The Jakarta Post, November 21, 2001
Opinion
Challenge of political Islam to Megawati
Azyumardi Azra, Rector, State Islamic Studies Institute (IAIN), Jakarta
The waves of anti-American mass-demonstrations seem to have decreased
significantly. But this does not mean that "political Islam" will also diminish. There is
strong evidence that political Islam, which has gained momentum since the fall of
Soeharto, may continue to exert itself in the era of President Megawati Soekarnoputri
and even afterwards. It will thus continue to affect not only the Megawati presidency,
but also the course of Indonesian politics as a whole.
The rise of political Islam in post-Soeharto Indonesia is clear from several trends.
First, the establishment of a great number of "Islamic parties" that mostly adopt Islam
as their basis replacing Pancasila, formerly the sole basis of any organization;
second, increasing demands from certain groups of Muslims for the official adoption
and implementation of syariah by, among other things, the reintroduction of the
so-called "Jakarta Charter" to the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution.
The third tendency is the proliferation of Muslim groups considered by many as
radicals, such as the Lasykar Jihad (Jihad Troops), the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic
Defense Front), the Hizb al-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) and the Angkatan Mujahidin
Indonesia (the Jihad Fighter Group of Indonesia).
The three developments -- by no means exhaustive -- to some appear to represent not
only great challenges for Megawati's presidency, but also to the existence of the
Pancasila state. Indeed, the very idea of transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state
could bring the future of democracy and pluralism in Indonesia into question.
However, despite the recent tendency to cling more closely to political and formal
Islam, it remains difficult to imagine that Indonesia would and could be transformed
into an Islamic state.
The three new trends could be very alarming for those who are concerned with the
nation's future of democracy. Yet a number of factors are at work that make the
realization of the various agendas of political Islam in Indonesia very unlikely.
Any discussion of Muslim politics should avoid sweeping generalizations. The scholar
Robert Hefner has argued that there is no single, civilization-wide pattern of Muslim
politics, but a variety of competing organizations and ideals.
Hefner wrote in his 1999 book that the modern era's nation-making and market
globalization have, if anything, only increased the pluralism and contestation of
politics in the Muslim world. Thus the most significant "clash of cultures" of today and
the new millennium is not that between distinct civilizations, but between rival political
traditions within the same Islamic country.
The contest and rivalry among a variety of Islamic political traditions are becoming
increasingly complex with the contemporary Islamic revival.
The "revival of religion" -- including Islam -- that has swept many parts of the globe
over at least the last two decades has revived old debates on the relationship between
Islam and politics. Both at the theoretical and practical levels Muslim intellectuals,
scholars, ulema and leaders have been entangled in such issues as the compatibility
or incompatibility between Islam and contemporary ideas and practices of democracy,
civil society and human rights.
Again, there is no single and monolithic answer to these questions. One thing to be
sure of is that most Muslims have accepted -- albeit tacitly -- the modern form of the
nation-state. But one can also be sure that there is a great number of differences
among Muslims, for instance, over the kind and level of democracy that would and
could be implemented in their respective countries.
While Islamic revival is continually gaining momentum, there are signs that many
secular nation-states in the Muslim world have failed to deliver on their promises. This
failure has not only eroded the credibility of secular regimes in the eyes of an
ever-growing number of Muslims, but has also created strong skepticism about the
viability of modern nation-states.
This is evident from attempts carried out by certain Muslim movements, regarded by
many as radicals, such as the Hizb al-Tahrir, Gama'ah Tafkir wa al-Hijrah and other
splinter groups of the Ikhwan al-Muslimun, to replace secular regimes and
nation-states with the classic model of an "Islamic state", better known as the
caliphate (al-khilafah), or in contemporary discourse among these movements, a
"universal caliphate".
The proponents of the universal caliphate believe that this kind of Islamic political
entity led by a single caliph is the answer and the only solution to resolve Muslim
disunity and powerlessness vis-a-vis the Western powers.
The contemporary revival of the idea of a single and universal caliphate, undoubtedly,
is very problematic. The idea is mostly based on historical and religious romanticism
as well as a misconception of not only the very meaning of the caliphate but also of
the historical development of the caliphate itself in the post-Prophet Muhammad
period.
Supporters of the caliphate have confused and have failed to distinguish between the
original and genuine caliphate during the Rightly Guided Caliph (al-khulafa'
al-rashidun) period and the despotic monarchies of the Umayyads, Abbasids and the
Ottomans. While at least the first two caliphs i.e. Abu Bakr and Umar ibn al-Khattab,
were elected on their merits, the subsequent "caliphs" in the post al-khulafa'
al-rashidun period were essentially kings who enjoyed uncontested rights and
privileges over all other Muslims.
Therefore, modern thinkers on the caliphate such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, `Abd
al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Rashid Rida, Sayyid Qutb and Abu al-A`la al-Mawdudi have
all refused to recognize the credibility and legitimacy of those Muslim kings as
"caliphs".
One should be aware, however, that these thinkers proposed different, if not conflicting
ideas, on some of the main themes of the caliphate. Al-Kawakibi and Rida, for
instance, insisted that the caliph should be an Arab of the Quraysh tribe.
Al-Mawdudi strongly refutes this idea; to him the caliph should be democratically
elected to represent all Muslims based on merit by a special electing body, the Majlis
al-Shura. He says that the lofty position of the caliph must not be reserved for Arabs,
since they have no special privileges over other non-Arab Muslims.
Despite all the conceptual and practical problems surrounding the feasibility and
viability of the caliphate today and in the new millennium, the idea seems to have
continually attracted certain elements of Muslims throughout the world.
In Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, the idea of the caliphate has been
promoted by such organizations as Hizb al-Tahrir and Jamaah Tarbiyah at least since
the 1990s.
Under Soeharto, these movements were very careful not to invite the regime to take
firm actions against their activities. They survived his harsh rule and made themselves
more pronounced in the post-Soeharto period.
The above is based on the writer's presentation at the Joint Public Forum on
Indonesia, held by Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Jakarta's
Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Singapore, Nov. 1.
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