Dominant Logistics
The Future Failure of FCS and Land Warrior
Arguably the most bizarre of future acquisition efforts within the military is the concepts driving the Future Combat Systems and Land Warrior programs. Don't get me wrong, I believe network centric warfare is a viable concept and we should begin the transition towards it, but the Army's lack of experience with sensor-driven warfare is evident in FCS And LW. So many lessons that have been learned the hard way are simply being tossed aside, not because there is any reason to believe they aren't relevant, but because Army planners insist that future technological developments will make these lessons irrelevant down the road. This foolishness will consign FCS and LW to failure unless we apply some basic and much needed common sense to the situation.
The Soda Straw Problem
The first major problem with these concepts is that they are based on the notion of enhanced survivability through improved situational awareness. In and of itself, this is a perfectly good concept, except that it is dependent upon sensors, like thermal sensors and motion sensors. Sensors are very valuable tools, but it is easy to place too much emphasis on them. Sensors lack the peripheral visual capabilities of the human eye and are therefore limited to only sensing in small sections of the battlefield as opposed to sensing across the complete picture. Sensors are also vulnerable to various means of deception and countering. The best example of how this problem will actually be handled in the field can be seen atop any given Abrams tank. The tank is filled to the gills with some of the best sensors in the world, so the TC sticks his head out the top because it is the only means available to him to actually see what is really happening outside.
Current planners intend to counter this problem by simply fielding more sensors and combining their views to form a single composite view of the battlespace that will be available to all fighters. But even this approach is problematic at best. The single greatest problem is that we lack a sufficient Combat Data Infrastructure to support this technique of data processing. In short, the means necessary to collect, compile, and distribute this composite view isn't in place, nor is it even in the design phase based upon currently available information.
Two things must occur in order to overcome the Soda Straw Problem. First, we must develop and field a legitimate Combat Data Infrastructure that will connect the entire battlespace with no gaps in coverage, regardless of circumstances. This must be something akin to a wireless Internet with very high bandwidth and robustness. Second, the sensors employed must match the resolution and depth of the human eye. Until we can view things as good with sensors as we can with the eye, then soldiers will still only use sensors on a part time basis, limiting the utility of the sensors and actually slowing the soldier down as he attempts to correlate the sensor data with the real world.
The Power Problem
Any technological system requires power in some form. In vehicles, this power comes from the vehicle's engine but things get a little trickier when we look at some of these other contraptions the Army insists we need. In general, any technological system that is a full time system must have its own dedicated power source and this should not be confused with batteries or other means of storing power. As the power needs of the gear of the soldier increase, batteries become impractical because they can only provide power for a limited time whereas the need for power is constant.
Until biotechnology enables us to tap into the potential of the human body to provide this electricity, we must find other means by which to meet the growing need. Fuel cells offer a potential answer but these will still be dependent upon a fuel source to remain active. This is better than a pure battery but still involves obvious limitations. Personally, I believe our efforts should focus more on microgenerator technologies.
Realistically, a soldier could have a total of 12 microgenerators integrated into his gear to provide power to batteries that would store it as needed and provide power during stops in movement. Each boot could house four microgenerators, two in the ball of the sole working on a rotation basis while two more in the heel work through compression. Two more microgenerators could work rotationally at the knees giving each soldier a total of 12 generators.
Until we develop the means to include power generation into the mix of Land Warrior, batteries will continue to be a problem with this concept. This will always be a burden that we'll have to overcome until we get our priorities straight.
Lack of Data Infrastructure
This problem was already touched upon but needs to be expanded. The fundamental problem is that we are designing a mobile force that will be wholly reliant upon a static communications network. This is to say that the network is a physically separate entity from the combat force - it must be moved along with the force or the force may lose it's communications capabilities and thus become tactically blind.
The planned Joint Tactical Radio System will address some of this problem but this program lacks the level of funding necessary to expand this concept into what is fully needed. It is all well and good to use existing aircraft as communication relays, but there needs to be mobile relay capabilities on the ground as well. Any radio is limited in it's range and the propensity of Air Force assets to remain above 10,000 feet for survivability reasons can cause problems in this area. Existing ground capabilities tend to focus on fixed relay sites that are difficult to move along with the force, but more importantly cannot follow along with the force when combat is first initiated. In short, our reliance on fixed antennaes means that advance forces may easily be blinded by a foe in the earliest and most difficult phases of conflict. When our technology is needed most, it is least likely to be available.
The means to provide mobile relay capabilities on the ground should be fairly straightforward once we get JTRS online. It is possible for electronically scanned radar arrays to serve as transceivers for communications with JTRS. The Air Force currently plans to use this capability to enable most aircraft to function as communications relays and a similar approach should be used on the ground. The Army has virtually eliminated all of it's radar-guided anti-aircraft systems except for the Patriot. Even the guns are no longer radar guided. By returning a radar capability to frontline ADA forces, preferably as a radar-guided gun on an armored vehicle, we can add electronically scanned radar arrays to the ground forces in a mobile and protected platform that will be accompanying the frontline forces anyways. We gain our mobile ground relay capability in addition to a more effective and useful gun system.
Information Overload
There's an old maxim in the Information Technology business that says if you take a given mess and throw a computer at it, all you get is a bigger, computerized mess. I have yet to see any evidence suggesting that we are not doing just that with current combat information systems. Let's review some of our more recent actions.
