parents often complain of lack of respect from their children and disregard of important African customs, particularly those related to interacting and dealing with other people, precisely because of negative cultural influences. What has happened to the old-time practice of *botho* or *ubuntu* toward other people? Consumerism is another leading evil encouraged by globalisation, as reflected in the desire for material possessions for their own sakes. This happens chiefly because of commercial bombardment from the media and for the sake of keeping up pace with the Joneses (see EATWOT 1998:138).

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. "Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society," *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 126.

Marginalisation is seen as a necessary condition of globalisation in the sense that countries must either board the globalisation train or be left behind to perish in a sea of oblivion and backwardness. But, Swamy (1997:135) remarks, 'globalisation holds no promise of prosperity for Third World countries'. Hence it must be embraced selectively and critically, with those elements that are detrimental to the wellbeing of Third World peoples being completely rejected and discarded. The only hope for Third World countries seems to lie in semi-detachment from the global trend and independent development. As Swamy (1997: 135) puts it, 'National reconstruction...requires a new vision. Under the circumstances *relative delinking* from the process of globalisation is first *not desirable, it is imperative.*'

Globalization is inherently unsustainable.

Grzybowski, Candido, "We NGOs: A Controversial Way of Being and Acting," *Development in Practice*, August 2000, v. 10, no. 3/4.

It is important, however, to stress that the neo-liberalism which spurs the current form of economic and financial globalisation, in spite of the power of the discourse and of its real impact, is in fact the expression of a crisis of capitalism, not of a durable 'solution' for it. Right now, the cracks and discords are more than visible. In almost three decades of neo-liberal policies, what stands out is the crisis of destruction, of demolition, the fragmenting impact of the need for 'flexibilisation', all in the name of the market and large corporations. Maybe the clearest image of neo-liberalism is the violent tide of the market, with its terrifying waves crashing onto the beach, and destroying the very protection system that humanity had been setting up to deal with the wounds of capitalism. Much has been destroyed; there is much to rebuild. Alongside the all too real threat that this has meant, and still means for at least 80 per cent of the world's poor, the worst effect has been the risk of dismantling more universal ideas and values. It is worth highlighting the need to rebuild a utopia of a more egalitarian society, one that is just and participatory. NGOs have a role in this task.

Grzybowski, Candido, "We NGOs: A Controversial Way of Being and Acting," *Development in Practice*, August 2000, v. 10, no. 3/4.

One of the most visible paradoxes marking the emergence of this new century is the contrast between the extreme ease and speed with which financial capital circulates around Planet Earth and the barriers of all kinds that are erected regarding the migration of human beings. The question of migrants is only the most visible tip of the iceberg of what globalisation implies in terms of the radical form of exclusion of the greater part of humanity. It is an exclusion that repeats itself from the global to the local level. There isn't room for everyone in the world of economic and financial globalisation. The inclusion of a minority, their access to goods and resources, implies the exclusion of the majority. Among the included are those who, in effect, are deepening inequality and poverty, thereby generating social exclusion. Apart from this, this 'exclusionary inclusion' is based on the degradation and destruction of the environment, the very basis of all life on earth. The appropriation and use of natural resources from a perspective of gain at any price, and on a global scale, exacerbates environmental destruction and generates unsustainability and social exclusion.

Globalization leads to deflation.

Laxer, James, "Reflections on the Public Good in the New Gilded Age," *Queen's Quarterly*, March 1999, v. 106, no. 1.

In the novel context of the high-tech globalized economy, a very old problem stalks the world -- the predicament of overcapacity and underconsumption. As a consequence of a worldwide maldistribution of income, cyber capitalism, despite its techno wizardry, is up against the threat of insufficient demand. Round the world, the prices of a wide range of products are falling. Producers are engaged in a desperate struggle to hang on to their share of shrinking markets. The automotive industry is a case in point. The world auto industry has a capacity to produce 80 million cars a year, but only 60 million cars a year are being sold worldwide. Overcapacity has cropped up in many other sectors -- hotels, computer software, and (as we know from our battered Canadian dollar) basic commodities.

Laxer, James, "Reflections on the Public Good in the New Gilded Age," *Queen's Quarterly*, March 1999, v. 106, no. 1.

What the world faces now is the onset of deflation, potentially the most severe onslaught of deflation since the Great Depression of the 1930s. When a general deflation hits, prices and salaries fall. In an extreme case, such as that of the 1930s, a deflationary spiral feeds on itself, driving down the output of goods and services, depressing the value of real estate, stocks, and bonds -- and destroying millions of jobs.

Laxer, James, "Reflections on the Public Good in the New Gilded Age," *Queen's Quarterly*, March 1999, v. 106, no. 1.

Half the world is now in recession. Some countries, like Russia, are in a state of economic collapse. The global economic crisis is heading our way. Its transmission belt is the quickly rising volume of goods being exported from Asia to North America and Europe. As many more high-quality, low-priced goods enter Western markets, the profit outlook for North American and European corporations will deteriorate, which will tend to erode stock market values. The investment plans of North American and European corporations will be scaled back, and that will have a direct impact on economic growth.

The failure to secure just economic order lays the seeds for globalization's own destruction.

Higgott, Richard, "Contested Globalization: The Changing Context and Normative Challenges," *International Organization*, 2000, v. 54, no. 2, pp. 131.

Even leading globalizers—that is, proponents of the continued liberalization of the global economic order occupying positions of influence in either the public or private domain—now concede that in its failure to deliver a more just global economic order, globalization may hold within it the seeds of its own demise. As James Wolfenson, President of the World Bank, noted in an address to the Board of Governors of the Bank in October 1998, "...[i]f we do not have greater stability no amount of money put together in financial packages will give us financial stability'. An economic system widely viewed as unjust, as Ethan Kapstein recently argued, will not long endure. These views, of course, are not new. Adam Smith himself acknowledged in *Wealth of Nations* that no society could survive or flourish if great numbers lived in poverty.

Role of the Nation-State in Economic Globalization

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

Globally, there is no central source of order. No sovereign power can claim legitimate authority over the world market. Although national economies continue to serve as important arenas for markets, an upsurge of transnational flows challenges extant authority in this realm. At issue is not merely what states do to each other, as Realism, the dominant tradition in International Relations, argues. Neorealists reformulate the problematic by delimiting it as a matter of how the state adjusts its policies, without giving credence to the structural transformations under way in the global political economy (see Waltz, 1999). In fact, diverse contenders--both state and non-state actors--seek to capture political and economic power or aspects of it.

National boundaries cannot determine the rules for the global economy.

Stopford, John; Strange, Susan. Rival States, Rival Firms. Cambridge Press. 1991. Pg. 21.

"These three sets of forces are transforming the old game of Diplomacy. No longer can national boundaries define the rules, for the game is now on where negotiation and action is carried out on a triangular basis. The traditional players in the embassies and foreign ministries are still in business, but they have been joined by members of other government ministries and by the executives of firms, both local and multinational."

Globalization diminishes the role of the state.

Stopford, John; Strange, Susan. Rival States, Rival Firms. Cambridge Press. 1991. Pg. 14.

"The change is significant as it diminishes the power of states to control economic events. States retain considerable *negative* power to disrupt, manage, or distort trade by controlling entry to the territory in which the *national* market functions. They cannot so easily control production which is aimed at a *world* market and which does not necessarily take place within their frontiers. And even when most of the supply is under control, the market may not be, as OPEC discovered to its cost in the 1980s. In other words, states' *positive* power to harness internal resources is decidedly constrained when they try to influence where and how international production takes place."

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Introduction," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 17.

Does globalism weaken state institutions? The answers vary by the type of state and the type of function. It is true that market constraints on states are greater than three decades ago, but the effects vary greatly. France, Germany, and Sweden feel market pressures, but the core of their welfare state remain strong. Some less developed countries, however, feel market pressures but do not have strong safety nets or governmental institutions to begin with. Transnational mobility of capital and skilled labor undercut powers of taxation. Transnational communications and the Internet make it more difficult and costly for authoritarian police to control citizens. In some instances, differential development may stimulate ethnic tensions that can overwhelm the institutions of the state. As Grindle points out, some less developed countries may have such weak institutions (for whatever historical and cultural reasons) that their leaders are unable to cope with the new challenges posed by globalization. For other developing countries, however, economic globalism has strengthened state institutions by creating a more robust economic base – witness the development of Singapore, Malaysia, or Korea. And as Saich's chapter shows, China is a special case. Linda Weiss argues that there is more a transformation of state functions than a weakening of the state. Our major conclusion about how globalism affects domestic governance is one of caution.

Globalization leads to the emergence of other actors.

Barrientos, Stephanie, "Globalization and Ethical Trade: Assessing the Implications for Development," *Journal of International Development*, May 2000, v. 12, no. 4, pp. 562.

Markets do not function in a vacuum, they depend upon and interact with society and institutions in which different actors, including consumers, workers, employers, the state and NGOs play a part. Because of the diminished role of the state, globalization has changed the form and space of this interaction. Non-state and other actors have come to play an increasingly important role, as the relationship between market and society is mediated through differing means.

Barrientos, Stephanie, "Globalization and Ethical Trade: Assessing the Implications for Development," *Journal of International Development*, May 2000, v. 12, no. 4, pp. 561-62.

Globalization has positive and negative effects, both economically and socially. In many developing countries, the negative effects have predominated, for example poverty, debt and increased unemployment. Ethical trade reflects a paradox of globalization. Where free markets reign, some large companies are seeking out new means of addressing social problems in their global supply chains by voluntarily adopting a form of regulation, a company code of conduct. Potentially this is a positive effect of globalization, developing new ways to extend benefits of global integration to export workers themselves. The ETI code of conduct helps to provide a common framework that applies across a wide range of sectors and countries. Ethical trade has arisen partly in response to NGO pressure. But companies are also adopting greater social responsibility in response to the risks of operating in a global market, and as a means of enhancing the stability of their commercial environment. Ethical trade is evolving at a global/local rather than national level, facilitated both through the global supply chains of large corporations, and through collaboration with non-governmental stakeholders in the north and south. It reflects the search for new strategies in a global world.

There are those who argue that national sovereignty remains important. First, the state is needed for any economic policy to succeed.

Rosenberg, Tina. "So far, globalization has failed the world's poor. But it's not trade that has hurt them. It's a rigged system. The Free-Trade Fix." Pg. 31.

"Says Juan Martin, and Argentine economist at the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. "Now we know you need infrastructure, institutions, and education. In fact, when the economy opens, you need more control mechanisms from the state, not fewer."

Sassen, Saskia. *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*. Columbia University Press. 1996. Pg. 15.

"Firms operating transnationally need to ensure the functions traditionally exercised by the state in the national realm of the economy, such as guaranteeing property rights and contracts. Yet insofar as economic globalization extends the economy- but not the sovereignty- of the nation-state beyond its boundaries, this guarantee would appear to be threatened."

Weber, Steven. "International Organizations and the Pursuit of Justice in the World Economy," *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol. 14, 2000, p. 111-112.

It is right to say that globalization demands governance. But it is wrong to jump from that point directly to the argument that the demand is for *global* governance. The most common suppliers of regulation remain states – sometimes in cooperation with each other, sometimes not. In most cases it is states that retain legitimate legal authority, and ultimately the capability to enforce rules with violence.

Weber, Steven. "International Organizations and the Pursuit of Justice in the World Economy," *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol. 14, 2000, p. 111.

The mistake may have been in thinking it would be otherwise. Globalization is sometimes portrayed as a battle of markets against states, of forward-looking economic integrative forces against antiquated political boundaries. This dichotomy misleads many into thinking that there is a zero-sum game played out between globalization and the state, and that what global markets gain the state loses. The error here, of course, lies in the belief that markets operate "naturally" and without external structures. Theory suggests and history confirms that liberalization and the opening of markets can only be sustained in the context of more efficient governance structures and regulation. Markets at a minimum need clear rules and secure property rights in order to function. The demand for regulation often increases as markets expand.

Nations remain relevant because some places cannot be helped by globalization because of geography.

Dollar, David and Kray, Art (World Bank economists). "Spreading the Wealth." Pg. 132.

"A final potential obstacle to successful and equitable globalization relates to geography. There is no inherent reason why coastal China should be poor; the same goes for southern India, northern Mexico, and Vietnam. All of these locations are near important markets or trade routes but were long held back by misguided policies. Now, with appropriate reforms, they are starting to grow rapidly and take their natural place in the world. But the same cannot be said for Mali, Chad, or other countries or regions cursed with "poor geography" - i.e., distance from markets, inherently high transport costs, and challenging health and agricultural problems. It would be naïve to think that trade and investment alone can alleviate poverty in all locations. In fact for those locations with poor geography, trade liberalization is less important than developing proper health care systems or providing basic infrastructure- or letting people move elsewhere."

Nations must remain vigilant in protecting their people because globalization increases the country's vulnerability.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 120.

Any local economy that is integrated into the global economy is exposed to the vicissitudes of world trade; for example, SAP's promotion of cash crop agriculture has made many countries in the global South vulnerable to drops in world prices for their crops. At the same time, the shift to cash crop agriculture has encouraged these countries to become permanently dependent on Northern machines and fertilizers. Thus, SAP's have ensured a "captive" supply of cheap labor, cheap raw materials and agricultural products for Northern industries, and have simultaneously created guaranteed markets for Northern manufactured products, technologies, and consumer goods. In a world where the terms of trade for raw materials and agricultural products have tended historically to worsen (with a few conspicuous, nonrenewable exceptions, such as oil), the South's need for Northern products and capital has inevitably made the North richer and the South poorer.

Rosenberg, Tina. "So far, globalization has failed the world's poor. But it's not trade that has hurt them. It's a rigged system. The Free-Trade Fix." Pg. 31.

"When the world economy went into recession in 1982, Chile's integration into the global marketplace and its dependence on foreign capital magnified the crash. Poverty soared, and unemployment reached 20 percent."

The success of globalization depends on forces outside the developing countries' control.

Dollar, David and Kray, Art (World Bank economists). "Spreading the Wealth." Pg. 121.
"If policymakers hope to tap the full potential of economic integration and sustain its benefits, they must address three critical challenges. A growing protectionist movement in rich countries that aims to limit integration with poor ones must be stopped in its tracks. Developing countries need to acquire the kinds of institutions and policies that will allow them to prosper under globalization, both of which may be different from place to place. And more migration, both domestic and international, must be permitted when geography limits the potential for development."

If other countries enact barriers to trade, then globalization will not work at all. Nation-states remain important then to (1) ensure other countries comply, and (2) protect their people in case other countries do not.

Rosenberg, Tina. "So far, globalization has failed the world's poor. But it's not trade that has hurt them. It's a rigged system. The Free-Trade Fix." Pg. 33.
"Subsidized American corn now makes up almost half of the world's stock, effectively setting the world price so low that local small farmers can no longer survive."

Dollar, David and Kray, Art (World Bank economists). "Spreading the Wealth." Pg. 131.
"Industrialized countries still raise protectionist measures against agricultural and labor-intensive products. Reducing those barriers would help developing countries significantly. The poorer areas of the world would benefit from further openings of their own markets as well, since 70 percent of the tariff barriers that developing countries face are from other developing countries."

Dollar, David and Kray, Art (World Bank economists). "Spreading the Wealth." Pg. 131.
"Through their trade policies, rich countries can make it easier for those developing countries that do choose to open up and join the global trading club. But in recent years, the rich countries have been doing just the opposite. GATT was originally built around agreements concerning trade practices. Now, institutional harmonization, such as agreement on policies toward intellectual property rights, is a requirement for joining the WTO. Any sort of regulation of labor and environmental standards made under the threat of WTO sanctions would take this requirement for harmonization much further. Such measures would be neoprotectionist in effect, because they would thwart the integration of developing countries into the world economy and discourage trade between poor countries and rich ones."

The nation-state remains relevant to manage the social impacts of globalization.

Barrientos, Stephanie, "Globalization and Ethical Trade: Assessing the Implications for Development," *Journal of International Development*, May 2000, v. 12, no. 4, pp. 562..
Economic liberalization has been a central element of globalization. Deregulation has enforced a separation between market and social, but markets need a social and institutional environment within which to operate (Hodgson, 1999). In the Keynesian era, the state played an important role in managing that relationship. The neo-liberal model led to its restructuring, facilitated by state deregulation and a focus on the motive and commercial gain, and the social and institutional aims of actors that often have different goals and aims.

The rest of this section on economic globalization looks more closely at certain of its specific impacts/consequences, such as poverty, culture, the rich/poor gap, etc.

Specific Areas of Concern: Unemployment

Many critics of globalization are concerned about the negative impact on jobs.

Gilleo, Margaret P., "Ethical Issues in the Global Economy," *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, August 2001, v. 21, no. 4.

How often do we hear the words, "Students must be prepared to compete in the global economy?" Made possible and facilitated by technological innovation, this global economy is promoted as the greatest human endeavor ever undertaken, the answer to all problems. But in the United States, our economy is heading downward, thousands see their jobs and incomes disappear through no fault of their own, union workers stand by as their jobs go to foreign countries, many families find even two incomes barely adequate for survival, and health care is becoming an upper-class privilege. Meanwhile, high-ranking executives accumulate vast wealth as the disparity grows between the top and bottom of the economic ladder. Those in the uppermost 20% have 87% of the world's wealth, whereas the bottom 20% must make do with 1%. The top 200 wealthiest people in the world have as much as lowest 2 billion (Gumbleton, 2001).

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

On the other side of the ledger, diminishing human capital and the progressive aging of the labor force have increased cost, thereby encouraging entrepreneurs to relocate their operations in countries whose labor force is the least expensive and the most flexible. Because the competitive production of developing countries is found especially in areas that require considerable unskilled labor, this labor force is encouraged and exploited in the South, and increasingly excluded from work in the North, contributing to the rise in structural unemployment. In the absence of an increasing number of commercial outlets, companies can only achieve the critical size they need to survive in global markets by taking market share from their competitors and by constantly improving their level of competition, which translates into a continuous movement of industrial restructuring and downsizing with devastating social consequences.

