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Revised paper for the Proceedings of the Conference on "Conflicts and Violence in Indonesia," organised by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Department of African and Asian Studies, Humboldt-University in Berlin, July 3-5, 2000.

GUNS, PAMPHLETS AND HANDIE-TALKIES (1  2  3  4  5):
How the military exploited local ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges

George Junus Aditjondro
(Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Newcastle, Australia)

we will further encounter in this chapter. Ongen's 'boys' mainly came from the villages of Pelauw and Kailolo on Haruku (SiaR, January 26 & February 5, 1999; Xpos, January 28-February 3, 1999, February 4-10, 1999; interview with sources in Maluku and Java, February 1999).

In the wake o fthe Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) in November 1998, when Suharto's successor, B.J.Habibie sought a legitimate mandate for his presidency, certain politicians, generals and business people created a new vigilante group to counter the student demonstrations. It was called Pam Swakarsa, which consisted of the Muslim Ambonese gangsters recruited by Dedy Hamdun and Muslim villagers recruited from various areas in West Java. Financial support for these vigilante groups came from the Suharto family and from a North Moluccan businessman of Arabic descent, Fadel Muhammad, whose businesses were closely linked to the Suharto family.While political patronage for those groups came from then Defense Minister, General Wiranto, MPR Deputy Speaker, Abdul Gafur, who hails from North Maluku, and the Jakarta Military Commander, Maj.-Gen. Djadja Suparman (Tempo, November 30, 1998: 44, 48, 50 ; Hadar 2000).

A former Minister for Youth and Sport under Suharto, Gafur had consistently tried to divide the Moluccan community in Jakarta along religiouslines. On May 15, 1995,when the Ambonese community in Jakarta were commemorating the day that Pattimura launched his rebellion against the Dutch in 1817,Gafur boycotted the all-Moluccan celebration in Gedung Joang in the Menteng neighbourhood, where both Christian and Muslim religious leaders said their prayers. He organized instead an exclusive celebration for MuslimMoluccans at Mrs.Suhartinah Suharto's Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park, by organizing a Pattimura torch run. On another occasion, Gafur claimed that Pattimura was Islam, refuting a well-documented fact that the national hero,whose real name was Thomas Matulessy, was a Christian (see Chauvel 1990:111,369; van Kaam 1977 : 11 - 37).

Returning to Ongen Sangaji's group, four of them who hailed from Kailolo (Haruku), Tulehu and Hitu (Ambon), and Kei (Southeast Maluku) were killed by locals who rushed to defend the student activists from attacks by the Muslim vigilantes. It is also important to note that to raise the militancy of these poor and lowly educated vigilantes were brainwashed to believe that the student activists were "Communists" and were supported by Christian generals and businessmen. Many vigilantes thus saw their mission as a 'holy war' (jihad ) against "infidels." The fact that the fiercest battle between students and soldiers took place at the campus of the Atma Jaya Catholic University -- due to its proximity to the parliament building -- gave a sense of credibility to this sectarian and anti-communist propaganda (Tempo, November 30, 1998: 27; Xpos, January 28 - February 3, 1999).

So, when four Muslim Moluccan gangsters were killed, the ground was laid to provoke Muslim Ambonese revenge not against the student movement, but against Christian Moluccans gangsters in Jakarta. That opportunity emerged during the riots in the Ketapang neighbourhood on Sunday and Monday, November 22-23, 1998. What began as a relatively harmless brawl between Christian Ambonese security guards of a gambling centre and locals instantly developed into a massive anti-Christian riot, where dozens of churches, schools, houses, banks, shops and dozens of motor vehicles were burned and destroyed.

Further investigations show that outside forces were involved in turning this local conflict into an inter-religious conflict. These outside forces included a group of 'Ambonese-looking' men, who raided the Ketapang neighbourhood at 5.30 am at dawn. They were paid Rp 40,000 plus three meals a day to terrorise Muslims. Although one of them was a Batak person from North Sumatra who was executed by the locals, the majority of these gangsters turned out to be members of the Muslim Ambonese vigilantes who had joined Gafur's PAM Swakarsa forces. They attacked all local residents who were seen moving around, and burned down a motorcycle parked in front of a local mosque, causing some of the mosque's windows to be broken. This then became the 'apparent spark' that turned the local conflict into an inter-religious riot, since rumours were spread around that a mosque was burned down by 'infidels.' The local Muslims began to counter-attack those earlier outsiders, supported by members of a Muslim paramilitary group, FPI (Front Pembela Islam ), who had been brought in from various places around Jakarta. During these riots, six people found their death in raw justice handed out by local Muslims and their outside supporters, and seven died after being burned alive in the local entertainment centre which was the original cause of the conflict. Three of the victims were Christians from Saparua and Haruku (Simanjuntak 2000: 54-55; Tempo, November 30, 1998: 30-31; SiaR, November 24, 1998, January 26, 1999; Waspada, November 24, 1998; RAPwashjp@aol.com, November 27, 1998; interviews with sources in Ambon and Java, February-June 2000).

It is unclear whether the successive killings of Muslim and Christian Ambonese gangsters in Jakarta were premidated by political allies of Suharto. The Ketapang riots in particular, however, created a monopoly for another gambling centre on Jalan Kunir, Jakarta. Claimed to be one of the largest gambling centre in Southeast Asia, this 'Paradise entertainment centre' is managed by Tomy Winata, a Sino-Indonesian business partner of Suharto's middle son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, and close friend of Yorris Raweyai of Pemuda Pancasila (SiaR, November 24, 1998; Tempo , June 6, 1999: 39-51).

