Wall Street Journal 2nd December 1997
James Schlesinger, former secretary of defense, secretary of energy and chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), is mistaken in arguing that ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty -- thus ending all nuclear testing -- means that "[o]ver the decades, the erosion of confidence [in the reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons] would inevitably be substantial" and therefore "[p]eriodic testing remains desirable" ("Nukes: Test Them or Lose Them," editorial page, Nov. 19).
From 1945 to 1992, the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests (not includ- ing 24 joint U.S.-British tests). Of these, 83.5% (860) were related to developing new nuclear weapons, 9.5% (98) concerned the effects of nuclear explosions on military hardware, 3.3% (34) were conducted to minimize the risk of accidental detonation, and 2.6% (27) were exploded as part of the Plowshare program to explore civilian uses for nuclear explosives (for example, excavation and mining). The remaining 1% (11 tests) were designed to help detect and locate underground nucleair explosions and analyze the risk of detonation in transportation accidents. In fact, since 1970 only 12 out of 408 tests were conducted to identify or assess the correction of defects in deployed weapons.
Since the AEC initiated its Stockpile Evaluation Program in 1958, more than 13,800 weapons of 45 different types have been disassembled, inspected and (non-explosively) tested. Only about half of the 800 or so resulting findings have been deemed "actionable," requiring a modification to either the warhead or the production process that made it or a lowering of the warhead's presumed yield or reliability. Most of these findings occurred within the first few years of a warhead's entry into the stockpile (the newest U.S. warheads were built in 1990). As weapons age, fewer modifications have been required. Moreover, nearly all age-related problems concern non-nuclear components that can be fully assessed and corrected without re- sorting to nuclear tests. Between fiscal 1980 and 1992, non-explosive testing of weapons and weapons components at the Department of Energy's Panter plant outside Amarillo, Texas, led to 1,414 weapons being disassembled and ultimately disposed of while another 2,449 were disassembled and reassembled using original or replacement parts. The weapons in this latter category were then redeployed.
The real issue is not whether the 12,000 nuclear weapons now in the U.S. stockpile will explode, but whether they will explode at their designated yield. Significantly, only seven U.S. nuclear tests have "fizzled," either failing to detonate or exploding at a yield much lower than predicted (and nearly all of these tests -- the last of which was in 1978 -- were of experimental devices, not actual production models). With the end of the Cold War, the military need for precise yields to guarantee the destruction of superhardened targets such as missile silos is decidedly less critical. Relatively minor potential degradations in the explosive power of some of our nuclear weapons are unlikely to weaken deterrence (or, as Mr. Schlesinger suggests, spur proliferation), not least because our adversaries and allies will have no idea which weapons, if any, are less "reliable" and, if so, to what degree.
STEPHEN I. SCHWARTZ
Director, U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Cost Study Project
The Brookings Institution
Washington
My editorial-page article of Oct. 22 argued that the Air Force and the Clinton administration are spending $11 billion on antimissile laser weapons (ABL) based on Boeing 747s even though the lasers will not penetrate the atmosphere to advertised range and cannot be defended against hos- tile fighters. I said that they are using lasers in this kooky mode rather than optimally because they value compliance with the ABM treaty more than shooting down missiles.
Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. John J. Jumper (Letters to the Editor, Nov. 17) writes that the Air Force could defend ABL jumbo jets in war zones because it has successfully defended the large Airborne Warning (AWACS) and J-STARS aircraft. But the general knows that whereas AWACS and,T-STARS fly into battle for brief periods and that the military assets they control also defend them, the ABL would have to hover for weeks or months at a time. Is it the administration's position that it would give the ABL fighter screens comparable to those that AWACS enjoys on a round-the-clock basis? Let's be serious.
I had written that the interactions between high-energy lasers and the atmosphere are inherently unpredictable and unmanageable. Gen. Jumper writes that the Air Force and MIT have developed deformable mirrors to measure and counter turbulence: "Observatories now use this once classified technique to take near Hubble quality pictures from the ground." Does the general really want to stake the credibility of the U.S. Air force on the proposition that the interaction of the atmosphere with minute quantities of heterogeneous light is analogous to its interaction with several megawatts of laser flux? Is it really the administration's position that adapting a mirror to correct the deformations of light coming through an otherwise stable column of atmosphere is a problem similar to adapting them to correct for the unknowable atmospheric conditions in the constantly changing path between a moving airplane and a moving missile? By so insulting the intelligence of his readers the general impugns his own integrity.
Gen. Jumper's willingness to bet on the reader's ignorance reflects the Air Force's recent efforts to support the administration's political correctness on missile defense. Chairman Curt Weldon of the House National Security R&D subcommittee recently cut off testimony by Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, USAF, director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, declaring that he had had enough of being lied to. By worrying less about the administration and more about the country the Air Force would safeguard its credibility.
ANGELO M CODEVILLA
Professor, Boston University