Shaun P. McGonigal

Ethical Theories—term paper

5/8/02

 

Relativism Revisited

 

Utilitarians, Deontologists, Egoists, oh my!  When one strolls down the yellow brick road of ethical theory—metaethics—we walk upon many so-called principles that are intended to act as bases for morality, laws, and rules that govern every-day living.  But often the decisions we tend to make will not easily fall into any ethical system cleanly, but may either overlap a few or illustrate where some ethical principles are incompatible or simply insufficient.  If we, while on this road, begin to ask what a principle is we might start to feel the bricks under our feet start to give way, and we notice that we are standing on shaky ground.

 

Freedom

Webster’s dictionary defines ‘principle’ as a “fundamental truth, law, or postulate” and also as an “underlying or established rule or policy.”  If it is genuinely fundamental and true, then we have no grounds for disagreeing with a moral principle.  If it is merely an established rule or policy, we do have grounds for calling the principle into question.  Ethical theorists have tried to demonstrate how their moral theories are fundamental and true, but all ultimately still fail to do so.  The true ethical principle has been overlooked, despite the fact that it has been presupposed by the vast majority of ethicists.[1]  This is not so say that, unlike other ethical theories, this principle avoids the common problems of ethical philosophy.  Ironically, it is because of this principle that these problems arise.  This principle is autonomy, and its freedom creates morally relevant beings that share in the responsibility of this freedom.  But ultimately, this principle leads to subjectivity, and thus to relativism.

The discussion of ethics assumes the existence of autonomy or freedom, and without this freedom moral responsibility would be absurd.  This has been sufficiently shown by Kant and others, so there is little reason to dwell on this fact.  What is significant here is that while Kant and others have recognized this fact, they felt it necessary to leave this fact behind as a basis for talking about an imperative or some other principle based upon the assumption of freedom.  I ask this; if freedom is the basis for ethical discussions in the first place, then why is it not recognized as the very principle from which systematic ethics should be derived?  That is, since the existence of freedom gives me ethical responsibility, then my responsibility is to act fairly and to not infringe upon the freedom of other beings that are given the same ethical responsibility.

 The second clause in my proposition above is not inherent to the idea of freedom itself, but from the nature of ethics itself.  Ethics—that is, the application of the principle of freedom to groups of free individuals—would be irrelevant if it were not for the presence of more than one free being.  If I were the only free being in the universe, then there would be no basis for talking about ethics beyond simple freedom, which is to say that I would be morally permitted to do whatever I will to do.  But there exists other free beings and so my freedom cannot be given unilateral range.  If I am to recognize my freedom to do what I will, then I must recognize that any other being with this freedom has the same right.  To put this in the language of Kant; I cannot will that a being’s freedom to do what it wills without limit to be universal  law, because that would lead to conflict with other free wills which will ultimately limit one or both of our wills.  Therefore, freedom needs to be limited to some degree, insofar as it allows freedom to remain while also allowing the minimization of conflict.  For example, if both X and Y will to eat that whole sandwich on the table, only one (or neither) will be able to fulfill their will.  So the freedom of will for each must be reduced in such a way that doesn’t completely restrict either party involved.  This could be done by sharing the sandwich or by having X and Y agree that one will eat the whole thing.  In either case, the will of each has been considered, and no will has been compelled or forced through conflict.  

Kant’s Categorical Imperative of Universality, however, is a logical structure that has been here applied to freedom, and not inherent to freedom or ethics itself.  The functioning of the imperative is one of logical consistency of a maxim universally applied.  If there is a logical inconsistency, then it is not, according to Kant, done because of duty and therefore not ethical.   This in itself does not seem to address morality directly—that is, freedom—but only logic.  Determining what is according to duty is the first mistake, as Kant assumes a connection between reason and duty (and therefore morality) that moves beyond the scope of freedom, and thus morality.  Kant’s insistence that the intelligible somehow determines right is here rejected, as it does not address freedom directly.  However, Kant’s respect for persons formulation of the categorical imperative seems to be relevant, and is rightly adopted by this principle of freedom.  A reasoned imperative is not relevant to freedom, and so the universality formulation is extraneous and is discarded.  Thus, the Categorical Imperative of universality cannot stand as a principle of ethics, being that it is not ethical per se, while the respect for persons can remain, but is also not a principle per se.

