Nationalism and Ethnic Conflicts in Transcaucasia in Comparative Perspective

In 1992, I.Bremmer and R.Taras wrote: “Soviet nationalities are highly differentiated, and comparisons, to the extend that they may be made at all, are often appropriate with nations lying outside* the USSR. We would expect, for example, Turkmen nationalism in Turkmenistan to resemble Turkmen nationalism in Iran or Afghanistan [...] more closely than Latvian nationalism.” [1] Indeed, despite the fact that in the 1970s the Soviet leaders declared emergence of a new national identity, Sovetskii narod, communism failed to remove national distinctions in the Soviet Union. The USSR remained ethnically diverse with uneven development and different levels of intensity of national consciousness. Not surprisingly, both perestroika and glasnost were met differently in the Soviet republics depending on the level of development in the particular republic: the higher it was, the more readily the new ideas were accepted. Nevertheless, the comparative analysis of nationalisms in the Soviet Union should not be neglected, particularly when it comes to the issue of the Soviet disintegration. In this case we need to compare not different nationalisms as such, but rather the role they played in, and the contribution they made to, the process of decentralisation. Parallels drawn between the Baltic and the Transcaucasian nationalist movements can show common features and differences between them with regard to the Soviet dissolution.

1. Transcaucasian Nationalism

Three former Soviet republics - Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia - are situated in the area between the Main Caucasian Range and the River of Araz. In Russian the region is called Zakavkaz’ie, which literally means Transcaucasia or the Transcaucasus. Despite the ongoing debates over the borders of Europe, most of the scholars tend to consider the region to be the south-eastern angle of Europe. Unlike the Baltics, the Caucasus is extremely heterogeneous in terms of its ethnic composition. It is unique for the great number of nations living in the comparatively small area. However, only three of them - Armenians, Azeris and Georgians - have achieved statehood. The three nations speak totally different languages. Azerbaijani belongs to the Turkic group of the Altay linguistic family, Georgian is one of the Caucasian languages, while Armenian constitutes a separate tongue within the Indo-European family. The Azeris are Muslim, the overwhelming majority of which is Shiite, although there are few Sunnis in the North. The Armenians and Georgians are Orthodox with their religious centres in Echmiadzin and Tbilisi.

In contrast with the Balts who achieved national consolidation within the area of historical settlement, the Transcaucasians are extensively spread. Eight million Azeris live in the homeland which is also known as North Azerbaijan.[2] Up to 21m Azeris live in South Azerbaijan which is the part of Iran. 1.26m Azeris live in Eastern Anatolia (Turkey) and 1.21m of the so-called Turkamans (who basically speak Azerbaijani) share with the Kurds the Iraqi provinces of Kirkuk and Mosul. 307,600 Azeris constitute the population of the four Georgian regions (Marneilu, Dmanisi, Bolnisi, Gardabani)[3] and some 150,000 Azeris live in Derbend - the Russian region in Daghestan bordering on Azerbaijan.[4] Until the outbreak of the conflict with Armenia in 1988, about 200,000 Azeris lived in this neighbouring country. Thus, only a quarter of all Azeris lives in Azerbaijan Republic. The Armenians are spread as well. Due to historical circumstances, the Armenians moved from the historical homeland in Eastern Anatolia to the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Russia, Western Europe and America. Armenian colonies were urban with the exception of those in Transcaucasia, where after the Russo- Iranian and Russo-Turkish wars of 1826-28 and 1828-29 they settled in the rural areas of the Erivan, Nakhichevan, Karabakh Khanates in Azerbaijan and in the Georgian regions of Akhalkalak and Akhaltsikh.[5] According to the Armenian historian G.A.Bournoutian, prior to the Russian incorporation of Transcaucasia, the Armenians barely formed 20 percent of contemporary Armenia’s population.[6] “[I]t was only after the Russo-Turkish Wars of 1855-1856 and 1877-78, which brought more Armenians from the Ottoman Empire - and the eventual emigration of more Muslims, that the Armenians established a solid majority in the region. Even then, and up to the twentieth century, the city of Erevan had a Muslim majority.”[7] Today along with the great number of Armenian communities all over the world, 145,450 Armenians live in the Azerbaijani region of Nagorno-Karabakh[8] and 437,000 - in southern Georgia.[9] Contrary to their neighbours and similarly to the Balts, the Georgians are compact: 3.787m Georgians live in the homeland and only insignificant minority lives outside - 1,400 in Armenia and 14,200 in Azerbaijan.[10]

Out of the three countries, only Armenia resembles the Baltic states by its homogeneity. After the expulsion of the Azeris in 1988, Armenia became a monorespublika: with the exception of the small Russian and Yesid (non-Muslim Kurdish) minorities, the republic is overwhelmingly Armenian. In contrast, the ethnic make-up of Georgia and Azerbaijan is heterogeneous. Apart from the indigenous populations, thousands of Russians and Ukrainians live in the big cities. In Azerbaijan Talishs live in Lenkoran and Astara, Lezgins in Kusar and Khachmas, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Georgian-speaking Ingilois in Kakh, the Kurds lived in Qubatly, Zangelan and Kelbajar prior to the Armenian occupation, and tens of other ethnic groups live in the different parts of the country. In Georgia the Abkhazians, Osetins, Adzhars live in their respective autonomous regions, the Armenians and Azeris live in the south, and the Greeks, Kurds, Jews, Chechens and Daghestani peoples populate different parts of the country. Georgia and Azerbaijan have always been diverse and multi-cultural states. There are about 70 minority groups in Azerbaijan, which is rather large for such a small republic.[11]

