Panexperiential Existentialism

Jean-Paul Sartre starts off his monumental essay Being and Nothingness by telling us that he is going to throw aside all dualisms, but then quickly concedes that the dualism of finite-infinite cannot be avoided. Ultimately, this leads into the separation of self-other, or in his terms, the being-for-itself and the being-in-itself. He carries this self-other dualism throughout the essay, which manifests itself as a relationship between the subject and the object. However, it is my contention that this subject-object relationship does not hold up when applied to the relationship between a subject and another subject. The subject objectifies the Other self through the “look” via seeing the body as an object of expression for the Other. However, the idea that this necessitates a conflict-based relationship between people is based upon something that Sartre overlooks. Sartre does allow the possibility of a “plurality of subjectivities” later on in the essay,[1] but only upon arguing that the very basis of human interaction is one of a conflict based upon the objectification of the Other. It is my goal to argue that the Other, as another thinking being-for-itself, never becomes a mere object; that this is an impossible situation. The objectification of the Other is either impossible or a result of the same “bad faith” as the objectification of the Other by the reflective consciousness of the self. The self is that thing which we cannot see as an object except upon reflection. The Other is that thing which we cannot see as a subject except upon reflection.

Sartre is not trying to do metaphysics, but the being-for-itself relating to a being-in-itself type of model assumes a subject-object ontology which gives rise to a particular metaphysical outlook. It is this model that drives Sartre’s essay exemplified by the very terminology he uses; being-for-itself as the subject and being-in-itself as the object. And while this kind of ontology seems inescapable given the way Sartre describes how we see the world from a phenomenological point of view, he seems to simply concede that this metaphysical model holds up even after we learn a thing or two about the nature of these interactions, making it seem that conflict is unavoidable between subjects. The methodology of description is good to a certain point, but fails when we begin to notice that in initially seeing the world as full of objects we cannot infer that the world is actually full of objects. This is not a solipsistic observation but a panexperiential one.

In some cases the subject-object model seems difficult to avoid, as it would be difficult to imagine any plurality of subjectivities when I am kept company by a room full of chairs or books. That is, the subject-object ontology of self in relation to other seems to be upheld by thinking about how people relate to inanimate objects. However, when it is clear that certain others are not mere objects without their own for-itself experiences, the subject-object relationship should break down and a subject-subject relationship—the plurality of subjects—should become clear. This is not the case for Sartre, and the following will be a critique of his sadist-masochist model of human interaction, despite his conceding the mitsein as a possible solution. The error is that this subject-object model only works as the initial interpretation of our relationship with the world. As we live in the world, surrounded by Others, this subject-object model should quickly fall to pieces the moment we know that the Other is a being-for-itself. First, a brief description of Sartre’s conflict-oriented relationship will be helpful.

The essence to this conflict is a competition for the dominance of subjectivities that arises from two approaches to the Other—sadistic and masochistic. The sadist attempts to capture the freedom, via objectification, of the Other, who in turn becomes the masochist in losing his or her own subjectivity by capitulating to the other. According to Sartre, this competitive interplay between people arises due to a paradox. The desire of a for-itself to be loved freely by the Other is threatened by the idea that for the Other to freely love me as a being-for-itself I would have to resign my subjectivity to the subjectivity of the other, which results in playing the role of the masochist.

According to Sartre, I cannot be a subject while having the Other freely love me because this freedom presupposes subjectivity. The best we could hope for is to have the role of subject/object oscillate in such a way that each person has a turn to play the masochist and the other to play the sadist. The assumption here is that for one to be the subject, the other must be the object. Thus the subject, as a being-for-itself, to hope to be loved freely by the Other would necessitate the possibility of equal ‘subjectness’ at any given time in the personal interaction. Since Sartre views this state of affairs as impossible, he calls it a paradox.

Alfred North Whitehead’s “Process” metaphysics—often called “panexperientialism”—might have this plurality of subjectivity solution built in, as it argues that the subject is the basis not only for all being-for-itself, but also for all of reality.[2] David Ray Griffin, a contemporary process thinker following in the footsteps of Whitehead has this to say:

All things other than our own experience appear to be mere objects, rather than subjects, because by the time they can be prehended they are objects; their subjectivity has perished…So, we are right to think that everything that we perceive is an object—in the ontological as well as the epistemic sense of the term. We are only wrong to think of them as mere objects.[3]

And then Sartre:

The self can not be a property of being-in-itself ...The self refers, but it refers precisely to the subject. It indicates a relation between the subject and himself, and this relation is precisely a duality…[4]

Again Sartre:

The Other is a thinking substance of the same essence as I am, a substance which will not disappear into primary and secondary qualities, and whose essential structure I find in myself.[5]

Here, Sartre seems to be in agreement with Griffin, but Sartre’s actual agreement is virtual. In Sartre’s account of “concrete relations with others,”[6] as described above, it is not only that the Other seems to be an object, but we actually feel threatened to become an object by the Other unless we dominate them and assert our subjectivity. Griffin’s point is that this is never an actual threat, as the Other’s ‘objectivity’ is never a “mere” objectivity and our subjectivity can only be an apparent objectivity to the Other. Thus, the threat is empty. The appearance of objectification is due to an ontological-epistemic separation between the consciousnesses. The further point is that the subject as well as the Other are in fact subjects in the same (at least similar) way as we are all subjects.[7] And if we look at what Sartre says, he seems as if he should agree logically while not seeming to agree actually.