This application of Kant’s Imperative also rules out egoism, for it eliminates the possibility of what is merely in my (or any singular being’s) interest.  Ethical egoism is further ruled out in ethical theory analytically because ethics is defined as pertaining to groups.  Egoism is, by definition, not concerned with anything but the self-interest of the individual, and thus not with the group.  Therefore, ethical egoism is a misnomer, and not even an ethical system at all.  This does not, however, make the idea of egoism completely irrelevant to discussions of freedom in a non-ethical sense.[2]  The egoist might be able to argue that the addition of ethics—of groups of people—to the discussion of freedom is not legitimate.  But this discussion seems to only lead to a form of nihilism and technically is beyond the scope of this discussion.  Egoism is not technically incapable of achieving shared morals.  It merely, by definition, does not consider such things, and therefore has no place in a discussion of ethical systems.

 

The Good and Subjectivity

 

But what this application of Kant’s Imperative to freedom does not rule out, interestingly, is subjectivity, which is the basis for relativism, as I understand it.  It is important to note that relativism here is not associated with any necessary lack of standard of morality or with ethical nihilism, but merely a result of subjectivism.  Because free beings are subjective, the determination of what is moral becomes relative by default—not all people will reach the exact conclusions of what right actions are.  However, it is still possible that they might determine the same conclusions, thus relativistic ethics is not nihilistic and will not necessarily lead towards "moral breakdown" or anarchy.  Ethical relativists are completely capable of agreeing on standards of right action, based on intersubjective qualifications, whether they be culturally, psychologically, or arbitrarily derived.

If morality is subjective, then what becomes of this notion of good?  G.E. Moore said that when you see good, you would know it.  But the fact that a person can recognize something as good does not guarantee that it is actually good.  Perhaps good is still a simple concept, but that does not make it simple to know.  One problem is that perhaps other concepts can be recognized, falsely, as the good.  This, of course, does not mean that we are trying to define good as anything except itself, but that we are trying to recognize something in our thoughts as “good” when it is in fact something else.  Another possibility is that there is no such thing as good, and that when, as Moore says, we “recognize good,” it is only good because we call it so.  Either of these possibilities, if true, lead toward a subjectivity that would create problems in establishing some principle of good. 

This issue opens up the question of interpretation, which is due to subjectivity.  When subjectivity becomes an issue, it opens up the door for relativism.  If every free being has the ability to interpret the value, truth, good, etc of the world around it, there is no certainty that any one being will interpret it correctly or that any two beings will share the same interpretation.  And while it may be the case that these free beings are able to communicate and agree on some basic rules, laws, etc, that does not mean that those agreed upon rules or laws are in any way derived from reality itself as it is—that is, from any true good.  That is, there is nothing to say that if some objective good exists, these free beings will be able to find, understand, or apply it.  If we conceive of something and call it good (or say, as Plato has, that it partakes in some quality called “good”) when it is not in fact good, then this assumes that there is some other thing out there that actually is the good.  And if we define what good is, then it is possible to simply say "that is good" and technically be right, until somebody gives a good enough reason why "that" should or cannot be considered good, and convinces us that something else is good. 

Utilitarian ethicists define good as having to do with happiness or pleasure, whether quantitatively or qualitatively, and thus in terms of its effects.  However, the means of determining which pleasures are better, especially with mill, depends on a subjective qualification.  For with the one who determines which pleasure is preferred, a subjective decision is made.  Even Mill, whose approach was qualitative, is dependent on subjective evaluations of pleasure and pain.  Further, one could say that the mistake here is trying to associate one simple concept, happiness/pleasure (if it is actually simple—it might not be) with the good.  But whether or not happiness can be compared with the good in any way does not effect the fact that the principle of utility itself cannot be applied to what is called good without subjective evaluation.  The utilitarian, like Kant, also overlooks freedom and tries to establish pleasure as good and as the basis for ethics. 

