Before turning to our present task, an existential (daseins-analytic) interpretation of the ideas, an apparently fundamental objection needs to be addressed. The objection is not that Heidegger is not of sufficient rank as a thinker to properly be compared to Plato, but rather that, since Heidegger is celebrated for his deconstruction of Platonism, and its doctrine of the ideas, it is Plato who is of insufficient rank to be compared with Heidegger.

If distinguishing between Platonism and Plato is not alone enough to remove the foregoing objection sufficiently to permit the present task, since it is not at all clear that what Plato had in mind and what later came to be known as Platonism are the same, it is rendered altogether powerless in face of Heidegger's own admission, that he did not in any event understand himself as having gone beyond some error of Plato, but only to perhaps have thought what was unthought by Plato, and so the same.

In the section 101 ⁽¹⁾ entitled "From Early On in a Secure Light...," Heidegger tells us that the point of the deconstruction of the ideas of Platonism, insofar as it is to steer clear of Platonism, is not for the sake of a forsaking of Plato. "To the contrary, by the [deconstructive] distinguishing [of, among other things, the Platonic ideas] of the first beginning, tradition first becomes tradition, and die Künftigen first come into their heritage." ⁽²⁾

In the next line of the same section Heidegger gives a clue as to how not to translate the "Künftigen." "Such are not and never merely through the accident of having-come-later." ⁽³⁾ The positive clue Heidegger already gave in having placed emphasis on the "werden," as the "(having)-come-into," taken in its sense of the legatee's taking of possession, and with it, the right of enjoyment, of the testamentary legacy.

Plato ⁽⁴⁾ is, then, so little to be cast aside and forsaken by the deconstruction of Platonism, that rather he is to be first handed down as an already-accumulated "property,"⁽⁵⁾indeed one that therefore can first be enjoyed by his "heirs," if and as they see fit.

We take our starting point from the hermeneutic principle that things are to be found where they have their origin and, following Gadamer,⁽⁶⁾look to the Phaedo as naming the place where the ideas have their origin.⁽⁷⁾ We excerpt here a rather lengthy passage, but no longer than just enough to answer three questions, (1) what is sought through positing the ideas, (2) how do the ideas let what is sought be found, and (3) what is the inner possibility that what is sought is able to be found by positing the ideas.

"One day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, that it is the mind that manages and causes all things. I was pleased with this theory of cause, and it seemed to me to be somehow right that the mind should be the cause of all things, and I thought, 'if this is so, the mind in arranging things arranges everything and establishes each thing as it is best for it to be. So if anyone wishes to find the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a particular thing, he must find out what sort of existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity is best for it. And therefore in respect to that particular thing, and other things too, a man need examine nothing but what is best and most excellent; for then he will necessarily know also what is inferior, since the science of both is the same.' As I considered these things I was delighted to think that I had found in Anaxagoras the teacher of the cause of things quite to my mind. ... I prized my hopes very highly, and I seized the books very eagerly and read them as fast as I could, that I might know as fast as I could about the best and worst. ...

My glorious hope, my friend, was quickly snatched away from me. As I went on with my reading I saw that the man made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other absurdities. ... But it is most absurd to call things of that sort causes. If anyone were to say that I could not have done what I thought proper if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I have, he would be right, but to say that those things are causes of my doing what I do, and that I act with intelligence but not from the choice of what is best, would be an extremely careless way of talking. Whoever talks in that way is unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. And so it seems to me that most people, when they give the name of cause to the latter, are groping in the dark, as it were, and are giving it a name that does not belong to it. And so one man makes the earth stay below the heavens by putting a vortex about it, and another regards the earth as a flat trough supported on a foundation of air; but they do not look for the power (dunamiV) which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed, nor do they think it has any divine force (daimonioV isCuV), but they think they can find a new Atlas more powerful and more immortal and more all-embracing than this, and in truth they give no thought to the good, which must embrace and hold together all things. Now I would gladly be the pupil of anyone who would teach me the nature of such a cause; but since that was denied me and I was not able to discover it myselfor to learn of it from anyone else, do you wish me, Cebes, said he, to give you an account of the way in which I have conducted my second voyage (deuteroV plouV).⁽⁸⁾

I wish it with all my heart, he replied.

After this, then, said he, since I had given up investigating realities, I decided that I must be careful not to suffer the misfortune which happens to people who look at the sun and watch it during an eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyes unless they look at its image in water or something of the sort. I thought of that danger, and I was afraid my soul would be blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with any of my senses. So it seemed to me that there is the need to run away from the possibility of being blinded by taking refuge in the logos, which is to say, to think the truth of beings in the ideas.⁽⁹⁾ Now perhaps my metaphor is not quite accurate; for I do not grant in the least that he who studies realities by means of conceptions is looking at them in images any more than he who studies them in the facts of daily life. However, that is the way I began. I assume in each case some principle which I consider strongest, and whatever seems to me to agree with this, whether relating to cause or to anything else, I regard as true, and whatever disagrees with it, as untrue. But I want to tell you more clearly what I mean; for I think you do not understand now.

Not very well, certainly, said Cebes.

Well, said Socrates, This is what I mean. It is nothing new, but the same thing I have always been saying, both in our previous conversation and elsewhere. I'm going to try to explain to you the nature of that cause which I have been studying, and I will revert to those familiar subjects of ours as my point of departure and assume that there are such things as absolute beauty and good and greatness and the like. If you grant this and agree that these exist, I believe I shall explain cause to you and shall prove that the soul is immortal. ...Then consider the next step, and see whether you share my opinion. It seems to me that whatever else is beautiful apart from absolute beauty is beautiful because it partakes of that absolute beauty, and for no other reason. Do you accept this kind of causality?