We blew up an aspirin factory in Sudan because we were sure it was producing WMDs. We've blown up countless empty terrorist camps. In Kosovo, we blew up a civilian train, a refugee convoy, and the Chinese embassy. We bombed the Canadians in Afghanistan. And in recent actions in Iraq, we hit bunkers that never existed, shot down at least one of our own aircraft, and opened fire on ourselves numerous times. Now then, who exactly is it that is going to be putting the targeting and identification data into this warfare network? The same folks who today cannot consistently get it right.
Data sharing is not going to lift the fog of war - if anything, it will make the cloud thicker as the entire force will now be sharing the same bogus information. This will inevitably lead to information overload as the data produced by the systems cannot be trusted to be accurate. Land Warrior purports to be a system that will enable the soldier to be more lethal but in reality, while it may be beneficial in some circumstances, it is actually designed to function more like a conscience than an assistant.
Combat is largely a matter of operating on instinct - Land Warrior is intended to serve as the little angel and devil on each shoulder telling you what is and is not correct. Think of this in terms of an infantryman on patrol spotting a person in the distance - without Land Warrior, there is only one question to be answered: shoot or don't shoot? With Land Warrior, or any similar system, there are far more questions to deal with. It starts with whether or not the person is a threat, but then we consult the LW network to tell us it's own thoughts on the matter. Then we must ask ourselves if the computer is correct or not as sensors can be fooled, perhaps this is a lost American who had to shed his IFF sensor for survivability reasons? And then once we have the network's suggestion, we still wind up at the same question as without LW: shoot or don't shoot? So instead of dealing with a single question we are expanding it to four questions, introducing greater opportunities for errors and slowing down the decision-making process altogether.
This is the root cause of information overload. As a matter of basic neurology, the human brain can only hold a limited number of items in short term memory, typically about seven items but this is an average and it varies wildly. A soldier without LW that is facing two threats only has to remember two items, whether or not to shoot each of the given targets. A soldier outfitted with LW or any similar system now must go through eight items to reach the same conclusion as the first soldier, shoot or don't shoot. Throw in a third potential target and while the first soldier is not struggling at all to keep his information straight, the "improved" soldier is now juggling data between short term and long term memory and experiencing information overload - and this is with only two targets and no other factors being included in the mix. This is grossly oversimplified but it points out the fundamental problem with combat computers - while the computer has tremendous benefits in some roles, it generally requires more information processing than not using a computer when it comes to basic tasks and skills. Computers do not decrease workload; they increase it. The perception of a decrease comes from the inherent speed of the computer in its tasks.
To address this problem, we should limit the use of these systems to those areas of the force where they will be most beneficial and avoid using them forcewide. For example, most crew served weapons already are reliant upon the communication and sensor capabilities we currently have. Crew served systems need enhanced data processing capabilities to manage the enhanced lethality and capabilities of their systems - they are stuck in the information overload trap already and improving their capability to manage it would be very beneficial. The individual soldier should be left out of this mess so that the majority of the ground force has their head in the fight and not buried in a computer.
Limitations of UAVs and UGVs
Unmanned vehicles are all the rage today and they do bring some unique and valuable possibilities to the combat table. On the other hand, they also bring a whole host of problems that must be dealt with so that the vehicles help the force and not hinder it. Current plans take unmanned vehicles into roles where they may very well cause more harm than good.
One of the more intriguing designs is for a UGV called a Mule. In essence, this vehicle would serve as a robotic mule to carry larger loads in an automated fashion. In theory, this will help the soldier on the ground to lighten his load and free him up to address the enemy. On the other hand, these mules may well cause more problems than they solve. Powering the mules is one obvious issue as the mules will require additional fuel or other means of power in order to operate. They also must be sufficiently programmed to deal with the wide variety of situations that can occur on a battlefield such as bypassing obstacles and avoiding holes, traps, and bomb craters. The mules will also require regular maintenance as all mechanical equipment does. And finally, they are dependent on the same communications capabilities that we are lacking to begin with.
Gaps in our communications capabilities are currently planned to be addressed using UAVs but here again, we face a variety of problems. For example, our lightest forces will be on the ground and fighting before the systems to operate the UAVs will be available. Moreover, the UAVs themselves can give away locations of where our forces are operating, allowing the enemy to interpret our actions without even actually seeing our forces. And as with the UGVs, there are obvious maintenance and fuel issues that add further burden to our already heavily strained logistics forces.
The final major problem with unmanned vehicles comes from the practice of using them as vehicles for sensors. While this isn't necessarily a bad concept, it significantly increases the costs of the systems and places highly valuable sensor capabilities in a position where the enemy can capture and use them against our own forces. The driving force behind unmanned vehicles is to use them in the highly dangerous roles where lives would otherwise be at great risk of being captured or killed. It doesn't make sense to instead place our most valuable and critical technologies in this role instead. These are essentially disposable vehicles and yet billions of dollars in advanced technologies are being placed on them, making it inevitable that these capabilities will fall into the wrong hands and be used against us.
Summary
Many other problems existing within the Future Combat Systems and Land Warrior programs but these appear to be the most critical items that must be addressed immediately. Before we continue to waste billions of dollars on useless programs like Commanche, FCS, Stryker, and Land Warrior, we must address the following critical needs: