Florida Supreme Court Changed Election Law
The State Supreme Court overturned Harris's attempts to change Florida's election laws (click here for more info).  As for her permutation of the "error in vote tabulation" standard, the State Court ruled that: "The plain language of section 102.166(5) refers to an error in the vote tabulation rather than the vote tabulation system. On its face, the statute does not include any words of limitation; rather, it provides a remedy for any type of mistake made in tabulating ballots."  Regarding the November 14th deadline, the Court argued that Harris has to exercise her discretionary powers under 102.112 in a way that recognizes other provisions, such as those in 102.166.  In other words, all parts of Florida's election laws must be recognized and enforced, and certain provisions can not be interpreted in such a way as to render obsolete other statutory provisions.  The Florida Supreme Court then provided a remedy for Harris's actions by trying to interpret these two provisions in a way that they felt was consistent with the entire statutory scheme (including the contest provisions under 102.168) and other concerns like the Dec. 12 deadline.  In other words, they tried to do Harris' job for her presumably because she had proven her inability or unwillingness to issue guidelines congruent with the entire statute (as opposed to ones that simply facilitated a Bush victory).

However, for their next big change in election law, the State Supreme Court seemed to take a page out of Harris's play book.  They took the broad discretion provided the judiciary in the contest provisions in 102.168 and used them to order a sweeping recount of all the undervotes statewide through a counting process not found anywhere in the statute except for the "intent of the voter" standard.  While it is clear that this remedy fashioned by the majority in the Supreme Court was grounded in statutory law and legal precedence, it is also clear that the remedy they fashioned (a statewide recount of the undervotes) was not consistent with any particular statutory provision.  In other words, a "strict" reading of the law would not lead one to the unequivocal conclusion that the Supreme Court had the power to order such a counting without situating the counting procedures within some statutory framework.  It can be construed that way, but only if you read the extensive power of review and remedy granted the judiciary under the contest provisions in Section 102.168 as an open invitation to craft remedies not specifically addressed or sanctioned in the election code.  The Florida Supreme Court definitely read it that way.

The Bush campaign argued that in both these cases, the Florida Supreme Court was changing the rules of the game; a violation of Title 3 Section 5 of the US Code.  Regarding the deadline extension, Gore's lawyers argued that the Court had simply reconciled statutory conflicts in a manner congruent with the entire statutory scheme; something Harris was supposed to do, but failed.  Bush's lawyers argued that the Secretary was simply exercising the discretionary powers granted to her in Section 102.112.  In the next case, these attorneys basically swapped arguments.  Regarding the undervote count order, Gore's lawyers argued that the judiciary was simply exercising the broad discretionary powers granted to it in the contest provisions of 102.168.  Bush's lawyers argued that the Court had exercised its authority under 102.168 in a manner that ignored the rest of the statute (much the same way the Court found that Harris had neglected the rest of the statute when she refused to accept late returns pursuant to 102.112).

Ironically, the Bush lawyers argued that the Court's broad use of statutorily conferred discretionary power was an effort to change election law, while Secretary Harris's efforts to do the same was not.  Moreover, the Bush lawyers accused the Florida Supreme Court of using the contest provision (Section 102.168) in such a way as to render obsolete other portions of Florida's election laws.  Just a few weeks earlier, the Florida Supreme Court rebuked Harris for using her discretionary power under Section 102.112 to obviate the manual recount provisions under Section 102.166.

Gore's lawyers were also forced to switch arguments with their opponents for it was now they who defended the State Supreme Court's actions as the legitimate use of the discretionary power granted the judiciary in Section 102.168, even though the argued against Harris use of discretionary power pursuant to 102.112.  The subtle, but significant difference between Harris's decision and the Court's was that the former was trying to prevent votes from being counted while the latter was trying to make sure that all the votes are counted.