Yes, I do.

Well, now, that is as far as my mind goes; I cannot understand these other ingenious theories of causation. If someone tells me that the reason why a given object is beautiful is that it has a gorgeous color or shape or any other such attribute, I disregard all these other explanations -- I find them all confusing -- and I cling simply and straightforwardly and no doubt foolishly to the explanation that the one thing that makes that object beautiful is the presence in it or association with it, in whatever way the relation comes about, of absolute beauty. I do not go so far as to insist upon the precise details -- only upon the fact that it is by beauty that beautiful things are beautiful. This, I feel, is the safest answer for me or for anyone else to give, and I believe that while I hold fast to this I cannot fall; it is safe for me or for anyone else to answer that it is by beauty that beautiful things are beautiful."

Phaedo 99c-101e. (Fowler's translation, except for the italicized language, which is my construction).

As to our first question, it is the nous that is sought in the ideas. Plato, in advance, decided in favor of an "intelligible" cause (nous), the "power which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed," and which is to be sought out and understood in advance as "divine power (daimwn)," over against those, who, starting with "physical causes," devoid of such divine power and guiding force,"are giving it a name that does not belong to it." Plato says such ones are "unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. So much, then, for what Plato intends to find by means of the ideas.

As to our second question, how positing the ideas allows the nous to be found, apparently the answer is as simple as it is profound. Simple, in that the "ideas" are causes precisely in the way that their "presence in things," Plato regards as "true," and correspondingly, their absence from things Plato regards as "untrue." Not only does the profundity of this simple view of "causation" lie in the fact that one can then let one's life be led by the ideas, inasmuch as the ideas reveal truth and untruth and no one, as the celebrated maxim would also have it, knowingly does what is untrue, but the profundity also lies in the soteriology that belongs to the ideas. ⁽¹⁰⁾

As to our third question, we posed it as the "inner possibility" of the ideas, and by this mean to ask, with what assurance or criterion of truth is it that the ideas answer to the cause Plato seeks? How is it that, precisely because of the ideas, we thereby retain that which Plato seeks, the divine cause, or nous, in its truth? What does "truth" mean here? Where, indeed, are we to look to find such truth?

Unless we are wholly mistaken, we think that Plato had already told us of the place to look, when he tells us in the passage cited that Socrates' motivations are two-fold. On the one hand, that the ideas are, at best, only "second best," and on the other, that they originate, in a very specific manner, in that realm where a certain danger lies, analogous to the danger of being-blinded that arises in the attempt to be an eye-witness of an eclipse of the sun. These, we presume, are the criteria we seek; but what are their truth-probative force?

We satisfy ourselves that "second best" means something like "does the same job, but in some way in an inferior manner," and further satisfy ourselves that "the same job" is none but the simplicity and profundity of the ideas, as discussed above in our second point. What is perplexing is the "best" presupposed, but left unsaid, by having called the ideas "second best." For surely, there can only be a second best if one were already in possession of, or at least were sufficiently possessed of, the best, to call the ideas "second best."

We believe Plato when he tells us that he did not discover the best way (98c8), but don't take him to have meant that thereby he knew nothing of it at all; on the contrary, only by knowing of it already could he know what he said of it to be the "second best" (in the sense of knowing to have failed to adequately conceive the matter) and indeed, unless we are wholly mistaken, the second best, as best, is such, because somehow, in some way, it already tells us something of the best. How, then, is this second best preserved in what Plato does tell us about, the second best?

The eclipse-analogy, if we may be permitted to call it so, is strange, and raises several questions. Does Plato there, where he introduces the ideas, and uses the eclipse-analogy to express Socrates' inner motivations, mean to announce something of the best? And if he intends precisely this, which is what we presume, as unfamiliar as that may seem,⁽¹¹⁾then viewed from that perspective, the question becomes just what is the eclipse-analogy to tell us about the best that we seek here?

As we have come to expect from Plato, we get nothing direct when it comes to such matters, ⁽¹²⁾ but only aporiai, often in the form of analogies, here the eclipse-analogy. In what way then does the eclipse-analogy speak to the question of how the best is preserved in the second best, which is to say, of how it expresses the inner possibility for the ideas as such to preserve the truth of the divine cause as nous? Since Plato tells us nothing direct about this, we must draw our clues from the eclipse-analogy itself.

The truth of the divine cause as idea is analogous to the way the calm surface of a still body of water allows the physical eyes to behold an eclipse of the sun without being blinded by its light. What is analogous on both sides of the analogy is the assurance of an "always-seeing," in the form of a guarantee of "not being-blinded." ⁽¹³⁾ Always-seeing = not being-blinded. In short, contraries!⁽¹⁴⁾ What are we to make of this, that "contraries" lie at the heart of the ideas? ⁽¹⁵⁾ We understand from the eclipse-analogy that in the "always-seeing" of the ideas lies a contrary, "not being-blinded." In the "always-seeing" of the ideas lies a "not being-blinded," in the form of a taking shelter by fleeing. The form of the contrary preserves the negative relation the ideas as always-seeing have to their origin as not being-blinded. ⁽¹⁶⁾ Plato's eclipse-analogy, however, tells us no more about this "negation" in truth that we seek.⁽¹⁷⁾ We must then try to follow Heidegger here.

In the section 110 entitled "The Idea, of Platonism and Idealism," Heidegger traces the history of the ideas from Plato through modern times in twenty-seven separate points. In the first eight "points," to which we limit ourselves here, Heidegger interprets the Platonic/Aristotelian thinking on alhQeia(asidea), as it is important in what follows to bear in mind, always already in light of the question of the meaning of Being.

