The current Bolivian crisis

June 8, 2005

1. With the inauguration of Eduardo Rodriguez as the new Constitutional President of Bolivia, the country is beginning to overcome the institutional and political crisis that determined the ousting of President Sánchez de Lozada in October 2003.
2. President Mesa´s reluctance to impose the rule of law by coercion increased the power of interest groups and populist movements up to the point where too many people felt that opening conflicts would be enough to obtain some return, be it the expropriation of foreign capitals or the replacement of the school principal in a small neighborhood.
3. The number of conflicts, as an indicator of governance (dis)ability, escalated since Gen Banzer´s inauguration, in 1997, reaching now a level similar to the Siles Zuazo´s government in the mid 1980s (more than 50 conflicts per month).
4. To understand the current situation it is crucial to learn from the Banzer period (1997-2001). Haunted by his authoritarian past, Banzer presented himself as a compassionate politician, giving concessions to protesters after promising to overcome poverty (by State action and international cooperation) during his electoral campaign. The high expectations he created combined with hidden desires for revenge from his old opponents, pushed the government against the rock. In April 2000 the Banzer administration tried to react with a State of Emergency, but it was unprepared to impose it and new political groups acquired greater strength to take advantage of the weakness of the government, more apparent than ever since the “water war” (April 2000) and the road blockades in the highlands (September 2000).
5. This emerging political groups are, paradoxically, extremely conservative. The Coordinadora del Agua (now focusing on hydrocarbons), the cocaleros and his party MAS, the ethnic Aymara movement, as well as traditional unions such as school teachers and mining workers are all moved by nostalgia for the old interventionist, patrimonialistic type of State and the fear for the social, economic and political opening carried on by the modernization reforms of the 1990s. Some may have been hurt by the structural reforms which, however, improved the situation of the majority of the population.
6. As a matter of fact, it is hard to find economic or structural causes of this process of mounting protests. A human rights report requested by the Ombudsman found relevant advances in every field between 1985 and 2003. In some areas there were more advances than in others, but progress was perceivable in all indicators: health, education, political and cultural rights, income, poverty, etc. Overall inequality expanded but mostly due to stagnation in the rural, traditional economies resisting market relationships, rather than within the more integrated, modern sectors of the economy. In spite of ideological claims, social change was underway for the good of the poorest. (Since the report questioned with hard data ideological claims shared by the current Ombudsman with the emerging political movement, it was quietly removed from circulation).
7. A very strong populist ideology, anchored in the social, historical experience in Bolivia, provided an umbrella to these expressions and captured the imagination of politicians and authorities as much as of social leaders. But even though most shared the basic populist idea that it is authentic and fair whatever comes from the grassroots or is presented in the name of the people, there were no specific political project capable to integrate the widely dispersed demands and aspirations. Rejecting modernization, labeled as “neoliberal”, was the only unifying theme of the emergent populism.
8. The international cooperation, both governmental and non governmental, played an important role in this process. Every time that a “social participation” conditionality was imposed to projects, the ability of democratic institutions to be recognized as representative of the common interest was eroded. The National Dialogues and the PRSP required by the HIPC initiative had the unintended consequence of institutional weakening. Just as much as the explicit criticisms of the marginal parties against the established system and the international NGOs transferring frustrations and idealism to Bolivia. The politics of populism was therefore well supported, often as an unexpected outcome of a naïve policy.
9. The main reason why populist, critical ideologies succeeded in Bolivia could probably be found in the rapidly growing expectations, against which those advances seemed too small. The gap between expectations and reality, and the adversarial, competing nature of democracy, where differences are exacerbated, created a political environment where radical minorities could easily fill the political arena.
10. Carlos Mesa´s lack of experience was apparent from the beginning of his government. Unable to establish a political alliance, he often alienated institutions and organizations presuming that political surveys showing citizen´s support are a measure of political strength and enough to implement policies.
11. In his search for support, he irresponsibly mobilized anti-Chile feelings to gain strength, as he was when appealed to regionalistic sentiments to confront the Santa Cruz movement. It was also irresponsible to call for referendum with ambiguous questions, written to obtain a supporting “Yes” to his government but leaving unsolved the problems of hydrocarbons policy. Moreover, most of his promises and his proposals to overcome critical situations put pressure on Congress, weakening even more an already weak institution of democracy.
12. Congress was summoned to meet in the Bolivian Capital, Sucre, to decide Mesa´s successor. According to the National Constitution, there was no election. As the President´s resignation was accepted, the President of the Senate declined as also did the President of he Representatives, which made the President of the Supreme Court the last resort to keep the system.
13. Hormando Vaca Diez, a skilled and smart politician, had suggested that he was to accept what the Constitution says, unifying all dispersed groups against his supposed ambition. Since he is realistic, he declined the Presidency as it did Mario Cosío, the next in line. The challenge reached Eduardo Rodriguez who will have to run a short and difficult transition.
14. Rodriguez received a wide support but it is less for himself that in rejection of Vaca Diez. Neighborhood organizations, peasant unions and former mining workers decided to keep their blockades and pressures and the coca leader Evo Morales called for a national insurrection to oppose the Senator and Mayors went into hunger strike with the same goal, sharing all a similar disrespect with the rule of law.
15. A serious constitutional problem remains. According to the current text, Rodriguez must call for new elections for President and Vicepresident but only for the remaining time of the period, that is, until 2007. But social demands are calling for a new, complete period of five years, as well as for the renewal of Congress. There is nothing in the Constitution regarding advanced general elections neither anything about collective resignation of members of Congress or a self imposed closure.
16. But even more challenging for Rodriguez will be how to restore order and to impose the rule of law in defense of the poorest citizens, whose jobs and daily lives are in greater risk because of the social upheaval. He received the back support of the protesters in part because they are probably betting on the chance of obtaining more from a weak government than from a stronger one, and the certainly presume Rodriguez´s will be weaker than Mesa and even more than Vaca Diez´s. That is why is crucial for the new government to send a clear message right at the beginning. If Rodriguez concedes to social pressures, he may end up devoured by social turmoil even before reaching elections. If he negotiates a truce or sends the military, order will not be restored immediately or automatically, but it will be a starting point.