Commission of Inquire into the Escape of the "Jasmine 9"

 

FINAL REPORT

 

Contents

 

Topic Page

1. Sequence of Events to the escape of Jasmine 9 on 18/2/99, as found out by the Commission.

2. Findings and Recommendations of the Commission

Part 1 – Police Management and Operations 
Part 2 -General Recommendations
Part 3 - Specific Findings in relation to Patrick Tatiera

 

 

 

Commission of Inquiry On the Jasmine 9

Sequence of Events to the escape of Jasmine 9 on 18/2/99, as found out by the Commission.

On 22nd June 1998, a Korean longline fishing vessel, Jasmine owned and leased to venus Marines Ltd (a Korean company, Managing Director, Mr. Jung Woo Lee) under the Korean Captain Sam Jung Jim, arrived Betio Tarawa, to pick up I-Kiribati crew.

The vessel was boarded by a party of officials from the Departments Fisheries, Immigrations, Customs and Health. A manual routine check of foreign fishing vessels was carried out by both the Fisheries Department officials and captain MITETI ABETE of the Marine Division of the Ministry of Information Communications and Transport found from the Jasmine 9 log book that on the 9th May 1998 the Jaxmine 9 had entered Kiribati’s EEZ and that when later it heaved up its long fishing lines it was then approximately 6 nantical miles inside Kiribati’s EEZ. At some time between 9th May and 22nd June 1998 the Jasmine 9 disposed of the fish catch which it illegally obtained on the 9th May above. As a results, the Jasmine 9 was detained and the Captain, Sam Jong Kim, was arrested and remanded in custody at Betio Prison on 26th June 1998. On the following day he was transferred to Betio Motel and placed under Police surveillance. Captain S.J.Kim escape twice from Police custody at the Betio Motel, one on 5th February 1999, Captain S.J.Kim was transferred back to Betio Prison and remained there until the actual hearing of the case by the High Court.

On 2nd July 1998 charges were filed before the High Court of Kiribati against Sam Jong Kim and Venus Marines Ltd. For:-

Entry by a foreign fishing vessel within the fisheries limits without a Permit and not a purpose recognised by international law, contrary to Section 5(1)(a) of the Fisheries Ordinance (Cap.33) as amended.

Fishing by a foreign vessel within the Fisheries Limits of the Republic of Kiribati without a permit contrary to Section 5(1)(b) of the Fisheries Ordinance (Cap.33)

During the detention of Jasmine 9 the Commission of Police Tuare Ioane issued verbal instructions as to the details of the guards duties. It would seem that this instruction was not carried out and that no senior officer either then or later inspected the Jasmine 9 no see if the guard duty instructions were being implemented.

On 26th June 1998, one (1) N.C.O and four (4) regular Policemen were Drawn from Betio and Bairiki Police Stations and put on guard duties on board Jasmine 9. They were instructed that no crews allowed to enter the wheelhouse.

On 1st July 1998 the number of guards on board Jasmine 9 was being Reduced to four (4). The guards were armed with one (1) teargas pisto; with four (4) gas cylinders, four respirations, two (2) walkie-talkies and one (1) V.H.F. the tear gas pistol with the gas cylinders were kept in an unlocked cupboard inside the wheelhouse. 7.

In about October 1998, with a manpower shortage at both the Betio and Bairiki Police Stations, Special Constables were called to assist, including guard duty on Jasmine 9. Each shift consisted of one Police Constable accompanied by one Special Constable for guard duty. The guards being taken out and back by the Police boat driven by the motorman from the garage at Police Headquarters.

On 29th December 1998 all the crew went ashore because some of the Koreans, including the First Officers, the Chief Engineer and the Second Engineer, were to be flown back to Korea.

About 30th December the CP issued instructions to the Superintendent of Police Operations to instruct the ASP (O) Iaoniman to inspect the Jasmine 9 and to make a record of all the ship’s equipment and items. This was done because before with the bunkering ship, the "Crane South", a lot of equipment and other items had been taken without authority and lost Iaoniman inspected checked and noted down all the equipment.

About 31st December 1998, there being no crew left on the ship, the Guard was reduced from 4 to 2 for each shift and guards from Bairiki PS Ceased and guards from Betio PS alone continued.

About 5th January 1999, Patrick Tatireta MP phoned the CP, informing That new Korean officers were arriving to replace the old Korean officers who had flown back to Korean on 29th December and requested that they be allowed to be accommodated on the jasmine 9. The CP approved the request. At the Commission finding; only two (2) who left on the same date.