The response.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization*, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. xxiii.

People who attack the winner-take-all society tend to depict it as the triumph of a narrow elite. In fact, the winners include not just Rupert Murdoch, Robert Kwok, and Bill Gates (the modern equivalents of the nineteenth-century robber barons) but, as we shall see, millions of small businesspeople, such as the Madini family of perfume makers in Tangier and Pratty Mphuthi, a caterer in Soweto. More broadly, while globalization, non less than other vehicles of modernization such as the industrial revolution, may destroy some jobs, it creates many more. Mourning the jobs lost in Detroit seems a little less regretting the departure of horse-drawn carriages (which ironically, Detroit did so much to speed).

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization*, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. xxiii.

Globalization is one reason why Western countries are losing manufacturing jobs and replacing them with service jobs. Naturally, there will always be a few politicians who claim that the new jobs are less "real" than the old ones: This is straightforward tosh. The argument that the new service industries offer nothing more than burger-flipping McJobs is nearly as fraudulent: The evidence so far shows that on average service jobs are higher paid than manufacturing ones. As for the supposed nobility of occupations such as coal mining, it is odd how few of the documentary producers who promote this idea actually want to enter the hellish subterranean profession themselves. And of course, we are all winners several times over as consumers. Globalization has brought us better, cheaper cars, computers, and holidays; it has forced our governments to spend more prudently and control inflation more vigorously; it has enriched our lives with music, art, books, and even the toys made by the Bruderhof.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 109-10.

The idea that economic integration is a zero-sum game underpins antiglobalist thinking about everything from “fair trade” to jobs to wages to the relationship between rich countries and poor ones. Ross Perot expressed this belief most vividly when he warned that NAFTA would produce a “great sucking sound” as jobs went south of the border. Other politicians—including Pat Buchanan and Dick Gephardt of America, Oskar LaFontaine in Germany, and just about every French leader you have ever heard of—have peddled the same line. Allow low-wage workers to compete head-to-head with high-wage workers, they maintain, and the high-wage workers will end up on the dole. Allowing Germans to buy foreign-made lightbulbs means fewer lightbulbs made by German workers. Allowing Germany companies to move their plants abroad means more jobs for foreigners and fewer for Germans. This is why even supposed supporters of free trade, such as the Clinton administration, announce each reduction in American tariffs as if it were a concession. There is, only such much employment and so much trade to go around, so the primary job of a government should be to hang onto its share of the pie.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 110.

In some cases, the myth is pathetically easy to expose. For instance, NAFTA seems to have had a negligible effect on jobs in the United States; American direct investment in Mexico has increased since the agreement, but only from \$2 billion a year to \$3 billion, still a small figure compared with the more than \$700 billion that American firms currently invest in their home country. However, in most cases, the zero-sum myth falls into the small-truth/big-myth category. Of course, some first-world workers lose as a result of foreign trade or foreign direct investment. Just ask a steelworker or a coal miner, if you can find one. But globalization also creates jobs. If Buchanan were right, the United States, with one of the most liberal trading policies in the world, would be losing jobs by the million. Instead, it has generated fourteen million additional jobs in the past decade alone.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 110.

In most places outside Paris and Havana, the zero-sum myth has been thoroughly debunked. This may explain why its partisans have recently shifted their focus from the quantity of jobs to the quality. Free trade, they point out, forces workers from rich countries into head-to-head competition with workers from poor countries. Companies can then move jobs to low-wage countries in order to reduce their payrolls—or at least they can threaten to move there if domestic workers refuse to accept “realistic” wage levels. This pressures the first-world worker into accepting low wages or following the steelworkers-cum-strippers of *The Full Monty* into dodgy jobs in the private sector. Marx, exponents of this scenario imply, was right: Capital profits at the expense of labor; this why American companies did so well in the 1990s and also why wages in the United States have risen more slowly since 1973 than they did during the “less global” period before then.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 110.

This argument has plenty of statistical problems and two big conceptual ones. The first statistical hitch is that relatively few American workers are in direct competition with workers from poor countries: Most of them are engaged in producing goods or services for industries in which there is little cross-border competition, such as health care or construction. (Immigration has a much more direct impact on American wages than trade does.) Second, most American manufacturing jobs are in industries in which the most direct competition comes from other rich countries rather than poor ones. Third, low-skilled workers seem to be doing even worse in industries that are little affected by trade than in those that are greatly affected by it.

Specific Areas of Concern: Poverty

Pogge, Thomas W., "The Moral Demands of Global Justice," *Dissent*, Fall 2000, v. 47, no. 4, pp. 37.

Of a total of six billion human beings, one quarter live below the international poverty line (*WDR*, 25), "that income or expenditure level below which a minimum adequate diet plus essential non-food requirements are not affordable.

Pogge, Thomas W., "The Moral Demands of Global Justice," *Dissent*, Fall 2000, v. 47, no. 4, pp. 37.

Such severe poverty has consequences: "Worldwide, 34,000 children under age five die daily from hunger and preventable diseases" (*USA*, iii). Roughly one third of all human deaths, some fifty thousand daily or eighteen million annually, are due to poverty-related causes (*WHO*, Table 2). This fraction is so high because far more than a quarter of all human deaths, and births, occur in the poorest quartile due to much shorter life expectancy among the poor. "Two out of five children in the developing world are stunted, one in three is underweight and one in ten is wasted" (*FAO*).

Proponents of globalization argue that global integration is necessary to eradicate poverty.

Rosenberg, Tina. "So far, globalization has failed the world's poor. But it's not trade that has hurt them. It's a rigged system. The Free-Trade Fix." Pg. 30.

"To embrace self-sufficiency or to deride growth, as some protesters do, is to glamorize poverty. No nation has ever developed over the long term without trade. East Asia is the most recent example. Since the mid-1970's, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China and their neighbors have lifted 300 million people out of poverty, chiefly through trade."

Rosenberg, Tina. "So far, globalization has failed the world's poor. But it's not trade that has hurt them. It's a rigged system. The Free-Trade Fix." Pg. 30.

"If there is any place in Latin America where the poor have thrived because of globalization, it is Chile. Between 1987 and 1998, Chile cut poverty by more than half. Its success shows that poor nations can take advantage of globalization- if they have government that actively make it happen. Chile reduced poverty by growing its economy- 6.6 percent a year from 1985 to 2000."

Dollar, David and Kray, Art (World Bank economists). "Spreading the Wealth." Pg. 121.

"In general, higher growth rates in globalizing developing countries have translated into higher incomes for the poor. Even with its increased inequality, for example, China has seen the most spectacular reduction of poverty in world history – which was supported by opening its economy to foreign trade and investment."

Critics say the evidence is not so clear.

Pogge, Thomas W., "The Moral Demands of Global Justice," *Dissent*, Fall 2000, v. 47, no. 4, pp. 38.

Many people in the more affluent countries believe that severe global poverty is rapidly declining. With so much economic and technological progress, it seems reasonable to assume that a rising tide must be lifting all boats. International declarations, summits, and conventions devoted to the problem project a strong image of concerted action and brisk progress. But the real trend is more mixed. There has been significant progress in the formulation and ratification of relevant documents, in the gathering and publication of statistical information, and even in reducing important aspects of poverty. And yet, in the period since the end of the cold war, the number of persons subsisting below the international poverty line "rose from 1.2 billion in 1987 to 1.5 billion today and, if recent trends persist, will reach 1.9 billion by 2015" (*WDR*, 25).

Global markets in developing countries take attention away from poverty.

Stopford, John; Strange, Susan. Rival States, Rival Firms. Cambridge Press. 1991. Pg. 20.
 “Rising consumer expectations in developing countries add pressure on government barely able to cope with basic needs. Labor unions have also exported their ideas. Though their attempts to organize labor internationally, as in the International Metalworkers Federation, have not amounted to much, their ideas are pervasive.”

Globalization (open economy) has failed for most of the developing world.

Rosenberg, Tina. “So far, globalization has failed the world’s poor. But it’s not trade that has hurt them. It’s a rigged system. The Free-Trade Fix.” Pg. 31.
 “For the rest of Latin America, and most of the developing world except China (and to a lesser extent India), globalization as practiced today is failing, and it is failing because it has not produced growth. Excluding China, the growth rate of poor countries was 2 percent a year lower in the 1990’s than in the 1970’s, when closed economies were the norm and the world was in a recession brought on in part by oil-price shocks.”

It is telling that some of the poorest countries are the most integrated into the world economy.

Jaggar, Allison M. “A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt,” *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 120.
 It is significant that some of the countries that are worse off are the most integrated into the global economy; for instance, exports account for close to 30 percent of the gross domestic product of impoverished sub-Saharan Africa, compared to less than 20 percent for industrialized nations. Many Southern countries are now in a state of economic collapse and their debt burdens have multiplied. By 1997, the total debt stock owned by the developing world to the developed world was \$217 TRILLION, up from \$1.4 trillion in 1990.

Third-world countries are locked into cycles of unpayable debt, that undermine global welfare.

Jaggar, Allison M. “A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt,” *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 121.
 Although SAPs have been largely counterproductive from the point of view of the global South, they have been highly successful from the point of view of the global North, because they have ensured that an increasing proportion of the debtor countries’ resources have gone to paying off foreign debts. Even by the mid-1980s, what was then called the Third World was paying out annually about three times as much in debt repayments as it received in aid from all developed-country governments and international aid agencies combined, and this continued in the 1990s. Ten years later, the developing countries are paying the rich nations \$717 million *a day* in debt service; \$12 billion annually flows north out of Africa alone. Over a decade ago, a former executive director of World Bank stated: “Not since the conquistadors plundered Latin America has the world experienced a flow in the direction we see today” (Miller 1991, 62). The world has never experienced anything like the current flow.

This situation is morally unacceptable.

Camdessus, Michel, "Church Social Teaching and Globalization," *America*, October 15, 2001, v. 185, no. 11.

Considering all the positive dynamics at work in our world, the excruciatingly slow progress toward reducing poverty is all the more unacceptable. The ever--widening gap between rich and poor within nations, and the gulf between the most affluent and most impoverished nations, are morally unacceptable, economically wasteful and potentially explosive socially. We know now that it is not enough simply to "increase the size of the cake"; the way the cake is divided is deeply relevant to the dynamics of development. Moreover, if large numbers of poor are left hopeless, their poverty will undermine the fabric of our societies through confrontation, violence and civil disorder. If we are committed to the promotion of human dignity and peace, we cannot afford to ignore poverty and the risks to peace that such indifference may entail. We all must work together to relieve this human suffering: this is what solidarity means.

Given conflicting data, debaters will have to focus on why certain countries failed. Was it globalization? Or was it something else? For example, in Chile, opening the market was possible because of concentrated sovereignty. Thus, it was strong national sovereignty that made success possible.

Rosenberg, Tina. "So far, globalization has failed the world's poor. But it's not trade that has hurt them. It's a rigged system. The Free-Trade Fix." Pg. 31.

"Only a dictator with a strong hand can put his country through the pain of economic reform, went the popular wisdom. In truth, we now know that inflicting pain is the easy part; governments democratic and dictatorial are all instituting free-market austerity. The point is not to inflict pain but to lessen it. In this Pinochet failed, and the democratic governments that followed him beginning in 1990 have succeeded. What Pinochet did was to shut down sectors of Chile's economy that produced goods for the domestic market, like subsistence farming and appliance manufacturing, and point the economy towards exports."

It's not globalization's fault that a lot of open economies have failed.

Rosenberg, Tina. "So far, globalization has failed the world's poor. But it's not trade that has hurt them. It's a rigged system. The Free-Trade Fix." Pg. 31.

"The saddest example is Haiti, and excellent student of the rules of globalization, ranked at the top of the I.M.F.'s index of trade openness. Yet over the 1990's, Haiti's economy contracted; annual per capita income is now \$250. No surprise- if you are a corrupt and misgoverned nation with a closed economy, becoming a corrupt and misgoverned nation with an open economy is not going to solve your problems."

Outward looking policies often need much government control.

Stopford, John; Strange, Susan. *Rival States, Rival Firms*. Cambridge Press. 1991. Pg. 12.

"Though it might be tempting to attribute South Korea's greater success to its outward orientation and India's problems to its inward-looking priorities, the many differences in social and economic conditions make it impossible to provide a single answer. Besides, aggregate statistics run the risk of provoking sweeping generalizations; they obscure sectors of relative growth or relative decline. Nonetheless, there are some important similarities and contrasts that seem to bear on the issue. For instance, both governments followed policies of strong intervention in their markets – an outward-looking policy does not necessarily mean *laissez faire*. The crucial difference is that India constrained competition, whereas South Korea actively promoted both domestic rivalry and the international development of local firms."

Rich/Poor Gap

Globalization has increased the gap between the rich and the poor.

Rosenberg, Tina. "So far, globalization has failed the world's poor. But it's not trade that has hurt them. It's a rigged system. The Free-Trade Fix." Pg. 31.

"Chile began to grow, but inequality soared- the other problem with Pinochet's globalization was the it left out the poor. While the democratic governments that succeeded Pinochet have not yet been able to reduce inequality, at least it is no longer increasing, and they have been able to use the fruits of Chile's growth to help the poor."

Ruiz, Pedro Ortega and Ramón Mínguez, "Global Inequality and the Need for Compassion: issues in moral and political education," *Journal of Moral Education*, June 2001, v. 30, no. 2, pp. 158-59.

Over the last 30 years the share of world income of the poorest 20% of the world population has fallen by 2.3% (1960) to 1.4% (1991) and to 1.1% (1997). Meanwhile, the share in world income of the richest 20% of the world population has increased from 70% to 85%. Over the last three decades, the proportion of inhabitants whose per capita income great at a rate of 5% annually has doubled (from 12% to 27%). However, we are faced not only with a relative poverty and a growing inequality, but also an alarming situation of absolute poverty. About one-third of humanity, 1300 million people, live on an income of less than 1 dollar per day. It is no exaggeration to claim that this distance separating rich and poor countries, far from closing over time will grow even further and population growth conditions contribute to the fact that the percentage of the world's population living at the limits of the system is constantly growing (Martin Seco, 1999).

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part II)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 63.

Indeed, global capital has generally encouraged a growth of income inequalities between rich and poor the world over. For one thing, global financial markets have allowed the wealthy of the South – physically resident of the periphery but very much 'located' in the core of the (supraterritorial) global political economy – to accumulate surplus at historically unprecedented levels. At the same time, marketisation in former communist-ruled countries, largely globally generated, has hugely widened disparities of wealth in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics. Increased polarization of incomes has marked the North, too. In the USA, for instance, unprecedented growth in global trade and investment during the 1980s can be linked to a decline of earning for 80 per cent of the population and a rise of 16.5 per cent in real terms amongst the top ten per cent (Agnew 1994a: 270-1). Similar trends have unfolded in other OECD countries, albeit not as starkly (Ghai 1994: 30-2).

Ruiz, Pedro Ortega and Ramón Mínguez, "Global Inequality and the Need for Compassion: issues in moral and political education," *Journal of Moral Education*, June 2001, v. 30, no. 2, pp. 159.

The division between those two worlds will grow ever wider and faster while the North continues to seek the help of the South for its own economic growth (Schneider, 1993). If to these figures we add the rapid demographic growth of the poor countries, in spite of the frequent wars of extermination which afflict them, their progressive environmental deterioration and their political instability, it is not difficult to claim that we are faced with a global crisis which affects the very structures of human co-existence. For the stability of all, it is in supportable to have 1300 million people, that is to say one-third of humanity, subsisting on an income of less than 1 dollar a day. It is impossible to turn our backs on this reality as though nothing were happening, when it is not a local problem affecting only a certain sector of the population, but rather a global issue. Inequality in development in human societies is a given throughout history since antiquity; but what could previously be viewed as an imbalance between regions or nations has turned, in modern times, into a polarization of marginalisation. Underdevelopment becomes the intrinsic product of the global expansion of a system which, for the first time in history, draws the planet's peoples into the same economic logic (capitalist) (Amin, 1998).

Pogge, Thomas W., "The Moral Demands of Global Justice," *Dissent*, Fall 2000, v. 47, no. 4, pp.38.

The trend in international inequality clearly shows the inadequacy of the rising-tide image: "The income gap between the fifth of the world's people living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to 1 in 1997, up 60 to 1 in 1990 and 30 to 1 in 1960." Estimates for earlier times are eleven to one for 1918, seven to one for 1870, and three to one for 1820 (*HDR* 1999, 3). Today, while the bottom quartile of human kind live on less than \$140 per year, 1998 *per capita* gross national product (GNP) was \$29,3409 in the United States; somewhat more in Japan; and somewhat less, on average, in Western Europe (*WDR*, 230-1).

Higgott, Richard, "Contested Globalization: The Changing Context and Normative Challenges," *International Organization*, 2000, v. 54, no. 2, pp. 136.

There is much empirical data (not always consistent it should be added) on this issue. The best sources do, however, identify a rapid post-World War II growth in global income gaps. The income gap ratio between the 20 per cent of the world's population in the richest countries and the 20 per cent in the poorest grew from 30:1 in 1960 to 60:1 in 1990 and 74:1 in 1995. The poorest 20 per cent of the world's population account for only 1 per cent of total global GDP and 40 per cent of the world's population live in absolute poverty. Whether the relationship between increased inequality and globalization is causally related or merely a correlation is theoretically very important, and there is emerging evidence to suggest that there is indeed a causal relationship. But the correlation alone is sufficient to make a political issue of the utmost importance. It is the identification of the correlation that causes the dispossessed to believe that globalization is a source of their plight.

Beck, Juliette and Kevin Danaher, "Top Ten Reasons to Oppose the World Trade Organization," from Globalize This!: The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule, Danaher, Kevin and Roger Burbach, eds., Common Courage Press, Monroe, ME, pp. 101.

