Great Russian Empire, owing to its many-century experience of conquering different countries and peoples, can perfectly well estrange the population of the targeted country and successfully carry out its plans in the country; it had no difficulty in splitting and opposing ourselves either and resulting from many-year carriers, of special services, has made a wonderful masterpiece of Georgian enemy icon for Abkhazs.

Tolerant nature of Georgians made it difficult for Russians to create in our consciousness an enemy icon from Abkhazs, but they managed to use even these for their aims. Georgians, who still perceived Abkhazs as their brothers, could not be so merciless and aggressive, as the separatists turned out to be in the war.

This conditioned the mass extermination and exceptional genocide of Georgians in Abkhazia, horrible tragedy in Gagra, treachery and brutality. The separatists were so full of hatred towards Georgians, that they fiercely punished even those Abkhazs who were noticed of a little sympathy towards Georgians.

In spite of that, all of us remember that during the war besides us in Sukhumi normally lived the representatives of Abkhaz ethnos, they stood in queues for bread and kerosene together with Georgians and none of them had any desire of revenge on them, as against enemy in general. On the contrary, we tried to help, cared for their security. But" with bitter experience let me remind you that any Georgian was unacceptable for separatists and such enmity resulted in hundreds of assassinated Georgian families, massacred Georgian mothers, tormented Georgian patriots, hundreds of thousands of people ousted by Calvary road.

Thus, at this stage Russia managed to implement in Abkhazia its former and present plans: the struggle for the restoration of the Soviet Union, attempt for re-conquest of its former republics, that are on the way to independence and renewal of Russian Empire has brought to us Abkhazian tragedy.

The guilty Ardzinba and his separatist regime have proved perfectly loyal to the directives of imperial forces of the northern neighbour. Numerous documents demonstrate the way how arms of Russia's law-enforcement bodies were delivered to the guilty Abkhaz leaders before and during the war, which were used for Abkhazias aggression and occupation, its destruction and extermination, for assassination and ousting of Abkhazia's population, chiefly Georgians.

Such policy of Russia towards Georgia makes it clear that instead of civil, good-neighbourly, partner relations with our country, it tends to the imperial, soviet standards. This is confirmed by the every-year orders of Chernomirdin regarding the lifting of economic embargo for Abkhaz regime, to say nothing about the liberties of Russian frontier troops. Though I'd like to share you my impression of Chernomirdin's order and the incident on the Larsi frontier in more detail. As it is clear that Russia has deprived us of Abkhazia, it shouldn't be surprising that Chernomirdin every year gives the order to take away tangerines and other agricultural products. Another point is that these orders of the Russian Premier represent an additional legal argument against the unceremonial neglecting of Georgia's state interests by official Russian government, likewise the usurpation of 1300 meters on Larsi section of Russian-Georgian border is the demonstration of the aggression of chauvinist Russian frontiers. But that is not worth mentioning, when our border was moved by 200 kilometers from Psou to Enguri at the expense of hundreds of killed lives and more than 300 thousand people made fugitive. We shouldn't forget either the border of Tskhinvali region moved to Gori, for it is more like Russian-Georgian border than the inner one.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, when Georgia took the way of construction of independent state, the way of complete democracy, many didn't like it, they didn't forgive us, punished us and made a plot against us. With the lever of Abkhazia they made us join the CIS, with the same lever they are making us obedient, agreeable to enslaving customs, frontier and financial agreements. With this pressure they induce us to give up independence and chain us to Russian Empire. Therefore, I categorically don't accept the assessments, which to my regret are still made in Georgia, as if there was a conflict inside the country, that Georgians and Abkhazs couldn't agree on something, have quarrelled and now they must reconcile. This is perfectly absurd. In Abkhazia we defended our Georgian villages and towns, we defended Tbilisi, our capital, we defended our homeland from conquerors. That was a war where many have committed heroism and many have committed treachery.

I will try to state briefly, in form of theses, my position, which is still unchanged.

As I have noted:

- The tragedy that happened in Abkhazia can not be assessed as an ethnic conflict between Abkhazia and Georgians. That was a military, political conflict inspired by the third, outer party, that is by Russian State, whose aggression resulted in the occupation of Abkhazia - an integral part of Georgia.

- Russian state could not and can not be a mediator in the conflict resolution for it is a party of the conflict.

- Russian peacekeeping forces are military troops, part of which was actually involved in Abkhazia's occupation, genocide and ethnic cleaning; they have artificially created and preserve the border between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia and they defend what they have conquered.

