Dominant Logistics
Understanding Strategic Streams
Somewhere along the way, someone came up with the term "strategic lift" and indirectly caused the collapse of strategic logistics in the U.S. military. With this term, we began the process of viewing transportation and supply at the strategic level as a single entity. Another issue that goes hand-in-hand with the "strategic lift" problem is the concept of prepositioning. By viewing strategic logistics as a single entity, we engage in the very problematic activity of prepositioning combat materials at locations abroad. This brings a whole host of problems to the area of logistics that must be addressed.
Active Capacity vs. Static Assets
When materials are prepositioned, they become Static Assets - materials that sit around and collect dust on the off chance that some day, a need will arise requiring these assets to be drawn from stocks and put into use. With some types of assets, such as food, water, and other Tier III materials, this makes sense but where we begin running into problems is when we pre-position equipment.
On paper, the concept looks great; unfortunately paper and reality are not even remotely related. There are problems that most people, including many logistics experts, lack the necessary background to recognize. The oils that keep mechanical equipment operational separate over time if the equipment isn't operated. These same systems also require ventilation to release pressure and this allows moisture-laden air into the system causing corrosion and contamination of the oil. Proper storage for more than brief periods requires replacing all of these oils with synthetic preservatives and sealing the vents - all of which has to be undone before you can use the equipment. But then you still have the electrical problems - these also require ventilation for cooling so you get more corrosion issues here from humidity and these also have to be repaired or cleaned before use. And then you still have the problem of all of the rubber seals and gaskets dry rotting and becoming brittle from lack of use (tires and band tracks face the same problems) - these then blow out as soon as you start to use the vehicle when you pull it out of storage.
And then once you've dealt with all of this, you still have to get the equipment to your theater of operations unless war happens to break out next door. Why do you think that when we send forces abroad, we never send forces that rely on pre-positioned equipment? We send the 82nd Airborne, other light Army forces, or the Marines, generally in that order. Consequently, pre-positioning of major systems is a severe drain on our resources. We need to keep the hardware here in CONUS, keep it properly maintained and used, and when required send it where it is needed. It took six months to build up the force in Desert Storm and this action made extensive use of pre-positioned hardware. If you want to pre-position fuel, rations, and munitions then go for it but doing this with vehicles and other hardware is nothing but a waste.
But this still leaves the problem of how to get the massive quantities of men and materials to a given area of need. Which brings us to the concept of Active Capacity. Instead of convincing ourselves of the lie that we will be able to utilize these stockpiled resources, we accept the reality that we must keep our major systems in use or here at home and then actively maintain the capacity to transport the systems abroad. To understand the practice of Active Capacity, let's take a look at some of the proposed logistics systems in actual practice.
Most people readily understand that the current American supercarriers are the largest and most powerrful surface vessels in the world. What most people don't understand is that the second largest and most powerful of the carriers is the American LHD-series of amphibious assault carriers. But the LHD carriers are more than just aircraft carriers - they also include command and control facilities, major medical facilities, and are capable of supporting amphibious operations (ie ground forces). By using a large fleet of LHDs instead of only supercarriers, we can have these capacities available to all branches of the military whenever they are needed stationed around the world.
Another key component of Active Capacity is the C-17. This aircraft is large and can carry a considerable amount of weight but it is far too expensive to purchase in large quantities solely for use as a system to deliver war materials. We simply don't require air delivery of sufficient M1 Abrams tanks to justify a large fleet of C-17s. But we NEED more C-17s for those occasions where a large quantity of Abrams and other tonnage items are needed rapidly. By using palletized systems that enable the C-17 to fight fires and to refuel other aircraft, we can field a larger fleet by expanding the role of the C-17 to take over the missions of other aircraft that currently either require replacement or don't exist. The KC-33A fills a similar role in the Active Capacity concept.
Palletization also allows us to field a large fleet of HSV ships for transport purposes while meeting other needs. The HSV can be outfitted as a mine warfare vessel, a hospital ship, a maintenance vessel, an oiler, or it can simply be used as a transport ship. By having these systems serve in multiple roles, the Active Capacity will always be present, allowing us to leave our combat systems and other politically incorrect materials here at home where they can be properly maintained and ready to go to war. Other materials, such as food, water, construction materials, and other Tier III materials can then be prepositioned anywhere in the world to lessen the load on deployment assets. These materials require virtually no maintenance and can be sold to the host nation to keep our supplies fresh or to support OOTW.
Having established Active Capacity, we can now break strategic logistics down into their proper areas. Instead of a single strategic support system, we need to look at strategic logistics as two distinct streams of support.
Strategic Deployment Stream
The Strategic Deployment Stream is the method of taking a given quantity of men and materials and moving it from one point to another. At some point in the future, this same quantity of men and materials will again be taken from that point abroad and returned to the original point. This redeployment may occur in a matter of weeks, months, or even years but ultimately it will occur in one form or another. A few key points should be noted here.
Every deployment abroad will require its own unique deployment stream based upon the nature of the deployment. Sometimes the deployment will be by ship, other times by air, or in most cases it will involve a combination of techniques.
Most deployments will involve multiple streams. With the threat of long and intermediate range missiles, you never want to pool a large quantity of assets within a single location abroad. The threat of terrorism is another reason for this step.
When we talk about deployment, we are talking about Tiers I and II. The transport assets from Tiers I and II are moving the materials of Tiers I and II to another location.
Strategic Sustainment Stream
For any force that is deployed outside of CONUS, there will need to be a Strategic Sustainment Stream. This stream provides the day-to-day materials necessary to keep the deployed force operational. Obviously, this stream functions on a constant basis; unlike the deployment stream, there is no lag time where materials will not be needed, only changes in the amount of material required.
Most people fail to grasp just how much material can be involved in the sustainment stream. A single heavy division can easily require between 2000 and 5000 tons of materials per day. That's a lot of material and contrary to popular belief, the need is not all that much less for the typical light division. Light divisions can still go through 1000 to 2000 tons of materials per day without even batting an eye when engaged in combat actions. While the light divisions may not have the fuel-chugging Abrams, they instead rely extensively on aviation assets that burn even more fuel than the Abrams. All divisions use massive quantities of artillery as well, leveling the table even more. The key points include:
Operational costs in sustainment can rapidly spiral out of control. It is absolutely critical that operational costs of sustainment activities be kept to a minimum.
Unlike equipment, materials for sustainment can, and SHOULD, be stockpiled abroad in massive quantities and in as many locations as possible. Most nations don't want Army units stationed in their country but most couldn't care less about storing food and other items if you're willing to pay some rent. Not to mention that a large quantity of MREs just isn't as valuable a target as a large quantity of Abrams tanks.
Sustainment falls into Tier III of our logistics structure. Sustainment will typically involve Tier III transports delivering Tier III materials to the deployed force.