The emergence of nationalism in Transcaucasia was closely tied to its incorporation into Russia in the early 19th century. Russian domination had had the negative effect for the development of the moderately industrialised Baltics, but this was not the case in the backward Caucasus. Russian rule had become profound in the socio-economic progress of once inferior Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Intensive development of the oil industry since the 1860s had significantly changed the look of Baku and turned it into one of the world’s oil centres. Rapid industrialisation and the increasing need for the world oil markets accelerated construction of the Baku-Batum railroad, facilitated growth of Tiflis and Batum which became the important trade and port centres in the Caucasus. Armenia, however, remained largely rural and backward. Urbanisation of the Armenians assumed a form of migration to the growing towns of Georgia and Azerbaijan. In 1803, nearly 74.3 percent of the inhabitants of Tiflis had been Armenian, though by the end of the century the influx of Georgians and Russians had decreased the percentage of Armenians to 38%.[12] At the turn of the century, Armenians constituted 17 percent of the population of Baku.[13] Armenian merchants enjoyed steady monopoly in Tiflis, and the share of Armenian capital in Baku oil industry was considerable as well. The emergence of the strong Armenian bourgeoisie outside Armenia was accompanied by the decline of the local Georgian and Azerbaijani nobility in the countryside. The Georgian nobles and Azerbaijani beks turned away from their estates to find refuge in state service, but when they came into the towns they found that they were forced to compete with an already well- entrenched Armenian bourgeoisie and rich middle class.[14] R.G.Suni argues that “[t]he urban and bourgeois character of the Tiflis Armenians contrasted sharply with the rural background and agrarian orientation of most Georgians, and the familiar attitudes about the inherent character of these two nationalities grew into racial stereotypes.”[15] In 1873, a Russian observer, S.Maksimov, compared the Georgian hatred toward the Armenian entrepreneurs with the one the Poles felt toward the Jews.[16] In Baku mutual intolerance had resulted in the so-called “Tatar-Armenian War” in 1905.[17]

Thus, the emergence of nationalism in Transcaucasia took place in the complicated socio-demographic conditions. As one can see, the historical background of Transcaucasian nationalism was different from that in the Baltics. An even course of industrialisation in the Baltics prevented massive ethnic migration to the neighbouring lands and preserved the homogeneity of the population. Due to the privileged status the Baltic provinces enjoyed within the Russian Empire, the national bourgeoisie established undisputed control of the political and economic institutions in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Hence, the peaceful coexistence between the Balts. Furthermore, nationalism in the Baltics emerged as a political movement aimed at the achievement of greater autonomy and, in perspective, full independence from Russia. These factors coupled with the common goal for the national liberation had become a solid ground for the Baltic co-operation. On the contrary, nationalism in the Caucasus was a response both to the Russian rule and the inter-ethnic clashes. The historical conditions predetermined character of the nationalist movements in the two regions for more than one hundred years.

Despite the peaceful coexistence, Baltic nationalists did not envisage development of their co-operation further into the political integration. Paradoxically, it was the Caucasus with all its inter-ethnic contradictions where the idea of the Caucasian federation became popular in the early 20th century.[18] Following the Bolsheviks’ dispersal of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918, the Georgian Mensheviks, Azerbaijani Musavats and Armenian Dashnaks proclaimed on 22 April a unification of the three nations into the Transcaucasian Federation which, however, had existed only five weeks. Internal strife and external pressures led to its dissolution on 26 May, which marked the emergence of three independent states in Transcaucasia.[19] Thus, by 1918 the Baltic and Transcaucasian national-liberation movements had resulted in the creation of the first republics there. Moreover, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR, 1918-1920) had become the first republic in the Muslim world recognised by tens of countries.[20]

The acquisition of independence was a final goal of the ethnically consolidated Balts. During the entire period of independence, the Baltic nation-states set an example of regional co-operation. The situation was different in the Caucasus. Once the Azeris, Armenians and Georgians became independent, an explosion of the old inter-ethnic clashes followed. The 1915 civil war in the Eastern Anatolia radicalised Armenian nationalism. Having lost their homeland in the Ottoman Empire, the Dashnak government in Yerevan attempted to expand the territory of newly independent Armenia at the expense of the Caucasian neighbours. This led to the Armenian-Georgian and Armenian-Azerbaijani wars in 1918-1920.[21] The Azeri-Georgian relations remained good despite the existence of the significant Azeri and Georgian minorities there. The Armenian territorial intentions and the lack of co-operation between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan facilitated the Soviet intervention and the occupation of the countries one by one. In contrast, national accord between the Balts promoted the security co-operation in the region, and after the Soviet failure in the Polish operation in 1921 the Bolsheviks withheld from intervention. Seven decades later, the fact of the Red Army’s occupation of the Transcaucasian states would give to the popular fronts a strong argument for the restoration of independence. Similarly to the Balts’ condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Georgians in 1989 would declare their entry into the USSR illegitimate and the status of the Soviet Army occupational because of Moscow’s breach of the Russo-Georgian peace treaty of 1920 and the country’s occupation in February 1921.[22]

During the Soviet rule, nationalist parties in the Caucasus were suppressed and communism was imposed by Moscow. The Bolshevik leaders proved to be completely unaware of the complex historical conditions and of the national peculiarities of the Transcaucasian peoples. Acting without the knowledge of the region, they had laid a foundation for the future outbreak of ethnic conflicts there. A prominent Georgian politologist, S.Tsintsadze, referred the reasons behind those conflicts to the 1920s when the Soviet Union was created: “From the very beginning the state was not based on the principles of equality, and therefore it had become a delayed-action mine which was to explode one day.”[23] Nonetheless, the cataclysms in Transcaucasia appeared to be completely unexpected for the majority of the 1980s generation.