On 5th January 1999, PC Tom Redfern received a message from Police Communications Centre that four days only crew were to be allowed to return to the Jasmine 9. Later the same day he noticed a private hire boat heading out to the Jasmine 9 with more than four crew, he called to the boatman who advised that Patrick Tatireta was waiting back at the wharf with even more crew to come out. PC Tom followed out on the Patrol boat’s rubber dinghy to check out the situation. Upon Patrick Tatireta’s arrival, Patrick advised that the CP had approved the return of the crew which was then about 10-12. Patrick rang ASP (O) Iaoniman on his mobile. ASP (O) Iaoniman spoke to PC Tom Redfern on the mobile and confirmed the CP’s approval for the "crew" to return.

The crew having returned SP (O) Kamaua Tirae and ASP (O) Iaoniman Discussed increasing the guard back to four, but decided to leave the guard at two, mainly because of shortage of funds to pay overtime and also because the crew had caused no trouble up to that time.

On 16th February 1999 MR. J.W.Lee, the Managing director fo the ship’s Company, arrived in Tarwa with three other Koreans, the "TV Crew". Patrick Tatireta MP phoned the CP and requested approval for the "TV Crew" to film the Captain prisoner and the Jasmine 9. The Cp approved the request. About 4 p.m. the same day the above four Koreans and the ship’s First Officer arrived at the Betio PS and requested that the Police boat wait for them in going out to the Jasmine 9, as they wanted to go and see Patrick Tatireta. The request was approved and about six Koreans went out on the Police boat and about 9 p.m. about four of them returned ashore to the Betio Hotel.

On 17th February 1999, about 12:30 p.m. MR. Lee requested the assistance of AOCS Sgt. Teriao to find a private hire boat to take the Koreans back out to the Jasmine 9 and assured the Sergeant that he had the CP’s approval. The Sergeant directed a PC to assist him and a private boat was hired and took the Koreans out to the Jasmine 9. On arrival two of the Koreans dived overboard to check the ship. Later four of the Koreans returned on shore to the Betio Hotel.

On 18th February 1999 about 9 a.m. a private hired boat again brought the four Koreans back to the Jasmine 9.

About 4 p.m. on 18/2/99 PC Kauriri and SC Kaubati arrived on board to Relieve the guards. About 8 p.m. the guards were in the saloon having coffee after dinner in the mess, when the Jasmine 9 weighed anchor and escaped. SC kaubati dived overboard, PC Kauriri was overpowered and taken to Korea.

 The escape was reported to Assistant CP Marewe on the 18th February 1999 at about 2 a.m. The Patrol boat was refueled about midday, set off in search of the Jasmine 9, but after three days of unsuccessful search, returned to Betio. The Jasmine 9 escaped leaving behind Captain Sam Jong Kim of Korea who is serving a sentence of 2 years imprisonment. Mr. Tandel Mangal Bhai and Mr.Lobo Francis, both of India who are also the crew, are living with their I-Kiribati friends on Betio until now. All their belongings are on Jasmine 9 including their Seamen’s Passports.

On 19th february 1999 the High Court hearing against the Captain commenced Mr. J.W.Lee did not appear for he had escaped on the Jasmine 9. 20.The Commission noted during the enquries that steps were not taken to Immobilise the Jasmine 9 nor soundings ever been made to ascertain how much fuel was on her.

The Commission interviewed several people in order to ascertain Whether Jasmine 9 had been refueled while anchoring in port Betio. The records of the KOIL showed no fuel was supplied to her. The supply Of fuel from the fuel outlets on South Tarawa were done through bowsers which did not indicate as to whom the fuel was being supplied. The Police on duty on board the Jasmine 9 confirmed that no fuel was being supplied.

It was also noted that the Patrol boat had not been able to sail out in Pursuit because it had no fuel. The Marine Division of the Ministry of Information, Communication and Transport which had chartered the boat prior to the Jasmine 9’s escape had not refueled the Patrol boat due to insufficient funds available.    

Findings and Recommendations of the Commission

 Part 1 – Police Management and Operations

Finding 1

That on 29th December 1998, all the crew were put ashore from the Jasmine 9 as the Korean officer crew were being flown back to Korea and also because the generator on – the Jasmine 9 had broken down, causing the ship to be blacked out and the refrigeration- and other electric facilities to be shut down. At that time an instruction has been issued that the guad to check the crew’s baggage as they were leaving the ship. That when this was done, some ships equipment such as flash lights, diving flippers etc. were found. That Patrick Tatireta MP later requested the OCS, Betio PS, to release the equipment kept at Betio PS, to release the equipment to him or to return it to the ship. The request was refused and the equopment kept at the Betio PS.

Finding 2

That on 30th December 1998, the CP instructed ASP (O) Iaoniman to board the Jasmine 9 and do ab inspection to record all the items and equipment on board.  

Finding 3

That on 31st December 1998 after all the crew were put ashore, that ASP (O) reduced the guards from four to two and obtained the SP (O)’s approval for the reduction. That from that time guards were only drawn from Betio PS and guards from Bairiki PS were discontinued.

Finding 4

That for the CP to give verbal instructions as to the details of the guards’ duties and responsibilities to both the first batch of guards and to Assistant Superintendent of Police (Operations) (ASP(O)) Iaoniman, and then to rely on the ASP (O) to pass on those verbal instructions to the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) of Betio Police Station, Inspector Beitika, then to the Assistant OCS (AOCS) Stg. Teriao, then to the Assistant Station Officers (ASOs) and finally to the Police Constables (PCs), was an unsatisfactory means of communication which failed to ensure that the instructions were strictly complied with over an extended period of time.

Recommendation

Finding 5

That about June-July 1998, the Commissioner of Police (CP) instructed the Superintendent of Police (Operations) Kamaua Tirae to check that the guard duty instructions were being complied with, but the SP (O) did not check and did not report back to the CP. About January 1999 the CP again instructed the SP (O) to inspect the Jasmine 9 and to check that the instructions were being complied with. The SP (O) again failed to check.. As before this verbal communications of important instructions was unsatisfactory.

Recommendation  

That SP (O)’s failure to obey the CP’s lawful order be dealt with under Either Section 39 Police Ordinance cap 73 or under Regulation 37 o fthe Services Regulations or by such means as are deemed fit.  

That in future any instruction from the CP to the SP (O) in relation to the SP (O) inspecting the fishing vessel and checking on whether or not the instructions to the guards are being complied with, be put in writing to the CP the date of the ship’s inspection, and the result of the inspection.  

Finding 6

That after the guard duty instructions had been given, no senior officer went on board the Jasmine 9 to check compliance with the instructions or to check the diary on board the Jasmine 9.

Finding 7

That when the Special Constables (SCs) were recruited in about October 1998, to participate in guard duty, no instructions were given to them as to their guard duties and they were left to learn the details of their duties from the PC with whom they went on duty. This was unsatisfactory instruction of the SCs.

 Recommendation

That in the event of the SCs being recruited to assist in guard duty that the same instruction and precaution as set out in Recommendation on Finding 4 above apply. Finding 8 That by late December 1998 to January 1999, the PCs themselves who were commencing guard duty for the first time, were given no instructions of their duties and responsibilities and were left to find out what those duties were from the PC guards that they happened to be relieving and for them in turn to pass that on to the SC who happened to accompany them. This instruction of duties was unsatisfactory instruction of both the PC guards and the SC guards.        

Finding 9

That as the months went by, there was no repeat of the details and importance of the original instructions, beyond the AOCS, Sgt. Teriao occasionally reminding the PC’s at one of their weekly meetings to "keep in mind" the earlier instructions which they had been given some months before back in June 1998. This was an inadequate reminder of the guards’ duties and responsibilities.  

Finding 10

That an additional important contributing factor to the guards’ failure to efficiently perform their duties, was the acute manpower shortage, necessitating the excessive use of overtime. During the week of the escape there were 27 call backs to duty at the Betio PS, a situation which had continued for some months. The situation was further aggravated by the non payment of overtime, due to the overtime vote having been expended. The guards complained to no effect. It was inevitable that the guards would become overtired, careless and at times failed to comply with important instructions such as some guard always being in the wheel house and not allowing the ships officers and crew to enter the wheel house.

Recommendations

That where there are several references in the diaries or in the evidence of A break of any of the above instructions, it is recommended that the responsible officer be charged with neglect of duties. That on officer of the rank of sergeant or corporal be placed in charge of Each shift on board the vessel and that adequate funding be provided for the appointment of new police recruits and that the ordinary complement of PCs at the Police Station, be not used for guard duty, so as to avoid the use of excessive overtime, resulting in a decline in the efficiency of the guards in the performance of their duties.  

Finding 11

Another contributing factor was that the guards with a natural friendly Kiribati disposition, became friendly and sociable with crew and the Korean officers, with the result that the Jasmine 9 diary contains several references to the clear breaches of original instructions in the Korean officers being not permitted to enter and remain in the wheel house and the practice developing among some of the guards of leaving the wheel house unattended, while they went down to the mess for meals, to doing some fishing or watching the video. None of these breaches were detected due to a failure of any inspection by any senior officer.

Recommendation

The same as recommendation 10 (1) above.

That the guards be warned of the risk of becoming friendly with the ship’s crew especially the ship’s officers and that they be on their guard at all times.

Finding 12

That on the evening of the escape, the above friendliness between the guards and the crew, was taken advantage of by the deceptive hospitality of Mr. Lee, in inviting the guards to a special dinner, followed by an invitation to coffee and video in the saloon. The trap was then sprung an the guards taken by surprise.  

