Paper presented at the 34th annual convention

Canadian Psychological Association - Montreal - 28 May 1993

LAND FORCE WESTERN AREA'S COMBAT STRESS REACTION MANAGEMENT

PROGRAMME. Captain Frank Kuschnereit, Major William Lai, Land Force

Western Area Headquarters, CFB Edmonton, Alberta.

Land Force Western Area (LFWA) personnel and their families faced numerous

dangerous and potentially mostly damaging incidents in the course of their

careers. United Nations peacekeeping troops in particular may be exposed to

extremely stressful conditions and potentially combat. The Commander of LFWA

considers it essential that his troops have every advantage in dealing with

such intense stress. In August 1992 he directed the development of a Combat

Stress Reaction Management Programme for LFWA with the priority being given

to the troops deploying to the former country of Yugoslavia for United Nations

peacekeeping duties. The overall programme comprises of four areas:

education/prevention, resource referral, family education support and Critical

Incident Stress Debriefings (CISD). The aim of the programme is to prevent and

mitigate pathological stress reactions as a result of operations, thus reducing

the risk of developing post-traumatic stress disorders. This paper provides an

account of the LFWA programme in general, the combat stress education

programme supplied to the United Nations troops prior to deployment to

Yugoslavia and the deployment of the Combat Stress Intervention Team.

Highlighted is the American Critical Incident Stress Foundations CISD

methodology and its adaptation to the management of combat stress reaction.

I. Introduction

Following a brief to Command Counsel on the subject of Combat

Stress in August 1992, the Commander of Land Forces Western Area (LFWA)

directed the development of a Combat Stress Management Programme for LFWA

with a priority being given to area personnel being deployed to United Nations

peacekeeping duties to the former country of Yugoslavia. The goal of the

programme was to "prevent and mitigate the pathological stress reactions as a

result of operations, thus reducing the risk of developing post traumatic stress

disorders".

This goal was broken down into four specific objectives:

a. To implement pre-operational and primary preventative measures ;

b. To effect mitigative action rapidly following operations or

incidents (secondary prevention);

c. To provide similar stress reaction preventative services to

families of affected units; and

d. To ensure the availability of suitable candidate referral networks

and procedure should further management be required.

The LFWA programme was designed to be a comprehensive programme that

would address the above issues. Combat Stress Reaction is a term which

encompasses an array of reversible effects caused by the stressors of combat

or deployment in an operational zone and encompasses the terms battle fatigue,

battle shock and critical incident stress as well as older terms such as shell

shock and combat exhaustion. LFWA decided to develop a comprehensive

programme based on the principles for management of Combat Stress Reaction as

outlined in QSTAG 909 which is Canadian Army Doctrine.

Prior to deployment, units received Combat Stress management training.

While in theatre, unit teams monitored stress levels and provided debriefings

after critical incidents. A LFWA team debriefed the entire unit in theatre prior

to rotation. Six weeks after their return to Canada, the units received a follow

up visit by the LFWA team. Support was also provided to families. The major

components of the programme are described on the following pages.

II Primary Prevention and Education

Prior to their deployment to Croatia all members of 3 Princess Patricia

Canadian Light Infantry and 1 Combat Engineer Regiment received a one hour

introduction to Combat Stress Management Lecture. The lecture consisted of a

20 minute introduction to the history and elements of combat stress

management. This was followed by a 23 - minute video "The Faces of Combat

Stress" which demonstrated how to prevent, recognize and manage combat stress

casualties in the field. The video was followed by an introduction to the

concept of Critical Incident Stress and debriefing procedures. The soldiers

were told that they may be required to attend a debriefing while in theatre. It

was emphasized at the end of the lecture that Combat Stress Reaction is not an

excuse for misconduct and any incident of misconduct such as not taking

prisoners or shooting prisoners would be dealt with the full measure of military

law.

The one hour introduction to Combat Stress Management lecture was given

to company size groups. At the completion the privates and corporals were

dismissed and the leaders (MCpls and above) remained for a three hour Combat

Stress Management Leader's Workshop which was broken into three fifty -

minute periods with a ten - minute break in between each. The first period

consisted of a lecture and discussion of the topic of Combat Stress Management

and the role that the leader plays. The second period consisted of how leaders

could prevent or minimize stress reaction in their troops, how to recognize the

more serious signs of stress reaction and also how to manage troops who are

displaying the more serious signs of combat stress reactions. During the third

period the group was broken into platoon size syndicates and were given two

scenarios. The scenarios were based on possible incidents that they might

encounter while deployed. The syndicates had fifteen minutes to discuss how

they would handle such a scenario and then each syndicate presented their

solution. After the syndicate discussions, the workshop was concluded.

While the workshop was orientated towards operation deployment general

stress management procedures were incorporated as part of the procedures for

minimizing and preventing stress reaction with the leaders and their troops.

Each soldier received an aide-memoir card and the leaders received more

detailed aide-memoir cards as well as the manual on the Management of Stress in

Army Operations.