Leaders of the global South are developing a new consensus that free trade policies result in great wealth for a few, and impoverishment of the many. Under WTO rules, developing countries are prohibited from following the same policies that industrialized countries pursued, such as protecting young, domestic industries until they can be internationally competitive. Local policies aimed at rewarding countries that hire a certain percentage of local residents, transfer technology and use domestic inputs are essentially illegal under the WTO.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 123.

The most obvious consequence of trade liberalization is that it has increased enormously the gap between the world's rich and poor, so that this gap has now reached what the United Nations Annual Development Report for 1999 called "grotesque" proportions. In 1960, the countries with the wealthiest fifth of the world's people had per capita incomes 30 times that of the poorest fifth; by 1990, the ratio had doubled 60 to 1; by 1997, it stood at 74 to 1. By 1997, the richest 20 percent had captured 86 percent of the world's income while the poorest 20 percent captured a mere 1 percent (Wallach and Sforza 1999, 4). For many – perhaps most – poor people in the world, neoliberal globalization has resulted in their material conditions of life deteriorating not only relative to but even absolutely to the more affluent. In more than eighty countries, per capita incomes are lower than they were a decade ago; in sub-Saharan Africa and some other least developed countries, the United Nations reports that per capita incomes are lower than they were in 1970.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 124.

Economic inequality is increasing not only between the global North and South but also within them. In June 2000, for instance, the U.S. Federal Reserve reported that the net worth of the richest one percent of U.S. households rose from 30 percent of the nation's wealth in 1992 to 34 percent in 1998. Meanwhile, according to an article published 11 June 2000 in the *Denver Rocky Mountain News*, the share of the national wealth held by the bottom 90 percent of U.S. households fell from 33 percent in 1992 to 31 percent in 1998. The Economic Policy Institute asserts that the median inflation-adjusted earnings of the average worker were 3.1 percent lower in 1997 than in 1989 and that the poorest 20 percent of U.S. citizens were making less in real terms at the end of the 1990s than in 1977. In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that homelessness affects increasing numbers even of working people.

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

The World Bank and the IMF play a direct role in the drive to universalize the values of neoliberal globalization. Responding to debt crises, the Bretton Woods institutions assist donor countries within a framework that safeguards the international monetary system. Their assistance is predicated on the obligation by borrowing countries to meet repayments by increasing export earnings, attracting foreign investment, decreasing government spending and diminishing social policy in areas such as health care and education. There is considerable controversy over whether this formula alleviates or hampers distressed economies, and over how the burden is distributed. An ethical dilemma is apparent in the types of balances struck between the rise in environmental harm and the drop in expenditure on environmental management. In this sphere, hard neoclassical logic brings to light the clash between economic reform and equity. The political decision to emphasize economic globalization coincides, and seems to collide, with the changing capacity of the state, especially in its heretofore inability to protect, or indifference towards, the most marginalized zones of the global political economy and the poor in other regions.

Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Captors and Captive," *Third World Quarterly*, 2000.

Embracing a neoliberal framework of liberalization, deregulation and privatization, the globalization paradigm clearly offers benefits to all who would partake in this process, but in an uneven manner. The higher the level of globalization, the greater the degree of polarization. Put differently, there are rips and tears in the fabric of globalization. Enclaves of poverty within the wealthy countries and a multitude of impoverished countries, except for their upper strata, most apparent in, but not unique to, Africa, fall into the breach. At the same time, the neoliberal formula prescribes delinking economic reform from social policy, which places a greater burden on women, the primary care givers and users of health facilities. By all indications, globalization and marginalization are two sides of the same coin. If so, one must consider whether globalization is ethically sustainable.

What do proponents argue in response to the inequality criticism? They argue that globalization has actually reduced the gap between the rich and the poor.

Frankel, Jeffrey. "Globalization of the Economy," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 62-63.

Income Distribution: International trade and investment can be a powerful source of growth in poor countries, helping them catch up with those who are ahead in endowments of capital and technology. This was an important component of the spectacular growth of East Asian countries between the 1960s and the 1990s, which remains a miracle even in the aftermath of the 1997-98 currency crises. By promoting convergence, trade can help reduce the enormous worldwide inequality in income. Most of those who are concerned about income distribution, however, seem more motivated by within-country equality than global equality.

Frankel, Jeffrey. "Globalization of the Economy," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 63.

In a survey of seventy-three countries, Chakrabarti finds that trade actually reduces inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. This relationship also holds for each income class.

It is not true that globalization only inures to the benefit of big global companies.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization*, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 101.

But the idea that the big are getting bigger is an old myth that seems to get statistically more inaccurate each time it is repeated. More than thirty years ago, in *The New Industrial State*, John Kenneth Galbraith predicted that the world would be run by huge corporations: "With the rise of the modern corporation, the emergence of the organization required by modern technology and planning and the divorce of capital from the control of the business, the entrepreneur no longer exists as an individual person in the mature industrial enterprise. Ever since then, of course, American corporate history has been dominated by entrepreneurs of one sort or another, whether corporate raiders ripping apart the old monsters or young tycoons simply outsmarting them. The proportion of American output coming from big companies rose gradually 22 percent in 1918 to 33 percent in 1970, but it did not change between them and 1990 (and surely, given the arrival of the technology industries, it must have fallen since then). In Germany, Japan, and Britain, the proportions all fell pretty dramatically between 1970 and 1990.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization*, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 101-02.

There are plenty of ways in which globalization reduces the power of big firms. True, national champions find it easier to spread their tentacles around the world, but they have tended to encounter other giants spreading their own rubbery arms. In Woo's own industry, Mattel and Hasbro have run into Lego, Sony, and Nintendo; Toys "R" Us has been losing market share to discounters such as Wal-Mart, and now it has to contend with etoys.com. Small firms have few of the fixed costs of their bigger rivals, such as bloated head offices and waffling middle managers. The deregulation of the capital markets has made it easier for such firms to borrow money; the availability of information technology has made it easier for them to do the sort of number-crunching that was once the preserve of the giants; and the declining cost of transport has turned the entire world into their marketplace. Consider many of the characters we have already met—not just Woo but also Patrick Wang, Marcus de Ferranti, and Jackson Tubela—and it is not hard to see why small firms feel less cowed than they once did.

It is also not true that globalization occurs at the expense of the poor.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization*, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 111.

MYTH: Globalization is helping productive, capital-rich countries profit at the expense of poor ones. Mexican trade unions complain that America is more productive just as American trade unions moan that Mexican workers are cheap. In fact, the evidence is that the current system has helped them catch up. In 1960, the average wage in developing countries was just 10 percent of the average manufacturing wage in the United States; in 1992, despite all that terrible globalization, it had risen to 30 percent. The reason lies in the second concept that the antiglobalists cannot handle: Globalization helps the whole pie get bigger.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization*, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 111.

Toytown provides an example of this. Sales of toys in America have grown pretty steadily since Woo founded Toytown. To be sure, Woo has replaced some jobs, but many of those that he has created are new ones. In America, his toys helped create a new niche in the market—below that of Mattel but above that of street vendors. In other markets, notably Latin America, Toytown has helped broaden the choice available to an emerging middle class. But it is not just a matter of price: Toytown has created new products, increasing the pie. Typically, innovation is not usually thought of in terms of a scarier Darth Vader mask, but in Woo's world it can be.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization*, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 111-12.

Two fundamental principles show why he is right. The first is Adam Smith's principle of the division of labor: The more people specialize in what they do best, the more productivity is improved—and the bigger the market, the more refined the division of labor can become. The second is David Ricardo's principle of comparative advantage. The whole point of engaging in trade is to allocate resources to the country that can best use them, even if that activity is linking Chinese hands with American consumers. This process is never painless. Some workers are forced to move to new lines of business. Some are forced to take a reduction in pay. But in the long run, the process creates far more winners than losers. Consumers obviously benefit from cheaper prices and more choice, but producers also benefit from doing what they do best rather than from what can be done better by others.

Assuming there is increased inequality, many debates will turn on what causes the increase in inequality. There are those who argue that the increases in inequality in poorer nations are not due to globalization.

Dollar, David and Kray, Art (World Bank economists). "Spreading the Wealth." Pg. 121.

"Globalization has not resulted in higher inequality within economies. Inequality has indeed gone up in some countries (such as China) and down in others (such as the Philippines). But those changes are not systematically linked to globalization measures such as trade and investment flows, tariff rates, and the presence of capital controls. Instead, shifts in inequality stem more from domestic education, taxes, and social policies."

Others argue that this inequality is inherent to global integration.

Ruiz, Pedro Ortega and Ramón Mínguez, "Global Inequality and the Need for Compassion: issues in moral and political education," *Journal of Moral Education*, June 2001, v. 30, no. 2, pp. 159-60.

The frequently remarked-upon gulf between North and South is rather more than an unpleasant fact with which we are forced to live: it is the desired outcome provoked in the international field by a radically unjust system and means of production. It is untrue that this problem will be overcome with time and in stages, but rather than price of prosperity for the North is the poverty of the South. Neither is it a scientific, almost religious truth, as the defenders of the actual system claim, damning with their dismissal and ostracism all those who, however slightly, dare to question the soundness of the prevailing values in the international economic order (Martin Seco, 1999). Poverty, inequality and exclusion are not explicable in a makeshift fashion, nor can they be blamed on those who suffer them; they are created by the economic system itself. This requires eliminating the very deep-seated idea that the market produces prosperity, not poverty. It is part of the system's logic to increase the production of goods without reducing the number of people lacking the necessary means to satisfy even their basic needs. Neither the inequalities between social groups nor countries themselves should be considered as an expression of a different evolutionary stage within a process which is the same for everyone, but rather as quite different positions within the world economy (Tortosa, 1993).

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

Once the exact nature of globalization is understood, it is easy to understand the consequences. The first is a tragic increase of economic disparity. Hegel already said that rich societies are not rich enough to reduce the excessive misery they generate. Today, poverty no longer results from scarcity but from the poor distribution of wealth and from a psychological and cultural mind-set which cannot conceive of wealth other than in terms of work and production.

Between 1975 and 1985, the gross world product rose 40%; since 1950, world trade has increased eleven-fold; economic growth, five-fold. However, during the same period, there has been an unprecedented increase in poverty, unemployment, social disintegration and environmental destruction. The real GNP per person in the Southern hemisphere today is only 17% of that in its Northern counterpart. The industrial world, which represents only a quarter of humanity, possesses 85% of the world's wealth. The G7 nations constitute 11% of the world population but two thirds of the planet's GNP. New York City alone uses more electricity than all of sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1975 and 1995, American wealth increased by 60%, but this increase was monopolized by 1% of the population. One last revealing figure: the holdings of the 358 billionaires on the planet today is more than the cumulative annual revenue of the 2.3 billion poorest individuals, or the equivalent of nearly half of humanity. This means one thing: the more wealth, the more poverty -- which refutes the liberal theory whereby the whole of society should end up benefiting from the profits of the wealthiest. In reality, because it gives a quasi-monopoly back to market forces, globalization contributes to the development of inequities and of social exclusion, thereby threatening social cohesion.

Globalization displaces foreign aid, which is really what is necessary.

Pogge, Thomas W., "The Moral Demands of Global Justice," *Dissent*, Fall 2000, v. 47, no. 4, pp. 39-40.

The growing reluctance to spend money on reducing world hunger is associated with the increasingly popular idea that this goal is best achieved through investment rather than aid. Hunger will be erased through globalization and free markets. But this idea is problematic. The freer, globalized markets of recent years have actually, thanks partly to the 1997-1998 global debt and currency crisis, produced a 25 percent *increase* in the number of people living below the international poverty line (*cf. WDR*, 25). Foreign investment and free markets can be helpful where a minimally adequate infrastructure is in place and the physical and mental development of prospective employees has not been permanently retarded through disease, malnutrition, and illiteracy. But foreign investment will rarely create such conditions; it will not help those children who *now* need food, safe water, basic sanitation, basic health services, and primary education. Money spent to meet those needs would produce an advance that would help attract foreign investment, which could then sustain the advance on its own. If these needs are not met, investment will flow elsewhere, and the enormous gap between rich and poor will continue to grow.

Women

The poverty and rich/poor gap issues have disproportionately affected women.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 121.

Southern debt functions not only as a drain through which the resources of impoverished countries are siphoned abroad, but also as a shackle, because it keeps highly indebted countries trapped in a global trading system that they cannot abandon if they are to earn the foreign exchange necessary to service their debts. The present global trading system is regulated by neoliberal principles that have been especially harmful to poor women in both the global North and the global South.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 123.

Neoliberal globalization has had mixed consequences – good for some people, bad for others. Those who have reaped its rewards have belonged mostly to the more privileged classes in the global North or to elite classes in the global South. Those who have been injured by neoliberal globalization are mostly people who were already poor and marginalized by in both developing and the developed worlds. Since women are represented disproportionately among the world's poor and marginalized, neoliberal globalization has been harmful especially to women – although not to all or only women. Neoliberal globalization has made the lives of some women much better but it is making the lives of far more women much worse.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 123.

Free trade has had an especially devastating effect on the livelihoods of many Southern women. The United Nations reports, "Small women-run businesses often can't compete with cheap imported products brought in by trade liberalization. In Africa, many of women's traditional industries such as food processing and basket making are being wiped out. New employment opportunities have been created in some parts of Asia, but often with low wages and poor working conditions." (Unifem, 2001).

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 124.

In the global North, women, especially women of color, are disproportionately impoverished by the economic inequality resulting from "free" trade, which has resulted in many hitherto well-paid jobs moved from the North to low-wage areas of the South. These jobs have been replaced in the North by so-called "McJobs," "casual" contingency, or part-time positions, often in the service sector, which are typically low-paid and lack health or retirement benefits.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 124.

The feminization of poverty was a term coined originally to describe the situation of women in the United States, but the United Nations reports that the feminization of poverty has now become a global and growing phenomenon, with women comprising 70 percent of the world's 1.3 billion poor (Unifem 2001). Women's poverty in the global South, as in the global North, is linked with disturbing statistics on children's nutritional status, mortality, and health. In many poor countries, including Zimbabwe, Zambia, Nicaragua, Chile and Jamaica, the number of children who die before the age of one or five has risen sharply after decades of falling numbers.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 126.

The increasing privatization of natural resources such as land, forests, minerals, and water has led to increasing exploitation, depletion and pollution of the environment and to the further impoverishment of women. Multinational corporations have patented many indigenous seeds and medicines in what Vandana Shiva calls a theft of the commons. (Shiva 1996; Shiva, Jafri, Bedi, et al. 1997) The WTO has defended so-called intellectual property rights (IPRs), which guarantee corporations' global patents on seeds and medicines, including indigenous seeds and medicines. These patents are criticized in the *United Nations Human Development Report* for 1999 because they preclude poor countries' access to food and medicine. They have especially adverse consequences for women, who tend to be even poorer than men who are otherwise comparably suited.

Jaggar, Allison M. "A Feminist Critique of the Alleged Southern Debt," *Hypatia*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 126.

Large-scale cash-crop development has displaced women's subsistence farming and thereby contributed to famines, especially in Africa. In India, the destruction of forests for large-scale agriculture has resulted in an increase in the time women must spend collecting firewood and fodder, which in turn means they have less time available for crop production; their income is reduced and their nutrition suffers.

Corruption/Political Systems

Globalization also has impacts on political systems. Now you might be wondering, why is there a separate political globalization section? Isn't this subsection redundant? No. Political globalization referred to efforts to globalize political structures themselves. This section refers to economic globalization – the integration into one global market – which, however, in turn has political effects.

Globalization is good because isolated, protected systems only concentrate power and increase corruption.

Rosenberg, Tina. "So far, globalization has failed the world's poor. But it's not trade that has hurt them. It's a rigged system. The Free-Trade Fix." Pg. 30.

"I spent many years in Latin America, and I have seen firsthand how protected economies became corrupt systems that helped only those with clout."

Globalization makes governments less authoritarian.

Saich, Tony. "Globalization, Governance, and the Authoritarian State: China," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 208.

The need to be increasingly accountable to liberal international trading investment norms, and the release of the state's monopoly over the provision of information and communication (it is argued) will undermine authoritarian control and help unleash a more plural society. To compete effectively the state will be forced to cede sovereignty on certain issues upward by empowering transnational institutions, relinquish many business decisions to transnational business corporations, and be held more accountable to a nascent transnational civil society. At the same time, the state will be forced to cede sovereignty not only downward (to local administrations) but also outward (to new social actors that are crucial to national success in a global world.)

Globalization has led to a broader acceptance of human rights/democratic ideals.

Coglianesse, Cary. "Globalization and the Design of International Institutions," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 301.

The increasingly widespread exchange of ideas about cultural and political values may well contribute to broader acceptance of human rights and democratic principles, notwithstanding the positive rights that are (and often are not) protected by particular countries. Since nation-states have not uniformly secured justice and protected the rights of their peoples, effective international institutions may be needed to help guarantee minimal protection of human rights across all nations.

Globalization creates new actors to check all governments.

Stopford, John; Strange, Susan. Rival States, Rival Firms. Cambridge Press. 1991. Pg.2.
 “No longer do states merely negotiate among themselves; they now must also negotiate – if not as supplicants then certainly as suitors seeking a marriage settlement – with foreign firms. Furthermore, multinational firms themselves are increasingly having to become more statesmanlike as they seek corporate alliances, permanent, partial or temporary, to enhance their combined capacities to compete with others for world market shares. The interaction of all three dimensions, in ‘triangular diplomacy’, calls for new skills in management and government that challenge the old order.” p.2.