Recommendation

The same as Recommendation 10 (1) above.

Finding 13

That sometime before 5th January 1999, Patrick Tatireta MP phoned the CP and advised him that a new Korean officer crew would be arriving in replacement of the four old Korean officers who had flown back to Korea and then on behalf of the owners of the Jasmine 9 and as the ship’s agent, Patrick request that the new officers be allowed to be accommodated on board, because he claimed the ship’s company could not afford the expense of accommodating them on land. The CP approved the request, unaware that Patrick Tatireta also intended to attempt to return the old Non Korean deck and engine crew, about eight in number, who were still in Tarawa. Patrick had not mentioned them to the CP.

Recommendation 

That in the event of a foreign fishing vessel being detained in the future, that all the crew be required to go ashore – any engineering maintenan- ce to be carried out from day to day by an engineer coming out to the ship each day with the Police guard. That the cost of maintaining the crew on the shore to be the responsibility of the shipping company that owns the ship and that in the event that the ship’s company abandons its crew, then the consul for any particular nationality be contacted, for them to assume responsibility for their nationals or alternatively for the consu- lar to liaise with the ship’s agent for the return of the nationals to their countries.

That important approvals such as this involving the return of all the crew Or the ship’s officers in board, be put in writing, defining the limits of the Approval and the notification to be initialed by each officer form the SP (O) down to the AOCS at Betio PS and then returned to the CP.

Finding 14

That the CP probably did but possibly did not inform SP (O) Kamaua that he had approved Patrick Tatireta’s request for the new Korean officersto return on board but abviously the CP or the SP(O) did not pass it on to ASP(O) Iaoniman because he only found out when Patrick phoned him on his mobile.

Finding 15

That on 5th January 1999, probably the CP had caused the information about the four new Korean crew to somehow be passed on to the HQ Communication Centre who in turn had it passed it on to OCS RKS Teanoai, Tom Redfern who happened to be standing on the deck of the Patrol boat when he noticed a private hire boat with more than four old crew heading out to the Jasmine 9 so he followed out in the rubber dinghy to check out the situation.

Finding 16

It later emerged that shortly before Patrick Tatireta MP arrived on board the Jasmine 9 with both the four new Korean officer crew and the old deck and engine crew, Patrick had already phoned ASP(O) Iaoniman probably down at the wharf and asked him for his approval of the "crew" to return on board, Advising that the CP approval for the four new Korean officer crew to return and not mentioning that the crew that he was seeking approval for, consisted of the old deck and engine crew plus the new Korean officers comprising altogether about 12 in number.

Finding 17

That Patrick Tatireta MP having obtained ASP(O) Iaoniman’a approval, hired a private boat for the return of the old crew and the new officer crew. ASP(O) Iaoniman phonedthe CP, the CP confirmed his approval for the "crew" to return, meaning the four new Korean officers as agreed with Patrick. When Iaoniman spoke with the Police guards on the Jasmine 9, using Patrick Tatireta’s mobile phone, he advise the guards that the CP had approved the return of the "crew". Patrick had relied on a frandulent misrepresentation by using the CP’s approval to obtain Iaoniman approval for the return of the whole crew.

Finding 18

That after the return of the crew on board, the SP(O) and the ASP(O) decided not to increase the guard back to four, mainly because of the acute manpower shortage and insufficient available funds to pay for the overtime. This decision meant that two guards were insufficient to resist a combined attempt by about twelve crew, to seize control of the boat and escape and it placed the personal safety and security of the two guards on each of the shifts at risk, as demonstrated by the final shift on 18/2/99.  

Recommendation

That care be taken to always ensure that sufficient funds are available to ensure that the number of guards on duty is sufficient to resist any sudden surprise boarding of the ship.

Finding 19

That on 16th February 1999 Patrick Tatireta MP phoned the CP on Behalf of the ship’s company advising that a Korean "TV crew" had arrived in Tarawa and requesting the CP’s approval for the " TV Crew" To interview and film the Captain who was a prisoner and also to go on board the Jasmine 9 to film the ship.

That the CP approved Patrick’s request believing that once the "TV Crew" had filmed the Jasmine 9 that they would return to the shore.  

Finding 20

That the CP verbally informed the SP’s including the SP(O) of his approval of the TV intended filming activities, at the regular daily meeting next morning but the SP(O) Kamaua did not pass this on to the ASP(O) and onto the OCS and onto the AOCS and so the PCs at the Betio PS were not informed of the CP’s approval for the TV crew to board the Jasmine 9 or that the CP’s approval was limited to taking film of the Jasmine 9 and then departing on shore. As before this verbal communication of an important decision was unsatisfactory. The result was that when the TV crew did come on board and went back and forth from the ship to shore, over the next three days and dived over board to inspect the bull, the PCs assumed that these movements and other activities had been approved and did not report to Betio PS.