If we are to talk about the potential principle of Divine Command, we will have to discuss the problem elucidated in Plato’s Euthyphro.  If God is commanding them because they are good, then they are, in principle, available for our discovery besides God’s distributing them to us.  If they are Good because God says so, then the question is whether are they are essential principles or just rules created by a being that understands the true nature of ethics? And even if we assume God’s beneficence in making these rules, it may still be the case that God would distribute laws which, for all we know, may simply be based on a principle such as freedom.   If they were genuinely essential principles, then why would a God need to command them?  If it were merely because we would otherwise not know them as ultimate and good laws, this still requires faith and thus we still have issues with subjectivity.  In terms of ethics, as some have shown, God is irrelevant if all that matters is good action.[3]

But more importantly than the fact that what is good is relative to the subject, is the fact that ethics itself is not even directly related to what is good necessarily.  Both ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ mean the same thing etymologically.  They both derive from words that mean ‘habit’ or common behavior in a group.  It refers more to what people (tend/prefer/actually?) do than what would be considered good.  Ethics is essentially a system of ideas towards defining right action.  It really does not change anything to observe that these common "right" actions will be done according to some notion of good, because these notions of good are ultimately derived via subjective means, even if they are learned from others.  Even learned morals have to be first created by someone, for whatever reason they seemed good by that creator.  The subjective nature of ethics, as they are chosen in society, will ultimately create standards of action based upon what people consider being good, which is based on their subjective criteria, of course.  Thus, actual morality—that is the habits of behavior in a particular society—is not necessarily derived from any good so much as it defines good (and is ultimately due to freedom).  Perhaps these so-called “principles” of classical metaethics are abstractions from these defined goods within cultures, as philosophers and other free individuals try to make what their culture sees as good the principle for systematic ethics.  Thus the principles of classical metaethics seem to actually be derived from freely choosing and culturally perpetuating individuals.  Morals, as part of culture, seem to be learned behavior, passed down from generation to generation—whether within society of philosophical schools. 

If the good were to have any objective meaning, it would have to be along the lines of a shared subjective experience or “intersubjectivity,” as Kant said. It would have to be something that all these free beings have in common due to some cause.  In one sense, we can say that evolutionary processes could determine what we see as “goodness.”  Our brains, after all, are to a large degree the result of these evolutionary processes.  The brain will tend towards perceptual processes that will allow the species to survive,[4] and to some degree moral behavior is conducive to this end.  But this evolutionary process is likely also cultural rather than purely physical (although it may end up effecting neural hard wiring to some degree, based on the above foot-noted "Baldwin effect").  Types of behavior that will tend to be passed down as successful memes[5] will tend towards what philosophers call good behavior.  In fact, philosophers arguing for certain types of behavior may be both a result of these evolutionary memes as well as a force of perpetuating them.  The fact that these memes continue to fight for there existence via our capability to argue on their behalf is interesting as an explanation for the existence of ideas of good, but it still fails to associate the Good with freedom per se.  Therefore, the concept(s) of good are not necessarily inherent to freedom, although they may ultimately derive from free beings. 

 

Implications of Subjective Relativism

 

The relativism of the good (or of anything for that matter) has to do with the fact that it is the subject who must decide which concept to use as “principle.”  This is the irony that I referred to at the beginning.  Our freedom, which brings the question of ethics in the first place, is also responsible for choosing which ethical “principle” or definition of good to use.  The fact that we have the choice seems to make the question ultimately relative.  Again, the only pertinent principle for ethics is freedom itself; any other so-called “principle” of metaethics is problematic. 

