Searching for the adequate place for God in process theism

Process Theism presents us with a double-dynamic monism. Process theists, such as David Ray Griffin, talk about God and the world while Process philosophy talks about the mental and physical poles, associated with the theory of prehension[1]. The first dynamic relationship is between God and the world, and the second is within the world itself, as being composed of the mental and physical poles, with “God” as the source of these poles. At least this is what the process theist should be saying, yet is not. The theory of panexperientialism, utilized by process thinkers, misinterprets this dynamism and the role and place of God in the world.

Dipolar metaphysics is central to process philosophy as well as process theology. This can be seen from the reading of any literature associated with process thought.[2] But more relevant to this discussion is the centrality of dipolarity in Process Theism itself. Griffin discusses a two-fold dipolarity thus:

One dipolarity, that between God as influencing the world and God as influenced by the world, is emphasized by Whitehead’s language of God’s “primordial” and “consequent” natures, respectively. The other dipolarity, that between God as unchanging and God as changing, is emphasized by Hartshorne…” (Searching for an Adequate God, 6)

Of course, the two-fold dipolarity here differs from the double-dynamism referred to above, but is related to it. Hartshorne’s dipolarity is similar to something that Griffin discusses elsewhere, in terms of experience/nonexperience[3] rather than change. This polarity, in it’s many forms, is the essence to process itself. Process Philosophy is based on the premise that reality is based upon action, and thus dynamics, rather than some essential substance.

Dipolar metaphysics of process thought is monistic, rather than dualistic. It is important here to draw the distinction between dualism and dynamism in terms of this dipolarity. The two poles—mental and physical—within process thought are not different substances, but different manifestations or aspects of the same thing.[4] Griffin, in his book Unsnarling the World-Knot, talks about this in terms of panexperientialism, which he also states as one of the core doctrines of process theology.[5] According to Panexperientialism, we need to reevaluate our conceptions of materialism, which has been too dependent upon the “common Cartesian intuition about matter” (UWK, p. 77). This intuition has to do with the idea that matter is inert and without experience, which panexperientialism attempts to dispel by saying that matter itself contains experiential attributes (prehension) that leads towards things such as consciousness in certain entities. Thus, in a sense, what we have classically termed “matter” and “mind” are essentially the same thing. Griffin does, in Hartshorne’s footsteps, acknowledge that there is a difference between experiential and nonexperiential matter, which would avoid the common criticism that rocks are not in any way conscious.[6] Thus matter, re-thought, is the basis for this new panexperientialist monism. Of course, this is not to say that panexperientialism, being a process-based theory, is a type of ontological materialism in the traditional sense because this would imply the assumption of the same substance metaphysics that the process philosopher tries to dispel.

Panexperientialism, as described by process thinkers, is in error when attributing experience to matter. This idea seems merely to create a different kind of dualism; that of the fore-mentioned experiential and nonexperiential matter. As Hartshorne has said, in being quoted by Griffin, “materialism is really dualism in disguise.” (Unsnarling, p. 77). The problem lies not in the concept of experiential versus nonexperiential per se, but in the assumption that both are based in matter, which still holds onto the idea that matter is the essential substance of being. Griffin’s solution, in following Hartshorne, seems to be that all matter itself contains the attribute of experience, but that aggregates of this matter does not. But here, he fails to show how one aggregate (a rock, for example) would differ from another in having this experiential attribute (a living organism, as the alternamte example[7]). It seems, therefore, that there may be a problem here despite Hartshorne’s solution of experiential/nonexperiential matter. Given this problem, we need to re-evaluate this metaphysical theory, first by assuming that matter, conceding that it is poorly understood and in need of rethinking by science, is essentially experiential. The solution that I see is that it is not matter that is essential, but something else. This should be blaringly obvious considering the fact that this is a theory that grew out of process philosophy. What is needed is some solution to the problem that neither falls into the dualists trappings nor the contemporary tendency to fall into materialism, while at the same time holding onto the idea of distinguishing between experiential and nonexperiential “stuff.” The result will be of a dynamic monism, rather than a dynamic dualism.