Recommendation

That as before such important approvals involving a modification if origi- Nal instructions should be put in writing by the CP and the note passed on down from the SP(O) to the AOCS, each officer initially his receipt of the notice and then returning it to the CP.  

Finding 21

That about 4p.m. on 16th January 1999, the Korean First Officer, Mr. Lee and two other Koreans came by car to Betio PS, got out, went to the doorway of the Police Station and spoke to PC Romatoa saying that they wanted to go out to the Jasmine 9 but could the Police boat wait for them as they wanted to see Patrick Tatireta. That the Koreans mentioned to PC Romatoa in order to participate in the party then requested PC Akamatang for him Romatoa to be placed on guard duty, that PC Romatoa did not obtain the approval of the AOCS Stg. Teriao for the Koreans to board the Jasmine 9 , but " came with them" down to the Betio wharf where they all boarded the Police boat for Jasmine , that when first interviewed by the Legal Advisor, PC Romatoa stated that the AOCS had approved the Koreans’ requested for the Police boat to wait for them. This was incorrect. Stg. Teriao had not seen or spoken to the Koreans at Betio PS. On board the Jasmine 9 that night PC Romatoa joined kthe welcome back party put on by the Koreans and would seem to have given little or no attention to his guard duties.  

Recommendation

That such action be taken against PC Romatoa for neglect of duty.

That the PCs be put on their guard about accepting hospitality from the Foreign fishing company’s representatives or the foreign ship’s officers.  

Finding 22

That about 9.30 p.m on the night of 16th February 1999, SP(A) Tekaie approved the Koreans’ request via the boat man, PC 166 Raobati Kanenei, to return them ashore from the Jasmine 9 but that the SP(A) did not report this, but instructed the PC to advise the Koreans that the Police would be offering no further assistance movements in and out to the Jasmine 9.

Finding 23

That next morning, 17/2/99, when PC Romatoa was being relieved by PC Kaitangare, Romatoa mentioned that Mr. Lee and the Koreans had come aboard the previous day, this only confirmed with the relief guard that this had been with the CP’s approval and as a result, they tool no objection to the return of Mr. Lee and the Koreans in a private hire boat about 10 a.m. that morning or to the diving overboard and checking the ship by the Koreans or the arrival of further Koreans in a private boat aobut 2 p.m.

Finding 24

That about midday on 17/2/99, the AOCS, Stg Teriao, was approached outside Betio PS by one of the Koreans, with a request for assistance to find a private hire boat to go out to the Jasmine 9, that upon the AOCS’ inquiring if the CP had approved the boating of the Jasmine 9, he was assured that the CP had authorised and that he thereupon instructed PC 278 Nawaia, to assist the Korean and to see if a boat could be hired from Police HQ, that PC Nawaia made some inquiries and that apparently the Koreans did mange to hie a private boat as it arrived out at the Jasmine 9 with Koreans about 2 p.m. That Stg. Teriao did not check with the CP, the Koreans’ claim to authorisation, becauses later that afternoon he saw the Korean man with other Koreans and a video camera taking video film of the Captain prisoner at Police HQ and assumed the CP that the CP would have confirmed authorisation of both the filming outside the Police HQ and for the film crew to board the Jasmine 9 and film.

Finding 25

That when the TV team was observed filming the captain prisoner, other police officers in the vicinity would have assumed the approval of the CP and the same officers, on hearing of any reports from the various guards on duty or from any other sources would have also tended to assume that the TV crew’s activities on board the Jasmine 9 were also approved by the CP.

Finding 26

That about 1730 hours on 17/2/99 PC 258 Meita noted that Mr.Lee and three Koreans returned ashore from the Jasmine 9 in a private hire boat at about 9 a.m. on 18th February 1999.  

Finding 27

That an inspection of the Betio PS Diary Report written up by the ASO shows that in a number of instances, matters requiring attention such as request for more manpower, repair of the portable raio etc. were not attended to and that the portable radio remained unrepaired from 13/1/99 to the time of the escape.  

Recommendation

That matters requiring attention as noted in the Betio PS Diary Report Book, such as break down of the generator, repair of the Police portable radio etc. should be put in the form of a brief handwritten memo for the attention of the AOCS, to be passed by him onto his OCS and to his superiors if it is so required.

Finding 28

That the tear gas pistol and two gas cylinders were kept in an unlocked cupboard inside the wheel house. That this was an unsatisfactory means of arming guards to enable them to resist any surprise attack by the crew.

Recommendation

That both guards should be armed with the tear gas pistols and should hand over to the relief guard at the end of their shift.