In the first point, ⁽¹⁸⁾ the idea is defined as the outward appearance, the look, that by which something is what it is. It is this, not as something represented is presented for a representing subject. It rather presents itself there, in the manner of that looming-up in which sight becomes a seeing-sight, which is to say, in the manner of a presencing that comes to stand in itself, indeed as what and that it is in original unity. The foundational sense of Being is "constant presence." "Constant presence" is what is at work in the ideas, the "sighted in its sightedness." Presence is presence that always already has come to stand in presence. ⁽¹⁹⁾

In the second point, ⁽²⁰⁾ having secured the idea in advance in terms of "constant presence," it becomes possible to decide what is not constantly present, namely, the ever-changing. Thus, the idea is seen as koinon. Constant presence takes on the character of koinon only in opposition to "beings," that is, to the not constantly present. The idea "tree" is common to the many trees, and only to them. If and only if the many trees come and go is the idea "tree" what remains present and common to all.⁽²¹⁾

The third point, ⁽²²⁾ having interpreted the Being of beings (Ideas) in distinction from the ever-changing as koinon, the koinonon the flipside stands in first place over against the ever-changing. Thekoinon, ontwV on; the ever-changing, mh on.

With the fourth point, ⁽²³⁾ the unity of the ideas is interpreted. In short, a plurality of ideaican be only as genh. The genhhave their unity only in "community," "marriage," whereby they are not simply co-present and indifferent to each other but rather they "beget" all things and so are the so-called "universals," as the progenitors of all things. ⁽²⁴⁾

The first four points are drawn to the Being aspect of the logoV, so called ontology. ⁽²⁵⁾ The remaining four points are drawn by Heidegger from regard to theQeoVaspect of the logoV.⁽²⁶⁾

In the fifth point, ⁽²⁷⁾ "constant presence" (idea as ousia), is not something ultimate, but rather a relation is indicated to what it is not -- epekeina ths ousiaV.⁽²⁸⁾This negative relation (epekeina ths ousiaV) is not nothing at all, but rather indicates the daimon itself as the "middle" between the QeoV and man, as such. ⁽²⁹⁾ Here the YuCh, "life," is born of and has its essence in this negative relation.⁽³⁰⁾ That is to say, as eudaimwnia mortals experience the epekeina ths ousiaV as agaQon in and through the idea.

In the 6th point, ⁽³¹⁾ in such a life, the way of presence of what is sighted in the sightedness of constant presence (eidoV) is the way of being-seen and grasped in living apprehension -- eidoV is already nouV. Further in such a life, the way of presence of the idea itself, "unifying," (koinon), also indicates the way of presence of the idea with the others (koinwnia), which are in the ways of being spoken out in living discourse, either with oneself, or with others -- koinon and koinwnia are already dialegesQai and logoV. Further in such a life, the way of presence of what is beyond Being is in the way of an enlivened arousal (erwV) -- agaQon and kalon are already erwV.⁽³²⁾

In the 7th point, ⁽³³⁾ the soul, already grasped as comprehending in itself the salient features of constant presence (idea, koinon, koinwnia and daimwn), is understood as "life," as what properly lies in life (arch zwhVand zwh). So living, one lives well (eudaimwonia).

Finally, in the 8th point, ⁽³⁴⁾ Heidegger explicitly points out the soteriological aspect of onto-theo-logie.

Unless mere word mysticism is at work, constant presence, as the truth of Being, has already been assigned to time. ⁽³⁵⁾ If such time "has" Being, then the Being of truth is another name for the question of how something "negative" can be; that is to say, the truth of Being already involves the question of the Being of truth. For "time" surely means something like what changes and varies, and so in one way or another "is not." The question of the Being of truth thus encloses the ancient Platonic -- Parmenidean question of whether or not, and how, what is not can be. ⁽³⁶⁾

What, then, does Heidegger tell us of this "negation" that lies at the heart of truth? ⁽³⁷⁾ How does Heidegger understand this "negation" which Plato expressed analogically as a turn-away (flight) that always already lies in the turning-to (arrival) the idea?

We will follow the text closely here, for, so far as we are aware, the treatment Heidegger gives of the negative relation we seek is unprecedented, as to its pedagogical detail, in the history of philosophy.⁽³⁸⁾We thus turn to the group of sections called the "Essence of Truth,"⁽³⁹⁾ believing that here we find account of the negative-essence we seek, in its truth.

In section 210 entitled "Towards the Destinal Gift of the Essence of Truth," the Platonic ideaas alhQeia is explicitly interpreted in terms of the Platonic zugon.

The section 210 begins:

Seit Plato die alhQeia als die Helle, in der das Seiende als solches steht, die Gesichtetheit des Seienden als seine Anwesenheit (alhQeia kai on). Zugleich als die Helle, in der das noein erst sieht. Also die Helle das, was on h on und noein verknüpft, das zugon.

