Dominant Logistics
Joint Strike Fighter Won't Fly
Let me start this off by admitting my bias outright - I'm a fan of the F/A-22. Yes, I am well aware that it is the most expensive fighter in history, that it is not the revolutionary aircraft the Air Force claims, blah, blah, blah. If the aircraft is used PROPERLY (as opposed to current AF intentions), then it will be a huge benefit to the force overall; much more beneficial than the preferred aircraft of most military reform advocates. The Joint Strike Fighter is a design that is destined for failure. While it is possible to make a quality plane that is a jack-of-all-trades, like the F-4 Phantom, this design is a flying contradiction that will make the aircraft unsuitable for most of the missions we want it to perform.
Exploding Costs
The biggest obstacle that the JSF will never be able to overcome is the matter of cost. It boggles the mind how reformers can attack the F/A-22 as costing $150million+ per unit (total costs of planes, testing, R&D, etc.) and then turn around and claim the JSF is only projected to cost $30-45million per bird, and do so with a straight face. The actual current cost projections for the JSF are that average unit cost will be around $80million per plane without any additional cost overruns. But even this estimate is insanely optimistic to the point where it isn't credible. Not a single actual JSF has ever been built - all we have had thus far are technology demonstrators that weren't even complete aircraft, since much of what is intended to go into this plane doesn't even exist yet in useable form.
The biggest question mark in this area has to be the avionics subsystems. This is a critical area in that this particular design is wholly dependent on its avionics for survivability. The JSF is currently scheduled to use a system that is very similar in concept to that of the F/A-22; the same system that the same contractors can't get to function properly. If we can't make sensor fusion work in the Raptor, where it is currently causing massive cost overruns, why should anyone believe it's going to work in the JSF within current budget estimates? And what about other unproven subsystems like the lift fans in the VTOL version - yes, we've demonstrated the technology but odds are there will be bumps in the road along the way and these cost money which the program is already spending too much of.
The most difficult monetary challenge for the program hasn't even begun - testing. The longer a testing period for a given technology drags on, the greater your costs become because there is no way in which to reduce costs effectively during testing, other than reducing tests which drags the cycle out even further causing more increases in costs. This process hasn't even begun yet and any setbacks, no matter how minor, will result in increased costs. And considering there are less than five years remaining before this thing is supposed to be on flight lines, this could present a serious problem. The F/A-22 has been in flight testing for over six years (and active development for another six prior to that) and isn't even close to ready for prime time, but the JSF will be ready to field in less than five? Yeah... sure... interested in buying a bridge?
Lack of Capabilities
It is never a good sign when the most striking feature of a system is the lack thereof. In an industry characterized by high technological advances and buzzwords, the JSF appears surprisingly lacking given it's hefty price tag. Let's do a quick features check:
Forward Canards to enhance manueverability? Nope.
Tri-plane Layout like the Russian Su-37? Nope.
Thrust Vectoring for super-manueverability? Nope.
Variable Geometry or forward swept wings? Nope.
Supercruise or similar speed capabilties? Nope.
Exotic design like a flying wing, no-tail, or wedge? Nope.
For what is being touted as a Fifth-generation superplane, this thing looks awfully familiar. Haven't we been spending billions on fighter technologies over the past two decades? Seems like an awful lot of research to be developing a new fighter that is really nothing more than a modernized F-16, a design that was originally conceived in the 1960s. When you break it all down, there are really only three features about the JSF that distinguish it from any of the thousands of other aircraft on the planet.
The first is composite construction but we first did this back in the 1970s with the F-117. It is also now a common method with other nations aircraft designs. Whether or not this is an appropriate design technique for an aircraft intended to fly at low altitudes is debateable. While the materials may be able to survive ground fire, how repairable will it be in the field? Given that the Air Force intends to replace the A-10 with this aircraft, this is certainly no minor detail.
The second key trait of the JSF is stealth but this is arguably the most over-rated technology in aviation history. It is a useful trait, but only in aircraft that are to be performing roles where stealth can be of benefit. For example, the F/A-22 is intended as an air superiority fighter where it is to square off against other fighters and long range radar aircraft - stealth is useful in this role as airborne radars tend to be lower in power and capability than ground based. The F/A-22 should also be going up against air defense systems where it's superpruise and thrust vectoring capabilities make it survivable in the role. Stealth isn't as useful here but there remains some benefit as long-range missiles tend to be internally radar guided and stealth will work against these. But the JSF is intended to be a strike fighter, which is a fighter that goes in low and hits critical targets - stealth is useless in this role. Low altitude systems tend to use heat-seeking and similar guidance systems that the JSF has no defenses against. These targets will also be protected by integrated air defense networks that can use radio and cellular signals to track even the smallest and stealthiest of aircraft. So here again, we're adding a feature that will likely give us no benefit at all.