God, or process itself, is the source of both the physical and mental poles. God is not one of the poles. Bruce Dearest, in being quoted by Richard Rice, says that “the primordial pole of God, which possesses no actuality, in fact possesses no reality.” His point being that the concept of God from the classical free will theist (or the “open view of God”[8]) is not adequately represented in process theism. But it is clear that the process theist is attempting to reevaluate God in terms of process thought, yet may be failing in this goal. Essentially, there are two possibilities remaining for this metaphysics. One possibility is that the mental and physical poles of process philosophy are essentially the same, but manifested slightly differently in some fashion, much like H₂0, which can be in the form of water or ice, for example.[9] Either that or there is something more fundamental that manifests itself into what we call “physical” and “mental” (which may be a false dualistic distinction created by the mind anyway). The issue here is one that deals with a similar problem as dealt with in quantum theory, which points out that matter is essentially energy.[10] The solution to this problem is not clear, and will be a question of empiricism more than metaphysics at this point. However, we are placed in a situation where the idea of God has to be dealt with in some fashion. The pantheist might argue for the first possibility, as it could be argued to support that God is both, like with the water analogy above.[11] However, problems with pantheism will be pointed out,[12] and the process theist might want to argue for the second possibility and say that it is God that is the essence of what manifests as the mental and physical poles, and at this point this seems to be the better of the two choices for process theology. As Whitehead has said, “the nature of God is dipolar” (PR p. 345). The mental/physical poles are what make up “the world” as we know it. Thus, it seems that the dynamism of God and the world holds up thus far.

The addition of the traditional “God” in process theism is extraneous; the role of God is the role of process. We must conclude that the essence to the two poles, which make up the physical/mental world we live in, is this process or action. If there were a God of any Kind it would have to either be the basis for (or simply be, if we were to lean towards pantheism) this action or process that gives existence to the mental/physical. Process is central to the dipolarity, which is central to process thought in general. God is central to the process theist, otherwise they would not be theists, and so the conclusion is simple; Process theism, in accepting God and process metaphysics, must concede that God is the basis for the dynamic relationship between the mental and physical. Further, it is curious why the process thinker is in need of God at all for this metaphysical system to work at all. Richard Rice’s need for some storage bank for the universal memory is not sufficient enough for this need[13], as there is nothing to show that any prehension contains any more memory then the causes (or “feelings”) that it prehends from its immediate influences. Interestingly, Rice quotes Demarest further in saying that “process thought does not need a God after all” and continues to suggest that “process theology should lay all its cards on the table and eliminate God entirely.” (SAG p. 179) I happen to agree, ironically, with Rice; ironically because Rice intends to give this as evidence for process thought’s downfall, while I still hold onto process thought’s validity and critique Rice’s Christian free will theology almost completely. If, however this process still ends up including a God, it is a much different God than the Christian God; more different than even the process theist seems to argue for.

The dynamism between God/process and the world is merely the relationship between the essence and it’s physical/mental manifestations. Despite Griffin’s insistence that there is a dynamic relationship between God and the world, or God and creativity[14], the only interplay is between the essence of process, or action, and what comes about due to this action. Thus, in a sense, it is an interplay between “God” (process) and “the world” (the poles). The world emanates from God and God also emanates from the world, as Griffin also holds. In very laymen-like terms, it would be like saying “stuff happens, and because stuff happens in a certain way, the results of those actions will follow a certain process or pattern.” This pattern is the interplay between the “physical” and the “mental.” Classically, this interplay has been interpreted as the dynamic (or dualistic) interplay of two substances. What Whitehead pointed out, and what I am re-emphasizing here, is that the “substances” themselves, although they may actually exist in different forms (they are “the world”), are different forms of the same thing; process.[15] The poles are manifested by the nature of the process, but the nature of the process is under constant change due to the manifestation of the poles throughout reality. In somewhat paradox-like fashion, the process itself is the nature of the interplay between the physical and mental poles, allowing the two-fold dipolarity which Griffin refers to multiple times. To use a loose analogy, let me paint a picture for you: Me and a friend are throwing a ball back and forth to one-another. The process of how the ball gets from me to him will depend on the physical surroundings, dynamics of our throwing motions, and our conscious decisions about how to throw it. At the same time, how we catch, hold, and throw the ball will also be dependent on how the ball travels to us. There is interplay between the motion of the ball (process) and our dealing with the ball while it is in our possession (the “prehension” of either pole[16]). Thus, the dynamism is a relationship between the different aspects of one process and it’s manifestations.