The problem that Sartre is concerned with in his analysis of the existence of Others concerns a conflict-laden relationship between people. I appreciate Sartre’s point. When we look upon another person, we do objectify them in some way, and there is a sense in which we have to battle against any threat, valid or not, of objectification in order to perpetually and constantly assert our subjective power. But let’s look at this problem in new light, and see what the real problem is. When one is objectified, we are summed up, defined, and become a static generalization within the eyes of the subject looking upon us. But the actual status of being a subject is never threatened. Sartre says that the Other is in a sense the “radical negation of my experience…for whom I am not subject but object,” [8] but this does not seem to be the case.

Objectification is a result of a wide gap between the Self and the Other. We look at an object and recognize it (that is, we define it) by its attributes, its secondary qualities. That is, we don’t see the primary qualities of the Other, but only the expressions of the being-for-itself through the medium of the body. The Other only becomes an object through our intentional states, but these intentional states of ours can only be formed by the intake of phenomena through our body, which are the perception of the bodily expression of the being-for-itself contained within that other body. This is quite a separation between the Other and myself. The question that remains is why this objectification is applied in such a way that makes it seem like we are talking about the direct relationship of the being-for-itself with another being-for-itself when they have no direct interaction? The solution is geared around the metaphysical ideology of Whitehead, as described by Griffin above.

The model of looking at the relationship between subject and object is both where the conflict emerges and where the mistake should be realized. The Other, when it is a being-for-itself, is not an object; Sartre admits this himself. The problem is one of interaction between subjects but this can only occur through their bodies as objects. The other is inaccessible to me directly because “[m]y body as a thing in the world and the Other’s body are the necessary intermediaries between the Other’s consciousness and mine”[9] and “the only way that he can reveal himself to me is by appearing as an object to my knowledge”[10]—that is, through the body. Thus, it is not the Other that is an object, but the bodies—my body and their body—which are the objects. Sartre says that the Other can be for me only an image because the body is the tool for expressing the intentional states, the for-itself of me and the Other. We cannot express all that we are, have been, and (potentially) will be in one expression or gesture, thus our body is objectified in the moment of consciousness (perhaps necessarily, as we would need to have some interpretation of what things are around us if we hope to act in any way. We cannot wait until all objects have reached their totality before acting, or we would never act.).

One criticism that could be leveled here would be to address the apparent assumption here that any distinction can actually be made between the “soul” and the “body.” By mentioning the gap between mind-body-body-mind that separates us from each other it might seem as if I were advocating a Cartesian ghost in the machine. But this approach would be misconceived, as Sartre is not (nor am I) talking of a Cartesian dualism, and thus the problem would be averted. Sartre’s use of “soul” in his discussion refers to what some others call intentional states,[11] private sensations,[12] or phenomena at the level of thetic and non-thetic consciousness which do not necessarily necessitate a Cartesian dualism. Further, on the other end of the debate, the fact that these phenomena might arise from the body (in terms of some form of epiphenomenalism[13] or some other neuroscientific monism) would not alter Sartre’s point, because it is still the case that there is a distinction between the intention itself (the intentional state) and the expression of that intention (the bodily gesture, or language in general). The point here is that it is at the level of expression, the gestures and so forth, where the self gets transformed into an object and not the intentional state which is (imperfectly) communicated through language and gesturing. Because subjects do not interact in any way directly (telepathy or true intersubjectivity) it is not the case that the for-itself ever becomes an object because the Other’s being-for-itself is never directly seen by the self. Further, even if the Other could be directly experience my being-for-itself (whether it be via some psychic phenomena or otherwise), objectification of our being-for-itselfs might be inconceivable, as there might be no separation for objectification to take place. But save telepathy, this point about direct subject-object interaction is purely hypothetical.

