Hermann Goering
The year 1932 will always be considered as one of the most important turning-points in German history. And, in fact, it is a year full of the most thrilling events, of great tension, of mighty controversies. German life seemed to have reached its lowest point; everywhere things had come to a standstill. A veritable twilight of the gods seemed calamitously to have settled down on parliament and its parties; at last it began to be realized what was happening among the people; the party men woke up from their deep parliamentary sleep, disturbed by the hostile mutterings of an embittered people. Decisive political events followed one another rapidly. There was one election after another; the avalanche of meetings rolled over the country. On the one hand we had the National Socialists passionately attacking, stirring up and firing the masses; on the other hand the Communists passionately attacking too, and desperately resisting ; the other parties of a Middle Class, red or black complexion, hopelessly trying to defend themselves. The gentlemen who were in the Government became afraid. But it is well known that fear makes people stupid, and that became apparent when one Government decree followed the other, each one being more stupid than the last. Once more they thought it would be possible to hold back the mighty millions of the National Socialist movement with ridiculous attempts at suppression. Behind the campaign against us were the Social Democrats, but in the vanguard were Middle Class politicians. Brüning and Groener were now the foremost fighters against the movement for freedom.
The monkish ascetic Brüning, a scholar out of touch with the world, but boundlessly conceited, and the democratic and feeble General Groener surpass one another in their hatred of National Socialism. Both were discontented politicians, whose petty ambitions had been disappointed, but who knew nothing of what the people needed, of the mighty drama in which they thought to play the leading part, but in which they were nothing but marionettes. We see a spectacle of the most shameful discord, but nevertheless, however strongly opposed the parties might be on the positive side, on the negative side they were firmly united by a paralysing fear of National Socialism. They might fight one another about officials' salaries, the raising of tariff s or taxes on dogs, but as soon as it was a question of keeping Hitler out of office they came together to form a single line of defence. And so the scenes change in this political theatre. Brüning Cabinet I falls, and after some weeks and with a few changes Brüning Cabinet II is presented to the German people. Which of those gentlemen at that time suspected the deep disappointment of the German people? When the first Brüning Cabinet resigned the people were possessed with the single hope that now at last their champion, Hitler, would come to power. The hope was disappointed. But after no more than a few weeks the Brüning ship finally sank. Once more hope was revived; once more the couriers hurried between the President's palace, the Chancellor's palace and the Hotel Kaiserhof. I should like to draw attention to Dr. Dietrich's excellent book With Hitler to Power. (The Chancellor's palace was the negative pole and the Kaiserhof the positive pole in this political system of high tension.) On the 13th August, 1932, the tension was discharged, and the spark destroyed once more the hopes of millions of the best Germans. The torment, distress and shame were still not to end. But the roll of thunder that followed this flash of lightning was even mightier than before. The foundations were shaken to the depths, and it was only the iron will of Adolf Hitler and his overwhelming authority that prevented the political tension from becoming the raging tempest of evil war. Hitler's hour seemed still not to have come. Today we know that the 13th August, 1932, had to be; today we are even thankful to Providence for this 13th August. For what would have happened if Hitler had accepted the conditions which were then presented to him and had entered the Papen Cabinet as Vice-Chancellor? The idea of Hitler being Vice-Chancellor shows the complete lack of psychological understanding on the part of the then Government. The offer was purely and simply a political farce. One could offer Adolf Hitler anything; in view of his qualities he could be appointed to any post, but everywhere only as head, as the first man. The suffix 'Vice' or 'next in rank' before Hitler's name was a sheer impossibility and was felt by all his followers to be an insult. The man who alone had been chosen by fate to save Germany was now suddenly to accept a purely representative post in order, at the best, to go on fighting the usual day-today parliamentary battle and to defend the political aims of a Middle Class Government as its deputy. It is necessary at this point to examine the intentions of a Middle Class Government which was prepared to take Adolf Hitler into the Cabinet as Vice-Chancellor. By that offer they hoped to achieve two things: first, the embarrassing and powerful opposition of the National Socialists would be silenced; and, secondly, National Socialism would have been deprived of its political force; it would have lost its nimbus and gradually have been crushed in the parliamentary treadmill. Hitler, without himself being able to influence its policy, would have to have taken over the responsibility for the inaptitude and political weakness of every Middle Class Cabinet. Catastrophe would soon have followed, for either the movement would have lost in strength or else he would have resigned again after a few weeks. But then the whole world, and all the political parties in Germany, would have rejoiced and declared 'So that is what the National Socialist leader is like. He accepted the responsibility of office only to show that Adolf Hitler was possible in sterile opposition, but impossible as a constructive statesman. Only a few weeks were necessary to show that National Socialism could not control the situation!' To this it will be objected that Hitler could have imposed his will on the Cabinet. We know today that that would have been impossible, for Hitler would not have had the actual instruments of power in his hands. General Schleicher would have continued to lead the Reichswehr, a man who, during the whole of his political career, has done nothing else but try to torpedo and overthrow his predecessors. At heart a sworn enemy of National Socialism, he would have taken a special delight in destroying the movement in this way. The Prussian police, however, according to the same scheme, were to be put under Gregor Strasser. Herr Strasser, who at heart was just as much opposed to Adolf Hitler as Schleicher, as was shown a few months later, was resolved to work against Hitler and to attack Hitler. There remained the Storm Troops as an instrument of power. We know today that that Middle Class Cabinet would never have tolerated the slightest use of the Storm Troops as a political instrument of power. Anyone who saw the beginning of the Hitler Government, particularly in the Cabinets of the states, knows that here one would have come up against insurmountable opposition. In addition to this the parliamentary system was to have been allowed to continue; it was even proposed to go on governing in the regular parliamentary manner. For the Party, that would have meant death. The Party could well fight in opposition within the parliamentary system, but it would have been impossible for Adolf Hitler to govern in a democratic parliamentary way.
It was therefore completely obvious and absolutely necessary that Adolf Hitler would have to refuse. The tension among the people had greatly increased. Everyone longed to see Hitler at last in the Government. In our own ranks, too, there were those who were discouraged and thought that Hitler should have entered the Government all the same. These people thought that further suspense would be unbearable, that the Storm Troops could no longer stand further persecution, further terrorism and suppression. But the Leader knew better; he knew that the mood of the Storm Troops would always remain the same, always as resolute and unafraid as the mood of the Leader himself. He knew his Storm Troops better, and he, as master in the play of political forces, here, too, did the right thing. It must have been a wonderful encouragement to him to hear, as he drove through the crowds after the 13th August, 1932, ever and again the cry 'Stick to it, Leader; stick to it!' The people, with its sound instinct, had correctly grasped the situation. The people wanted to give its Leader all or nothing. And so the struggle of the year 1932 continued, if possible with even greater bitterness and intensity. We had warned Chancellor von Papen, we had explained to him that we were compelled to attack him, not for personal reasons, but because of the post he wished to fill. Again and again we explained to him that there was only one possible solution, and that was to make Hitler Chancellor. It would have been quite conceivable for Hitler to have been Chancellor and for there to have been no other National Socialists in the Cabinet. But it was quite unthinkable that there should be a whole Cabinet of National Socialists and the Chancellor not a National Socialist. We proclaimed that anyone who stood between us and this goal of ours would be passionately attacked. We proclaimed that anyone who thought to draw his sword against us would be ruthlessly pushed aside.