Sassen, Saskia. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. Columbia University Press. 1996. Pg. 15.
 “Globalization has been accompanied by the creation of new legal regimes and practices and the expansion and renovation of some older forms that bypass national legal systems. Globalization and governmental deregulation have not meant the absence of regulatory regimes and institutions for the governance of international economic relations. Among the most important in the private sector today are international commercial arbitration and the variety of institutions that fulfill the rating and advisory functions that have become essential for the operation of the global economy.”

Opponents to globalization say that these effects are actually detrimental. Globalization results in the ceding of power to agents/actors that are not accountable.

Kosmicki, Eugeniusz, “Shaping Globalization—A Challenge for 21st-Century Ethics and Politics,” *Dialogue & Universalism*, 2001, v. 11, no. 3.
 In 1995 the Lisbon Group published its Limits of Competition report which points to the negative economic, social, cultural, and ecological effects of rivalry between large corporations, regions, and countries. According to the Lisbon Group, the main economic players today are transnational corporations made up of whole networks of companies, whose power centers and ownership are hard to define. Using slogans like deregulation, privatization, and liberalization, national governments have de facto ceded a considerable part of their power to international corporations in the hope that they will still be able to pursue their goals through such "global players".

This encourages corruption.

Farazmand, Ali. “Administrative ethics and professional competence: accountability and performance under globalization,” *International Review of Administration*, vol. 68, 2002, p. 129.
 Additionally, as an ideological strategy of globalization of advance capitalism, the globally sweeping privatization has also promoted opportunities for corruption so pervasive in the corporate marketplace (Korbin and Naim, 1997; Farazmand, 1999d). Both globalization and privatization have contributed to the expansion of corporate capitalism with its cultural as well as political features at the expense of public service domain (Frederich, 1990; Frederickson, 1993; Korten, 1995; Farazmand, 2000a, 2001).

Multinational corporations are corrupt.

Stopford, John; Strange, Susan. Rival States, Rival Firms. Cambridge Press. 1991. Pg. 6.
 “Many [nations] have relaxed their previously stringent criteria for screening potential investors and added more generous incentives. By their actions, they are showing how far opinion has moved from the early 1980’s, when one study could report that three-quarters of diplomats thought that all multinationals employed corrupt practices and policies detrimental to development.”

Global corporations compromise human rights standards.

Stopford, John; Strange, Susan. *Rival States, Rival Firms*. Cambridge Press. 1991. Pg. 23.
“When the British Foreign Secretary announced that British aid would be reduced to countries abusing human rights, the British High Commission in Nairobi had to lobby strenuously to get the UK government to back off, so as to protect British investors’ interests.”

Globalization threatens democracy.

Farazmand, Ali. “Administrative ethics and professional competence: accountability and performance under globalization,” *International Review of Administration*, vol. 68, 2002, p. 134.
Some of the consequences of globalization, such as the loss of state sovereignty, loss of territorial control and threat to democratic rights of community, are important to note not only for less developed nations, but also for some of the advanced industrialized countries. For example, globalization empowers dominant economic elites who are subsidiary/subservient agents of globalizing corporations, pushes for privatization as part of the structural adjustment programs, promotes corruption in both industrialized and developing nations. Such corruption at the highest level has already reached the point of national crisis in many nations. Examples include the United States (Thayer, 1984; Henry, 1995), pre-revolutionary Iran (Farazmand, 1989), Arab countries of the Middle East (Jreisat, 1997), Southeast Asia (Zafarullah and Siddiquee, 2001) and elsewhere (Eisner, 1995; Farazmand, 1998).

Globalization empowers elites at the expense of accountable government.

Farazmand, Ali. “Administrative ethics and professional competence: accountability and performance under globalization,” *International Review of Administration*, vol. 68, 2002, p. 134.
Elite empowerment leads to a new global organizational system characterized by a global ‘corporate imperialism’ that requires organizational as well as policy flexibility in its giant transformation of the world power structure (Barnett and Cavanaugh, 1995). This transformation draws a clear demarcation between the elites and non-elites, the latter being expendable as disposable people (Dugger, 1989; Greider, 1997). In short, globalization and privatization empower corporate business elites and, by providing various opportunities for corruption, lubricate the wheels of domination and exploitation of indigenous national economies and human and natural resources.

Farazmand, Ali. “Administrative ethics and professional competence: accountability and performance under globalization,” *International Review of Administration*, vol. 68, 2002, p. 135.
Furthermore, globalization and privatization cause severe problems of accountability, as neither global finance nor national privatizing elites are accountable to any citizens. Accountability is resisted by globalizing powers – both transnational corporations and their globalizing states – as well as by local subservient elites whose further empowerment – both politically and financially – are depended on facilitation of the globalization process. Privatization has been used by the globalizing corporation and their governments – as donors to the World Bank and lenders of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – as a global strategy to promote corporate capitalism around the world. Such a global trend empowers business and military-political elites and promotes potential corruption everywhere. Corruption works as a lubricant for the machinery of governance that promotes globalization, subsidiarity, agencification and corporatization. Accountability is therefore either lost or seriously weakened in the new global power structure that dominates national democratic rights of sovereign states and their citizens around the globe.

Globalization has led to the empowerment of transnational corporations. These corporations are in control.

Gilleo, Margaret P., "Ethical Issues in the Global Economy," *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, August 2001, v. 21, no. 4.

In the global economy, transnational corporations have become as powerful or even more powerful than nations. In *The Ecology of Commerce*, Hawken (1993) states, "No empire--Greek, Roman, Byzantine, British, or any other--has had the reach of the modern global corporation, which glides easily across borders, cultures, and governments in search of markets, sales, assets, and profits" (p. 6). Today's world is no longer ruled by emperors and kings--the heads of transnational corporations have become the new ruling class. Often, it is corporate rather than elected leaders who control so-called democracies.

This shift to corporate power is not desirable.

Gilleo, Margaret P., "Ethical Issues in the Global Economy," *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, August 2001, v. 21, no. 4.

According to David Korten (1995), former Harvard Business School professor and former Asia regional adviser on development management for the United States Agency for International Development, there is tension between older style multinationals and newer transnationals. Korten described the multinational as a company that establishes local roots in countries where it maintains autonomous production and sales facilities. It takes on national identities of the countries in which it has units. By contrast, transnationals merely set up affiliates in the most advantageous locales to produce parts or to assemble final products. If circumstances such as labor costs or labor and environmental regulations appear more favorable in another place, the transnational does not hesitate to shut down the plant and move its operation. Korten expressed serious concern that the ease of shifting production from one country to another:

"weakens the bargaining power of any given locality and shifts the balance of power from the local human interest to the global corporate interest. The more readily a firm is able to move capital, goods, technology, and personnel freely among localities in search of such advantage, the greater the competitive pressure on localities to subsidize investors by absorbing their social, environmental, and other production costs." (p. 126)

Alain De Benoist explains this shift to corporate power, as opposed to national sovereignty, and its detrimental impact.

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

The last consequence of globalization is the nation-states' growing loss of power. In view of the increasing mobility of international capital, the globalization of markets, and the integration of economies, state governments are seeing their possibilities of macro-economic action diminish in the blink of an eye. In currency matters, their impact is already almost nil because the interest and exchange rates are now controlled by independent central banks that make their decisions according to markets. A country deciding on a unilateral decrease in its interest rates would immediately witness a flight of currency to countries offering the possibility of higher gains. At the same time, the range of monetary mobilization of the central banks has become less than the volume of transactions: in July 1993, in a single day of speculative attacks against the franc, the Bank of France lost all of its exchange reserves. In budgetary matters, states see their margin of freedom similarly reduced, owing to increased public debt that prevents any non-legislated stimulation. Finally, regarding industrial policy, governments have no solution to resist competition other than to attempt to attract foreign business through subsidies and special fiscal privileges, which leaves them at the mercy of the multinationals.

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

However, these firms are not satisfied merely to break through barriers: they also bend the legislative framework meant to regulate their operations. High wages and taxes or costly labor conditions make them leave. The result is that "any form of regulation may be a victim of the market's downward pressures simply because transnational companies see a cost." The fiscal power of the states is then no longer sovereign but contractual, because it must be negotiated with an increasingly erratic capital in an ever better position to dictate its conditions. "No government, even in the North," explains Edward Goldsmith, "has control over multinational corporations any more. If a law disturbs their expansion, they threaten to leave and they can do so immediately. They are free to run all over the planet to choose the cheapest labor, the environment least protected by the law, the lowest taxes, and the most generous subsidies. There is no longer any need to identify themselves with a nation or to allow a sentimental attachment to hinder their projects. They are totally out of control." In the end, concludes Adda, "financial globalization may be analyzed as a process of getting around the rules instituted by the most developed states through a multilateral system of world economic regulation."

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

The globalized economy thus weighs so heavily on nation-states that they see their traditional means of action gradually relegated to modalities of adherence. Confronted by a growing difficulty to control the rich, they find themselves deprived of an essential political lever: the coherent development of their territory. Since all budgetary efforts in the social realm means less ability to compete economically, they can no longer fulfill their historical role of managing social compromises. Politicians thus become powerless and the state changes its role. From a social mediator, it now merely manages territorial affairs beyond its control. Reduced to the role of spectator, it is like "a court clerk who notes decisions made elsewhere."

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

Such a change is revolutionary in that it undermines one of the foundations of modern politics: national sovereignty. According to Badie: "globalization destroys sovereignties, cuts through territories, abuses established communities, challenges social contracts and renders obsolete earlier concepts of international security. ... Thus sovereignty is no longer the undisputed fundamental value it was, while the idea of outside interference slowly but surely changes connotation." As soon as the concept of sovereignty is challenged, however, the question of identity comes to the fore with all the social anonymity it brings along. Democratic principles are also threatened. There is a direct link between the loss of national sovereignty and the weakening of democracy. On the one hand globalization tends to generalize multiple loyalties to the detriment of civic allegiance. On the other, the ruling class' democratic legitimacy is called into question as soon as it no longer has the means to intervene between the demands of capital and social needs. Finally, the free circulation of currency also limits democratic control over economic and social policy because such policy is subject to external pressures the government can no longer ignore and because there is a transfer of decision-making power to worldwide unaccountable economic players. Citizenship thus becomes meaningless to the point where one wonders what "taking power" means any more.

Bauman, Zygmunt, "The Ethical Challenge of Globalization," *NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly*, Fall 2001 (October), v. 18, no. 4, pp. 6-7.

The globality of capital, finances and trade—those forces decisive for the range of choices and the effectiveness of human action—has not been matched by a similar scale of the resources which humanity developed to control those forces that control human lives. Most importantly, that globality has not been matched by a similarly global scale of democratic control. Indeed, we may say that power has "flown away" from the historically developed institutions that used to exercise democratic control over uses and abuses of power inside the modern nation states. Globalization in its current form means disempowerment of nation states with (so far) the absence of any effective substitute.

This is also known as the “Golden Straitjacket.”

Singer, Peter, “Navigating the Ethics of Globalization,” *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 11, 2002, v. 49, no. 7.

Global market forces provide incentives for every nation to put on what the foreign-affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman has called a "Golden Straitjacket," a set of policies that involve freeing up the private sector of the economy, shrinking the bureaucracy, keeping inflation low, and removing restrictions on foreign investment. If a country refuses to wear the golden straitjacket, or tries to take it off, then the electronic herd--the currency traders, stock and bond traders, and those who make investment decisions for multinational corporations--could gallop off in a different direction, taking the investment capital that countries want to keep their economy growing. When capital is internationally mobile, to raise your tax rates is to risk triggering a flight of capital to other countries with comparable investment prospects and lower taxation.

The upshot is that as the economy grows and average incomes rise, the scope of politics may shrink--at least as long as no political party is prepared to challenge the assumption that global capitalism is the best economic system. When neither the government nor the opposition is prepared to take the risk of removing the golden straitjacket, the differences between the major political parties shrink to differences over minor ways in which the straitjacket might be adjusted. Thus even without the WTO, the growth of the global economy itself marks a decline in the power of the nation-state.

The political impact of globalization is at best mixed.

Baudot, Jacques, ed., *Building a World Community: Globalisation and the Common Good*, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2001, pp. 16-17.

This process has mixed consequences for democracy. Nationally, it is a dissolver of authoritarian regimes. These regimes have great difficulty maintaining a suppression of individual freedom while liberalizing their economies and being exposed to the mass media. Regression of these regimes towards more severe totalitarianism is economically costly and means international isolation, especially if the country concerned is not militarily powerful. More freedom, however, does not mean more equity and equality, nor more effective participation in public life beyond the casting of an occasional vote. There is credible evidence of aggravation of inequalities in the distribution of income, assets and perhaps also sentiment of social integration, notably in affluent countries, during the last decades of the 20th century. The process of globalisation reinforces or generates powers in the public and private spheres that have a formidable influence on the lives of people and the functioning of governments. Global capitalism is not a democratic affair. But the essence of the market economy system is a fair and broad distribution of opportunities for work, entrepreneurship and acquisition of various types of assets. And this issue of distribution of opportunities now applies within as well as among countries. To democratize the world economy is to bridge the gap between the current avatar of global capitalism and the *raison-d'être* of the market economy system.

Social Concerns

One main criticism of globalization is that it elevates economic concerns over social justice.

Weber, Steven. “International Organizations and the Pursuit of Justice in the World Economy,” *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol. 14, 2000, p. 99.

The belief that globalization is bad for important aspects of social justice bound together an enormous diversity of protestors at the World Trade Organization ministerial meeting in Seattle last year, and it is binding together a piece of common wisdom that is increasingly consequential for domestic and international politics. We may not have a fully agreed definition of “social and economic justice” in the world economy, but we seem to “know” somehow that globalization places it at risk.

Pogge, Thomas W., "The Moral Demands of Global Justice," *Dissent*, Fall 2000, v. 47, no. 4, pp. 38.

One quarter of all children between five and fourteen, 250 million in all, are compelled to work, often under harsh conditions, as soldiers, prostitutes or domestic servants or in agriculture, construction, textile, or carpet production (ILO; *WDR*, 62). If they survive long enough, many of them will join the 850 million illiterate adults. Some 840 million persons are today chronically malnourished, 880 million without access to health services, one billion without adequate shelter, 1.3 billion without access to safe drinking water, two billion without electricity, and 2.6 billion without access to basic sanitation (*HDR* 1998, 49; *HDR* 1999, 22).

Barrientos, Stephanie, "Globalization and Ethical Trade: Assessing the Implications for Development," *Journal of International Development*, May 2000, v. 12, no. 4, pp. 565-66.

As developing countries compete against each other in a global free market, there has long been a concern regarding a downward spiral in employment conditions in export production (Sengenberger and Campbell, 1994). Some of the extreme examples of this, such as the use of child labour and cases of gross exploitation or harm to workers, have fuelled sensational media reports and campaigns by NGOs and consumer groups against companies selling the resulting products.

Beck, Juliette and Kevin Danaher, "Top Ten Reasons to Oppose the World Trade Organization," from Globalize This!: The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule, Danaher, Kevin and Roger Burbach, eds., Common Courage Press, Monroe, ME, pp. 99.

WTO agreements forbid the regulation of a product based on the way it is produced, regardless if the product was made with child labor or by workers exposed to toxic chemicals. A Government Accounting Office study found that the U.S. law banning products made with forced labor violates WTO rules. Furthermore, governments are not allowed to take human rights into consideration when deciding how tax dollars should be spent; purchasing decisions can only be based on commercial considerations such as quality and cost. The Massachusetts law against contracting with corporations that do business with the brutal military dictatorships of Burma is currently being challenged in the WTO. International labor issues are relegated to the International Labor Organization, which unlike the WTO has no enforcement capacity. The ILO has found Burma in violation of key labor standards, but Burma is still considered an equal member of the WTO.

Transnational firms stymie any attempt to achieve social justice, because they'll just leave.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part II)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 62.

Global factories are industrial processes organized across the world, largely irrespective of the immediate physical environments of installations or the distances between corporate headquarters, research centers, design units, fabrication points, assembly lines and consumer markets. With the growth of this supraterritorial production, an estimated 25 per cent of cross-border merchandise trade now consists of intra-firm transactions within global companies (UNDP 1994: 87). Moreover, the global factory is mobile and can fairly readily relocate in response to shifts in costs of production. Hence, for example, a significant number of assembly plants, especially in the textiles, automotive and electronics sectors, have in recent decades move from Western Europe, Japan and North America to export processing zones (EPZs) in East and South East Asia, Mexico and the Caribbean (Grunwald and Flamm, 1985).

This undermines a nation's sovereign ability to respond to important concerns.

Beam, Craig. "Liberalism, Globalization, and Cultural Relativism," *Dialogue*, vol. 73, 1999, p. 110.

Globalization is the process whereby liberal capitalism "creates a world after its own image." It has three faces – one *economic*, one *cultural*, and one *demographic*. The first involves a move towards global markets, the growing interdependence of national economies, and free trade agreements such as NAFTA. Economic globalization weakens the power of governments, subjecting them to the discipline of currency traders and international bankers. The imperatives of "competitiveness" make it harder to tax and regulate corporations, which have the option of moving to the most low-tax, low-wage place they can find. Social issues that once dealt with by countries and provinces now require global solutions. The same goes for the latest crop of environmental issues: acid rain, global warming, and the depletion of the ozone layer are all "problems without frontiers."

This changes the role of the government, making it less responsive.

Smith, Stuart, "The Impact of Globalization on Sovereignty and the Environment," *Canada—United States Law Journal*, v. 24, 1998.

In a sense, governments have been reduced to the position of what I call "bond salesmen," and to some extent, "real estate salesmen." They need to please investors, whose supply of loyalty is pretty close to zero. If you have to make sure that people are confident enough to buy your debt instruments on the international market, you do not have a heck of a lot of clout. You are suddenly put in the position of a supplicant going to somebody else and hoping they will buy what you have to sell.

Beck, Juliette and Kevin Danaher, "Top Ten Reasons to Oppose the World Trade Organization," from Globalize This!: The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule, Danaher, Kevin and Roger Burbach, eds., Common Courage Press, Monroe, ME, pp. 101.