II Secondary Prevention

Critical Incident Stress Debriefing is a structured group debriefing

procedure and is based on a theoretical model developed by Dr. Jeffrey Mitchell,

a Clinical Psychologist who has worked for years with emergency measures

personnel in the United States. The basis of the theory is that if personnel

involved in a traumatic incident are allowed to speak about the facts and their

feelings and thoughts on the incident and allow them to be worked through,

rather than being internalized, that this will prevent or reduce the incident of

post-traumatic stress disorder.

The debriefing session was conducted in seven phases:

a. Introduction. During this phase, the purpose and sequence of

the session was outlined. The soldiers were also told what the

ground rules were. It was emphasised that this was not an

operational debriefing and that no notes were to be taken;

b. Fact Phase. As the soldiers had not experienced one discreet

incident, they were asked to describe their most stressful incident

that they had been involved in over the six month tour;

c. Thought Phase. The soldiers were asked what their first

thoughts were during the worst part of their incident. The intent

is to allow them to conceptualize their thoughts;

d. Reaction Phase. After processing the information from the

objective, fact modality to a more personal, cognitive one, the

soldiers were asked to describe their feelings or emotional

reactions to their incident;

e. Symptom Phase. During this phase, the soldiers were

encouraged to discuss any physical or behaviourial reactions they

may have had and to share how they had been coping with the

stress of the incident;

f. Information Phase. During this phase the debriefer provided

information on stress reactions. It was emphasised that these

reactions were normal. Positive coping strategies and stress

management information was provided. As the soldiers were

preparing to return to Canada, information on how to reintegrate

with their families and how to minimize jet lag was also provided;

and

g. Conclusion. This final phase allowed the soldiers to ask any last

questions. The debriefer then concluded by reinforcing the fact

that the soldiers had made a positive contribution.

In order to mitigate the pathological stress reactions resulting from

operations, a number of LFWA personnel received specialized CISD training. Five

members of the units deploying to Croatia received the four day Mitchell CISD

course and were designated as part of their unit debriefing team. These teams

would be responsible for conducting immediate defusings at or near the scene of

the incident. The unit team also conducted debriefings in theatre within 24 - 72

hours. The unit debriefing teams could handle the immediate assistance but an

external team comprised of mental health professionals and skilled CISD

debriefers was also placed on standby. The external team was tasked to provide

assistance to the units prior to returning to Canada. The debriefing procedure

was based on the International Critical Incident Stress Foundation's Critical

Incident Stress Debiefing methodology as outlined above.

On 22 March 1993 the team assembled in Edmonton and on 23 March 1993 the

team departed Edmonton and flew to Zagreb, Croatia. Upon arrival it was

discovered that the unit had a comprehensive debriefing schedule arranged.

During the next 7 days the team conducted 34 debriefings for a total of 741

personnel of 3 PPCLI. The overall reaction of the soldiers was very positive.

During the six-month tour in Croatia, a number of incidents occurred.

Three armoured personnel carriers struck anti-tank mines and another was

damaged by a anti-tank missile. One officer was almost killed by an anti-

personnel mine. There were numerous vehicle accidents. A hand grenade was

thrown at an out post and another into a compound. Many soldiers were fired at

but were not hit. All members of 3PPCLI experienced the stressors of living in a

war zone such as having to wear flak jackets and being in constant danger as

well as being away from their families for an extended period of time.

Six weeks after their return to Canada, the units received a follow up

visit by the LFWA team. Unfortunately less than 400 of the 862 personnel still

remained with the unit. The remainder had been sent on courses, posted to

other units or had been reservists who had completed their contracts. The

commanding officer did state that he was more than satisfied with the

programme. He had predicted prior to the deployment that 10% of his unit would

have to return to Canada during the tour. He noted that only 4% returned and

most were for non stress related reasons. He also was pleased that there was

very few marriage break ups.

III Family Support and Education

The family support and education component of the LFWA programme was

managed through the family support centres located at the various bases.

Personnel Selection Officers provided stress management training for spouses

and significant others. It was recognised that a six-month separation was just

as stressful for the families as it was for the soldiers.

Family members and home unit personnel were also briefed on how to

recognize stress reaction symptoms in the returning soldiers and also how to

help them deal with it.

Contingency plans to provide Critical Incident Stress Debriefings to

family members were developed in the event that there were mass casualties.

Family support centres and units were provided with information on

referral procedures and treatment resources in their communities.





IV Resource Referral Networking

In order to take advantage of non-military resources, a list of community

contacts of professionals trained in Critical Incident Stress Debriefing and

follow-up counselling was created. Referral procedures were developed as well

as contingency plans for isolated communities.



Conclusion

Land Forces Western Area's Combat Stress Management Programme was

implemented in a short period of time but has been well received by the soldiers.

Commanding officers attribute reduced attrition and fewer marriage break ups

Formal programme evaluation has been initiated but the study will not be

completed until next fall. In any event, this programme has shown that

Psychological support to operations can be useful in peacekeeping as well as in

war.