Copyright © 1999
by Robert G. Morris
CHAPTER 5. Meeting New Conditions in International Relations
"...Of all studies, the study of politics is the one in which a man may make himself most useful to his fellow creatures..."
Anthony Trollope
Autobiography
The applications of science and technology to foreign affairs so far described have been rather classical, obvious or even trivial: exchange of scientists and bilateral and multilateral cooperation, with an occasional U.S. initiative, not always successful. The 1970s marked a turning point in the use of S&T in foreign affairs. With the sixth and seventh special sessions of the United NationsUnited Nations , the 29th and 30th UN General Assemblies, UNCTAD IV, UNIDO II, meetings at the OAS and the two-year ordeal of CIEC in Paris, science and technology for development as an international issue reached a peak.
At the same time environmental concerns following the Stockholm conference, the first UN population conference in Bucharest in 1974, and the World Food Conference in Rome in 1974 focused attention on ways that science and technology could influence the great problematic of the world. Law of the Sea meetings resumed in 1973; the INTELSAT consortium had been set up in 1964 to deal with international communications. A series of UN space treaties initiated in 1967 continued in 1968, 1972 and 1975. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty to control the spread of nuclear weapons was negotiated in 1968 and went into effect in 1970. The outcome of these as well as many another diplomatic meeting and negotiation depended on the science and technology underlying the issue, whether it concerned satellites, fishing or nuclear weapons.
Science and technology became an element in the effort to defuse East-West relations at Helsinki in the CSCE beginning in 1973. OECD pushed for rationalization of member states' S&T policies for their prosperity. Even NATO expanded its security mandate first to include science and technology and then, in its CCMS program, environmental protection for member countries.
Organizationally, Congress awarded science and technology full bureau status at the Department of State in 1973 and established by law the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in 1976. (See Chapter 15.)
The following chapters will treat these subjects and events.
In a book entitled The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs: Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy since World War II (Random House, New York, 1972) former ambassador Charles Yost identified the new conditions in the world to which American foreign policy must adapt:5
Science and technology figure to a greater or smaller extent in each of the above conditions. Yost clearly predicted the wave of the future on the basis of changes that took place from 1945 to the early 1970s. He wrote: "...Present-day makers of foreign affairs are confronted with problems of wholly unprecedented dimensions...many of the traditional objects of foreign policy make little or no sense under the new conditions...therefore there is likely to be, even on the part of the most skilled operators, more misconduct than wise conduct of foreign affairs. Even policy correctly designed to cope with a problem ten years ago may be wholly out of phase with what has happened in the meantime --even more with what will happen in the next ten years."6
By 1975 a former presidential
science adviser could make the following statement, unimaginable five or
ten years earlier:
Technology has become the
preferred currency of foreign affairs... Technology is the bedrock of detente
with the Soviet Union, improved relations with China and our ability to
dilute centuries-old issues in the Middle East...Tomorrow's security will
come not from mutual fear of MIRVs and ICBMs but from mutual dependence
of each on the other's technological resources, natural resources
and markets. (Edward David7)
Henry KissingerHenry Kissinger designed the International Energy Agency (IEA) at the OECD to counteract the oil crisis of 1973 by means including pooling and sharing. Nevertheless, in 1975 he addressed the IEA and predicted that in developing new, nonconventional energy sources, the Agency's program of cooperation in research and development "may make its most important and lasting contribution."8 As mentioned in Chapter 3 Kissinger particularly appreciated the role science and technology have played in U.S. economic development to the point of exploiting it.
The turning point in the role of science and technology in U.S. foreign affairs came in the 1970s. Thereafter science was no longer just a transboundary academic activity to be humored if not fostered in the name of foreign affairs. Henceforth governments could use science to promote vital national interests like military security and economic growth.
The remaining chapters here will treat some of these new conditions, new issues and new demands, starting with controls on technology exports, then nuclear nonproliferation followed by a group of global concerns including telecommunications, space and environment. The succeeding four chapters investigate the use of science and technology for economic development. They are followed by five specific case studies of science and technology in foreign affairs.
End of Chapter 5.