The final great "feature" of the JSF is sensor fusion, but as has already been noted, this technology doesn't exist yet. Simply put, we don't know if we can make this work yet but it also poses another problem. Radio signals can be tracked by radar systems - if this is to be a stealth aircraft, it can't use radio signals which are necessary for sensor fusion to work. Ooops!
Can't Pass the Sniff Test
As a rule of thumb, if something smells like @%&#, it ain't no rose, and frankly the JSF isn't smelling too pretty here. For starters, there's the obvious issue of whether or not this is truely a "fifth-generation" fighter as its supporters claim. By any realistic measure, this design barely even rates fourth-generation status, much less fifth. When compared to existing third generation fighters, the JSF is really not impressive by any measure - there is nothing useful here that couldn't be incorporated into existing third-generation designs and some of the technologies ARE being added to the current aircraft. Pentagon claims that this aircraft is something special are dubious at best.
Then there's the nomenclature issue. Since aircraft that are designed to attack ground targets typically have "A" in their nomenclature, where is it? The Air Force has gone to great lengths justifying the need for the F/A-22 as being to protect the JSF (which is true given that the JSF is actually only a third-generation aircraft) because the JSF is to engage ground targets, so where is the "A"? They added it to the Raptor and made a huge production over the switch so why isn't this strike aircraft wearing appropriate nomenclature? And if the Air Force needs to "protect" the JSF, why doesn't the Navy, Marine Corps, or any of the international players in the JSF program?
And then there's that pesky little money question again. But let's look at it a little more closely, shall we? Using the Pentagon's bogus per plane costs and the current budget of R&D, the total costs that we come to for the JSF are only about $135billion for current plans, but the JSF budget is currently sitting at about $220billion? Where's the other $85billion going? Support costs? That's almost $30million per plane, must be some really good tools! For some perspective, consider that the entire C-17 program costs roughly $42billion and the F/A-22 program is currently scheduled for about $65billion and these are widely regarded as two of the biggest recent boondoggles. So what exactly is this other mystery $85billion for in the JSF budget? Until the Pentagon can keep their lies straight about what this plane is, what it is for, and how much it actually costs, then someone needs to pull the reigns on this horse because we can't afford to be gambling $220billion that we don't even have.
JSF Alternatives
Our options here are many and pretty much every one of them is a substantially better choice than continuing the current path of the JSF. If we really need a large fleet of fighters (and frankly I don't believe we do), there is no real reason we cannot simply reconstitute most of the force we currently have with upgraded units. For example, we could purchase 1400 modernized F-16Cs, along with 480 F/A-18Cs, and still have sufficient funds to develop and field 480 VTOL JSFs for the Navy/Marines, expand the F/A-22 fleet to 500 aircraft for the Air Force, and still save over $100billion compared to the current JSF plan. The Navy would still have access to the JSFs capabilities while the Air Force would still get the superior F/A-22. This would also keep Boeing in the fighter business with their loss in the JSF competition while Lockheed would still get major work and the JSF could still be made for allied forces as an alternative to the F/A-22 that most cannot afford. That $100billion could be put to far better use modernizing and upgrading other capabilities like adding 200 KC-33As and 100 C-17s to the transport fleets and modernizing the helicopter fleets with MH-60s and new CH-53Es (or comparable alternatives). Lockheed would still be producing 2400 new fighters for the United States (plus more for overseas), while Boeing would get contracts for 480 new fighters and about 300 large aircraft - seems like common sense to me if our intention is to maintain the aircraft industrial base.
Another legitimate option, given the incredible cost of the JSF, is to go with cruise missiles instead. A modern design with loitering capabilities and advanced sensors can be made for about $1million per shot. For $220billion, we would have sufficient money to purchase 440,000 cruise missiles initially, and then another 6000 or so every year with the savings from not having the huge force of expensive fighters and their costly pilots, fuel, and maintenance. And we would still have the F/A-22 and the F/A-18E for the work where fighters were actually needed so this is really a viable option that should be considered along with the cheap Arsenal Ship concept to carry the missiles to where they are needed. Realistically, it is hard to see where more than 100,000 missiles would ever be needed for an initial force so that $220billion could be reduced to about $50billion in initial costs and another $3billion per year after that, which would free up $170billion in procurement dollars for other needs while still meeting defense requirements.
The final option that I will propose is that we use a small mix of the above two options and use some of the savings for advanced technologies that will ultimately replace this class of fighters. This may involve unmanned vehicles, ultra-long-range missiles and guns, hypersonic bombers, or any of the many other concepts currently in their infancy that lack sufficient funding to get developed. The Raptor and Super Hornet programs have already exceeded their halfway points with regards to funding, we may as well finish them but there is no legitimate reason to be spending $220billion on an over-hyped, under-capable, short range conventional fighter. This is insanity, pure and simple, and we can't afford the money or the time for this nonsense.