"Since Plato, alhQeia [has been interpreted] as the brightness, in which what is stands as such, [which is to say,] the sightedness of what is as its presence (alhQeia kai on). Simultaneously [alhQeia was interpreted] as the brightness in which noein first sees, [i.e., comes into the light as a seeing sight]. Thus the brightness is that which yokes on h on and noein, the zugon."⁽⁴⁰⁾

Heidegger characterizes later in the same section the kind of truth of the zugon as "Grund," one which grounds "nur im Gegründetsein des Gesetzten seiner Einsichtigkeit," precisely in the groundedness of what is placed there already into intellectual apprehension; and which finds therein, and only therein, i.e. in such groundedness, its homoiotic truth, "weshalb eben die omoiwsiV noch alhQeia ist, griechisch, auf diesem grund ruht, in ihm als Wesen west und deshalb auch noch so gennant werden kann und muß."⁽⁴¹⁾

The ground, necessarily open for Plato as zugon, gets lost, "allein, das reicht, wie die Geschichte zeigt, nicht zu,"⁽⁴²⁾ and Heidegger draws therefrom the impetus to seek again the same negative essence of truth, "die Unverborgenheit muss als Offenheit des Seienden im Ganzen und die Offenheit als solche des Sichverbergens (des Seins) und dieses als Da-sein ergründet und gegründet werden," "the un-hiddenness must be grounded [again] and founded, [which is to say, be understood in advance] as the openness of beings as a whole, and the openness as such [must be conceived in advance in terms] of the self-hiding (of Being), and this [intends nothing but placing mortal mankind in such a self-hiding opening, ⁽⁴³⁾] as Da-sein."

What matter, then, is named by the formula "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen"? From "Lichtung" both the "clear" and the "light" come to speech. Lichtung thus preserves something of the light-character (FwV) of the Platonic zugon. From "das Sichverbergen," a "not," something "negative," comes to speech. "Verbergung" thus preserves something of the not of "not being-blinded" of the flight to the logoi of the eclipse-analogy. And as third moment, the "für" names the relation between the Lichtung and the Sichverbergen. In formal terms, then, the formula as a whole names the very negative relation we seek, namely, how the "not" is to be thought in the not being-blinded in relation to the always-seeing in a light of the eclipse-analogy."⁽⁴⁴⁾

What, then, is called for by the formula "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen"? As general background, it is well-known that Heidegger was fond of likening the concept "Lichtung" to the metaphor of the forest-clearing. Hiking through the woods, one comes upon a clearing. There, in the bright open, and only there, is found the surrounding envelope of hidden forest, precisely as hidden. Only, as it were, in the clearing is the forest experienced as hidden. The clearing is not only the clearing of the forest but also, that wherein the forest first shows itself as hidden.

In section 214 entitled "The Being of Truth, (Openedness)," another metaphor is given that is said to be like to what is summoned up by the formula "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen."

Aber das Offene, in das, zugleich sich verbergend, je das Seiende hereinsteht, und zwar nicht nur die nächsten handlichen Dinge, ist in der Tat so etwas wie eine hohle Mitte, z. B. die des Kruges.

"But the open, in which, simultaneously concealing itself, beings in each case stand, and indeed not only the closest things at hand, is in fact something like a hollow middle, for example, that of a jug."

Heidegger tells us the "hollow middle" is not to be thought as a void, empty of matter, defined by the encircling walls, which alone have matter and substance; but rather, the way of thought is to be turned about, whereby the walls of the jug are to be thought from out of the openness. Then the open-ness is not devoid of any content, but the open-ness is that which determines the walls as encircling walls, supporting and bearing out the encircling ordering of the "walling" ⁽⁴⁵⁾of the walls.

"Hier erkennen wir jedoch, daß nicht eine beliebige Leere nur durch die Wände umschlossen und von »Dingen« unerfüllt gelassen ist, sondern umgekehrt, die hohle Mitte ist das Bestimmend-Prägende und Tragende für die Wandung der Wände und ihrer Ränder. Diese sind nur die Ausstrahlung jenes ursprünglichen Offenen, das seine Offenheit wesen lät, indem es solche Wandung (die Gefäform) um sich herum und auf sich zu fordert."

"Here we do not intend an arbitrary emptiness merely enclosed by walls and empty of 'matter,' but rather the opposite, the hollow middle is the determining-stamping and supporting for the parting of the walls and their borders. These are only the emanation of that original open, which lets its open-ness essence, inasmuch as it demands the walling (the form of the vessel) precisely about itself and in relation to itself."

That is to say, the open-ness is not defined by the encircling walls of the jug, rather the open-ness gives the walls their place, by enplacing them in that place. ⁽⁴⁶⁾

So strahlt im Umschlieenden die Wesung des Offenen wider.

"Thus [,when turned-about,] the essence of the open emanates the surrounding walls."

The open-ness of the open lets what is opened up thereby stand in the open, like the hollowness of the hollow middle lets the walls stand determined and shaped thereby -- as a jug.

What is decisive in the jug-analogy, is the turn-about from the usual view that the negative is merely the absence of the positive. On this view, the hollow middle has no "being" of its own but is precisely to be determined by the encircling walls, which alone define it as "empty."

When turned-about, the negative is to be seen to give the positive in analogy to the way the open of the hollow middle enplaces the jug in its open-ness.

If we hold fast to the way the jug-analogy works, then we can use it as a clue to interpret the formula "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen." Here, everything is already turned-about, and if, following the clue of the jug-analogy, we are to see the negative as giving the positive, this means we are to see the Lichtung ⁽⁴⁷⁾ as given by the Sichverbergen, ⁽⁴⁸⁾ which Heidegger expresses in the very next sentence of the section we are considering:

Entsprechend, nur wesentlicher und reicher, müssen wir die Wesung der Offenheit des Da verstehen. Seine umrandende Wandung ist freilich nichts dinghaftes Vorhandenes, ja überhaupt nicht ein Seiendes und selbst nicht das Seiende, sondern des Seins selbst, das Erzittern des Ereignisses im Winken des Sichverbergens.

"Correspondingly only more essentially and richer, we must understand the essence of the open-ness of the Da. Its bounding walls are certainly nothing materially at hand, indeed overall not any particular thing and itself not what is in general, but rather [it is the encircling] of Being itself, the vibrancy of Ereignis in the wink of the self-concealing."

