Dominant Logistics
Transportation Assault Battalion
Some have suggested the use of a Transportation Assault Battalion in the light divisions of the Army. While this isn't a bad idea, I believe we need to take it a step further and use this unit formation as a means to rebuild the Army's lost abilities to engage in amphibious operations. In WWII, the Army conducted substantially more amphibious operations than the Marine Corps and yet today, there is virtually no amphibious capability at all in the Army. The most commonly given excuse for this lack of capability is the need to reduce the weight and costs of vehicles. And this is not an illegitimate concern; it's just wrong.
Regardless of what anyone thinks of the Marine Corps or amphibious operations, the bottom line is that SOP when we get after another nation is to blow every bridge in the countryside. Common sense would tend to indicate a need for the ability to cross these waterways given that we are removing the means to cross them. But then again, common sense tends to fly in the face of DoD policies and infighting. Bridging is the ideal long-term solution for this problem but you still need the means to clear the other side of the water!
The basic idea of a TAB is to provide a unit to the light divisions that could transport infantry under armor for assault purposes. Most propose using the M113A3 as the primary vehicle within the TAB and it is hard to argue against this suggestion. The M113A3 is an outstanding option for this role; even moreso because of a kit that is available to turn the existing M113A3 into a true amphibious vehicle.
The kit is available overseas and consists of a bow assembly and waterjet kit that attaches directly to the existing vehicle. You still retain full access to the rear doors as well as the top hatches; this kit does not degrade any of the M113A3s capabilities. And with full access to the doors, we can still use these vehicles as transports of personnel but also of materials. A typical M113A3 can carry our proposed one ton pallet or a substantial quantity of loose supplies.
By using this vehicle, we can clear the other sides of these waterways so that bridging operations can be performed effectively. But this vehicle adds much more to our capabilities. With it, we can now use rivers and lakes as transportation routes for support operations or for combat operations. We can also engage in operations based from ships off-shore. And it also provides the infantry in light divisions with a dedicated means for engaging in heavy assaults.
We should also develop an amphibious kit for the TSV to support these operations and to expand on our logistics support abilities. A TAB company won't require many personnel as all we're doing is manning the vehicles and equipment. The TAB company should have nine amphibious M113A3s for transportation, two amphibious M113A3s for command and control of the formation, and three amphibious TSVs for support.
The Headquarters company for the TAB should consist of four amphibious TSVs, four amphibious M113A3s for command and control, and eight amphibious HEMTTs. The HEMTTs should be of the stretched variety to accomodate either the smaller pallets of the TSV or the larger pallets of the PLS while remaining amphibious with either load.
The personnel for this unit should consist entirely of varying ranks of Combat Technicians. There should be six personnel for each of the transport vehicles, allowing us to have three crews for continuous operations or two larger crews for more intense operations. This also builds a group of trained Combat Technicians that can be shifted to forward units to mitigate the effects of attrition on our logistics capabilities. And since all Combat Technicians are trained in the full spectrum of logistics, there is no need for additional personnel for supply, maintenance, and communications.