The fact that there are competing ethical “principles” for free beings to choose from makes the relativistic nature of classical metaethics clear.  As soon as you meet a utilitarian, you will soon meet a deontologist near by, both having freely (to some extent, at least) chosen that particular principle of ethics.  Freely made decisions about things do not make them principle, and they certainly do not make them true.  If everyone in the world agreed, each using his or her own subjectivity, that some one ethical principle was true, or some moral rule or law was true, that does not necessarily guarantee that it actually is true[6] because people err.  If we all agreed that Mill’s Utilitarianism was the way to discuss ethics, this decision would not make the principle of utility a true principle of ethics.  The fact that we have the freedom to choose between them is further evidence that their so-called “principles” may not be so fundamental, because we might have chosen otherwise.  And if they are not truly fundamental, then they can be brought into question. 

If any argument against relativism is to be leveled, it must argue that there is something implicit to reality that is good in itself and can be somehow observed or tested objectively.  G.E. Moore’s insistence that we will simply know it when seen is not acceptable because of problems with our ability to get past the veil of subjectivity.  Moral theories such as Utilitarianism, Deontology, "ethical egoism," Virtue Ethics, etc, are all based upon human subjective evaluation of either consequences or some analysis of the action to be done to associate it with goodness.  Deontology at least makes the attempt to associate duty with something metaphysical, but I ultimately believe this too fails.[7]  Human analysis does not necessarily interpret reality as it is, which is to say that the problem with epistemology.  Can we really rely upon our ability to discern the nature of reality in order to determine what the good is, if good even exists?  I do not believe that we can, and so I agree with the idea of contractarianism as a solution for ethical problems.  Since we cannot know what would be good, if anything is good without qualification,[8] we have to use our freedom and willingly and fairly limit our freedom in light of the fact that other free beings exist.

 

Conflict, agreement, and a potential Biblical answer

 

Assuming that we are free, ethicists will bring up issues of what to do when conflicts arise between the freedoms of people.  If my free will chooses to do A, and A violates the free will of some other person, then how can this be resolved?  This is where, classically, either Kant, Mill, Aristotle, or whomever will step in and start talking about what the categorical imperative will say, what is preferable according to the principle of utility, what the Virtuous Man would do, etc.  And, in the end, these (at least one) principles may result in what we can call a right action—that is, deemed moral by most people.  And this is the crux of the issue; it is what most people would deem a moral resolution.  It says nothing about what is objectively or Platonically ‘Good,’ only what is preferable to free individuals.  Thus, what must occur is the free beings involved in this group will have to agree to a fair rule or law, determining what action is right in a given situation.  The social contract is essentially what responsibility for autonomy must lead to. 

The principles discussed in metaethics—egoism, utility, categorical imperative, etc—however, all fall short of qualifying for true principle-status.  However, this does not mean that what these classical “principles” will systematically develop will differ from what free beings will contract with one-another.  The principle of utility violates the Naturalistic fallacy and yet many Utilitarians might develop the same solution to abortion as freely contracting individuals, Kant might say the same thing concerning suicide as a relativist, etc.  As was discussed above, if the good exists then issues with subjectivity create problems with attaining it.  If the good does not exist, then this question becomes irrelevant, and nothing, not even pleasure, can be associated with good unless it is arbitrarily defined as the good for subjective reasons, making the good ultimately relative.

Something that was said in the New Testament, supposedly by Jesus himself, is of interest here.  It was when someone asked Jesus to summarize the law.  The first part was overtly religious, but in the second part of his response he says “You shall love your neighbor as yourself,”[9] which is another way of formalizing the golden rule of do unto others what you would want done to yourself.  And while this might imply some ambiguity in precisely how to interpret this (due to subjectivity!), it is clear that a principle of fairness between (what we can assume to be free) individuals is contained here.  The phrase “as you would want done to yourself” implies subjectivity very strongly.  There is nothing here about doing what is done by a Virtuous Man, or according to any other abstract idea.  It is a matter of giving to others what you would want to be given; the freedom, respect, and love due to any being with the responsibility of freedom—truly to love your neighbors as yourself.  And in the end, considering the relative nature of “the good,” it may end up being the case that such a formulation as this golden rule may be the only acceptable standard for subjectivism.  It does not claim to have any objective good, but only a subjective judgment that allows a person to ask what he or she would want done unto themselves, and assume that others might want that same basic treatment.  And while this ultimately will result in conflict due to differing personal standards, it is really the best gauge we have for determining what people want short of meticulously polling everyone in the world.