Here, another thinker, Ludwig Wittgenstein, may help with solving Sartre’s problem. Wittgenstein suggests to us that one of the problems in the philosophical tradition is that we tend to try to summarize or generalize the world into universals for our use, a process that is related to the ritual of naming or defining as well as objectification. His advice to stop thinking and look—that is, observe instead of analyzing—as the basis for a methodology designed to avoid this objectification that Sartre seems to think is unavoidable. To look, “the look” for that matter, is essentially all that we have to interact with one another. But as I argue above, looking only observes the expression of self, not the self per se. If we tried to analyze what we see, we might generalize or summarize the Other, falling into bad faith. But by simply looking, we avoid bad faith and realize that the Other is beyond our perceptive reach. The problem is that Sartre seems to look at the Other as a mere object, while he should keep in mind that he (admittedly) knows another subject is behind that object of the body. He seems to look at the Other in terms of a negation of his own being while asking himself if he can interact with the Other in any way except that sadistic-masochistic manner. He has the tools to recognize that the Other is not a mere object, yet he is stuck objectifying the expression of the Other as if it were the Other itself. If he is merely describing the phenomenological world, he makes a leap here that is not warranted, and his conclusion about the nature of this conflict is invalid.

Perhaps it would be interesting at this point to explore the problem as if it were a matter between two subjects with only the distance of not sharing a consciousness, instead of the more significant gap of bodies in between. Sartre says that “as the subject of knowledge I strive to determine as object the subject who denies my character as subject and who himself determines me as object.” This is the source of the conflict, the sadist-masochist interaction between subjects. This seems to imply that it is the case that the other must deny my “my character as subject” and that I must do the same in return in order to retain my own subjectivity. What necessitates this relationship of conflict? The answer is that nothing necessitates this conflict, and that it is a flaw in reasoning on Sartre’s part to think it is necessary. Only a moment of consciousness—the perceived gestures that express a role played, a choice, etc—can be objectified, never the Other.

This is in fact the basis for bad faith, the sort of ‘objectification’ of myself as if some essence preceded my existence, only applied to the Other’s consciousness which, for reasons purely hypothetical to here address Sartre’s point, are without the further separation of bodily expression in time and space. The point is that if I can be called to be in bad faith in “passing judgment on myself as on an object,”[14] then doing so of another is equally in bad faith. I cannot faithfully objectify the action of the Other as defining the Other any more than I can for my own self. To do as Sartre asks us, to perpetuate this conflict between my self and the other is to do to the other what you should not do to yourself. Sartre should not criticize self-objectification—bad faith—while asserting the necessity of objectification of the other if you have recognized that the other is a subject as you yourself are (unless, perhaps, you are Nietzsche). This not only seems to violate Kant’s Categorical Imperative, it seems also to violate the Golden Rule in ethics.

This point, further bolstered by the great existential distance between minds interacting through the expression of bodies, makes the objectification of the Other’s being-for-itself impossible. It is impossible because we have no direct access to the Other’s being-for-itself due to the expression instrument called the body that stands between my self and the self of the Other. Further, without this impediment, a self could not objectify the Other because it would be in the same bad faith as when I try to sum up my own being—which is ultimately a moot point because this separation does exist. And, lastly, if two subjects were to truly be intersubjective, that is, experience the subjectivity of the other directly, this would make objectification of the Other not only impossible, but it would make the Other not Other, but a part of the self. Again, this is a moot point unless we concede psychic phenomena.

It should be concluded that the conflict that Sartre sees as arising due to interactions between subjective beings should never arise as Sartre argues. This is not to say that conflict between subjects is impossible, as it seems that conflict arises perhaps because it is subjects that interact. Subjects have opinions, preferences, etc that will give more than enough fodder for confrontation, disagreement, and so forth. It just does not seem to make sense to say that it is a threat to my subjectivity when confronted with the Other who threatens the status of my subjectivity. Instead, it seems likely that the dominance play that does occur is more of a matter of manifesting or asserting the content of your subjectivity, intention, or desire rather than the existence of it. The subjectivity of the Other does not threaten my subjectivity, but it may threaten the possibility of my actualizing the content of my subjectivity. This seems to be the true nature of conflict. At this point the question of mitsein becomes an ethical question, but not an ontological one.

[1] Cf. Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness: A PhenomenologicalEssay on Ontology. Hazel E. Barnes [trans.]. Washington Square Press, New York, 1984. p. 535

[2] Cf. Whitehead, Alfred North, Process and Reality. Edited Edition. The Free Press, New York, 1978

[3] Griffin, David Ray. Unsnarling the World Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1998, p. 159. It should be noted that the term “prehend” is Whitehead’s term, and loosely could be translated as ‘perceived.’

[6] This is the title of chapter 3, part 3, of Being and Nothingness

[7] And while it is actually argued by process metaphysics that the subject-object relationship breaks down even between, for example, a person and a chair, it is my intention to focus on a critique of Sartre’s account of the relationship between people, leaving it to the reader to speculate how this critique might be applied to a broader metaphysical critique of Sartre’s conclusions.

[11] Cf. Daniel Dennett and Ned Block, for example.

[12] Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations

[13] Epiphenominalism is a theory within the philosophy of mind that argues that consciousness arises out of physical processes. The philosophical problems with this theory, focused around how consciousness then effects the physical processes—how consciousness is reflective—is only partially relevant here. In the interest of space limitations, this issue will be omitted.