The WTO claims that it operates by consensus, but the Seattle debacle illustrates how the WTO really functions. After much of the ministerial declaration was drafted in private "green room" meetings with select countries present, African and Caribbean countries effectively banded together for the first time. They denounced the closed-door process and blocked the launching of a new round. The WTO boasts of its interference with the democratic process within countries as well. Their website states: "Under WTO rules, once a commitment has been made to liberalize a sector of trade, it is difficult to reverse... Quite often, governments use the WTO as a welcome external constraint on their policies: 'we can't do this because it would violate the WTO agreements.'"

Globalization removes the social shield.

Bamyeh, Mohammed A., The Ends of Globalization, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 2000, pp. 77.

Under globalization today, by contrast, capitalism thrives because of the *weakening* sovereignty of the state. Global capitalism now requires a less socially overbearing state, a state offering a "competitive," deregulated environment to lure an already secure, globally flexible capital. These state thus opens up its domain of sovereignty through free-trade agreements, which involve an unmistakable acceptance of reduced sovereignty—at least the part of sovereignty that deals with *economic* responsibility. This occasions and often explicitly justifies a global trend in national politics toward removing *one* of the two main historical shields of capitalism, namely, the social shield. Ostensibly, the fiscal crisis should be resolved thereby.

Globalization harms social cohesion.

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

Nations no longer have any choice but to fall back on policies of pure competition, to the detriment of social cohesion. That is precisely what happened in Europe beginning in the 1980s, first under the influence of Ronald Reagan's and Margaret Thatcher's liberal theories, then as a result of the Maastricht Treaty. This acceptance of globalization's demands has translated into generalized deregulation and liberalization, with priority given to foreign over domestic markets, the privatization of publicly-owned corporations, the opening to international investments, the fixing of wages and prices by the world market, the progressive elimination of aid and subsidies, and, lastly, the reduction of expenditures designed to slow competition -- such as education, social welfare and the protection of the environment. One after another, European nations have adopted strictly monetarist policies (called competitive deflation) that amount to fighting inflation through high interest rates, the clearest result of which has been slow growth and increased unemployment. Taxed at a lower rate than wages, finance capital, meanwhile, contributes less and less to the general welfare.

Globalization breaks the social contract.

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

Whereas the industrial revolution allowed the integration of unskilled labor, globalization tends to systematically exclude those who do not have the right kind of know-how. From the viewpoint of the previous tendencies of capitalism, this represents a fundamental break that calls into question all social compromises adopted by the Keynesian welfare state. Globalization of wages and financial globalization combine to reverse the course of economic and social policies prevalent during the decades of post-war growth. During the thirty years following WWII, which correspond to the apogee of the Fordist system, capitalism had to come to terms with social demands formulated in industrial societies, as well as the determination of nations to create the foundations of an international economic order. The welfare state was the result of this historical compromise between capital and labor. It was a strategic adjustment of capital to meet a number of social demands. Globalization broke this social contract. Beginning in the 1970s, the economic logic of capitalism began to disconnect itself from social preoccupations, which led to the questioning of the hierarchy of wages and of mechanisms of social cohesion.

This exacerbates the rich/poor gap.

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

This disconnection of the economic and the social goes hand in hand with the loosening of the connection between the welfare state and the middle class around which the growth of preceding decades was built. Globalization is leading to the rise of an hourglass model of society in which the large majority of the occupants tend to fall towards the bottom, succumbing to a precarious existence, while money is polarized in the higher spheres, signaling the deconstruction of the middle classes, i.e., of those classes "that capitalisms of the early 20th century not only generated but on which founded their growth." During the thirty years following WWII, these middle classes became consolidated, leading to the integration of increasingly large portions of the population and thus to the relative reduction of inequities.

Mark Neufeld analyzes the effect of globalization on the democratic model of government.

Neufeld, Mark, "Theorising Globalisation: Towards a Politics of Resistance—A Neo-Gramscian Response to Mathias Albert," *Global Society*, January 2001, v. 15, no. 1, pp. 101.

The fifth distinguishing characteristic of globalisation is the shift in the understanding of democracy. This theme can be addressed in terms of both domestic and foreign policy. To begin, different generalized modes of democracy must be distinguished. The form of democracy that prevailed in core states in much of the post-war period can be termed "compensatory democracy". It was distinguished, at least in part, by a diachronic understanding of democratic governance. Democracy was seen, not as a given system existing at a single point in time, but as a process, stretching back into society's past – where today's democracy was understood as the result of past improvements – and forward into society's future – in which liberal democracy was viewed as a means of continuing improvements.

Neufeld, Mark, "Theorising Globalisation: Towards a Politics of Resistance—A Neo-Gramscian Response to Mathias Albert," *Global Society*, January 2001, v. 15, no. 1, pp. 102.

There is no need to portray this earlier version of democracy as a fully functioning form of "participatory democracy". Mass participation was largely limited to periodic elections in which voters were limited to an elite-managed choice between a narrow range of platforms of mainstream parties, all committed to one variant or another of welfare-state Keynesianism. Notwithstanding this limitation, however, this earlier conception of democracy did exhibit a willingness to address the inequities produced by market-society (for example, through social welfare provisions, noted above). Specifically, it was seen as vital to the practice of democracy that the state intervene to redress the inevitable inequalities produced by market forces. Democracy was understood to involve "social citizenship", where citizens could expect to be "compensated" by the state in those realms where the market failed to provide what was necessary.

Neufeld, Mark, "Theorising Globalisation: Towards a Politics of Resistance—A Neo-Gramscian Response to Mathias Albert," *Global Society*, January 2001, v. 15, no. 1, pp. 102.

More recently, however, the discourse of compensatory democracy has been supplanted by that of "protective" democracy. This conception of democracy, reminiscent of 19th-century theorizing, allows no space to the idea that democracy might involve compensation for market failure, or that democratic citizenship might have a social-welfare dimension.

Neufeld, Mark, "Theorising Globalisation: Towards a Politics of Resistance—A Neo-Gramscian Response to Mathias Albert," *Global Society*, January 2001, v. 15, no. 1, pp. 102-103.

In contrast to the earlier diachronic understanding of democracy, the "protective" view is an unambiguously synchronic one. Now democracy is reduced to a process that exists in a given moment in time. In politico-economic terms, protective democracy is distinguished by a strict separation of the economic and political spheres, with the former responding only to the logic of the marketplace, and the latter restricted in its role to allowing that logic to proceed without interference. Like its immediate predecessor, protective democracy also reduces the meaning of mass participation to taking part in "free and fair elections" every few years in which voters' choices are limited to an elite-managed choice between a narrow range of platforms of mainstream parties. What is different, however, is that the earlier consensus on the need to redress the negative effects of the market has been replaced by a new one based on an agenda of "deficit reduction" and "tax relief" to be achieved through the progressive dismantling of the welfare state.

This mutated form of democracy is more concerned about protecting markets, than about meeting the needs of the people.

Neufeld, Mark, "Theorising Globalisation: Towards a Politics of Resistance—A Neo-Gramscian Response to Mathias Albert," *Global Society*, January 2001, v. 15, no. 1, pp. 106.

Democracy. The acceptance of the protective conception of democracy legitimises the notion that capital is not to be subject to "political interference"; however, the accompanying inability of governments to meet public needs for secure employment and adequate social programmes leads to a growing disenchantment with politicians, parties, and liberal-democracy generally, thus reducing its legitimising power.

Laxer, James, "Reflections on the Public Good in the New Gilded Age," *Queen's Quarterly*, March 1999, v. 106, no. 1.

As the state withdraws from the role it adopted after the Second World War -- extending public education and social services -- and instead becomes the defender of the rights of capital, the power of the wealthy and the major corporations continues to expand. Why has all this happened? What has opened the door to the harsh and widening inequality of our day?

Part of the answer certainly can be found in the gradual disintegration of the postwar Great Social Compromise. In the postwar decades, that compromise delivered a highly favourable climate for businesses to make profits, but it also enabled wage and salary earners to win rising incomes. During that time, generous social programs were created, and access to higher education was widened.

By the mid-1970s, the Great Social Compromise waned as the industrialized countries set out on the path to the globalized economy. New technology and de-regulation helped create today's globalized financial market and a system of production that enables multinational corporations to produce and market their products in almost all parts of the world.

Laxer, James, "Reflections on the Public Good in the New Gilded Age," *Queen's Quarterly*, March 1999, v. 106, no. 1.

The globalized economy has given the wealthy and the corporations decisive new leverage in their dealings with wage and salary earners. Consider the case of the meatpacking workers at Maple Leaf in Edmonton they lost their jobs because they refused to take a huge pay cut so that the company could match the lower costs of its competitors in the US. Many of the workers at Maple Leaf in Winnipeg had to accept just such a cut in order to save their jobs -- packers who used to earn \$16 an hour suddenly found themselves working for \$9 an hour.

Laxer, James, "Reflections on the Public Good in the New Gilded Age," *Queen's Quarterly*, March 1999, v. 106, no. 1.

I spoke to the manager responsible for keeping an eye on labour conditions in the Asian plants where Nike shoes are made. He told me that in these plants in Vietnam, Indonesia, and China, the almost entirely female work force is paid about \$10 a week. He looked me in the eye and claimed there was evidence that many of these workers were saving up to 30 per cent of their incomes, using their savings so they could found their own businesses. Independent investigators of the plants have exposed a quite different picture -- one of workers who make barely enough money to feed themselves and who are subjected to various forms of abuse.

Laxer, James, "Reflections on the Public Good in the New Gilded Age," *Queen's Quarterly*, March 1999, v. 106, no. 1.

The relationship of power in the globalized economy drags wage and salary earners everywhere in the direction of the lowest common denominator -- a level established by the Nikes of this world. Some are dragged much further than others. In general, though, business has gained leverage over wage and salary earners to such an extent that the historical clock has been turned back to the 1920s, at least, when it comes to social equality.

What do supporters of globalization say? They argue that there are market incentives to solve many of these problems.

Barrientos, Stephanie, "Globalization and Ethical Trade: Assessing the Implications for Development," *Journal of International Development*, May 2000, v. 12, no. 4, pp. 566.

But companies sourcing for global export do not only require cheap supply, they also need to obtain high quality output, and stability in supply, which poor conditions of employment do not always encourage. In addition, with the global integration of supply, the risk is increased for northern companies to be accused of bad practice in their sourcing policies. In the absence of national regulation, large corporations have looked to new mechanisms to provide a more stable employment framework within which their supplies can be sourced. Global sourcing has increased the direct relationship between large purchasers and suppliers, with the former often in a powerful commercial position in relation to the latter. These companies are thus in a position to impose conditions of supply at little extra cost to them. Company codes of conduct are designed to end the poorest employment conditions, and thus limit any commercial damage that could result. A paradox of globalization, therefore, is that on the one hand it has stimulated downward pressure on labour standards through the deregulation of labour markets, but it also leading to pressure on companies to restrain this through new forms of private sector control of employment conditions. Voluntary codes of conduct help to provide a new form of mediation between free markets and the social institutions within which global corporations now operate.

And nations can still act to solve these problems. They just don't. That's not the fault of globalization.

Quiggin, John. "Globalization and Economic Sovereignty," *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2001, p. 72.

The French have led the way in resisting pressure for American-style working conditions. In 1997, the 'loi Aubry' set a maximum working week of 39 hours, applicable to all workers including managers. The maximum was lowered to 35 hours per week with effect from 1 February 2000. There have been some offsets, such as systems of annualization, allowing a maximum of 48 hours per week. However, the majority of agreements concluded so far call for annual hours of less than 1600 hours for full-time workers, equivalent to about 45 weeks per year at 35 hours per week. Despite Anglo-Saxon predictions of disaster, the new law has been accompanied by strong economic growth and falling unemployment.

Quiggin, John. "Globalization and Economic Sovereignty," *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2001, p. 73.

The idea of 'state capacity' is useful in understanding the debate about globalization and neoliberalism. Despite claims to the contrary, the state retains a substantial capacity to intervene effectively in the economy. However, that capacity has not grown in line with the demands implied by the range of responsibilities taken on by governments in the postwar period, giving rise to the notion of a 'capacity gap.'

Ultimately, the creation of a global government can solve these problems. But opponents think this is unrealistic.

Smith, Stuart, "The Impact of Globalization on Sovereignty and the Environment," *Canada—United States Law Journal*, v. 24, 1998.

The most important consequence of all of this, the one that is really looming over the planet, is the fact that supranational government organizations cannot yet match the power of supranational firms. There simply is nothing on the horizon that indicates that we will be able to meet that challenge.

The Environment

Globalization is also criticized for its impact on the environment.

Mittelman, James H., "Environmental Resistance to Globalization," *Current History*, November 2000, v. 99, no. 640, pp. 383.

Environmentalists are playing a prominent role in the rapidly growing resistance to globalization. They have been a major force in recent venues, including the "Battle of Seattle" over World Trade Organization policy, the 2000 protests in Washington and Prague at the meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and the 2000 demonstrations in Melbourne at a gathering of the World Economic Forum.

Smith, Stuart, "The Impact of Globalization on Sovereignty and the Environment," *Canada—United States Law Journal*, v. 24, 1998.

The market system regards the environment, ethics, labor practices, working conditions, and human rights as "externalities." There is no monetary value attached to those things. Consequently, the unparalleled growth and the now unopposed victory of the market system, (one which I applaud, by the way), has put in front of us a huge challenge of how to deal with these externalities.

Gilleo, Margaret P., "Ethical Issues in the Global Economy," *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, August 2001, v. 21, no. 4.

In many parts of the world, increasing poverty goes hand in hand with environmental degradation. A frequent objection to proposed environmental regulations or cleanup proposals is that they will interfere with the economy. Corporations express fear that a clean environment is costly and will cause economic dislocation and curtail growth. Within the current economic structure of the United States and much of the industrially developed world, this fear has some validity. Corporations exist to enhance shareholder value, a goal that can only be attained by evaluating every action according to its impact on the bottom line and the resultant effect on Wall Street. Likewise, in countries still in the developing stage of industrialization, environmental regulations can interfere with economic growth and development, the stated objective of the World Trade Organization and its related treaties such as the North American Free Trade Agreement.

Globalization allows circumvention of environmental protection.

Smith, Stuart, "The Impact of Globalization on Sovereignty and the Environment," *Canada—United States Law Journal*, v. 24, 1998.

Such externalities were previously dealt with, if at all, by individual governments who could set standards for human rights, for working conditions, for environmental protection, and so on. This has become very difficult, since companies are easily able to leap over any particular rule that a given country applies and use the threat, or the actual performance of taking their business elsewhere. The globalization of markets makes that fairly easy because these companies do not have to lose the market from which they are escaping or from which they are threatening to escape. The positive side of all this has been an upward pressure on these standards in countries that need to export to the industrialized world. So with respect to environment and working conditions, and, to a lesser extent, human rights and business ethics, these developing countries are trying to meet higher standards than they have met in the past; they are worried about being shut out of markets due to such factors as poor environmental performance.

Globalization elevates markets over environmental concerns.

Beck, Juliette and Kevin Danaher, "Top Ten Reasons to Oppose the World Trade Organization," from Globalize This!: The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule, Danaher, Kevin and Roger Burbach, eds., Common Courage Press, Monroe, ME, pp. 100.

The WTO is being used by corporations to dismantle hard-won environmental protections. In 1993, the very first WTO panel ruled against a regulation of the U.S. Clean Air Act, which had required both domestic and foreign producers alike to produce cleaner gasoline. Recently, the WTO declared illegal the provision of the Endangered Species Act that requires shrimp sold in the U.S. to be caught with an inexpensive 'turtle-excluder device' that allows endangered sea turtles to escape shrimp nets. The WTO ruled against the law, calling it an illegal encroachment on the sovereignty of other governments for the U.S. to set rules for what can be sold in the United States.

Environmental Research Foundation, "The WTO Turns Back the Environmental Clock," from Globalize This!: The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule, Danaher, Kevin and Roger Burbach, eds., Common Courage Press, Monroe, ME, pp. 129.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has effectively canceled the three mainstays of modern environmental protection: (1) pollution prevention using bans, (2) the pre-cautionary principle, and (3) the right-to-know-through labeling. In effect, the WTO has erased thirty years of work by environmental activists and thinkers, forcing us back to an earlier era of "end of pipe" pollution regulations based on risk assessment.

Relying on technology and progress to solve environmental problems is foolish.

Ruiz, Pedro Ortega and Ramón Mínguez, "Global Inequality and the Need for Compassion: issues in moral and political education," *Journal of Moral Education*, June 2001, v. 30, no. 2, pp. 156.

Furthermore, the supremacy of instrumental reason is shown, Taylor affirms, in the prestige and aura surrounding technology, pushing us to believe that we must find technological solutions to the problems facing us, even though what we actually need is something very different: an ethical-moral re-orientation of the principles which regulate the between people and the relationship between people and the natural environment.

Gilleo, Margaret P., "Ethical Issues in the Global Economy," *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, August 2001, v. 21, no. 4.

For the United States, the gross domestic product (GDP) has benefited from more open trade since World War II. However, serious environmental problems have resulted from this growth. Runge theorized that the gains from trade can be used to repair environmental damage. This appears to be a superficial understanding of the functioning of the natural environment, along with an unquestioning faith in the unlimited power of the "techno fix."

Failure to take care of the environment will lead to disaster.

Gilleo, Margaret P., "Ethical Issues in the Global Economy," *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, August 2001, v. 21, no. 4.

The global economy is dependent on a finite ecosystem. The global economy is based on unlimited economic growth, which is not possible in a finite system. As the global economy grows, it feeds off its host body, until, like cancer, it destroys the system upon which it lives. Society does not recognize this out-of-control growth, and thus its immune system has failed. Such unrestrained materialistic growth leads not to human flourishing but to war and destruction.