We are on virgin conceptual territory indeed. The "Lichtung," which corresponds to the Platonic FwV as zugon, is thought out of the self-hiding, in the formula "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen." Later in the same section and in the context of a negative discussion of what philosophy hitherto was not able to retain, Heidegger explicitly tells us that the way of Being of the Lichtung, its "Wesung," is first to be experienced from out of the Sichverbergen:

Sowenig wie das Offene und die Offenheit verfolgt wurden in ihrer Wesung (den Griechen war zuvor überhaupt ein Anderes aufgegeben), ebensowenig wurde klar und der grundsätzlichen Erfahrung zugewiesen die Wesung von Verborgenheit - Verbergungs. Auch hier wurde, echt griechisch, das Verborgene zum Abwesenden, und das Geschehnis der Verbergung ging verloren und damit die Notwendigkeit, es eigens zu gründen und vollends in seinem inneren Zusammenhang mit der Wesung der Offenheit zu begriffen und schließlich und zuerst dieses Einheitliche auch als ureigenes Wesen zu gründen.

"As little as the open and its openness could be tracked in its manner of Being (for the Greeks, an other in general and in advance was posited), just as little could its manner of Being be allotted clearly in the fundamental experience of hiddenness-hiding. Even here, in a typically Greek way, the concealed was thought as absence, and the event of hiding collapsed, and with it, the necessity, genuinely to ground and to conceive it completely and fully in its inner possibility with the manner of Being of openness and, to ground this unitariness simply and at first also as the primordial essence."

What, given the clue of the jug-analogy, is the proper name of the negative relation we seek, which names the "not" of not being-blinded of the eclipse-analogy, the second best left unsaid in the second best, which, if we are right, lies implicit in the formula "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen"? Heidegger gives us the answer in the very next sentence: "Der Versuch dazu ist die Nennung und Entfaltung des Da-seins."

At this juncture, one thing is certain. The famous Heideggerian Da-sein is not anything like a conventional "subject" concept. Rather, as we have just seen, its proper birth-mark is the "new concept of Being and not-being" begotten in original reflection on the birth-place of the Platonic idea.⁽⁴⁹⁾

So here it has become clear (1) that and how Heidegger asked the same question as Plato, (2) that the famous Heideggerian "deconstruction" of the history of philosophy is aimed at a re-construction, indeed one that attempts to think the same more originally, and (3) that the result thereof, in a single word, is the Da-sein. But, at this juncture, all of this has only been pointed out. ⁽⁵⁰⁾

In the section 215 entitled "The Manner of Being of Truth," Heidegger gives a definition of Da-sein, which thinks the relation of man to Da-sein on the basis of the turned-about manner aforesaid of a "positive from a negative," of the jug-analogy. Man, then, first opens to Da-sein when placed before the self-hiding. How is this to be thought? Heidegger says:

Was heisst dieses: vor das Sichverbergen, die Ver-sagung, Zögerung gestellt in ihrem Offen ständig sein? Verhaltenheit, und daher Grund-stimmung: Erschrecken, Verhaltenheit, Scheu. Solches nur dem Menschen und wann und wie »geschenkt«.

"What does this mean: to stand before the self-hiding, the denial, hesitantly placed in its open? To come to be held by what holds back, and therefore the finding oneself back in the ground: fear, [before what holds back,] being held thereby, [and so, opening out to] holy awe. Such is only possible for man and when and how 'sent.'"

If we may be permitted the direct comparison, the "not" of "not being-blinded" is positively retained when turned-about as "held-in in being held-back" (as "Verhaltenheit"), not as absence (as if a contrary), but "held-in in being held-back" precisely as a "standing-open."⁽⁵¹⁾ Thus "held-back," mortal man is held between fear and awe, fear for the dawning call of the new sense ⁽⁵²⁾ of Being/not Being and awe at belonging to it. ⁽⁵³⁾

Such, Heidegger tells us in section 221 entitled "Truth As Manner of Being," is the Ereignis ⁽⁵⁴⁾ itself:

Die Wahrheit: die Lichtung für das Sichverbergen (d.h. das Ereignis; zögernde Versagung als die Reife, Frucht und Verschenkung). Wahrheit aber nicht einfach Lichtung, sondern eben Lichtung für das Sichverbergen.

"Truth: the clearing for the self-hiding (that is the Ereignis; hesitating denial as ripeness, fruit and gift.) Truth, but not simply lighting, rather, precisely clearing for the self-hiding."

If we are right so far, then the last step in our present inquiry, namely, to give an "existential" interpretation of the ideas, has already been taken. How so?

It is the Lichtung für das Sichverbergen, the open-standing relation thought out of the self-hiding as Da-sein, that names the essence of the negative relation Plato left unsaid in the eclipse-analogy.
 

1. All section references herein are to the Beiträge.

2. "In der Auseinandersetzung aber mit dem ersten Anfang, wird das Erbe erst Erbe und die Künftigen werden erst zu Erben."

3. "Solches ist man nicht und nie lediglich durch den Zufall, ein Späterer zu sein."

4. Who belongs to the "first beginning."

5. To be taken in analogy to its juristic sense of the legatee's right to enjoy and to use the testamentary property.

6. Gadamer, "Amicus Plato Magis Amica Veritas," tr. P. Christopher Smith, Dialogue and Dialectic, Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) 198.

7. The propaedeutic function of the ideas in the education of the guardians, as in the Republic; the apology for the ideas in face of the venerable Parmenides, as in the Sophist and Parmenides, and the obscure power of the ideas to reveal the One, as in the Seventh Letter, must all remain in the background of our present inquiry.

