Citizens for Reform has been covering the legal challenges in the above captioned matter as the legal implications imply the unconstitutionality of the civil commitment of sex offenders who have been denied jury trials in Minnesota when, “serious” deprivations of liberty are at issue. Last month we printed, in part, the states response to the Appellant’s brief. Appellant (Poole) has consistently argued that “The Common Law antecedents of both the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution require the conclusion that jury trials were required to prevent Government oppression, whenever liberty is at issue.” Appellant’s reply brief dated December 23, 2002, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit argues, in part, the analysis applied by the Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1971) as follows: The court in Duncan traced the jury to the American colonies, as reflected in: the 1765 Stamp Act Congress which resolved, “[T]hat trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies;, the First Continental Congress, which objected to trials before judges, rather than being “tried by their peers of vicinage;” the Declaration of Independence; Art. III, sec.2 of the Constitution; as well as, the Sixth Amendment, itself. Duncan at 152-153. The Court also referred to previous opinions in which the Court had recognized that the right to a jury trial flowed from the font of common law: “Those who immigrated to this country from England brought with them this great privilege as their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law which fenced around and interposed barriers on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power.” Duncan at 154, citing Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-350 (1898), Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721, States Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, (1955) and Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 122 (1866). [T]he jury trial provision in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power -- a reluctance to plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or a group of judges. Duncan at 156 [emphasis added]. In Humphry v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), the Court held that the right to jury trial, particularly with judgments of predicted dangerousness are at issues, is an indispensable part of a fair civil commitment process. According to the Court: “Like most, if not all, other States with similar legislation, Wisconsin conditions such confinement not solely on the medical judgment that the defendants is mentally ill and treatable, but also on the social and legal judgment that his potential for doing harm, to himself or to others, is great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty, the jury serves the critical function of introducing into the process a lay judgment, reflecting values generally held in the community, concerning the kinds of potential harm that justify the State in confining a person for compulsory treatment.” Humphry at 509 {emphasis added). The Due Process right to a jury trial in civil commitment proceedings when “liberty” is at issue has been so well accepted in the Common Law, State Constitutions, and in the Supreme Court “civil commitment” jurisprudence, the refusal to grant a jury trial was contrary to established Federal Law and was an unreasonable interpretation of Federal Law. |
| In the Matter of James Robinson Poole, M.D. v. Michael O’Keefe, etc. |
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| To view appellant and appellee briefs, click on the link below to go to 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Website: (Case No. 02-2629) www.ca8.uscourts.gov/index.html |
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