Finding 29

That on 18/2/99, PC Meita was on duty with SC Bauro on ‘A’ shift, be sates that nothing unusual happened during the shift, but at 4 p.m. be failed to do any handover to PC Kauriri believing that SC Bauro had done the handover. This was not satisfactory. He also admitted he had spent about an hour watching the video while his SC was on duty in the wheel house.        

Recommendation

That such measures be taken against PC Meita for neglect of his duty in relation to the handover including his failure to record the handover in the Jasmine 9 diary.

Finding 30

That the Jasmine 9 escaped about 8 p.m. on 18/2/99, that the escape was not discovered until the relief shift came on duty about 12 midnight. That the Assistant Commissioner of the Police (ACP) was advised of the escape about 2 a.m. but that the Patrol boat had not been able to sail out in pursuit because the boat had not been refueled buy the Marine Division because they had insufficient available funds to pay for the $16,000 worth of fuel because the allocated funds had been used. That the Oil Company eventually agreed to refuel the Patrol boat and that it set off in search of the Jasmine 9 about midday on 19/2/99.

Recommendation

The approval to any department seeking to charter the patrol boat, should not be granted unless they have sufficient available funds to pay for refueling.

Finding 31

That when Mr. Lee and the other three Koreans arrived on 16/2/99, Mr. Lee’ Visa was about to expire and the other three Koreans had no entry visa. The Immigration Officer not seize their passport and allowed them to enter Kiribati.

It had become the practice that when foreign visitors from over- Seas without an entry visa, they were allowed entry oon the understanding that later the same day, they would attend the Immigration Office and pay the $40 entrance fee. The Koreans undertook to do this but failed to do so.

The Koreans claimed they were going to have a meeting with the Government about the Jasmine 9.  

Recommendation

That the above Immigration procedure was unsatisfactory. It is recommended that the present procedure of allowing visitors to enter without an entry visa upon their paying of the $40 unless they come within an exemption or unless undertaking to pay later, be continued, but that their passports be held by immigration until payment is made if so required.  

Recommendation

That although Kaubati was together with PC Kauriri neglectful of his duty in leaving the wheel house unguarded and ion going down to the mess for dinner, allowance should be made of the pesuasive effect of Mr. Lee in inviting them down to dinner. However that Kaubati’s courage and bravery in rushing up to the bridge and in attacking the First Officer on the wheel house and in resisting the attempt by the two other Koreans to overpoer him and finally in diving over board and making a long swim until he reached the wreck of MAT 1 and in thereby putting his life at serious risk of drowning be noted.

Finding 32

That Special Branch’s surveillance of the Jasmine 9 would seem to have been unsatisfactory in light of the importance of securing and guarding the Jasmine 9 that the circumstances required. This comment is made in view of Special Branch’s inability to otherwise inform the Commissioner.

Part2 – General Recommendations

That the file containing all the affidavit evidence, the documentary exhibits and the record of witness evidence given at the Inquiry, be forwarded to the Director of Public Prosecutions for him to determine whether any further investigations should be carried out and whether any charges should be laid against any persons.

That the evidence of PC Kauriri Arawatau be forwarded to the Public Prosecutor in South Korea where charges are at present pending against Mr. J. W. Lee and his accomplices, with a view to ensuring that:-

PC Kauriri’s allegations of bribery by Mr. J. W. Lee are investi- Gated and

That the Korean Prosecuting authorities are informed and made Aware of the alleged pressure and manipulation of PC Kauriri by Mr. J. W. Lee, resulting in a false petition to the Korean Prosecutor’s Office being signed by and presented by PC Kauriri and false representations being made by PC Kauriri for Mr. Lee not to be severely punished and likewise false representations that were made by Kauriri that any claims for compensation that PC Kauriri would have had against Mr. Lee and his accomplices for being kidnapped unlawfully assaulted and deprived of liberty, be waived or minimised.

That the Director of the Forum Fisheries agency and the various mem- Ber countries of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, be advised of the circumstances of the seizure and escape from lawful custory of the Jasmine 9 long line fishing vessel owned by the Korean Company. Venus Marine Limited registered in Honduras and the kidnapping of the two police guards on duty at the time. That the government of the Republic of Kiribati request that consideration be given by the various member countries to declining any future application for fishing licence:-

by Venus Marine Ltd or by any new owners of the Jasmine 9 whose name it is understood has been changed to ASMINE 6, or

by owner of the two other long line fishing vessels owned by Venus Marine Ltd namely JOH 9 and AMBER also registered in Honduras or

by any other vessels owned by Venus Marine Ltd, or

by any fishing vessel owned by a Korean company in which the Managing Director of Venus Marine Ltd Mr. Lee Jung Woo, is a Director.