8. Proverb quoted in Liddell & Scott: "The next best way, from those who use oars when the wind fails." Note that both ways are complementary, not mutually exclusive, and, given a skilled captain, who knows how to use the wind and command his sailors, enable one to voyage the open sea with prospect that the shore may be reached.

9. To the same effect, compare the definition of the philosopher in the Sophist at 254a8.

10. The soteriology of the ideas lies outside the scope of the present investigation, but to make the point, two things may be noted. From the outside, it may be glimpsed from the fact that, for Plato, the ideas not only enable access to the nous (as cause) but also "prove that the soul is immortal." In this latter connection, at 107d, Plato says "but now, since the soul is seen to be immortal, it cannot escape from evil or be saved in any other way than by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul takes with it to the other world nothing but its education and nurture, and these are said to benefit or injure the departed greatly from the very beginning of his journey thither."

11. We are not aware of any commentator, ancient or modern, who has considered this possibility as such; see chapter 2, section 2.2.1 for a discussion of the works most closely related to our own research. As appears there, the "best" is usually interpreted as the teleological or final cause and the "second best" as the exemplary or formal case. Although the commentators differ as to their relation and individual natures, none has seen fit to inquire into the structure of the eclipse-analogy itself as preserving, but otherwise leaving unsaid, a "negative relation to the origin," and to interpret that ("negation") itself as the unsaid "best" in the "second best," as will appear presently (cf. n. 16).

12. Compare, for example, the famous "cave" analogy of Book VII of the Republic, 514 et seq.

13. For Plato at Phaedo 100 explicitly denies that it is the "image" quality that is of decisive importance in the eclipse-analogy.

14. The subsequent path of the dialogue then loses any mystery as to why Plato saw fit to introduce just such contraries at 102e into the discussion of the nature of participation. Nor are contraries strangers to the other dialogues; compare the same contraries of the five highest kinds of the Sophist; and compare the Parmenides, which is full, to overflowing, with such "back and forth." And indeed, in a certain sense, the "Eleatic strangers" of the latter are the living embodiments, as it were, of such things! If it is so, that the figure of the stranger from Elea is the "living truth" of the contraries, then, perhaps, given Plato's well-known Pythagoreanism, such artful "philosophizing" is the nature of the "art" that Socrates, awaiting death, alludes to at the beginning (60e) of the Phaedo, saying there that he believed to have practiced such "art" his whole life long.

15. One thing should be clear in advance, Plato here, as elsewhere in his logical investigations, never wrestled with negations (typically as contraries and heterotes) merely to pin them, and so force them to submit, but wrestled with them to learn their moves, in hopes of becoming a better contestant in the stakes of the Parmenidean game of Being and not Being as Plato saw it.

16. If we are right, it is the form of the contrary itself that is "second" in second best, but, insofar as it does capture something of the negative relation to the origin, the flight to the logoi from the fear of being-blinded, it is, to that extent, second best. And if we are right, the contrary, as negation, is precisely second best to the heteron, which, only first worked out in the Sophist, adequately founds the relation of seer and seen as "power," and with that, at Republic 505a, the Idea of the Good is said to be the "final knowledge." Cf.. in this connection chapter 5, below.

17. Though, in terms of the eclipse-analogy, it is interesting to speculate, the a-privative of a-lhQeia corresponds to the not, of not being-blinded, and the lhQh corresponds to the being-blinded. The mystery, if we may term lhlh that, is already apprehended in quite a peculiar way, if it to be experienced as analogous to the fear of being-blinded. That is to say, on the one hand, an instrument for apprehending the mystery is already presupposed to be at work analogous to the seeing-eye, and on the other, the mystery itself is already experienced in the analogy in terms of the light source, the sun. Everything is then already turned-about, the alpha-privative in no way expresses non-being as if it were nothing at all, but rather expresses the way the mystery is to be apprehended in its truth -- always-seeing-in-the-light-of-the-sun (Cf. the "Idea of the Good"). But precisely what kind of "negation" it is that is not a mere "no" and "not at all," Plato does not here say.

18. 1. Der Begriff der idea (eidoV), das Aussehen von etwas, das, als was etwas sich gibt und macht, das, wohin zurückgestellt etwas das Seiende ist, das es ist. Obzwar idea auf idein (noein) bezogen ist, so meint das Wort gerade nicht das Vorgestellte des Vorstellens, sondern umgekehrt dasAufscheinen des Aussehens selbst, was die Aussicht bietet für ein Hinsehen. Das Wort will gerade nicht, neuzeitlich gedacht, den Bezug zum »Subjekt« anzeigen, sondern die Anwesung, das Aufscheinen der Aussicht im Aussehen und zwar als das, was anwesend zugleich Bestand gibt. Hier ist der Ursprung der Unterscheidung in das (essentia, quidditas) und (existentia) in der Zeitlichkeit der idea (vgl. Der Sprung). Das Seiende ist seiend in der beständigen Anwesenheit, idea, das Gesichtete in seiner Gesichtetheit (alhQeia).

19. Compare the "always-seeing" of the eclipse-analogy.

20. Die idea das, wohin das noch Wechselnde und Viele zurückgestellt wird, das Einigende Eine und deshalb on, seiend = einigend; und in der Folge davon ist die idea mit Bezug auf ihr Vieles (ekasta) das koinon, und, merkwürdig, diese nachträgliche Folgebestimmung der idea als Seiendheit, das koinon, wird dann zur ersten und letzten Bestimmung der Seiendheit (des Seins), dieses ist das »Generellste«! Aber das ist nicht merkwürdig, sondern notwendig, weil von Anfang an das Sein als Seiendheit nur vom »Seienden«, gleichsam Seienden her, dem Vielen her und auf dieses zurück und nur so erfahren und gedacht wird.