Supporters of globalization argue that globalization has actually advanced the environmental movement.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Introduction," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 9.

Economists use the term "network effects" to refer to situations in which a product becomes more valuable once many other people also use it. This is why the Internet is causing such rapid change. Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank, argues that a knowledge-based economy generates "powerful spillover effects, often spreading like fire and triggering further innovation and setting chain reactions of new inventions...But goods – as opposed to knowledge – do not always spread like fire." Moreover, as interdependence and globalism have become thicker, the systemic relationships among different networks have become more important. There are more interconnections among the networks. As a result, "system effects" become more important. Intensive economic interdependence affects social and environmental interdependence, and awareness of these connections in turn affect economic relationships. For instance, the expansion of trade can generate industrial activity in countries with low environmental standards, mobilizing environmental activists to carry their message to the newly industrializing but environmentally lax countries.

Clark, William C. "Environmental Globalization," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 98.

At the nation-state level, the single greatest contribution to globalization may well be the copying of environmental regulations from one country to another. This effect has not, to my knowledge, been quantified at a global scale. But the degree to which national environmental regulations converge across countries has been remarked upon by a number of scholars. At a more formal level, more than 150 international environmental treaties have now been signed, almost two-thirds of them since World War II and half since 1970. Many of these treaties are of limited scope or regional scope.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part II)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 69.

Indeed, ecological globalisation has provided one of the principal spurs to the growth of supraterritorial regulation in recent years (Caldwell 1990; Sand 1990). Around 130 states created specialized environment agencies between 1971 and 1985 (McCormick 1989: 125), but it was generally recognized that they could not tackle global ecological questions on their own. Most of the major multilateral organizations have developed environmental policies since the 1970s, and a string of global conferences have formulated action plans in regard to key ecological issues. By the end of the 1980s the global biosphere figured on the agenda of the G7, Non-Aligned and Commonwealth Summits, and even in the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT (Porter and Brown 1991: 135-7). Contemporary globalisation has gone hand in hand with an exponential growth in international environmental law, with a trebling of multilateral agreements in this area between 1970 and 1988 alone (UNEP 1989). Among the more notable measures have been the Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979 and the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985, both with subsequent strengthening protocols, and the Conventions on Climate Change and Biological Diversity signed at the Earth Summit (Flinterman 1987; Benedick 1991; Grubb 1993).

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization*, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. xxiv.

By the same token, globalization has certainly been a mixed blessing for the environment, but it has also helped to force previously closed countries such as China to come clean about pollution. In 1998, under pressure from the World Bank, China revealed that pollution in Beijing is six times worse than in Los Angeles.

Culture

Another negative impact of economic globalization is on local culture. Many people are fearful of the McDonald's culture globalization seems to threaten.

Neufeld, Mark, "Theorising Globalisation: Towards a Politics of Resistance—A Neo-Gramscian Response to Mathias Albert," *Global Society*, January 2001, v. 15, no. 1, pp. 100.

Thesis IV: Globalisation involves a degradation of shared community identifies that can facilitate collective action in favour of a generic American mass culture entailing an ideology of "possessive individualism." A fourth fundamental shift involves the nature of collective identity. One can note here the virtually universal influence of corporate-promoted American mass culture, promulgated by means of advertising and the products of the entertainment industry (movies, television). The consequence of this cultural imperialism is that traditional community identities built around a shared distinct cultural heritage are being supplanted by a nondescript American (i.e. Mickey Mouse; McDonalds) culture.

Beam, Craig. "Liberalism, Globalization, and Cultural Relativism," *Dialogue*, vol. 73, 1999, p. 110-111.

Second, globalization is driven by the influence of movies, music, television, computers, and other mass media. The American information and entertainment industry plays a particularly key role here. The process is also driven by modern advertising which, whatever it is selling, implicitly glorifies a lifestyle of materialist consumption. In relation to the Third World, this raises questions about the ethical wisdom of promoting luxury cars, Big Macs, and Western patterns of consumption in countries where the vast majority of people are in dire poverty. For Western countries like France and Canada, it raises concerns about language and culture. Francophones worry about the fate of their language in a world where English is the language of Hollywood and the Internet, and English Canadians have similar concerns about their cultural identity.

Globalization encourages a throwaway, commercial culture.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part II)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 62.

Through supranational production and distanceless communications, globalisation has also figured centrally in the impressive spread and intensification of consumer capitalism in recent decades (Featherstone, 1991: chs 2, 8; Sklair 1995). With consumerism, much accumulation transpires through large-scale rapid purchase and disposal of commodities in a frenzied pursuit of novelty and instant gratification. Many of the objects of this hedonistic mass consumption are globally manufactured, packaged, distributed and marketed: Ikea furniture, Nike sportswear, Sony hi-fis, Armani perfume, Swatch timepieces, Heineken beer, Camembert cheese, Nintendo computer games, and so on. Today's shopping centers and duty-free stores, where to be is to spend, are in large part global emporia. Other objects of consumerist desire have emerged directly from the technologies of globalisation, for instance, in the seductions of tourism, the self-indulgence of video games, the fantasies of television and cinema, and the ephemeral pleasure of CDs. To this extent global capital has helped to foster a throwaway culture and the intensified ecological degradation to be described later.

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

Finally there is another novelty which facilitates understanding of the nature of cultural globalization: capitalism no longer sells just commodities and goods. It also sells signs, sounds, images, software, connections and links. It does not just fill up houses: it colonizes the imagination and dominates communication. In the 1960s, consumer society thrived on identifiable material goods, cars, household appliances, etc. The system that Benjamin R. Barber calls "McWorld" -- like in Macintosh or McDonald -- is a virtual world resulting from the intensification of all sorts of transnational transactions that converge to homogenize life-styles. "The props of the McWorld system," says Barber, "are no longer cars, but the Eurodisney amusement park, MTV, Hollywood films, software packages. In short, concepts and images as much as objects."

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

This generalized commodification makes the consumption of advertising-spectacle the sole form of social integration, while at the same time intensifying feelings of exclusion and aggressive tendencies in those left out. Through a flood of universal images and sounds, it contributes to the standardization of lifestyles, to the reduction of differences and particularities, the conformity of attitudes and behaviors, the eradication of collective identities and traditional cultures. But more than this, it goes so far as to modify our perception of space and time. Under the network of stationary satellites, under the influence of economic empires that multiply alliances and mergers, under the effect of information highways that carry the same global sub-culture to the farthest reaches of the earth, the planet is shrinking. Dominated by fewer and fewer monopolies, which are more and more powerful, the space in which commodities, investments and currency circulate is being increasingly unified. Furthermore, while up until now all societies have lived time both as a succession of moments and subjective duration, this distinction is being erased. The technological revolution of "real time" accelerates the circulation of material and immaterial flux, with no possibility of a reference point or contextualization. This compression of time makes immediacy the only remaining horizon of meaning. As Rene Char put it, "Abolishing distance kills." The closeness that new communication technologies create ends up crushing things and confusing forms.

Proponents of globalization reject these arguments. It's not clear sharing of culture is bad. Globalization gives individuals choice over culture.

Beam, Craig. "Liberalism, Globalization, and Cultural Relativism," *Dialogue*, vol. 73, 1999, p. 111.

Globalization undermines the autonomy and distinctiveness of many of the world's cultures. However, it is not clear that this is a bad thing. For globalization is an essentially peaceful process. Some may condemn it as "cultural imperialism" -- a kind of Coca-colonization of the world, in Western values and ways of life overwhelm indigenous cultures. But globalization has little in common with the imperialism of the past. The empires of Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan were created purely by force, and broke up soon after their deaths. The economy and technology of the day made their empires virtually impossible to sustain. The conquerors were soon assimilated by the civilizations they had conquered. Today, globalization proceeds largely through the free choices of countless business people, immigrants, and consumers. It is a matter of trade and technology, of communications and culture.

This leads to the best of all worlds.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. "Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society," *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 119-120.

A very good example of globalisation is suggested by Ali Mazrui in describing the competing influences of America and Europe on the Third World in particular. He writes: 'Western Europe and the United States are in the grip of cultural competition for the soul of the Third World' (Marzui 1990: 118). He goes on to list a number of areas in which each of these regions excels in the competition. Western Europe, he writes, is leading in terms of formal dress; America takes the lead in casual dress. America is the guru of fast foods; while Europe prides itself on formal cuisines. When it comes to drinks, Europe reigns supreme in alcoholic drinks (for example the famous French wines and German beer), but it has no equivalent to Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola in the field of soft drinks. In Marzui's (1990: 119) words: 'We have been witnessing the coca-colonization of the world, symbolic of a much wider process of the Americanization of humanity.' The competition extends to the fields of fiction and art versus the natural, applied and social sciences; classical music versus popular music; and the almost total dominance of America in the fields of technology, film and television with its soap operas and talk shows. On the other hand, there are no American equivalents for the world of Rembrandt, Michelangelo and Picasso. But what about Walt Disney and the cartoon industry? In short, the Third World has not been immune from most of these Western influences. In general, we have even appropriated them as part of ourselves and no longer even recognize their ports of origin. They are the fruits of the process of globalisation. (Marzui 1990: 120-121).

Moreover, globalization can actually protect local cultures.

Scholte, Jan Aart, "Globalisation and social change (Part II)," *Transnational Associations*, 1998, no. 2, pp. 72.

By overriding sovereignty, globalisation has reduced the state's capacity to exclude minorities inside as well as foreigners outside. Substate nationalism have proliferated throughout the world since the 1960s, amongst Eritreans, Slovaks, Québécois, Acehnese, Scots and Chechens, to name but a few (Halperin and Scheffer 1992). Meanwhile in Fiji, Australasia, Lapland and the Americas, indigenous peoples have intensified their struggles for relative autonomy within their respective states. Like the European regions, they too have sometimes strengthened their causes through transborder solidarity, as Navajo aids Saami, for example (Anaya 1994). In various ways, then, the late twentieth century has experienced a new localism, regarded by Strassoldo as a search for enclaves of familiarity and intimacy at a time when globalising technologies expose the self to an infinity of places, persons, things and ideas (1992: 46).

Stability and War

Globalization encourages internal stability.

Stopford, John; Strange, Susan. *Rival States, Rival Firms*. Cambridge Press. 1991. Pg. 56.

"The new game of competing for world market shares alters the order of importance of the functions of the state. In the long run, the defensive function wanes as the welfare function waxes in importance. Armed forces increasingly take on the role of internal policemen – as they often have in several countries. Where states need armed forces to maintain internal order, as in China or South Africa or Northern Ireland, the military will continue to play a political role."

Globalization leads to demilitarization.

Stopford, John; Strange, Susan. *Rival States, Rival Firms*. Cambridge Press. 1991. Pg. 56.
“Neighboring states, observing these forces [military forces in developing nations] as a potential threat to themselves as well as to the internal dissidents, will hesitate before dismantling their own forces. But the trends in the global security structure must be toward a demotion of the military functions of the state.”

Globalized nations are less likely to go to war.

Allison, Graham. “The Impact of Globalization on National and International Security,” in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 79.
Economic development and prosperity leads to peace between nations: “When a country reaches the level of economic development where it has a middle class big enough to support a McDonald’s network, it becomes McDonald’s country. And people in McDonald’s countries don’t like to fight wars anymore, they prefer to wait in line for burgers.”

On the other hand, globalization has led to an increase in nationalist feelings.

Smith, Stuart, “The Impact of Globalization on Sovereignty and the Environment,” *Canada—United States Law Journal*, v. 24, 1998.
An interesting side-effect of globalization on weaker nation-states is that governments are obliged to enter larger blocks and to compete with one another to attract industry and investment. The weakness of central governments has also allowed nationalist sentiments in certain places like Scotland, Quebec, the Balkans, and others to flourish. The people ask themselves, if my central government is not able to control things and give me the kind of society I want, and if I have to join a larger block anyway, why do I have to go through the central government that is not of my particular nationality and that I have never liked anyway? There is a significant increase in that type of nationalist sentiment within nation-states. In Britain, they are trying to deal with it by giving Scotland and Wales a certain devolution of power. We have a federal system in Canada that was supposed to deal with the matter, and I am confident that, in the long run, it will. But for the moment, as you know, we are going through some difficult times.

And the problems of globalization – if unaddressed – can cause conflict.

Hoffman, Stanley, “Out of the Cold,” *Harvard International Review*, Fall 1993, v. 16, no. 1.
The post-cold war world is no longer dominated by a single conflict capable of bursting into an all-out global war between nuclear superpowers and their allies. But it is still a troubled and dangerous world in which two kinds of issues intersect. On the one hand, many states are still pursuing the age-old game of power, threatening their neighbors and trying to satisfy old grievances or dreams of regional hegemony through the accumulation and eventual use of force. On the other hand, many of the central state actors in international politics are experiencing enormous internal turbulence, ranging from famine or revolt to disintegration, for a multitude of reasons: economic poverty or mismanagement, ethnic or religious conflicts, ideological or power rivalries, oppressive measures by a tyrannical regime, and the list goes on.

A Moral Assessment of Social Arrangements

Ultimately, the resolution asks debaters to morally assess two world views: one in which social interaction is structured more globally, and one in which social interaction is structured more nationally.

Kessler, Clive S., "Globalization: Another False Universalism?," *Third World Quarterly*, December 2000, v. 24, no. 6.

Much of the current globalization literature speaks of the creation through increasing economic interdependence of a single unified world. All this is made to sound as positive and as benign as it is said to be irresistible. But it does raise the question of what kind of world is being created, according to whose agenda and in whose interests, and how and in what form the new social order which an unchallengeable economic logic is said to be creating for us all is to be institutionalized.

In making this moral assessment, some element of Utopianism is acceptable. We're here to consider what would be the ideal goal, even if it is a little idealistic. We are here to determine what we "ought" to value higher.

Pogge, Thomas W., "The Moral Demands of Global Justice," *Dissent*, Fall 2000, v. 47, no. 4, pp. 42.

A third response to the economists' smokescreen of skepticism goes back to Immanuel Kant, who argued that a morally mandated project may not be abandoned merely because, for all we currently know, it *may* be unachievable, but only if it is "demonstrably impossible" (Kant 89, 173-4).

To make the moral assessment of a globally-structured society versus a nationally-structured society, we can proceed either consequentially or deontologically.

Clarke, John N. "Ethics and Humanitarian Intervention," *Global Society*, vol. 13, no. 4, 1999, p. 492.

Consequentialism assesses the "goodness" or "rightness" of an action by the extent to which it promotes a desirable outcome. Assuming that one can agree on the result desired, the "right-acting" moral agent must select the means most likely to bring about the desired results. Despite allowing the violation of "rights" in order to bring about desirable end-states, consequentialism also allows for consideration of the ethical merits of the means employed, for two main reasons. Firstly, consequentialist can rarely guarantee that the end sought will always result from the means employed. Thus, the best the consequentialist can provide is a probabilistic account of the likelihood of bringing about a desirable end, and thus "we can make only short term predictions, and ...have no way that even mimics mathematics of comparing the costs of fighting to the costs of not fighting, since one set of costs is necessarily speculative". Secondly, some forms of consequentialism may offer a rationale for a particular right. Thus, a consequentialist might reason that universal liberty or equality will bring about desirable ends.

Clarke, John N. "Ethics and Humanitarian Intervention," *Global Society*, vol. 13, no. 4, 1999, p. 493.

Deontological theory focuses on individual agents' motives and, more significantly, emphasizes consideration of principle over consequence.

Clarke, John N. "Ethics and Humanitarian Intervention," *Global Society*, vol. 13, no. 4, 1999, p. 493.

For Kant, and other within the "common morality" school: "The prohibitions of common morality are absolute; the acts they forbid are wrong even if they are done for the sake of a good end." This "does exclude...consequentialism, the doctrine that the consequences of an act, rather than its relation to principles of conduct, determine its rightness or wrongness, and that such principles have, at best, instrumental value in helping to secure morally desirable ends". Rigid deontology of this form therefore precludes consequential calculation in moral reasoning.

One example of this distinction is explained by David Schmidtz.

Schmidtz, David, "Justifying the State," *Ethics*, October 1990, v. 101, no. 1, pp. 90.

To justify an institution is, in general, to show that it is what it should be, or does what it should do. The teleological approach seeks to justify institutions in terms of what they accomplish. The emergent approach takes justification to be an emergent property of the process by which institutions arise.

Schmidtz, David, "Justifying the State," *Ethics*, October 1990, v. 101, no. 1, pp. 91.

Teleological justification posits *goals*, and compares the practically attainable forms of government in terms of how they do or will serve those goals. In contrast, *emergent* justification posits *constraints* of a particular kind, namely, constraints on the process by which the state comes to be. Emergent justification turns on a state's pedigree.

Consider some examples. One could argue that instituting a Leviathan is *teleologically* justified if a Hobbesian war would otherwise be inevitable. In contrast, one could argue that a Leviathan will be *emergently* justified if it emerges from the state of nature by consent.

Schmidtz, David, "Justifying the State," *Ethics*, October 1990, v. 101, no. 1, pp. 91.

One could also justify particular institutions within the state in either of these two ways. For example, one could try to justify teleologically the passing of a certain statute by showing what the statute will accomplish. Or one could try to justify emergently the same statute by showing that it was duly passed by the appropriate legislative bodies.

The moral assessment must also be made in light of important moral principles – such as dignity, morality, and justice.

Mothlabi, Mokgethi B. G.. "Ethical Implications of Globalisation for Church, Religion and Society," *Religion and Theology*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, p. 128.

People must not be treated as means to economic ends but as ends in themselves (Koshy 1997:6). Hence a global ethic must strive toward 'a just social and economic order, in which everyone has an equal chance to reach full potential as a human being' (Kung & Kuschel 1993:15), a being created in the image of God, according to the doctrine of some of the participating religions.

Nationalism versus Cosmopolitanism

A very basic way to think of the moral conflict in the resolution is whether we "ought" to consider the globe more than we consider our own nation.