- The aim of the conflict inspiration is to slow and finally stop formation of the independent Georgian state, prevent Georgia from becoming a western-orientated state, prevent state development on democratic principles, to chain Georgia to Russia and become in future the sphere of its influence only; to categorically prevent Georgia's integration in NATO, prevent implementation of oil pipeline and other transportation programmes.

In March 1992, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, on Ardzinba's initiative, on any approval from Georgia, an economic agreement was made between Russian Federation and Abkhazia. At the beginning of March Ardzinba addressed B. Yeltsin with a request of economic aid for Abkhazia. Already on March 29, B. Yeltsin ordered the administrative governors of Krasnodar and Stavropol district to make an agreement on trade-economic cooperation with Abkhazia by the way of direct negotiations, which was executed during three months.

Also before the commencement of military actions Ardzinba took measures to delivering armaments to illegal military separatist units and for hampering delivery of battle techniques and arms for Geo gia which is confirmed by his correspondence with heads of CIS and russian federation military bodies and public organixations.

Moreover, in August 1992 the agreement between Abkhaz republic and Defense Ministry of Russia was drafted which envisaged giving by Abkhazia to Russian jurisdiction of the objects formerly belonging to Defense Ministry, Security Ministry and Military Transport Complex of USSR in exchange for consolidation of Abkhazia's defense power and the guarantee of inviolability of its state borders.

After beginning of military operations in Abkhazia, co-participation of Russians and Abkhaz separatists and sometimes-direct military assistance on the part of Russians became more obvious. With mute consent of Russian government Confederation of Caucasian Nations, which acted at the territory of Russian Federation and wasn't registered anywhere, actually declared war against Georgia and started to send armed to the teeth mercenaries to Abkhazia. In the book "Abkhazia's Tragedy" Vitali Sharia, Abkhazian journalist says: "After August 14, 1992 North Caucasus (confederation of Caucasian mountaineers) became the organization center for any voluntary movement for Abkhazia's defense. The mass and organized rallies were held in Kabardo-Balkaria and Chechnya, in Adige and Karachai-Cherkezia, in North and South Ossetia, the volunteer headquarters were created". All this was done quite obviously, in front of official Russian Federation leadership and with their support.

Right from the first days of military operations, the military troops deployed in Gudauta started delivery of armaments and war techniques to Abkhaz separatists. Again according to V. Sharia: "Russian troops in Abkhazia not being under control of Transcaucasian military region leadership did their best not to allow the extermination of Abkhaz people".

Gradually Abkhaz separatists received more significant military support. By the end of September they already had such samples of modern munitions as "BMP", tanks - T-72, artillery - BM-21, "Grad", air-defense system "OSA" and others. At the same time Russia in every way tried to assume the role of peacekeeper and mediator in the eyes of the international society.

On September 3, 1992 on Russia's initiative the agreement on cease-fire and conflict resolution was signed in Moscow with the participation of North Caucasus leaders. Russia was to become the guarantor of the execution of this agreement. Abkhazs used the time of the negotiations for gathering their strength. On October 1, 1992 they took Gagra and started execution of ethnic cleansing of Georgian population. On September 3 the guarantor of the agreement was not only silent, but was giving active assistance to Abkhaz separatists with living forces and arms.

From September 2 till October 5, 1992 the military equipment "Bezukorizneny", "Kil-25" and "Don" actually executed military operations from the sea.

We possess the copy of the report of the head of naval group, 1st rank captain, V. Fomin. The document says: In accordance with the plan on 1st October the demonstration training was carried out for the headquarters' officers to check the armaments 15 OPE with SKR "Bezukorizneny" and OG VDV), the battle capacity of Gudauta aviation and armed tanks. That happened on the day Gaqra attack was begun. Further in the document the real aim of Russian militaries is revealed more clearly - on October 2, at 17.00 First Deputy Defense Minister of Russia, Colonel-General G.G. Kondratyev gives the following battle objectives to armships: 1. In no case allow entrance of naval landing force from Georgia in Bitchvinta region. Arms to be used if necessary. 2. Carry out air defense of Gudauta airport.

The mentioned document arouses the idea that Russian military bodies were aware of military operations and the hostilities were carried out with their direct participation.

Approximately in the middle of October, 1992 the city of Sukhumi was periodically bombed. Official Russian circles denied participation in the action, declaring that was the business of Abkhaz separatists. But it's curious, where from did Ardzinba's regime get so many modern aircrafts "SU-25" and "SU-27"? Though the allegations of Russian power representatives were crushed on March 19, 1993 when the aircraft "SU-27" No.11 was shot down from Sukhumi. The identification papers of the pilot (Mayor Vatslav Shipko) proved that on 19th March he was sent from Kushevskaya (Rostov district) to Gudauta, Bombora airport, where he had received battle objectives.