21. In Heidegger's short-hand, Being (idea) is always already the Being of beings (koinon), as opposed to Being itself, which, according to what we have seen in the eclipse-analogy, corresponds to the "negative relation" of "not being-blinded" that lies in the always-seeing in a light (as idea).

22. Ist einmal die idea als die Seiendheit des Seienden angesetzt und ist sie als koinon begriffen, dann muß sie, wieder vom gleichsam Seienden (Einzelnen) her gedacht, an diesem das Seiendste sein, das ontwV on. Die idea genügt dem Wesen der Seiendheit zuerst und allein und darf daher beanspruchen, als das Seiendste und eigentlich Seiende zu gelten. Das Einzelne und Veränderliche wird zum mh on, d.h. das der Seiendheit nicht und nie Genügende.

23. Ist so das Sein (immer als Seiendheit, koinon), begriffen, en, das Seiendste und Eine - Einigendste, und sind der idea iselbst viele, so kann diesesViele als Seiendstes nur sein in der Weise des koinon, d.h. in der koinwnia unter sich. In dieser wird die Anwesung und Beständigkeit in der Seiendheit und d.h. Einheit gesammelt; die genh als Einheiten sich einigende und so Her-künfte bezw. »Gattungen«.

24. At once, we are spared the misunderstanding of thinking constant presence, "always- (already)-seeing" in a light, as if it were some simple "eternity" of the ideas. As koinwnia, the genh exhibit the rich and interconnected dimensionality of the Being of beings.

25. An interpretation of ancient "ontology," as such, is outside the scope of the present inquiry.

26. These twin aspects of the logoV are expressed most succinctly in Heidegger's claim that all ontology is "onto-theo-logie."

27. Die Auslegung des on als ousia und diese als idea (koinon, ghnh) begreift die Seiendheit des Seienden und damit das einai des on (das Sein, aber nicht das Seyn). In der Seiendheit (ousia) ist das einai, das Sein, geahnt als das irgendwie Andere, das sich in der ousia nicht voll erfüllt. Deshalb wird versucht, im Weiterschreiten auf demselben Wege, d.h. des Fassens der Anwesung, über die Seiendheit hinauszugehen: epekeina thV ousiaV (vgl. Die metaphysischen Grundstellungen des abendländischen Denkens (Metaphysik). Übungen Wintersemester 1937/38). Aber weil die Frage nur steht nach dem Seienden und seiner Seiendheit kann sie auf das Seyn selbst und von diesem her nie stoßen. Das kann deshalb nur als etwas bestimmt werden was die Seiendheit nunmehr als solche in ihrem Bezug zum Menschen (eudaimonia) kennzeichnet, als das agaQon, das Taugliche, alle Tauglichkeit Begründende, also als Bedingung des »Lebens«, der Yuch und somit deren Wesen selbst. Damit ist der Schritt getan zum »Wert«, zum »Sinn«, zum »Ideal«. Die Leitfrage nach dem Seienden als solchem ist bereits an ihrer Grenze und zugleich an der Stelle, wo sie zurückfällt und die Seiendheit nicht ursprünglicher mehr begreift, sondern be-wertet, derart, daß die Wertung selbst als das Höchste ausgegeben wird.

28. Inasmuch as the motive for the flight to the logoi remains in the logoi in a negative way, this is precisely what we would expect from the eclipse-analogy. The fear of being-blinded is never a mere casting-aside. Rather, it is a relation in the nous as divine cause, albeit a negative one, which is indicated in the eclipse-analogy.

29. Compare the Symposium at 203a et seq. and the sections 4-6 of chapter three, supra.

30. And, indeed, if the Phaedo is to be believed, not any old life, but un-dying life.

31. In eins damit werden nun auch die Bezüge der idea selbst zur Yuch deutlich und magebend:

a) als eidoV zum ideinund noein - nouV

b) als koinon und koinwnia zum dialegesQai und logoV

c) als agaQon - kalon zum erwV

32. These three ways of Being (presence) of life are not further specified.

33. Weil so in der YuCh das Wesen des Seienden versammelt ist, ist die YuCh selbst die arCh zwhV und zwh die Grundgestalt des Seienden. YuCh ist hier und auch bei Aristoteles nicht Subjekt, und demnach ist mit diesem Bezug des on als Wesentliches gesetzt:

a) das Seiende als solches ist immer das Gegenüber, Gegenstand,

b) das Wem-gegenüber selbst das ständig Anwesende und Vorhandene und Seiendste und der Seinsbefragung Unbedürftige.

34. Das epekeina thV ousiaV als arCh hat gemäss seiner Magabe für die eudaimonia den Charakter des qeion und qeoV, vgl. Aristoteles.

Die Frage nach dem Seienden als solchem (im Sinne der Leitfrage), die Ontologie, ist somit notwendig Theo-logie.

35. Idea as ousia as "constant presence."

36. Heidegger therefore questions the same as Parmenides, who prohibited, so it would seem, thinking what is not in the so-called "didactic poem," and as Plato, who, with explicit reference to that prohibition, introduced the dialectic of the five highest kinds in the Sophist and who, as we have just seen, even produces the ideas themselves out of the explicit projection of a negation ruling in the eclipse-analogy.

37. As we saw above, since Plato characterizes the idea as "second best," he says nothing explicit about the negative relation we seek beyond preserving it in terms of the eclipse-analogy.