Many people argue that a "nation first" mentality is immoral and dangerous.

Singer, Peter, "Navigating the Ethics of Globalization," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 11, 2002, v. 49, no. 7.

As scientists pile up the evidence that continuing greenhouse-gas emissions will imperil millions of lives, the leader of the nation that emits the largest share of those gases has said: "We will not do anything that harms our economy, because first things first are the people who live in America." President Bush's remarks were not an aberration, but an expression of an ethical view that he may have learned from his father. The first President George Bush had said much the same thing at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.

Singer, Peter, "Navigating the Ethics of Globalization," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 11, 2002, v. 49, no. 7.

But it is not only the two Bush administrations that have put the interests of Americans first. When it came to the crunch in the Balkans, the Clinton-Gore administration made it very clear that it was not prepared to risk the life of a single American in order to reduce the number of civilian casualties. In the context of the debate over whether to intervene in Bosnia to stop Serb "ethnic cleansing" operations directed against Bosnian Muslims, Colin L. Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quoted with approval the remark of the 19th-century German statesman Otto von Bismarck, that all the Balkans were not worth the bones of a single one of his soldiers. Bismarck, however, was not thinking of intervening in the Balkans to stop crimes against humanity. As chancellor of imperial Germany, he assumed that his country followed its national interest. To use his remark today as an argument against humanitarian intervention is to return to 19th-century power politics, ignoring both the bloody wars that style of politics brought about in the first half of the 20th century, and the efforts of the second half of the 20th century to find a better foundation for peace and the prevention of crimes against humanity.

Singer, Peter, "Navigating the Ethics of Globalization," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 11, 2002, v. 49, no. 7.

That forces us to consider a fundamental ethical issue. To what extent should political leaders see their role narrowly, in terms of promoting the interests of their citizens, and to what extent should they be concerned with the welfare of people everywhere?

A nation-first ethic is understandable.

Singer, Peter, "Navigating the Ethics of Globalization," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 11, 2002, v. 49, no. 7.

There is a strong ethical case for saying that it is wrong for leaders to give absolute priority to the interests of their own citizens. The value of the life of an innocent human being does not vary according to nationality. But, it might be said, the abstract ethical idea that all humans are entitled to equal consideration cannot govern the duties of a political leader. Just as parents are expected to provide for the interests of their own children, rather than for the interests of strangers, so too in accepting the office of president of the United States, President Bush has taken on a specific role that makes it his duty to protect and further the interests of Americans. Other countries have their leaders, with similar roles in respect to the interests of their fellow citizens.

There is no world political community, and as long as that situation prevails, we must have nation-states, and the leaders of those nation-states must give preference to the interests of their citizens. Otherwise, unless electors were suddenly to turn into altruists of a kind never before seen on a large scale, democracy could not function.

This nation-first ethic is dangerous, however, especially given 9/11.

Singer, Peter, "Navigating the Ethics of Globalization," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 11, 2002, v. 49, no. 7.

For the rich nations not to take a global ethical viewpoint has long been seriously morally wrong. Now it is also, in the long term, a danger to their security.

Singer, Peter, "Navigating the Ethics of Globalization," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 11, 2002, v. 49, no. 7.

THERE IS ONE GREAT OBSTACLE to further progress in this direction. It has to be said, in cool but plain language, that in recent years the international effort to build a global community has been hampered by the repeated failure of the United States to play its part. Despite being the single largest polluter of the world's atmosphere, and on a per-capita basis the most profligate of the major nations, the United States has refused to join the 178 states that have accepted the Kyoto Protocol. Along with Libya and China, the United States voted against setting up an International Criminal Court to try people accused of genocide and crimes against humanity. Now that the court seems likely to go ahead, the U.S. government has said that it has no intention of participating. Though it is one of the world's wealthiest nations, with the world's strongest economy, the United States gives significantly less foreign aid, as a proportion of its gross national product, than any other developed nation.

When the world's most powerful state wraps itself in what, until September 11, it took to be the security of its military might, and arrogantly refuses to give up any of its own rights and privileges for the sake of the common good—even when other nations are giving up their rights and privileges—the prospects of finding solutions to global problems are dimmed. One can only hope that when the rest of the world nevertheless proceeds down the right path, as it did in resolving to go ahead with the Kyoto Protocol, and as it is now doing with the International Criminal Court, the United States will eventually be shamed into joining in. If it does not do so, it risks falling into a situation in which it is universally seen by everyone except its own self-satisfied citizens as the world's "rogue superpower." Even from a strictly self-interested perspective, if the United States wants the cooperation of other nations in matters that are largely its own concern—such as the struggle to eliminate terrorism—it cannot afford to be so regarded.

The alternative is cosmopolitanism.

Jacobsen, Michael and Stephanie Lawson, "Between Globalization and Localization: A Case Study of Human Rights Versus State Sovereignty," *Global Governance*, April-June 1999, v. 5, no. 2.

Cosmopolitanism offers an alternative vision of international life. In repudiation of the state-centric realist vision, cosmopolitanism promotes the idea of a universal moral code transcending state boundaries and state interests.

Globalization is morally good because it forces people to think as one planet.

Beam, Craig. "Liberalism, Globalization, and Cultural Relativism," *Dialogue*, vol. 73, 1999, p. 111.

Third, the migration of people is a potent globalizing force. Once such migrations proceeded outward from Europe. Millions of colonists and settlers swamped the indigenous peoples of America and Australia, and established a presence in Africa and Asia. In recent years, this pattern has reversed itself, as people from impoverished Third World countries with high rates of population growth seek to move to the West. Such migrations pose a cultural challenge. They require immigrants to adapt to a new way of life, host countries to accept diversity, and everyone to become more cosmopolitan and tolerant – or risk traveling down the road of Bosnia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Lebanon.

Globalization makes us aware and care.

Schwab, Klaus., "Building the Future," *Newsweek*, December 17, 2001, v. 138, no. 25.

Globalization has made the world smaller, decreasing the sense of distance between the haves and the have-nots. As a result it's no longer possible (and let's regard this as a good thing) to turn a deaf ear to the concerns of the poor.

Clarke, John N. "Ethics and Humanitarian Intervention," *Global Society*, vol. 13, no. 4, 1999, p. 506.

There is, however, evidence that citizens have a growing interest in distant crises. Steven Kull, for example, has recently suggested that American citizens are increasingly willing to subvert national interests for global "goods". Television has brought the "distant other" into the living rooms of the Western world. Moral reasoning about international affairs and the distant other is therefore entering the domain of domestic civil society. While states remain the primary actors in international affairs, the media increasingly function as the catalyst for a moral "community", increasing the impact of civil society and NGOs on the policy decisions of states. Given that states act largely, if not entirely, in their own interest, a moral international order appears conditional on fostering interdependencies between states (whether economic, cultural, or otherwise) which link the interests of states and provide a psychological bridge between civil societies. Collapsing the distance between the "self" and the "other" will make distant crises of interest and importance to civil society.

Singer, Peter, "Navigating the Ethics of Globalization," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 11, 2002, v. 49, no. 7.

WE HAVE LIVED with the idea of sovereign states for so long that they have come to be part of the background not only of diplomacy and public policy but also of ethics. Implicit in the term "globalization" rather than the older "internationalization" is the idea that we are moving beyond the era of growing ties between nations and are beginning to contemplate something beyond the existing conception of the nation-state. But this change needs to be reflected in all levels of our thought, and especially in our thinking about ethics. For most of the eons of human existence, people living only short distances apart might as well, for all the difference they made to each other's lives, have been living in separate worlds. A river, a mountain range, a stretch of forest or desert, a sea--those were enough to cut people off from each other. Over the past few centuries the isolation has dwindled, slowly at first, then with increasing rapidity. Now people living on opposite sides of the world are linked in ways previously unimaginable.

Brown, L. David, Sanjeev Khagram, Mark H. Moore, Peter Frumkin. "Globalization, NGOs, and Multisectoral Relations," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 2000, p. 271.

What *is* new is the recent explosion in numbers, activity, and visibility of international initiatives by civil society actors on a variety of issues, at least in part linked to the rapid expansion of globalization of communication, transportation, and production. Indeed, accelerated globalization has apparently coincided with the blossoming of civil society groups across the globe. The talent and instinct for voluntary association to address social problems is increasingly visible in the developing countries of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Banuri, Tariq and Erika Spangler-Siegfried. "The Global Compact and the Human Economy," *Journal of Human Development*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2001. p. 11.

Even more than the integration provided by trade and financial flows or the information revolution, these protests symbolize the fact that the world has entered a planetary phase. Consciously or unconsciously, we think of the world increasingly as if it were a single country, albeit ruled by a multiplicity of factions and systems. In the same vein, it is important to remember that this 'world as a single country' is, in fact, a developing country. If the world were imagined as a single country, its degree of inequality, its co-existence of two economic systems, one modern and aggressive, the other traditional and introverted, its cultural diversity and conflict, and the weakness and fragmentation of its system of governance would be characteristic of most developing countries. As such we need to think about the social and economic transformation of this 'planetary country' in much the same terms that we think about the transformation of developing countries. This is a rather obvious point but is often forgotten in discussions of globalization and its impacts.

Kessler, Clive S., "Globalization: Another False Universalism?," *Third World Quarterly*, December 2000, v. 24, no. 6.

By producing for the first time, no matter how unevenly, a single, interdependent humankind and, in prospect if not yet in actuality, a single worldwide human community, globalization processes may be producing an objective, experiential basis for the emergence of a genuine and uncompromised moral universalism: as a successor to, and to transcend, the sequence of selective intimations and incomplete intuitions of human universality that has hitherto constituted the history of humankind's moral imagination.

Kessler, Clive S., "Globalization: Another False Universalism?," *Third World Quarterly*, December 2000, v. 24, no. 6.

To identify these further issues, it is necessary to recognize that globalization, as a key feature of contemporary social life, does not simply work its way upon important practical dimensions (economic, political, communicative) of contemporary life but, in doing so, involves a central philosophical issue. What the increasing, and increasingly manifest, human interdependence that modern globalization processes promote and highlight in an entirely new perspective is the question of humankind--the moral issue of human equality and universalism--itself.

Kessler, Clive S., "Globalization: Another False Universalism?," *Third World Quarterly*, December 2000, v. 24, no. 6.

Whether it takes the form we may prefer or not, globalization processes are arguably now creating, for the first time in human history, the detailed social infrastructure of a single unified humanity, a universal human community: a network of mutual human interdependence and of worldwide involvement in one another's fate. It may, at worst, be the interdependence born merely of market principles, of those who have long dreamed of a world held together by nothing more noble than the dismal logic of comparative advantage in production. But, even in this worst case, what is emerging nonetheless is a comprehensive form of human interdependence, unprecedented in its scope and grip. What will result will, of course, be the worst case, unless--as in a concerted way people together imagine in the midst of the gamut of globalization processes and on the basis of understanding them deeply--we can somehow 'negotiate' something better.

Kessler, Clive S., "Globalization: Another False Universalism?," *Third World Quarterly*, December 2000, v. 24, no. 6.

While humankind may be at last effectively unified under these circumstances by the false universalism of mere market principles, what is occurring may still be of enormous historical significance for humankind. The profound issue involved here--behind the political, economic and communicative transformations which the modernist and postmodernist theories of globalization processes have identified--is a moral or philosophical one. It involves the question of whether globalization processes are now producing, of whatever kind, a single interdependent human community and therefore, in whatever form, providing some objectively real foundation for the notion of the commonality and universality of the human condition.

Kessler, Clive S., "Globalization: Another False Universalism?," *Third World Quarterly*, December 2000, v. 24, no. 6.

No matter how hierarchical and inequitable the form of human inclusiveness and interdependence now being fashioned by globalization processes may be, they are still producing a world in which, for the first time, the unity of humankind which religions and anthropologists have in their different ways imagined, dreamed of or intuited will have some objective basis. Such a development creates the possibility for something dramatic, novel and significant in the moral progress of humankind to occur; it represents a transformative moment in the history of the human moral imagination. For the first time, a sense of the unity and moral equality of humankind will no longer be a difficult matter of abstract moral intuition. Instead, as a result of advancing globalization processes, it will have a socially objective and material, an experiential and existential, foundation.

Kessler, Clive S., "Globalization: Another False Universalism?," *Third World Quarterly*, December 2000, v. 24, no. 6.

This is a development whose significance should not be minimized. Where an awareness of the commonality of the human situation and the involvement of all humankind in one another's lives is transformed from a moral intuition to an experiential reality grounded in a worldwide social infrastructure of interconnection, then something hugely important has happened. The unity of humankind may cease to be simply a slogan or idealistic aspiration and becomes, at least in principle and prospect, a lived social reality. That is why ultimately, beyond the political-economic and communicative dimensions with which much of the relevant theories and literature are preoccupied, globalization is profoundly a moral, a philosophical, issue.

Kessler, Clive S., "Globalization: Another False Universalism?," *Third World Quarterly*, December 2000, v. 24, no. 6.

Michael Ignatieff discerningly articulates an important part of what this contemporary transformation of the human moral imagination entails when he notes (1999: 4-5, 8):

'It isn't obvious why strangers in peril halfway across the world should be our business. For most of human history, the boundaries of our moral universe were the borders of the tribe, language, religion, or nation. The idea that we might have obligations to human beings beyond our borders simply because we belong to the same species is a recent invention, the result of our awakening to the shame of having done so little to help the millions of strangers who died in this century's experiments in terror and extermination. Nothing good has come of these experiments except perhaps for the consciousness that we are all Shakespeare's thing itself: unaccommodated man, the poor, bare forked animal. It is 'the thing itself' that has become the subject--and the rationale--for the modern universal human fights culture ...Weak as the narrative of compassion and moral commitment may be, it is infinitely stronger than it was fifty years ago. We are scarcely aware of the extent to which our moral imagination has been transformed since 1945 by the growth of a language and practice of moral universalism ...'

Of course, the emergence of cosmopolitanism is not guaranteed...

Kessler, Clive S., "Globalization: Another False Universalism?," *Third World Quarterly*, December 2000, v. 24, no. 6.

Of course, the emergence of a comprehensive and genuine sense of human interdependence and mutual moral involvement from these often unedifying processes of corporate-led economic globalization is far from guaranteed. As ever, things are open-ended and contestable: that is, if not there simply for the taking, then there for people to make what best of it they can. Whether the powerful interests promoting the form of globalization and advancing human interdependence which we are now experiencing will succeed in suppressing that new moral sense, or whether that new social and moral awareness of a universal human interdependence and common fate will emerge from the universalization of the grim logic of the 'dismal science', remains unclear. It is an open question whether that new historical and moral awareness will be contained, captured and thwarted by the new conflicts and hierarchies which corporate-led globalization often entails; or whether human beings will succeed in capturing from those developments, and from the morally equivocal world into which globalization processes are delivering us, not just the redeeming vision of the unity of humankind but some stake in and some hold upon a part of its emerging social infrastructure.

Dehumanization: Markets v. People

Many people criticize globalization because it dehumanizes people, elevating markets over their concerns.

De Benoist, Alain, "Confronting Globalization," *Telos*, Summer 1996, no. 108.

But globalization is not universality either. In certain respects, it is even the opposite, because the only thing that it universalizes is the market, i.e., a mode of economic exchange that corresponds to a historical moment of a particular culture. In this regard globalization is only the imperialism of the Western market expanding to cover the entire planet -- an imperialism internalized by the very people who are its victims. Globalization is the mass imitation of Western economic behavior. It amounts to turning the entire planet into this market religion, whose theologians and high priests operate as if the only goals were profitability. It is not a universalism of being but of having. It is the abstract universalism of a splintered world, where individuals are defined only by their ability to produce and consume. Capitalism proposes to succeed where communism failed: to create a planet with no borders, inhabited by a "new man." But this new man is no longer the worker or the citizen but the "plugged in" consumer who shares the common destiny of an undifferentiated humanity connected only by the Internet or the supermarket.

Ruiz, Pedro Ortega and Ramón Mínguez, "Global Inequality and the Need for Compassion: issues in moral and political education," *Journal of Moral Education*, June 2001, v. 30, no. 2, pp. 155-56.

Individuals and peoples have seen themselves stripped of their identity in the interest of the markets, with no other function than that of swelling the coffers of faceless multi-nationals. The "objectification" of human beings and all that is human has made us lose the genuine and open anthropological sense in human relationships. Instrumental reason has become for modern man the over-riding, if not the only, principle which determines and justifies social, political and economic relationships. The loss of sense of *finis in se ipso* (end in itself), inherent in the human condition, has made it possible for man to be treated like raw material or an instrument for projects at the service of others. The culture of maximum cost-benefit, inherent in instrumental reason, has supplanted the other of maximum humanity. All that is human has been converted into goods and has objectified its signs, depriving them of the symbolic value which they carry as human actions.

This subverts ethics.

Gilleo, Margaret P., "Ethical Issues in the Global Economy," *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, August 2001, v. 21, no. 4.

With the increasing focus on globalization of the economy, ethical issues are often submerged by the goal of increasing profitability.

The market itself is not a moral force.

Kessler, Clive S., "Globalization: Another False Universalism?," *Third World Quarterly*, December 2000, v. 24, no. 6.

A good deal of skepticism is warranted on this point. After all, the whole globalization agenda in which we are asked to enlist rests simply on that earlier form of false universalism, that of the market. The difference is that now we are asked to submit totally to the operations and supremacy of market principles at the level of the entire world itself rather than, as before, of the sovereign state. As with the earlier false universalism of market impartiality, here again we need to ask in whose interests is this new world being created, whose sectional agenda stands to be advanced behind globalization's facade, its deceptive masquerade of impersonality as neutrality.

We must humanize the market.

Ruiz, Pedro Ortega and Ramón Mínguez, “Global Inequality and the Need for Compassion: issues in moral and political education,” *Journal of Moral Education*, June 2001, v. 30, no. 2, pp. 160.