The documents possessed by us prove that not only military services but also Russian special services provided active assistance and support to Abkhaz separatists.

On March 31, 1993 during Ahe secret-service action in Sukhumi Lieutenant of Russian military forces Alexander Sitnikov was detained, who served in military unit 48427 located in Moscow region. He had been specially sent to Sukhumi with a mission where he contacted Abkhazian special service agent, from whom he had received reconnaissance data of military character, simultaneously he managed to draft a concrete mission against Georgian troops deployed along the front line.

Sitnicov's criminal activity in Sukhumi was documentarily proved. Sitnicov has completely admitted the given accusation in accordance with article 66 (espionage) of Criminal Code of Georgian Republic.

On April 1, 1993 in the building of Information Intelligence Service of Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia in presence of commander and deputy commander of military unit No.2011, one of the members of the unit, chief of P-14 radio station, Sergeant-Major Alexander Oleg Lunev (born in 1973) was given an official warning On March 17-22, 1993 by means of staff outer radio station of the military unit, he was delivering to armed units of Abkhaz separatists the data regarding deployment on the front line of Georgian troops and battle equipment, informed them of the situation in Sukhumi, etc

The retarded confession of mercenaries, carried by Russian media also confirms the support of separatists by Russia's official and military leaders

Recruitment of mercenaries for Abkhazs was carried out not only by the Confederation of Caucasian Nations but also by Russian National Legion under the command of Nikolay Lisenko

Here are the names of several mercenaries, all of them being Russian citizens Shamil Basaev - commander of Confederation troops, Kharat Kazbeg - General, Sultan Sosnaliev - General, Anatoly Sidorenko - Colonel of VDV, who was supervising Abkhazian armed forces, Ivan Kononov - Cossack General, afterwards repented his mistake, Nikolay Gusko - Cossack Ataman, Boris Akulinichev - nickname "Akula", Colonel of the Soviet army, previously had fought in Angola, Syria, Afghanistan, Igor Lunev - General-Mayor, member of Russian Legion (brought to Abkhazia more than 50 mercenaries), Genadi Kolodin - nickname "Koloda", Major, Chief of sub-department of special troops , Mikhail Bondarenko - nickname "Guhay Pole", Captain (commanded the taking of Sukhumi), Roman Semiulin - Major, Head of the battalion located in Eshera laboratory

Among the mercenaries there were Generals of Russian Defense Ministry Kondratyev, Sigutkin, Sirokin, Chindarov, Chief General of General Staff of Defense Ministry Kolesnikov, Admiral Kolesnikov, Captain Bondarenko, Captain Epherov, Captain Nikolaev, Lieutenant-Colonel Kravchuk, Lieutenant-Colonel Kudinov, Lieutenant-Colonel Dolgopolov, Lieutenant-Colonel Sidorenko, Major Klimov, Major Semigulin, commander of Cossack unit 0 Petrov

345-S, B paratrooper regiment, 643rd surface-to-air missile regiment, military unit No 5482, military unit No 3697, warships of mili-tary-naval fleet, aircrafts "SU-25", "SU-27" located on Gudauta, Rostov and Maykop airports took part in military operations

On August 14, 1992 in Gudauta 643rd surface-to-air missile regiment was disarmed and looted without battle, armed persons of Abkhaz nationality got hold of 984 tommy-guns, 267 pistols, 18 light machine-guns, 600 signal rockets, over 500 grenades and over half a million bullets of various caliber Apart from that automobile facilities were taken, all the buildings of the military town were looted, the whole equipment of loading and food-staff warehouses of chemical and engineering service were plundered

Chief of technical supply of the airport, Lieutenant-Colonel A Dolgopolov gave the local Abkhaz separatists in Gudauta 6 infantry battle machines with complete battle munitions, 6 machine-guns, 367 hand grenades "F-1" and over 50 000 bullets of various caliber

Abkhazs started the war with 2 BTRs, 1 BMP and one aircraft They had no qualified artillerist at all In a month's time, on October 1 1992, when they stormed Gagra, they became owners of many tanks howitzers and BMPs They had even installations of "Grad" and "Igia"