 

A problem of worldviews—towards a solution

           

With free individuals, finding any kind of solution is extremely difficult.  This is evident by looking at what really happens in the world.  As I mentioned above, morality is about what groups of individuals do, and a discussion of ethics deals with the responsibility of beings’ freedom when they interact socially.  The idea of a ‘good’ seems to be an abstraction from what has good results in acting in a world of free people.  Of course, ideas about the universe and it’s metaphysics get muddled into the question of what works, because the metaphysics of a person’s world will effect what types of actions get results.  It is this that ultimately creates the relativism.

            Differences in metaphysics are the real obstacles to an ethical harmony with our neighbors.  What we see as being valuable, good, and/or real in the world will substantially effect how you view what to do.  If your metaphysics describe a world of satanic powers out to deceive and tempt you from the divinely commanded laws, then it becomes pragmatic to follow those laws if you don’t want to suffer any punishment for falling out of favor with God.  If your metaphysics is one of process, and you see the world as an ever changing and essentially progressive, you may see a very different good in certain actions than another person.  Here, I use the term good as being a quality of an action that allows it to achieve desired ends.  In this case, what is good towards literacy is going to school, what is good towards eternal bliss in heaven is following the divinely commanded laws, etc.  However, to one who does not see the value of eternal bliss because they don’t believe in heaven, following the “divinely commanded laws” may not be of any concern of theirs (although they still might come to the same “right” actions individually).  Thus, what we believe about the world will determine how we would want to choose to limit or liberate the wills of people in our society, although it is possible to determine the same solutions for different reasons. 

            I believe that Rawls’ Justice as Fairness, with its idea of the original position, is essentially where we would need to start in order to establish an ethical system based upon subjective freedom’s responsibility to other free beings.  Ideally, however, I would like to extend the veil of ignorance over any particular religio-metaphysical system, in much the same way as the First Amendment of the US Constitution tries to prevent the federalization of any religion.  This, of course, is technically impossible, for we must assume that the world exists and that free beings exist in this world, with whom we will have to interact.  The intention of this idea is to prevent, as much as possible, metaphysical propositions from allowing any values slip into the ethical system before we are even off the ground.  We must assume freedom, and not strict determinism, as well as other free beings because otherwise a discussion of responsibility would be absurd.  Beyond this, however, everything must be taken with some level of uncertainty, such as ideas about the existence of a particular type of God, true religion, or true “good.” Fairness is, therefore, a central part of the solution to the problem of ethics. 

It is important to note that this new formulation of the original position is idyllic, and perhaps impossible to apply to the world that already has competing religio-metaphysical memes.  However, it might be valuable to look at the examples of people that seem to, for whatever reasons, move about in society with ease, respect (from other free beings), and general happiness.  And while happiness or pleasure may not be, itself, a principle of ethics, it may end up being a good marker for the existence of a person who has found a good way to behave socially as a free being.  This is reminiscent of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, in the sense that to learn what is right to do, simply observe someone who already is moral.  And while this does not lay down any type of absolute or standard for action, it is essentially moral.  It may be true that the actions of good men will differ from group to group.  Perhaps what is good towards the end of having responsibility and respect for other free beings around you might differ from culture to culture, for example.  While the virtues actually are is not immediately clear to us, it seems that Virtue Ethics is a valuable tool for us to use in the search for value.

            It is this issue of cultural relativism that makes the golden rule problematic as a solution for a complete and global ethic.  What I may prefer—or more generally, what people in my culture may prefer—might differ greatly from a person from another culture.[10]  However, the golden rule does not seem concerned with particular rules at all, but only with the idea that a free being deserves to be given its freedom insofar as you yourself feel you deserve (or at least desire) it.  Thus, perhaps the more correct formulation of the golden rule would be to say that a free being should always allow another being’s freedom so long as it does not impede the freedom of others, which is what I have been proposing all along.  This of course will be overridden by occasions where the parties involved have entered into some sort of agreement or contract stating that they agree to their wills being restricted under given circumstances (as with the example of the sandwich on the table).  Or, more simply (1) do your will, so long as your will does not violate (2) doing unto others what they would want to have done to them.  This basis is subjective and thus relativistic because what each individual wants will differ, according to his or her preferences. 