38. In the section 129 entitled "The Nothing," Heidegger would seem to grant that he too found no other to have explicitly given detailed account of that negative relation as such: Sollte unser Fragen nur diese zugestandene (aber gleichwohl noch nicht begriffene) Nichtigkeit angehen, dann dürfte es nicht beanspruchen, die Metaphysik in Frage zu stellen und die Zusammengehörigkeit von Seyn und Nichts ursprünglicher zu bestimmen. "Should our questioning only touch this conventional (but nonetheless still not grasped) no-ness, then there would be no need to have claimed to have placed metaphysics in question and to have determined the negative relation of Being more originally."

39. In "c) Das Wesen der Wahrheit," which group of sections occupies central place in the fifth part of the Beiträge captioned "Die Grundung," preceded by two groups of sections captioned "a) Da-sein und Seinsentwurf," and "b) Das Da-sein," and followed by the two groups of sections called "d) Der Zeit-Raum als den Ab-grund" and "e) Die Wesung der Wahrheit als Bergung."

40. See, the Republic, Book VI, 508a1 for the zugon.

41. The very next sentence introduces the collapse: "Später aber geht die alhqeiaals solche verloren." But later than when? Later than Plato!

42. In section 211 entitled "alhqeia, the turn-about of its destinal-gift as accomplished by Plato and Aristotle, its last glimmer and full collapse."

43. "Lichtung für das Sichverbergen," for short.

44. An orientation with respect to how the matter stands is given in section 213 entitled "That with Which the Truth Question Deals," in the form of six propositions which we merely repeat here:

1. it is not about a mere change of concept,

2. it is not about a merely more original look into essence.

3. Rather it is about the spring into the Being of truth.

4. And consequently it is about a transformation of human being in the sense of a dis-lodgement of his place in beings.

5. And thus, at first, about a more original appreciation and empowerment of Being itself as Ereignis.

6. And therefore, above all, about the grounding of human being in Da-sein as the ground of man's truth necessitated by Being itself.

1. Nicht um eine bloe Abänderung des Begriffes,

2. nicht um eine ursprünglichere Einsicht in das Wesen.

3. Sondern um den Einsprung in die Wesung der Wahrheit.

4. Und demzufolge um eine Verwandlung des Menschseins im Sinne einer Ver-rückung seiner Stellung im Seienden.

5. Und deshalb zuerst um eine ursprünglichere Würdigung und Ermächtigung des Seyns selbst als Ereignis.

6. Und daher allem zuvor um die Gründung des Menschseins im Da-sein als dem vom Seyn selbst ernötigten Grunde seiner Wahrheit.

45. If we may be permitted a Heideggerian neologism.

46. It is interesting to compare in this connection the much-discussed but ever-elusive Platonic "chora."

47. As positive.

48. As negative.

49. Compare, as Heidegger says in section 218 entitled "The Indication of the Manner of Being of Truth": Zugleich aber soll diese Nennung anzeigen, dass die Auslegung der Wesung der Wahrheit in der Erinnerung steht an die alhqeia, d.h. nicht an das blosse wörtlich übersetzte Wort, in dessen Bereich dann doch wieder die herkömmliche Auffassung einfällt, sondern an die alhqeia als den Namen für das erste Aufleuchten der Wahrheit selbst und zwar notwendig in der Einheit mit der anfänglichen Nennung des Seienden als FusiV. "Immediately this naming should indicate, that the interpretation of the manner of Being of truth stands in reflection on alhqeia, that is, not as the merely literal translating word in whose realm the subsequent interpretation dovetails, but rather on as the name for the first coming to light of truth itself and indeed necessarily in unity with the beginning naming of what is as FusiV."

50. Auch diese Besinnung kann nur anziegen, da ein Notwendigkeit noch nicht begriffen und ergriffen ist. Dieses selbst, das Da-sein, wird nur erreicht durch eine Verrückung des Menschseins im Ganzen und d.h. aus der Besinnung auf die Not des Seins als solchen und seiner Wahrheit. "Such reflection can only indicate that something necessary is still not grasped and conceived. Itself, Da-sein, is only attained through a dislodgement of human being as a whole, that is, out of reflection on the need of Being as such and its truth" (sec. 214).

51. It is interesting in this connection to compare the Neoplatonic "One in Us," and chapter five of the present investigations.

52. Dass eine Lichtung sich gründe für das Sichverbergende, dies meint die Fassung: Wahrheit sei lichtende Verbergung zuerst (vgl. der Ab-grund). Das Sichverbergen des Seyns in der Lichtung des Da. Im Sichverbergen west das Seyn. Das Ereignis liegt nie offen am Tag wie ein Seiendes, Anwesendes (vgl. Der Sprung, Das Seyn). "That a clearing grounds itself for the self-hiding, this means the interpretation that truth is at first the hiddenness that comes to light (compare the abyss). The self-hiding of Being in the clearing of the there. Being's manner of being lies in self-hiding. The event never lies open in the day like a being, present at hand (compare the spring, Being)" (sec. 217).

53. Die Er-eignung in ihrer Kehre ist weder im Zuruf noch in der Zugehörigkeit allein beschlossen, in keinem von beiden und doch beides er-schwingend, und das Erzittern dieser Erschwingung in der Kehre des Ereignisses ist das verborgenste Wesen des Seyns. Diese Verbergung bedarf der tiefsten Lichtung. Das Seyn »braucht« das Da-sein. "The appropriation in the turn-about is alone enclosed neither in the call [of Being] nor in the belonging [of man thereto], [and] not in the two together[, ] and nonetheless compelling both, and the vibrancy of this compulsion in the turn of the Ereignis is the most hidden essence of Being. This hiding needs the deepest clearing [of Being]. Being 'needs' Da-sein" (sec. 217).

54. Er-eignis, as coming into what is proper to man, corresponds to "existential authenticity" in Sein und Zeit.