On September 25, 1992 Russia's Supreme Council adopted the statement envisaging full support to Abkhazia Yeltsin gave no reaction to this E Shevardnadze flew over to Moscow to meet the president, who announced during the conversation that he recognized Georgia's territorial integrity Later it became known to us that the same day Chairman of Security Council Yun Skokov met Ardzinba in the Kremlin Very soon after, surely that wasn't a mere coincidence, Abkhazs got arms, heavy equipment and money

One of the greatest mysteries of new Russia was trade in arms, or to be more precise, everybody knew that trade was flourishing If it wasn't, battles in Georgia, Karabakh, Moldova and Chechnya would be going on with stones and sticks

In some cases the support of one side or another in the conflict was determined by the desire to facilitate and expand the trade in "death machines" But that was the general picture The concrete facts remained unknown The scarce information began to leak only after the leaders of Defense Ministry had been changed One of the first commands of Igor Rodionov concerned checking Transcaucasian warehouses Astonishing miss was found, criminal case was brought It's more than clear that the case may go on forever because the whole documentation is in a mess Something that is impossible to prove must be proved documentanly, whether the oral directives from Moscow regarding hand-over of property and arms took place or not Surely every military commander will try to make excuses of this Sensational facts became known from reliable sources of Defense Ministry If we believe these facts, in 1995-96 only in Armenia 84 tanks "T-72", 50 infantry battle machines "BMP-2", spare parts worth 7 milliard rubles were handed over The curious thing is that not a single document allowing and regulating the give-out of technical echelons, not a single ruble paid for the "lent" machines couldn't be traced anywhere

Armenia (as well as Azerbaijan, Georgia, former republics of Yugoslavia) is in an acute need of arms. Generals, some directors of military-industrial complex, spies gladly entered such deals. In recent years the consolidated corporation of people was created, who enrich themselves at the expense of blood and death. It is a common knowledge that for any resolution regarding arms there is needed cooperated work of dozens of high-rank officials, out of which some prepare the operation, the others carry it out, the third give consent (only dare to give a tank without ministerial order) and the fourth cover all of them on political level. The buyer has to leave dozens, hundreds of thousands dollars on each stage of the pyramid in the form of bribe.

In due time Russian government, trying to restore its zone of influence - Transcaucasian republics, set a political target to militaries in relations with that countries and the supreme military leadership started to act in accordance with the corresponding programme. Those, who didn't agree and tried to change something, simply left the arena, like Deputy Minister M. Kondratyev.

Russian aircrafts bombed Georgian sub-units in Abkhazia, Russian instructors trained Shamil Basaev's battalion when it fought against Armenians, Russian and Ukrainian pilots fought against each other in Karabakh. Endless examples could be given but when there ends the state and the private begins, nine out of ten cases can't be registered. For instance, when Defense Minister R. Gaziev was dismissed in Baku who had been flying to Moscow almost every week with suitcases full of money, Grachov personally demanded from Azerbaijan leadership restore him in the office. It should be noted that the favorites of Russian service men were specific people as a rule. In Baku thanks to Russian arms S. Huseinov became Prime Minister, who was regarded as a narco-king in Azerbaijan. When after a regular armed skirmish Aliev defeated the Premier, special services moved Huseinov from Azerbaijan. The same happened in Georgia when it became necessary to take away Security Minister Igor Giorgadze from Tbilisi on board of a military aircraft. He had been accused of trade in arms, transit of narcotics and assault of Shevardnadze.

In the long run, "military political experiment" in Transcaucasus ended with a fiasco for Russia. The chief defeat is Chechnya which was logical end of autocracy of special military services and the related officials. If there weren't Karabakh and Abkhazia, there wouldn't be Chechnia. Moreover, the need for the revival of "deadly" business, which became less profitable in Transcaucasus, was one of the reasons of Russia's involvement in Grozny's tragedy.

It's hard to tell when the new figures of "gratuitous" hand-over of armaments in the Caucasus will be known, but if the killers' corporations are not finished with, if special services and generals related to the fore-mentioned deals are not taken under control, then by all means, they will repeat Chechnya's case. The executors come and go, only the business is forever.

Although there are no documents confirming the orders of Russian leadership, it is undoubted that multiple transit of warships, of their staff and armaments (to Abkhaz side) would have been impossible without the leaders' participation in any form.

Here are the facts registered by the International Organization Helsinki Watch:

...Helsinki Watch has documentary record of the facts of Russian mercenaries' serving in semi-military units and their attacks on civil objects in Abkhazia. Here the money "enliven" in Pridnestrovye Republic was used. In these conflicts militarized units used arms and heavy equipment against civil persons. We possess the proofs of sale, exchange and hand-over of destructive arms by certain representatives of Russian military forces to Abkhaz boeviks.