And what if one does violate this formulation?  By violating the will of others,[11] whether for your personal gain or for any other reason (including the collective good), you forfeit the ‘right’ to your own free will—at least, you forfeit the equal kind of or amount of right to freedom as you violated.  As Plato said, “it is just to harm the unjust and benefit the just.”[12]  Justice—this shared freedom—is given to everyone except when people act unjustly, forfeiting this right.  For the same reason that my feeling a desire to have a free will allows me to see why others should have this same freedom, if I act in such a way that I violate others’ freedom, I allow the right for the same to occur to me by others.  Thus, by acting in violation of people’s wills, I forgo my right to have the same level of freedom, and can be subject to sanctions from others because of it.  This is especially the case if my will shall continue, or is likely to continue, to violate the will of others.[13] 

Subjectivity brings many problems concerning finding ways to get along with other subjective beings that may determine much different ideas about right conduct.  However, it seems that whatever ethical system we try to implement for people to use, they will ultimately resort towards determining what is right on there own, using subjective criteria.  Therefore, it seems like a better solution to encourage this idea of subjectivism mixed with the idea of fairness, given that people will always tend towards it anyway.  So rather than imposing some false “principle” of ethics on people who will not understand it anyway, allow them to do what people naturally do and determine what is right on there own.  And while this may seem subject to the “is-ought’ fallacy, I am not so sure that this is a fallacy.  Freedom and subjectivity is part of the condition we as beings are in.  What we ought to do is to act freely, while being fair to other free beings.  This is the only way to discuss ethics that follows from autonomy, which makes us morally relevant beings in the first place.  What way ought we to act besides responsibly from what is?  Freedom is what is, acting responsibly and fairly according to freedom ought to be the just solution to what would otherwise devolve into perpetual conflict. 

 



[1] Which is to say that, somehow, some philosophers have not.

[2] That is, it  might still be legitimate of determining what is right, but not for groups, only for individuals.

[3] I allude here to Staks' wager, which essentially argues that If God has superior morality, then God could not punish just people.  Therefore, belief in any theological doctrine could not be relevant for any after death punishment or reward, but only just behavior.  (Thanks to Staks and other irreletheists out there). 

[4] This is evident in the “Baldwin effect,” which is the process of the neural “wiring” can shift in such ways to try different ways of thinking, perceiving, etc towards what is beneficial or successful.  Cf. Richards, R.J. 1987. Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[5] This is a relatively recent idea.  It argues that ideas act according to similar patterns as genes, and survive based upon there ability to be reproduced and transmitted in culture—a kind of natural selection for ideas. 

[6] Although it would seem make it universally applied.

[7] And while I would like to further expand on this point, space restrictions will not allow me to, unfortunately. 

[8] It may be important to note that ultimately I agree with Kant in that the good will may be the only thing good without qualification.  This works with my principle of autonomy because the good will is the will that wills freely while not infringing upon others’ wills.  In this sense of good, I use the term good in its sense of instrumentality; it is good for the end of freedom to be this kind of will.

[9] Mt. 22.39

[10] This is not to say that this cultural relativism is somehow the cause of ethical relativism.  It is more true to say that cultural and ethical relativism are both the result of individual subjectivity.

[11]I would like to point out here that cases where one might allow certain actions that are typically things that one would not will for some other end would not violate the persons will.  For example, while certain medical treatments can be painful, and in themselves not desired by people, they are done for the sake of a greater good, health, and not done against the will of a person. 

[12] Rep. 334d

[13] This makes me wonder what should be done with either clumsy or unintentionally irritating people.  Through no intentional fault of their own, these people continue to cause events that may violate the willed environment of others, yet they do not intend to do so.