In sum, the theory of panexperientialism, utilized by process thinkers, misinterprets this dynamism and the role and place of God in the world. God’s role in the world, according to this dipolarity is even more immanent than the process theist wants to admit. In essence, it dissolves the traditional conception of God to a point where it is unrecognizable from that God of the “Good News.”[17] It seems that the Process Theist, is being Christian, has tried to concede too much to the “Good News” in trying to adhere to something that is recognizable as Christianity. Perhaps the Process Theist would be better off leaving the “Good News” behind as old news.

[1] Cf. PR 239

[2] Cf. PR 45, 108.

[3] Experience here is associated with the Whiteheadean concept of “prehension.”

[4] As Griffin points out elsewhere, “panexperientialism involves the rejection of the early modern dualism between two kinds of actual entities.” Cf. Reenchanchment without Supernaturalism, p. 6

[5] Cf. Searching for an Adequate God (SAG), p. 4

[6] In other terms, this is the distinction of the difference between “true individuals and aggregational composites of such individuals.” This is Hartshorne’s distinction, utilized by Griffin to answer to common criticisms of panexperientialism/panpsychism. Cf. UWK, p. 95-96.

[7] The theory of Supervenience, which states that macroproperties are fully determined by microproperties, is discussed on pages 56-57 of Griffin’s book, Unsnarling the World Knot, and might be a contending solution to this at first glance. However, this theory still fails to demonstrate why the microproperties of a rock and a neuron or a cell would create sufficient differences in terms of one being capable of experience and the other not, considering that panexperientialism postulates that this attribute of experience is common to all matter at the micro-level.

[8] CF. SAG p. 39

[9] Once again, this is reminiscent of supervenience. Cf. UWK, p. 56-57.

[10] It can be shown here that the theory here is essentially saying the same as panexperientialism is with matter and mind, is assuming that energy/mind are both essentially matter. This is not surprising considering the bias towards phyicalism that has dominated philosophy recently. This problem of particle/wave in quantum theory is similar to the one in the mind/body problem in that at the sub-atomic level, we see something that acts like a particle and a wave much in the same way that we see something in metaphysics that acts much like matter as well as like a self-determining, experiencing mind. Thus, for both mind/body and quantum mechanics, I would offer the same solution; that of the two metaphysical choices above.

[11] Whether this is a matter of a continuum or a true dynamic relationship of two manifestations is not clear at this point in our understanding of physics/metaphysics

[12] CF. SAG p. 176-177 for example

[13] CF. SAG p. 168-170. Although, Rice here is also arguing against process theology

[14] CF. SAG p. 31

[15] As mentioned above, these different forms may end up being merely apparent. I would cite this theory, but I am not sure who I would cite, as I have never read it anywhere. The closest idea that comes to mind would be that Eastern philosophical concept represented by the Dai chi du (otherwise known as the “yin-yang”); the interplay between the Yin and Yang.

[16] Of course, the nature of each prehension may differ based on the properties of the different poles, as Whitehead discusses throughout part III of Process and Reality.

[17] I feel silly here having to point out that ‘Gospel’ does not mean “good news,” but more like “God’s word.”