Charles Sanders Peirce

From The Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902 by William James

What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder. The Continental schools of philosophy have too often overlooked the fact that man’s thinking is organically connected with his conduct. It seems to me to be the chief glory of English and Scottish thinkers to have kept the organic connection in view. The guiding principle of British philosophy has in fact been that every difference must make a difference, and that the best method of discussing points of theory is to begin by ascertaining what practical difference would result from one alternative or the other being true. What is the particular truth in question known as? In what facts does it result ? What is its cash-value in terms of particular experience ? This is the characteristic English way of taking up a question. In this way, you remember, Lock takes up the question of personal identity. What you mean by it is just your chain of particular memories, says he. This is the only concretely verifiable part of its significance. All further ideas about it, such as the oneness or manyness of the spiritual substance on which it is based, are therefore void of intelligible meaning; and propositions touching such ideas may be indifferently affirmed or denied. So Berkeley with his “matter.” The cash-value of matter is our physical sensations. That is what it is known as, all that we concretely verify of its conception. That, therefore, is the whole meaning of the term “matter”—any other pretended meaning is mere wind of words. Hume does the same thing with causation. It is known as habitual antecedence, and as tendency on our part to look for something definite to come. Apart from this practical meaning it has no significance whatever, and books about it may be committed to the flames, says Hume. Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown, James Mill, John Mill, and Professor Bain, have followed more or less consistently the same method; and Shadworth Hodgson has used the principle with full explicitness. When all is said and done, it was English and Scotch writers, and not Kant, who introduced “the critical method” into philosophy, the one method fitted to make philosophy a study worthy of serious men. For what seriousness can possibly remain in debating philosophic propositions that will never make an appreciable difference to us in action? And what could it matter, if all propositions were practically indifferent, which of them we should agree to call true or which false?

An American philosopher of eminent originality, Mr. Charles Sanders Peirce, has rendered thought a service by disentangling from the particulars of its application the principle by which these men were instinctively guided, and by singling it out as fundamental and giving to it a Greek names. He calls it the principle of pragmatism, and he defends it somewhat as follows : ¹ —

Thought in movement has for its only conceivable motive the attainment of belief, or thought at rest. Only when our thought about a subject has found its rest in belief can our action on the subject firmly and safely begin. Beliefs, in short, are rules for action ; and the whole function of thinking is but one step in the production of active habits. If there were any part of a thought that made no difference in the thought’s practical consequences, then that part would be no proper element of the thought’s significance. To develop a thought’s meaning we need therefore only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce ; that conduct is for us its sole significance ; and the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, we need then only consider what sensation, immediate or remote, we are conceivably to expect from it, and what conduct we must prepare in case the object should be true. Our conception of these practical consequences is for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.

That is the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism.   (Etc.)

      In an article, How to make our Ideas Clear, in the Popular Science Monthly for January, 1878, vol. xii. p. 286.

New York : Modern Library (Random House) 1929, pp. 432-35.

Charles S. Peirce 7 June 1903 to Lady Welby

"Arisbe," Milford Pa. 1903 June 7

My dear Sir:
    I think you for your pleasant letter. I had already received your book from the London Macmillan firm and had looked it through with much interest, for I have often thought a book ought to be written on that subject.

As to my own writings on the subject, there were two in the Revue Philosophique. I think one was in volume VI and the other in vol VII. They were transalted into English and printed in the Popular Science Monthly (Edited by E. L. Youmans) at the end of 1877 or beginning of 1878.

To the doctrine there proposed I gave the name pragmatism, which is defined in Baldwin's dictionary, and which has some adherents in Oxford—Schiller, Sturt, etc. But I do not subscribe to all their extensions.

I have just been delivering a course of lectures on the subject in Harvard University, and these will be printed if I can find a publisher.

There was also a review by me of the first three chapters of Pearson's Grammar of Science in the Popular Science Motly of Jan. 1901 or thereabouts.

When I get time I shall read your book consecutively and will call attention to it in the Nation, if the editor will insert a short note for that purpose. I know the columns of that journal to be so crowded that is it difficult to get anything into it.

Yours very truly C. S. Peirce

Semiotic and Significs
The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby
Edited by Charles S. Hardwick with the assistance of James Cook
Bloomington and London : Indiana University Press 1977, pp. 3-4.