The serious crisis of a system which affects us all demands the establishment of more just and equitable relationships and interchanges between countries, an economic system in which the moral values upheld among men regain their influence in the economic and technological spheres. The need to develop critical capacity and protest against an economic system (capitalist) which carries within it poverty and exploitation can no longer be postponed. Similarly, it is essential to encourage the values of solidarity, help and respect towards different cultural identities as an expression of the rich variety of rich existence (Ortega & Mínguez, 1998). In a word: it is urgent that we educate for a change in the relationship of dependence of the countries of the South, to put an end to a system unbearable for some (the exploited) and undesirable, because immoral, for everyone.

The Case for Globalization Based on Freedom

The main ethical argument for globalization is based on its facilitation of freedom and choice.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. xxii.

That brings us to the second aim of this book, which is to make the intellectual case for globalization. For many economists—perhaps too many—that project is too easy to waste time over. *Of course* globalization makes sense: It leads to a more efficient use of resources; any student who understands the basic tenets of comparative advantage understands *that*. Though hard to dispute, this argument seems inadequate for two reasons. First, it fails to confront the harsh questions concerning those people who lose on account of globalization, not just economically but socially and culturally. And, second, it undersells globalization: The process has not to do only with economic efficiency; it has to do with freedom. Globalization offers the chance to fulfill (or at least come considerably closer to fulfilling) the goals that classical liberal philosophers first identified several centuries ago and that still underpin Western democracy.

Globalization overcomes the tyranny of place.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. xxvi.

Globalization is not just an economic process that can be more or less mashed into the mold of classical liberal political theory; it marks a significant articulation of it. In the classical vein, John Stuart Mill advocated the largest possible measure of individual freedom, but not at the expense of harm to others. And indeed, most of the battles that have been fought in freedom’s name have involved opposition to political tyranny of one sort or another. Globalization has undoubtedly lent powerful support to those struggles, not only by helping to topple corrupt autocrats such as the Suharots but also by casting light into the darkest corners of the world. It is not coincidental that the pace of globalization has picked up with the spread of democratic rights; the two are symbiotic. Yet globalization also widens the concept of what the maximum degree of individual freedom could be.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. xxvi.

One of the main restraints on liberty has always been “the tyranny of place.” At its crudest, this has meant restrictions, both political and economic, on where people can live, but it also includes restrictions on where people can go, what they can buy, where they can invest, and what they can read, hear, or see. Globalization by its nature brings down these barriers, and it helps to hand the power to choose to the individual.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 42.

In the meantime, wireless technology is allowing some of the world's poorest people to plug themselves into the global economy, with huge benefits to their standard of living. Four fifths of the world's mobile-phone subscribers still live in the rich world, but by far the fastest growth in mobile-phone ownership is in the developing world, among people who are not very far from being rich.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 337.

Globalization redresses this balance in two ways. The most obvious is that it puts limits on the power of government. This advantage is most obvious in commerce. Free trade makes it easier for businesspeople to escape from interfering officials by moving their money and operations abroad. As we have pointed out, companies seldom want to flee, but the very fact that they might acts as a brake on those officials. The sullen fury of a Bangalore bureaucrat staring at the satellite dishes that allow "his" software companies to export their products without his grasping fingers interfering would delight Mill (even though he worked for the often more extortionate East India Company). More important still, free trade allows ordinary people to buy products from companies who make the best of their kind rather than from those that enjoy cozy relationships with governments. Similarly, they can put their retirement money in pension funds that are not tied to schemes of national aggrandizement.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 337-38.

Governments are not retreating from this easily. They can still slap controls on the flow of capital (as Malaysia did in the wake of the Asian crisis) or even on the flow of information. (Singapore employs a staff of censors whose job is to surf the Internet ceaselessly looking for objectionable information to block). But the world is nevertheless a lot freer today than it was just a few decades ago, before globalization got into high gear. In 1966, for example, the British Labor government imposed a travel allowance that virtually confined Britons to their country except for two weeks' worth of penny-pinching foreign vacation. Today, any politician who suggested such a restriction would be carted off to an asylum.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 338.

Indeed, the recent history of globalization can be written as a story, albeit an uneven story, of spreading a political culture that is based on individual liberty to areas that have been longing to embrace it for years. The last dozen years of the twentieth century saw not only the spectacular death of the biggest alternative to liberal democracy, totalitarian communism, but also the slow death of other collectivist models. Around the world, countries have abandoned attempts to plan their way to prosperity. Even the Asian crisis, in its own awful way, has made it more difficult for the continent's authoritarians to boast that they had discovered a nondemocratic way to generate growth.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 338-39.

In fact, many of the most vengeful howls directed at globalization come from self-interested business elites who are being forced to surrender to consumer choice. Globalization does not mean homogenization. People want to consume books, movies, even potato chips, that reflect their own identities, and those identities remain primarily national. When politicians complain that globalization is changing society, they are correct, but they are seldom bother to ask who society it is. When society is defined by a fairly compact national economy, an elite has a chance of co-opting it. But when society is an open-ended international system, it becomes increasingly difficult for any elite to identify their values with the common good.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 338.

Many on the left would argue that globalization has merely involved a change of master. Globalization may have liberated us from the onus of having to get our television programs—or our health care and pensions—from our governments, but it has forced us to get the same things from giant companies that are just as remote and even less accountable. The gentleman in Whitehall has been replaced by the knucklehead in the boardroom or, if you work in the Académie Française, by the illiterate in Hollywood. This suspicion is healthy and should be encouraged. But so far the evidence is that it is misplaced. Of course, businesses will try to control markets, but that does not mean that they will be able to. As we have seen, one of the wonders of global capitalism is its capacity to hurl challenges at incumbent champions. Most of the forces of globalization—particularly the availability of capital and technology—favor small companies. In parts of Europe and Asia, commercial oligarchies are clinging to power, but only because governments collude with them. There is nothing global about, say, the importance of *guanxi* in Asia—quite the opposite. By the same token, the Department of Justice campaign to restrain Microsoft’s power, no matter now misguided, has a legitimately global aim of trying to open up a market.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 339.

Restricting overmighty states and elites is all very well, but globalization increase the basic freedom of individuals as well. We have already talked about the tyranny of place: Most people’s lots in life are determined by where they were born, something illiberal regimes everywhere have done their best to reinforce. As Leszek Kolakowski, a Polish intellectual, points out, one of the defining features of communist regimes is their refusal to allow people to move from city to city without official permission; they even made short journeys difficult, providing few road signs or decent street maps. Even today, the lives of half of the world’s population are bounded by local villages, and local markets.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 333.

Travel and migration have long provided a fraction of the world’s population with freedom from the tyranny of place. The printing press and the television have allowed others a more imaginary form of escape. Globalization is now making these freedoms more pervasive. The impact of the Internet, particularly as it goes wireless, will also be dramatic. The world Wide Web allows people to gain access to information anywhere at any time. And it allows them to do so in a way that undermines local elites and expensive middlemen. People will never escape the pull of geography entirely, as the tendency of business to cluster in particular places shows. But those clusters only survive if they work with the grain of globalization. And the penalty for being born a long way from those clusters is diminishing. Remember the Bangladeshi farmers using their cell phones to check the proper prices for their produce rather than having to accept the diktats of local grain merchants.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 339-40.

The more these ties weaken, the more people can exercise what used to be called God-given talents. Again, businesspeople are the most obvious beneficiaries: If you have a good idea and the entrepreneurial vim to pursue it, you can take it anywhere you want. If, like Michael Skok of AlphaBox, you think that your business belongs in Silicon Valley, not the Thames valley, you can take it there. But there are also more spiritual, artistic reasons to believe that globalization is a good thing. The thousands of Miltons who remain “mute and inglorious” in their villages often begin to sing only after they move to the “mansions houses of liberty” that are the world’s greatest cities. Bustling centers of trade from fifteenth-century Venice to twentieth-century New York have usually been centers of creativity, too. Even if your God-given talents are more prosaic, it is becoming even easier to study abroad, and, thanks again to the Internet, you will soon be able to do so (more or less) without leaving home.

Michlethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization, Crown Business, New York, 2000, pp. 340.

Somewhere behind the freedom to exercise our talents lies the most fundamental freedom of all: the freedom to define our own identities. This can sound like the moan of a petulant teenager, but it is at the heart of what is becoming one of the main debates of our time, between liberals and the growing band of communitarians. (To the extent that “the third way” means anything at all, its adherents are probably on the side of communitarians). Communitarians, as their name suggests, worry about the effect of things like globalization on communities. John Gray, one of globalization’s most searching critics, has argued that human beings’ “deepest need is a home, a network of common practices and inherited traditions that confers on them the blessings of a settled identity.”

“A Different Manifesto,” *Economist*, September 29, 2001, v. 360, n. 8241.

The crucial point is that international economic integration widens choices-including choices in social provision-because it makes resources go further. Policies to relieve poverty, to protect workers displaced by technology, and to support education and public health are all more affordable with globalisation than without (though not even globalisation can relieve governments of the need to collect taxes to pay for those good things). When governments claim that globalisation ties their hands, because politically it makes their lives easier, they are conning voters and undermining support for economic freedom. Whatever else that may be, it is not good governance.

This is going to be a fun – but hard – topic. Spend time reading all of the evidence. That’s where you’re going to learn. There are MANY arguments raised by the materials in this handbook. NOTE: this handbook is not designed to be a cheat-sheet. So don’t expect this handbook to mean that you don’t have to read and work. This handbook is also not meant to be comprehensive. Good luck! And let us know how you do!



VICTORY BRIEFS INSTITUTE | July 2003

Lincoln Douglas



Last year's top labs included:

Vikrum Aiyar (CA)
Lucia Bill (AZ)
Mike Brokos (MD)
Dahvid Castillo-Reminick (FL)
Kelly Cataldo (TX)
Neil Conrad (TX)
Jon Detzel (FL)
Justin Eckstein (NM)
Lauren Ford (TX)
Jeremiah Fugit (TX)
Satyan Gajwani (FL)
Andrew Garvin (CA)
Brian Hogue (TX)
Shelly Jain (TX)
Patrick McMillin (TX)
Will Palmer (TX)
Ashan Peiris (CA)
Brian Poindexter (TX)
Lauren Rosenberg (FL)
Max Stevens (NV)
Samantha Waters (MD)
Min Zhang (ID)

We all know that debate isn't solely concerned with success; but, we all (at least most of us) also know the frustration of not meeting those goals we set for ourselves. These goals may vary a great deal, from breaking at local tournaments to winning NFL Nationals, but in some form or another we have all had them. It is, after all, the nature of competition to often compete against one's self... growing and maturing in whatever activity one finds meaningful. At the Victory Briefs Institute, we aspire to teach debaters who continue to *push* themselves to new heights and improve with consistency and a passion for the activity. But we also know with great familiarity the struggle that such improvement entails. Becoming a better debater, meeting your own goals, and getting more educationally out of this pursuit requires time, effort, determination, and of course a helping hand from those who have something to offer.

While the majority of that formula is something that you the debater must provide, the last part has inspired Victory Briefs to do more with regard to its educational role in the debate community. This summer's institute at UCLA marks the invigorated return of a winning formula. But, more exciting than Victory Briefs' track record as a reliable name in debate education is what we're doing right now to advance the opportunities debaters have to hone their skills and embrace a more educationally valuable debate experience. VBI not only has something to offer you in your pursuit of goals; it has something unique that we think debaters are calling for.

First of all, VBI will provide an extensive focus on strategy, adaptation, and a number of other essential components for being able to do in-round what you hope for before the tournament even begins. Technique isn't just something that happens upon you—the best learn it from somewhere, and we think the staff we've put together at VBI is a group with proven mastery of the very skills that will bring you closer to reaching your goals. The reason the names on our staff were the names that consistently won the nation's most challenging and reputable tournaments is that each one understood the debate climate clearly, knowing what works and what doesn't. Those very same names continue to judge extensively throughout the nation, meaning they know better than anyone why the people who wins rounds keep winning them. And those very same names also coach, teach at debate institutes across the country, and do lots of reading, researching, and writing for Victory Briefs. In other words, VBI's experienced and talented staff combines with an emphasis on the 'how-to' of winning rounds so that your two weeks of camp are worth the money spent.

Another advantage to spending two weeks at UCLA this summer is the unprecedented return to what debate is really all about: communicating in an educational format. Instead of letting our students linger in lecture after lecture, we want to use the lecture format to a minimum. In its place will be more time spent in small lab groups. To be sure, though, these groups will *not* just be smaller lectures—they will be an opportunity for you to contribute ideas, get feedback, work on what you feel needs to be improved, and take a proactive role in your steps forward as an effective debater. And of course, there will be lots and lots of practice rounds. After all, talking about debate isn't half as meaningful as *doing* debate... and doing it a bit better with every try. Likewise, our approach to philosophy, future topics, and becoming a critical thinker who can develop arguments independently will center around the belief that while all these facets of a camp experience are valuable, they are *especially* valuable when taught in the context of how they may be applied to actual rounds. Your high school history class can give you the synopsis on what John Locke was all about; VBI will give you the tools to integrate such great minds into your debating with precision and analytical eloquence. Even more importantly, we want to cater to *your* needs. That means if it's time for you to understand Hobbes, so be it. If you have already been there, then we will challenge you with newer ideas that keep debate moving. And as you get closer and closer to your very own goals, you will be the one keeping debate moving.

The Victory Briefs Institute is directed by a group of experienced educators: Victor Jih (the Director of Forensics at Archer School for Girls), Josh Stephens, Chad Kahl, and Stephanie Davis.

Staff

Although the final staff lists for the Lincoln-Douglas, policy, and extemp programs for this summer have not yet been finalized, most of the instructors from last year will be returning. Victory Briefs' staff are selected for their geographic diversity, their competitive success, and their proven teaching effectiveness. Victory Briefs' staff are also selected to serve as advisors and counselors for the students, and are selected for their commitment to a clean, safe, and educational residential environment. Victory Briefs prides itself on the interaction it fosters between students and teachers. Last year's instructors included:

Michelin Massey (MN) - Coach at Hopkins High School
Clay Calhoon (OK, MA) - Policy Champion NDEA Tournament
Leah Halvorson (MN) - 1996 Bronx Champion, Ass't Coach at Archer
Tammy Jih (CA) - Stanford Champ, Speaking Instructor at Stanford
Adam Preiss (CA) - 2000 National Champion, Ass't Coach at Logan
Oscar Shine (CA) - 2002 National LD Debate Champion
Stephen Babb (TX) - Texas Champ, Ass't Coach at Highland Park
Jesse Nathan (KS) - 2000 National Foreign Extemp Champion
Andy O'Connell (WA) - Glenbrooks LD Champion
Josh Anderson (WA) - Stanford LD Champion
Tommy Clancy (TX) - St. Mark's Champ, Ass't Coach at Westlake
Joey Seiler (TX) - 2001 Semifinalist TOC, Ass't Coach at S.F. Austin
Andrew Swan (CA, OR) - Stanford Extemp Champ, State Champion
Seamus Donovan (OK) - TOC Lincoln-Douglas Debate Champion
Tim Fletcher (IA) - Iowa State Champion LD; Glenbrooks Finalist
Frances Schendle (TX) - Semifinalist LD Valley and St. Mark's
Orijit Ghoshal (TX) - Semifinalist National LD Championships
Jon Squires (FL) - 2000 Wake Forest Champion in LD
David Vivero (FL, MA) - 2000 Greenhill LD Champion
Rana Yared (FL) - Barkley Forum Extemp Champion

Victory Briefs is still in the process of finalizing staff rosters for the 2003 Institute, and is in the process of bringing on additional teachers with extensive experience and proven effectiveness. Check the website for the latest. Anticipated additional staff includes:

Shane Dinneen (MA, TX) - Champion Policy Debater from Grapevine H.S.

Mike Bietz (MN) - As the director of forensics at Edina H.S., in this year alone, he has coached the champion of the Greenhill tournament and the Hopkins Round Robin, closed-out the final round of Glenbrooks and Iowa Caucus, and coached the second-place debater at Apple Valley, Greenhill Round Robin, and Valley.

Pat Fitch (MD) - Coach at Catonsville High School, MD.

Stacy Thomas (TX) - Coach at S.F. Austin H.S., TX

Sarah Smith (TX) - Ass't Coach @ Kincaid H.S.; TX State Champion

Sam Duby (TX) - Champion of St. Mark's and the Greenhill Round Robin.

Nick Green (MN) - Champion of Greenhill, Glenbrooks, Iowa Caucus, Mid-America Cup. Nick also won the Minnesota State Championship as a junior.

Merve Emre (NY) - Greenhill (Top Speaker, Second Place), Apple Valley (Semifinalist), Wake Forest (Quarterfinalist).



"When camp started, the instructors poured their hearts into improving every area of debate I needed to improve. Every day, they gave their all to help me get better, and were, at the same time, so willing! In the evenings, the staff kept their doors open so I wouldn't feel awkward walking in and asking for help. In fact, they often roamed the hallways and came into our rooms and asked us if we needed anything at all! Not only was I surprised by the staff's willingness, but also I was impressed by their knowledge. They improved my arguments, developed my thought process, and challenged my ideas. The learning I received from the VBI staff will stick with me long after my debate career is through."

- Tim Silvester, Bob Jones, SC

"VBI stresses one thing, the student. Flexibility in the curriculum allows instructors to deliver not only what students need, but also what students want. Students not only learn how to debate from some of the premier ex-debaters and current coaches in the country, but they also learn life lessons while at camp. It is hard to find another institute where a student can have a discussion about the merits of baseball versus basketball at 2 am in the morning with a staff member. VBI allows for a certain bond to arise between the staffers and campers, a bond strong enough to where, in the end, everyone learns from each other."

- Orijit Ghoshal, TX, VBI Instructor