Russian arms merchant captured during the battle in Sukhumi, maintained direct participation of Russian soldiers in the hostilities, among them were rocketeers, who shot down aircrafts and so on. Also he has made a declaration regarding the gratuitous transit of arms to Abkhaz side by Pskov airborne division.

Here are the memoirs of the mercenaries participating in Abkhazian tragedy: Serdiukov Vladimir Alexanderovich, sailor, born in 1974 (military unit No.7322, the city of Ochamchire, Abkhazia, the Commander of the unit - Major Kovalyov): "I could no longer stay in the unit. In the existing situation I couldn't get along with the commanders. The conflict started because of ... Generally, at the time there were many of those who wished to leave Ochamchire. The crowd pressed the pier to clear the way to the ship. We were ordered to give a warning fire first, which we did. Second Rank Captain ran over to me and told me: 'Shoot!' At first I didn't understand his order and said that I had already shot. 'You have shot to warn and now you must shoot the border violator'. I refused to comply with the order. Then he asked me: 'Sailor Serdiukov, do you know the service regulations?' I answered: 'I know that I can deny the order three times and after the third denial you can act as you want'. He ordered me three times to shoot... And the boys who were with me, we were of the same age, we went together, all of them disarmed, clasped each other's hands and so detained the crowd".

Rushkin Alexander Sergeevich (Kamchatka district, the city of Eliozov; private soldier of Kantemirov Division): "For behavioral offence I was sent to the guardhouse. Staff commander came into the cell, gave me a sack of my things and said: 'You are to go to a trip'. But he hadn't said where. I was put on board of an aircraft. So I found myself in Abkhazia, in Gudauta. I went to the war where I didn't want to be. I wanted to go back but was allowed".

Asian Jabrailov, Chechen (battalion "Edelweiss"): "At first they told us that Georgians came to alien land, they oppress the small nation, slaughter and humiliate. That's why I went on my own wish, as many like myself. In short, I happened in the war in Abkhazia against Georgians. All the time I thought that I served a just cause... So it was before the capture of Sukhumi. Then I realized that I was wrong. In the storm of Gagra three or four houses were harmed, but after the city was taken, about one hundred houses were burned. The same happened in Sukhumi as well. Here, on eastern front, almost everything was burned down. They go on burning, killing mainly peaceful people who never held arms. Innocent people are harmed actually.

Two days after the capture of Sukhumi we stood in the street. About 70-80 year-old woman came out of the gate. The burst of the tommy-gum mowed her down. I together with one Chechen (he was from Grozny) took the gun and ran to where the shooting came from. We thought that Georgians were killing Abkhazs. We found out that it were Abkhazs who killed the old Georgian woman. On the way I saw many burnt bodies, in Dranda there were people tied to the trees. Near the Red Bridge there was the burnt body lying on the bed. There were a lot of them in the city. In Pridnestrovye 1 was paid 5200 rubles".

Leonov Vladimer Evgenich (St. Petersburg): "We were fighting in Pridnestrovye. In two months I was paid about 4 thousands there. I was told that they paid well in Abkhazia. There are many Russian mercenaries here. They fight on Abkhaz side".

Kaliagin Aiexey Petrovich, Cossack (the city of Kropotkin, Stavropol district): "I came to fight against Georgians. I fought in Pridnestrovye against Moldavia... And when I was going back in Cossack uniform, that was on 12th or 13th, at the station "Kavkaz" three Abkhazs came to me. They asked who I was, from where. I told them everything. They offered me to go with them. In Moldova I was paid 5000 per month and here I was offered 30 OOO".

Nikolai Novichenko (Moscow): "There were rumours in Moscow that here they pay money and recruit mercenaries. So I came here. There were five of us. We were told that we would go with second echelon, but we found ourselves in a mincing machine. They drove us forward and those who had employed us went behind. Together with me were three Russian guys and one Chechen. Afterwards I have seen them killed. I don't know who killed them, I think, our employers killed them in order not to pay them the promised money".

Khaidulin Eldar Gaskarovich, born in 1962, dweller of Tatarstan: "We were told that those who fought for over three months, would get an apartment, registration and dual citizenship".

Mastaev Asian Khuseinovich, Chechen (Grozny): "We arrived in Gudauta, received arms, military uniforms, were put in line. Chief of the staff came (so he presented himself to us) and told us: Those who want to stay here, you'll get land, lodging, and you'll be registered and provided with the best living conditions".