Regardless of the motive behind the burning of the Ketapang gambling centre, the killings of Muslim and Christian Ambonese gangsters did provide both groups -- unaware of the forces 'higher up' manipulating them - with strong motivations to take revenge on each other later in their homelands, Maluku.

Using the Ketapang riots as an excuse, the security authorities rounded up all Moluccans in Jakarta who had no proper identification papers (KTP) and put them on passenger ships as well as Navy ships bound to Ambon. According to a respondent who sailed on KM Bukit Siguntang to Ambon in December 1998, a group of Ketapang gangsters travelling on the ship's public space loudly expressed their intention to take revenge against their Christian rivals. They had taken their knives and machettes with them, which was kept by their leader, a tall man who travelled on the ship's third class for tourists, in the large drawer below his bed.

These measures by the Indonesian security apparatus did not look suspicious because many of Christian Ambonese were returning home for Christmas, while Muslim Ambonese were also planning to spend the Muslim fasting month (Ramadhan) and Idul Fitri holiday with relatives. Hence, between 165 and 600 young Ambonese men were later identified of having sailed to Ambon during the end of 1998. Among them were Christian Ambonese gangsters, who were involved in the dawn raid at Ketapang, as well as Sadrakh Mastamu, the head of the security guards of the Ketapang gambling centre (Tempo, February 8, 1999: 37; Forum Keadilan, February 8, 1999: 25; Humor, September 1995: 45; interviews with sources in Ambon, Java and Australia, February-June 2000).

The two arch-rivals, Ongen Sangaji and Milton Matuanakotta were also among the Ambonese gangsters that returned to Ambon at the end of 1998, to create the initial spark for the Ambon riots. Their return to Ambon was co-accidental with the assignment to Ambon of between 50 and 100 West Javanese volunteers by Yayasan Kesejahteraan Masyarakat Indonesia (Yakmi). This foundation is led by Suharto's eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana and Abdul Gafur. Its volunteers are officially called Satgas Tebas (Satuan Tugas Tenaga Bantuan Sukarela ), which literally means 'Volunteers Taskforce', but the abbreviation 'Tebas' can also mean 'Slash,' so, Satgas Tebas can also mean 'Slashing Taskforce.' They had previously also been involved with Ongen's boys in the PAM Swakarsa militias which fought pitch battles with the student activists in November 1998. Ten Satgas Tebas members were caught by the police in Ambon, but were probably soon released (SiaR, December 2, 1998, January 26 & 29, 1999; Xpos, January 28-February 3 & February 4-10, 1999; interviews with sources in Jakarta and Ambon, July - August 2000).

EXTERNAL ACTORS:

Following Bartels (2000), the conflict in Maluku can be divided into two distinctive phases. The first phase began in January 1999 and ended at the end of April 2000. This phase was characterised by mutual attacks of native Christians and Muslims using largely primitive home-made weapons and self-made bombs (bom rakitan ). Generally, there was an equilibrium of strength. Then, the second phase began in May 2000, characterised by the arrival of non-Moluccans, mostly Muslims from Java, Sulawesi, and Sumatra, called Lasykar Jihad (Holy War Forces). They brought with them sophisticated modern weaponry and allied themselves with Muslim personnel of the military which constituted about eighty per cent of the troops stationed in the Spice Islands. These developments totally destroyed the previous balance, tipping the scale in favour of the Muslims.

During the first phase, when relatively fewer people had been killed and the level of inter-religious hatred had not been reached its climax, carefully planned intelligence operations conditioned both communities to jump at each other's neck as soon as a social spark had been ignited. These intelligence operations included the distribution of provocative pamphlets among the ordinary population, and the distribution of handie-talkie phones among ring leaders, to ensure that the riots could be triggered simultaneously over a wide range (Nation, February 19, 1999). Some anonymous pamphlets which circulated in Ambon prior to the January and February 1999 riots warned both parties that the other party was planning to burn their houses of worship, and others warned one ethnic group that another ethnic group was planning to annihilate them (Nation, February 19, 1999; Warta Berita Radio Nederland, January 12, 2000; Sydney Morning Herald, January 15, 2000; Forum Keadilan, January 30, 2000: 19, 25).

Similarly, pamphlets were circulating among Muslims in North Maluku, prior to the August and November 1999 riots, ostensibly signed by Protestant church leaders in Ambon, urged Christians to convert or annihilate all Muslims. One of these pamphlets was brought to the attention of a village administrator in Tidore. A meeting was called and when the local minister, Ari Risakotta, did not turn up to explain the letter's content, he was attacked and killed in his house. With fighting still going on in Ambon, it is most unlikely that any church leader would want another conflict in the archipelago. So, it can be concluded that these pamphlet must have been made by highly professional agitators who knows the North Moluccan society very well (Alhadar 2000: 15; Bubant 2000; SNB 2000).

Eventually, after the fratricide had been going on for several months, and enough victims had been killed on both sides, calls for waging the 'holy war' (jihad ) were aired by militant Muslim organisations, supported by several of the most highly ranked Muslim politicians in a mass rally on January 7, 2000 at the Monas square in Jakarta, which became the platform to mobilise jihad forces to be sent to Maluku.

continued to part 4

From: aditjond@psychology.newcastle.edu.au (George J. Aditjondro)
Subject: GJA: Guns, pamphlets & handie-talkies (3)


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