International Commission for Impact Assessment

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Needs Assessment

1) The initiative has been developed between 1987 and 1990 and was shelved in 1990. What has changed since then that makes the idea more viable now?

The clearest indication that there is a need for the ICIA is the fact that in the period since 1990, developing countries and countries in transition are increasingly seeking support for their IA priorities from where ever it is available. For example, the Netherlands Commission for EIA receives increasing numbers of requests for independent expert review of EIAs, despite the fact that its possibilities to respond positively to these requests are limited. Another indication is that recently an independent EIA review body has been established for the Southern African region. The establishment of the Inspection Panel and the International Advisory Groups by the World Bank and the establishment of the Inspection Panel by the Asian Development Bank since 1990 also attest to the increasing need for independent advisory bodies of various types and at various levels. In addition, the private sector increasingly seeks independent IA reviews.

2) Will the ICIA have a world wide focus or will it concentrate on developing countries?

The original recommendation of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) focussed on developing countries. Since then it has become clear that the original concept should be modified and adapted to new developments and insights. One of these adaptations results from a comment by the European Commission that there is actually a need within the European Union for an independent body as the ICIA. This means that the proposed ICIA should have a wider scope and should not restrict itself to the developing countries but should be of service to the developed countries (and the countries with economies in transition as well). The world wide character is stated in the Note on “Exploring the potential support for the ICIA”.

3) Will the ICIA not be used to create a new non-tariff barrier for developing countries?

We feel this fear is not justified. Sufficient other mechanisms are at hand if the objective is to create non-tariff barriers. It is our experience that independent review services are specifically sought in cases of insurmountable controversy that have culminated in decision making blockages. In those cases independent expert reviews expedite decision making by identifying any instances of manipulation of information, by ascertaining that the right information is available and by distinguishing true from false arguments in the debate. Moreover, it is important to note that the competent authority stays in command all the time. The ICIA does not act if the competent authority does not agree that it acts. Also, the ICIA, in advising, in no way will involve itself in decision making.

4) Is Private Industry interested in the ICIA?

Some private companies and the International Chamber of Commerce have shown an interest in the ICIA because in certain situations private companies are in need of independent judgement about the quality of their impact assessments.

5) Will the establishment of the ICIA not pre-empt development of in-country EIA review capacity?

We assume that government of countries in which there is willingness to accept really independent review might be tempted to use the ICIA instead of using or developing their own national review capacity. However, the objective of the ICIA is to be complementary to national review capacity. Consequently, the ICIA will limit the number of reviews it will perform for individual countries (see also question 17; more precise limits can only be targeted when the ICIA has become operational). Thus, the need for in-country review capacity will not be reduced by ICIA intervention. On the contrary, as the ICIA will use working groups that always include local experts, this will strengthen development of in-country review capacity and will help to create and enhance local expertise for review. The existence of the ICIA will possibly stimulate governments that are hesitant about really independent review to develop their own review capacity as they will dislike being urged to resort to call on the ICIA.

Fields of application

6) Would it be more effective if the ICIA provides advice related to IA processes rather than carrying out ex post quality assurance of the IA documentation?

Most probably it will not. It is not only the availability or non availability of knowledge that determines the quality of the IA-process in a certain country. In most countries the quality of the IA-system (including the decision-making process) is the result of political compromise and as such it is an expression of the sovereignty of these countries. Commonly, IA-systems reflect the distribution of political power between those groups of interest that prefer a high quality IA system and those that, if possible, would prefer the absence of any IA-system altogether and the whole range of opinions in between. It is unlikely that the ICIA, in advising on the quality of the IA-process (if it would be asked to do so at all), would have any influence on this distribution of power and, hence, on the quality of the resulting IA-system. We believe that the ICIA if advising on IA-processes only could bring about marginal improvements of the IA-system at best. Conversely, we think that the ICIA, by providing independent judgement on the quality of IA-information, would confront the various groups of interest with the benefits of independent judgement. This in turn, may provoke an interest in improving the IA-system. We see, however, the possible improvement of individual IA-systems as a (be it important) side-benefit of the ICIA.
It is not the intention that the ICIA restricts itself to “ex post” quality assurance of the IA documentation. If called upon, the ICIA would prefer to be involved already early in the IA-process, i.e. in the scoping phase prior to the preparation of the IA reports and their subsequent review.

7) Will the ICIA deal with project IAs only or will it also deal with IAs for plans, programmes and policies?

In principle, the ICIA can respond to calls for involvement in reviewing impact assessments concerning projects, plans, programmes and policies with major potential environmental, social and socio-economic impacts. That depends on the stakeholders requesting advice.

8) To which standards will the ICIA refer and what, if there are no standards (e.g. social)? Will the ICIA pay attention to International Conventions?

In the first place the ICIA will look at national legislation of the country in which the initiative takes place and the relevant International Conventions that the country in question has ratified. In addition, it will look at international standards and good practices (such as World Bank policies). If no standards exist, it may suggest research or use best professional judgement. The ICIA may contribute in developing and reviewing standards.

9) What will the ICIA do about (a) “the assessment of alternatives” in IAs, and (b) about social impacts and (c) health impacts?

