Dominant Logistics
Building a Logistics Net
There are a variety of ways in which logistical support can be provided to deployed military units. The design that is being proposed is a radical departure from conventional logistical thinking. This new Logistics Net is designed to be far more robust and adaptive than traditional designs.
The Straight-Line Efficiency Model
The basic design of existing logistics can best be described as a Straight-Line Efficiency Model. With this construct, each unit has a specific line of support for each segment of logistics. This structure is designed to function as the most efficient means of providing support. What gets lost in many measures of military logistical success is the difference between efficient and effective. As an example, let's look at how the typical deployed Army unit currently receives water.
Each and every soldier in the field requires a given quantity of water every day. The soldier obtains this water from either a water blivet or a water buffalo at the company or battalion level, depending on the size of the unit. These blivets and buffaloes are in turn filled at a water collection point that is typically filled by a ROWPU unit or some similar source. This is a very simple and efficient model that is similar to how most supply actions are accomplished in the U.S. Army. But there are a number of issues that make the effectiveness of this design highly questionable.
For starters, at each step of the logistical chain, there are personnel who require specialized training. Even at the unit level, there must be personnel to ensure that the water is safe to drink and that the water holding equipment is properly cleaned and maintained. What happens if the water guy gets taken out? Or if the equipment holding the water develops a problem or gets shot up? What if the water guy simply gets seriously ill or has to leave because of an emergency issue? Any of these problems can cause the entire unit to be without water. Or worse yet, they can lead to the entire unit developing a waterborne illness.
There is also the obvious question of how do you support this logistical line with units on the move? They certainly can't stop while you run to the ROWPU to reload the water buffalo. Now your water operations require an additional security team just to continue to function and you still have to deal with locating your unit once you have acquired the water they need. And things are certainly no less complicated back at the ROWPU.
ROWPU may be able to extract potable water from virtually any source, but you still have to locate and transit to that source. So here again, you require some security assets to keep you alive because the Army tends to avoid positioning itself next to lakes and rivers. And unlike the water teams, the ROWPU unit will be filling dozens of buffaloes and other water holding systems making unit movement issues even more of a problem as a ROWPU unit can be tied up for hours at a stretch without batting an eye. And again, what happens if the team DOES get hit? Now, you can easily be talking about an entire brigade being without water. It's easy to say "they'll just get the water from another unit" but remember that this model is based upon efficiency. What this means is that logistical units have as little excess capacity as possible to minimize the number of resources in the combat area. The Foward Support Battalions of light infantry divisions in the Army have fewer personnel than many other COMPANY formations and this limited number of personnel are filling literally dozens of logistics missions. They are designed to support a single infantry brigade; they don't have nearly enough resources to support two.
These same problems apply equally to the other areas of logistics. These issues are no different if you dealing with a field kitchen, a supply unit, or a maintenance company. These traditional formations are highly efficient and result in lower costs and personnel requirements. But they also dramatically hinder mobility and increase the vulnerability of the unit's logistical capabilities.
A Logistics Net
To replace this conventional wisdom, we need to devise a logistics concept that is more resilient to combat, more flexible, and more mobile. In essence, we need to reorganize and re-equip our logistical units to form a sort of logistical net instead of logistical lines. We want a design that can reach units with necessary supplies and services regardless of their location or activity.
With the Straight-Line Model, any hole that develops in the logistical chain inevitably results in a break in that particular line. And because the Straight-Line Model is based on efficiency, there is little excess capacity within other units to make up the difference. With the Logistics Net Model, a hole may develop but means will exist to circumnavigate the hole so that logistical support can continue albeit at a reduced level of efficiency. With the Logistics Net, movement of ground units no longer matters because no traditional fixed lines exist - unit movement simply results in supplies and support coming from another segment of the net.
Conventional logistics relies almost entirely on roads for transportation. With the Logistics Net, some CSS units will continue to be road-bound, while others will be amphibious and some will even be airborne. Because this net will be a multi-service program, every significant unit will have a group in a strategic area assembling pallets of log packs and other supplies for movement to tactical areas. Instead of having major logistical systems like field kitchens and ROWPUs within the tactical area, these are located in rear areas and a widepread transportation network moves the materials to the tactical units. A tactical unit can get their supplies from any of the support groups in the rear. Their packs may come from an Army unit, a Marine unit, an Air Force unit, or even a Navy ship. They'll still have a normal unit that will provide their support, but in the event of a breakdown in the system, these support roles can be diverted to another unit until the problem is addressed.
With this design, our logistics can be as flexible and robust as our combat formations. It is not as efficient as current logistics models, but it isn't intended to be. Efficiency, by design, means a lack of redundancies, and this in turn means a lack of overall survivability and excess capacity to make up for losses. Current logistical models, by design, are eliminating their ability to survive in combat. We cannot allow this trend to continue.