The event of a foreign fishing vessel bunkering ship or any other type of ship being detained by the Kiribati Government. It is recommended that the following precautions and procedures and procedures be adopted:-

That the ship be immobilised by removing key parts of the ship’s engine for safe storage ashore.

That the ship’s Communications and navigation systems be made inoperable.

That fuel be discharged from the ship leaving only enough fuel to operate the generators.

That all the crew be sent ashore and certain precaution taken as set out in Recommendation 17 above.

That steps be taken to ensure that the Patrol boat the RKS Teanoai is refueled at all times that it is ready to set off in pursuit of any vessel illegally entering or fishing in Kiribati’s Exclusive Economic Zone or any vessels attempted to escape from lawful detention.

That the part of the Fisheries Section of the Ministry of Natural Re- Sources Development which is involved in the tracking of foreign fishing vessels and which is at present based in Bairiki, be transferred to an office within the National Co-ordination Centre at Police HQ in Betio, so that the Director of Marine can more effectively co-ordinare the tracking operations of the Police Marine Unit and the Fisheries Office.

Part 3 – Specific Findings in relation to Patrick Tatireta

That Patrick Tatireta MP betrayed the oath he tool on becoming a Member of the Maneaba ni Maungatabu to be "faithful and bear true allegiance to the Independent and Sovereign Republic of Kiribati" in the following conduct and representations on behalf of Mr. Lee when he went to Korea after the Jasmine 9 had escaped and had returned to the port of Pusan:-

In saying to Mr Lee when he first met him in the restaurant at Pusan after arriving in Korea about 11th March 1999, " I congratulate you for the good work in taking the Jasmine 9 back to Korea.

In about 12th March 1999 at the Maritime Police Unit, in allow- Ing himself to be introduced by Mr. Lee to the two Police Officer Present, as a Member of Parliament from Kiribati and then saying to the two senior officers words to this effect, "Now you are making an investigation for Mr. Lee taking back his ship, while the Kiribati government did not make any investigation for the (Kiribati) Police" and at that stage pointing to PC Kauriri, as if he were in some way to blame or was involved in what Patrick went on to say, namely "shot the head of one of the Korean crew on the Korean fishing boat" and that thereby he was in some way representing the views of some of his fellow Members of Parliament. These words were both intended and likely to influence the senior Korean police officers to both treat the punishments which Mr. Lee was charged less seriously and to minimise the punishments which Mr. Lee came up for sentence before the Korean courts. Both of these objections and probable results were contrary to the best interests of the Kiribati Government and betrayed Patrick Tatireta’s oath to be "faithful and bear true allegiance to the Independent and Sovereign Republic of Kirirbati".

On the same day a short time later Patrick Tatireta MP agreed to Mr. Lee’s request for Patrick to make further representation on Mr. Lee’s behalf to the Public Preseccutor and that afternoon at the Public Prosecutor’s office Patrick Tatireta MP, after again being introduced by Mr. Lee to the Public Prosecutor as a " Member of Parliament from Kiribati", said words to this effect. "Tell the Prosecutor that if I had been Mr. Lee I would have done the same thing as Mr. Lee and taken the ship back to Korea with the policeman on board, for two reasons, firstly, because I would not want my company to be bankrupt by the ship being forfeited and seized by the Kiribati Government. Secondly, Mr. Lee did what he did because he didn’t want his children and grandchildren to suffer, if his company was made bankrupt. He also said to the Prosecutor, "Do you know what my government did for the Dongwon company’s fishing vessel and another Korean fishing vessel, when they entered Kiribati waters and were fishing jinside it without a license? My government seized the two ships, but because these ships were very old, the government released them. Now when the Jasmine 9 entered Kiribati waters, because it was a new ship, my government was going to have it forfeited and seized". He also said to the prosecutor, " Do you know what the police (pointing at PC Kauriri) did in Kiribati- the Police shot the head of one of the crew of a Korean fishing boat and the Kiribati Government did not take any action and now your Korean Government is going to punish Mr. Lee for doing the right thing in taking his ship back to Korea". The Public prosecutor made notes of Mr. Patrick Tatireta’s representations. Again these words would be likely to be constructed in the same way and were intended and likely to have the same influence on the Korean prosecuting authorities and were intended and likely to have the same influence on the Korean prosecuting authorities and were contrary to the interests of the Kiribati Government and betrayed Patrick Tatireta’s oath to bear ture allegiance to Kiribati as mentioned in 2 above and in fact would carry more weight, as they were being made to the Public Prosecutor authorities.  