(a) The ICIA will refer to international standards for (E)IA which indicates that (E)IAs must consider viable alternatives. The requirement to consider alternatives is the single most important strength of (E)IA.
(b) The ICIA must pay particular attention to the domain of social impacts. Social impacts are more contentious than environmental impacts since social norms are based on cultural values, unlike environmental global public goods.
(c) Health impact assessment is part of the family of impact assessments. The domain of health impacts is part of the natural and social environment. That is why the WHO is emphasising the inclusion of the health impact component in IAs.

10) How will the ICIA react to a request for confidentiality of information?

EIA or the review of an EIA sometimes requires delivery of information that the proponent would like to keep confidential (notably information on industrial equipment or processes, and on government policy). The ICIA would guarantee the confidentiality of information that it needs to perform its review. It will do so if it judges the confidentiality justified. If it considers the requested confidentiality unjustified, it will ask the owner of the information to make it public. If the owner does not agree to publish the information, the ICIA will not use the information in its review and it will state that in its report, indicating the significance of the information for decision-making. The possible involvement of the ICIA in early stage Impact Assessments was included in the concept for the ICIA at the suggestion of certain private industries that are interested in receiving independent advice from the ICIA in the pre-feasibility phase of planning. In the pre-feasibility phase a formal decision making procedure involving a government decision about a license or plan consent has not yet started. In that case, it is understandable that the advice has a confidential character for the private developer and the ICIA will not publish its advice. It is clear however, that the advice of the ICIA on Impact Assessments for formal government decisions will be published.

11) Could the ICIA go into auditing organisations?

It is not the intention that the ICIA will audit organisations. We consider that a task that should be performed by other institutions or management consultants.

12) Could the ICIA provide mediation services?

From our consultations it turns out that there is a need for mediation services. Although these services are available e.g. at the Cambridge (USA) based Consensus Building Institute, the ICIA, once having acquired credibility, may consider going into mediation if the need for mediation persists and other institutions do not fill the gap. Going into mediation would, however, require establishment of a separate department in the ICIA with a strict separation between the mediation and independent advisory services.

13) Is there a risk that the ICIA would become an unofficial international appeal mechanism without proper jurisdiction?

Most countries with IA systems have domestic mechanisms for access to justice and there is no need for an external international body such as the ICIA to provide an extra appeal mechanism. We fully agree and confirm that the ICIA cannot be used as such. In IA-procedures, an appeal is made when a party disagrees with a government decision. The ICIA will not address requests to judge decisions (nor decision-making processes); it will only advise on the adequacy of the presented IA-information for decision making. Also, the ICIA will not respond to any request if the competent authority does not consent to the request (see question 6). In our opinion this pre-empts the use of the ICIA as appeal mechanism.

14) One ICIA member may favour the ICIA advice, where another one, having a stake in the same situation, could reject ICIA’s involvement. How can impartiality be assured?

Only members of the ICIA can call upon the advisory services of the ICIA. So, any member (regardless whether this member is a government, a private industry, an international organisation or an NGO) can initiate a request. However, in order to protect the sovereignty of countries, the ICIA can only become involved if the competent government on which territory the pertinent activity is located, consents with the request to involve the ICIA. In this way, the ICIA cannot become involved against the will of that country’s government.

15) Is there a risk of confusion with the role of the Inspection Panels of the World Bank and of the Asian Development Bank and with the Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs) that the World Bank appoints on a case-by-case basis for complex projects?

The Inspection Panels address complaints of people that feel adversely affected by projects funded by the concerned bank as a result of non-compliance of the concerned bank with its own policy. The Inspection Panels are internal appeal mechanisms of these banks. The ICIA will not address complaints. We feel that there is no risk of confusion here.
The World Bank has, so far, appointed three International Advisory Groups (IAGs). These IAGs are independent bodies that monitor (1) the compliance of project preparation with World Bank and recipient countries stated policies and objectives (e.g. Nam Theun ll) or (2) compliance of project implementation with what has been stated in the project documents, including the Impact Assessments (e.g. Chad Export project). The ICIA will not go into monitoring compliance in project implementation. In project preparation, the ICIA will, as a one time action, check compliance of the Impact Assessment’s content with stated IA policies. It will, however, not monitor compliance of project preparation processes (as the IAGs do). Also here, we feel there is no risk of confusion. The World Bank is entirely free to appoint its own IAGs when this is deemed appropriate. The ICIA has no intention to compete with the IAGs. However, due to their case-by-case nature, IAGs may lack consistence in their operation and approaches. Therefore, in certain situations the World Bank may occasionally want to call upon the ICIA for the sake of consistency in approach and ease in operation, rather than appointing stand-alone IAGs.

16) Will the ICIA also review monitoring studies?

The ICIA will not exclude the review of monitoring studies on their quality, although that is not anticipated as the top priority.

17) If the number of requests exceeds ICIA’s capacity, what would be the criteria for acceptance of requests?

We advocate a modest start for the ICIA, not focusing on quantity but on quality so that it builds up credibility. This necessarily means that the number of requests accepted annually would be limited. We think requests should be processed by order of submission on an annual basis, giving priority to a request from a member country that has not yet been able to use ICIA’s services, over a country that already has had that opportunity.

FAQs on the proposed ICIA