Dominant Logistics
Rethinking the UAV
There is great support developing these days for
the expansion of UAV programs. At first
glance, this type of technology appears to offer tremendous possibilities. But as with so many other systems today, the
closer we look, the worse the UAV option appears. This
is not to say that there is no potential in the technology; only that we are looking in
the wrong places.
Originally, the greatest promise of the UAV was to
dramatically reduce the costs of aircraft, as systems to support the pilot would no longer
be required. It takes very little to spot the
obvious problem with this theory. If a pilot
is supposed to be flying the UAV from a remote location, then optical systems will be
required to provide the information the pilot needs to fly the plane. The costs of hiring and training the pilot is the
greatest personnel cost with respect to aircraft and this cost cannot realistically be
eliminated. So we still have the costs of
having the pilot but instead of having costs for oxygen systems, we have costs for optical
systems. Instead of flight control costs
within the aircraft, we have flight control costs at the ground control station. Its little wonder that the costs of UAVs have
risen to equivalent to the costs of manned aircraft.
But not only has their been no improvement in
costs, there has also been no demonstrated improvement in performance either. Another of the empty promises of UAVs was that
performance levels could be improved without the limitations of human frailty. But here again, the problems are rather obvious. The presence of a pilot in the aircraft has
virtually no impact on speed, altitude, or most measures of maneuvering. While it will someday be possible to have UAVs
that can achieve higher G maneuvers, we are still limited by the communications
technologies that must connect the aircraft to a pilot on the ground.
The only current method available for remotely
piloting an aircraft is to use a form of radio transmission. Radio signals can be jammed quite easily and are
also affected by such factors as weather and distance.
So we are introducing a host of problematic issues in an effort to achieve a slight
if any gain in high G performance. Given the
fact that there is no current data to suggest that the G performance of existing manned
aircraft is in any way a hindrance to capabilities, this seems like an odd trade off.
Besides offering little in the way of improved
performance, the use of remotely piloted aircraft introduces the possibility of an enemy
literally hijacking the radio signal of the UAV and taking the aircraft. Rumors have been circulated that this has already
occurred on at least one occasion.
Other UAV proposals have focused on using these
systems as ground attack assets. But here
again, numerous problems arise. For the UAV
to function on its own in this role will require that it be outfitted with extensive
sensor capabilities and this will keep the prices of these platforms excessively high.
Is there a way to cost and combat effectively
incorporate this technology to our advantage? Yes
but not in the ways that are currently being worked on in the US. We need to consider the UAV as being a flying
extension of our current capabilities. To put
this another way, the UAV offers tremendous potential as a means to provide existing
airborne assets with a greater amount of munitions and area coverage.
With the advent of data-linking technologies, we
can use UAVs as a form of flying “magazine” to make larger quantities of
munitions available to other platforms. By
having the UAV fly a pre-programmed route, the need for a pilot on the ground, and the
resulting complexities that this introduces, can be entirely eliminated. The UAV flies a continuous patrol with various
weapons for either ground or air capabilities. Manned
assets can then utilize these weapons through data linking.
A basic package would work something like this.
A Combat Air Patrol would consist of a small group
of manned aircraft like the F-22 along with an Airborne Early Warning system like the E-2
or E-3 and a quantity of UAVs armed with long-range missiles. The F-22 provides “man-in-the-loop”
capabilities for investigating and prosecuting potential targets. The AEW system can direct the F-22 to the target
with its own radar (so the F-22 can stay in a stealthy configuration sans radar) and it
can also redirect a UAV or two to a better patrol route.
If the F-22 determines the contact to be hostile, fire can be directed from three
locations simultaneously.
In a ground attack system, the UAVs could be
controlled by JSTARS or a ground support version of the E-2. The UAV would still operate in a pre-programmed
route but instead of the F-22, a system like the proposed RAH-60 Strikehawk could be
utilized to redirect the UAVs with data linking.
These types of configurations would dramatically
reduce the number of pilots required to perform these functions. The UAV could be built more cost-effectively and
consequently we could field more of them. We
would continue to maintain the critical “man-in-the-loop” capabilities that are
necessary to minimize fratricide. We would
eliminate the ability of an enemy to “hijack” the UAV, as data linking in small
quantities of information is vastly more secure than a continuous radio stream. And by avoiding the tendency to build the UAV as a
high-performance platform, costs can be kept under control.
High performance aircraft are not expensive because they are manned – they are
expensive because they are high-performance.
UAVs offer a tremendous amount of potential to our
military forces. But we need to remember that
there is no technology that can be used as a replacement for personnel. We need to develop UAV systems as extensions of
existing abilities – not as robotic killing machines.