On Saturday 13th March 1999 in Seoul, Patrick Tatireta MP again Agreed with Mr. Lee to make further representations on his behalf to a senior officer at the Korean Department of Foreign Affairs and later at that Department on that day, after Mr. Lee again introduced Mr. Patrick Tatireta as a Member of Parliament, Patrick said words to this effect: " Mr. Lee did the right thing and that if I had been Mr. Lee I would have done the same thing as Mr. Lee and taken the ship back to Korea with the Policeman on board", and he again repeated what he had already said to the Public Prosecutor back in Pusan, about the old Korean boats being released and about the Kiribati Government intending to forfeit and seize the Jasmine 9 and about the Korean crew member being shot by the Kiribati to take about 10 crew to employ them and so my government should appreciate this, but instead they were going to forfeit the ship". While Mr. Patrick was talking the Foreign Affairs official was taking notes. The Foreign Affairs Officer made notes of Mr. Patrick Tatireta representations. Again these representations were intended and would have been likely tp have the same effect as mentioned in both 2 and 3 above and Patrick Tatireta again betrayed his oath "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to the Independent Republic of Kiribati".  

On Wednesday 17th March 1999, after Mr. Lee, Patrick Tatireta And PC Kauriri Arawatau had returned from Seoul to Pusan, when PC Kauriri confirmed Patrick and said to him, " The reason you have come back to Pusan is to try and get Mr. Lee from the Korean prosecution charges". Mr. Patrick Tatireta admitted and said to Kauriri: "How can you blame me for that?"

That on 18th March 1999 at Pusan Patrick Tatireta so-operated With Mr. Lee in concocting a false petition for PC Kauriri to present to the Public Prosecutor in Pusan and in getting PC Kauriri to copy the false petition out in his- own handwriting and sign it. This false petition made representations seeking to both lessen Mr. Lee ‘s punishment by the Korean courts and to waive any claims for compensation buy either the Kiribati Government or PC Kauriri for his being kidnapped and assaulted.

That Patrick Tatireta MP’s evidence before the Commission of Inquiry showed him to be a very unreliable witness, he evaded questions, gave inconsistent answers to questions, made claims of conversations with Police which were in conflict with Police’ testimony and which at times were corroborated by other Police present at the time, in circumstances where there was no reason to suspect that the Police had conspired together to give false testimony against Patrick, that he changed dates of events or gave dates which were in conflict with objectives records from the Immigration Department or objective records made in the Jasmine 9 diary by the Police guards on duty at the time. These conflicts of evidence were so numerous that little or any weight could be placed upon most of the evidence that Patrick gave. In relation to the representations which Patrick made to the Public Prosecutor and Foreign Affairs officals in Korea, Patrick in part denied and in part admitted that he said certain things, and in relation to his denials he was unable to give any reason why PC Kauriri would say these things about him if they were untrue, until about the 10th denial when he then came up with the weak excuse that Kauriri said this because Patrick had made fun of him. The other false excuse which Patrick raised in his attempt to deny the truth of PC had said to the Korean Public Prosecutor because he did not understand English properly. This is incorrect as PC Kauriri us a senior PC with a good command and understanding of English and all of the detailed account in the eleven pages of his affidavit are PC kauriri’s words and the Advisor had no difficulty in recording what he said without the aid of an interpreter.    

Recommendation

That the Maneaba ni Maungatabu take such action against Patrick Tatireta MP as it deems fit.

That Patrick Tatireta either knowingly or unknowingly aided and assisted in the planned escape of the Jasmine 9 as evidence by his following actions and conduct:- That about 5/1/99 he made representations to the Commissioner of Police for the four new Korean Officer, including the First Officer, Chief Engineer and the Second Engineer, to be allowed to return on board the Jasmine 9 on the grounds that the ship’s company , Venus Marine Ltd. Could not afford the cost of accommodating them on shore.

That having gained the CP’s approval for the return of Korean Officers, be then used this to obtains the approval of ASP(O) Iaoniman for the return of the whole crew, including the old non-Korean deck and engine crew.

That on 5/1/99 he made the necessary arrangements for the whole crew to return by a private hire boat to the Jasmine 9 and accompanied them on board, introducing the Korean officers to the Police guards on board as the "The new First Officer, Chief Engineer and Second Officer".

That about 16th February 1999 he made persuasive representa- Tions to the CP for the so-called "TV Crew" comprising Mr. Lee, the managing director of Venus Marine Ltd and the three other Koreans, for the CP to approve the "TV Crew" to go on board, to film the Jasmine 9 and to film the Captain prisoner at the Police HQ. The CP granted his approval, not knowing the true intentions of the TV Crew going abroad the Jasmine 9.

That after the escape of the Jasmine 9, he traveled to Korea, Resumed his friendly and business associations with Mr. Lee with the Korean prosecuting authorities, as set out in paragraphs 1 to 6 above.    

 

End Of Report