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Syria and International Terrorism

With the entry of armed Palestinians into Lebanon in the late 1960s and early 1970s the country became a training ground for international terrorist groups. With large numbers of Palestinian guerrillas pouring across the borders into Lebanon, the Lebanese found themselves unable to control the situation. Soon terrorist training camps were established in areas under Palestinian control and terrorists from all over the world came to Lebanon to learn the art of terror. Lebanese efforts to control the activity of the Palestinians resulted in a full blown war with the Lebanese right on one side and the Palestinians and the Lebanese radical left wing on the other. International terror groups training in Lebanon as well just about any socialist idealist who had nothing better to do sided with the Palestinians and fought in Lebanon. The Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Red Army Faction, the Red Brigade, the Japanese Red Army Faction, the IRA, the PKK and countless other groups journeyed to Lebanon to take instruction from and fight along side the Palestinians. The interaction of all of these groups in the training camps formed strong relationships and thus an international network with these groups often working together. With Syrian sponsorship, and then direct Syrian support after the Syrians invaded Lebanon, Palestinian terror groups flourished in Lebanon and the Bekaa valley became, and in some cases still is, the base of operation for organizations like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Popular Struggle Front (PSF), the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), and The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) to name but a few. It was not long before Syria started to use these groups to spread terror for its own aims.

The use of terror as an instrument in the hands of Syrian policy makers, as well as the sponsorship of terrorism dates back some thirty years, indeed it is as old as the Assad regime. The use of terror, and the way in which it has been utilized by the Syrian regime, has changed over the years, as a consequence of developments in Syria, in the inter-Arab arena, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in the relations between Syria and Western countries, principally the United States. In the course of the 1970's and 1980's the Syrian regime faced internal and external difficulties, which led it to an intensify its use of terrorism, at times including direct Syrian involvement in acts of terror.

Syria's patronage first and foremost allows the terrorist organizations to find refuge and shelter on Syrian or Syrian-controlled Lebanese territory, where they enjoy comfortable political and security conditions. Terrorist groups can thus organize training; develop a logistical infrastructure (Weapons, storehouses, communications, documentation, funds and so on); they can take advantage of the political and propaganda cover of official Syrian bodies. They can travel freely between Syria, Lebanon and Iran, and between Syria and Lebanon and other Arab states; they can develop channels of communication to the existing infrastructure in Judea, Samaria and Gaza; they can travel to and from Europe; they can develop a financial infrastructure and pass money on to activists in Judea, Samaria and Gaza; they can benefit from each others' assistance; they can establish contacts with other terror supporting states, principally Iran, Syria’s ally. At he same time, the Syrians keep a close eye on the terrorist organizations, particularly those who might potentially pose a danger to the regime. The Syrians see these organizations as essentially bargaining chips, which may be cynically used and then discarded. They expel terrorists from their territory and that of Lebanon, or imprison them without charge; they send intelligence agents into the organizations, and use them according to the shifting needs of the Syrian intelligence structures.

The central reason for Syria's support for terrorism is the wide gap between the far-reaching ambitions of the Syrian regime to achieve regional hegemony - primarily via Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians - and to play a leading role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the objective limitations and weakness of the Syrian state. In the military field, Syria has a strong military but is clearly inferior to Israel; It is not a state with a large population and political tradition of longevity, as is Egypt. It does not possess great natural wealth and economic resources, as do Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or Iraq; It has no tradition of democracy or openness, and the existing Alawi regime, though it has brought Syria stability, behaves in a brutally oppressive fashion toward the opposition, which draws its own strength from the Sunni Muslim majority. In the absence of military, economic or demographic capabilities to translate into political strength and no moral or legal impediments, and without legitimacy at home, the regime has turned terrorism into its main weapon. The intensive and continuing use of terrorism makes it possible for the Syrian regime to advance by force a wide range of objectives while fitting in with changing requirements and developments: ensuring the survival of the regime at home; “punishing” Western countries and obtaining political gains from them; punishing Syria's enemies in the Arab world and applying pressure to them; and advancing Syria's interests in the Arab-Israel conflict. All this is accomplished without the need to resort to military force or engage in a military confrontation with Israel at an inopportune moment and in potentially disastrous circumstances.

Terror as an instrument for suppressing opposition to the regime

In the 1970's and 1980's the Assad regime made extensive use of military force and brutal oppression to suppress domestic Sunni Muslim opposition, which at that time had raised its head and posed a danger to the stability of the regime. The use of the state’s military force to suppress opposition is not typical only of the Assad regime. Such methods have also been used by other members of the “club” of nations which support terrorism such as Saddam Hussein of Iraq, who did not hesitate to use chemical weapons against his own people, and the Iranian regime, which assassinated its opponents abroad.

The clearest expression of the use of the state’s military force against domestic opposition was the suppression of the popular rising in the city of Hama by elite units of the Syrian army, led by the 569 division, commanded by Rifa'at Assad, younger brother of the President, and the commando units (“special forces”) headed by Ali Haydar, (a prominent Alawi officer loyal to Assad). In the course of the attack carried out by these units on the city of Hama, the fourth largest city in Syria and stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood, in January 1982, 15-20,000 Syrian civilians were killed, and whole neighborhoods were completely destroyed in this ancient and well-known city.

The use of terrorist methods against opponents of the Assad regime has taken place not only within Syria itself. Opposition members living in Europe and the Middle East have been systematically murdered by the security and intelligence agencies of the regime, who have made use of diplomatic immunity and of Syrian embassies as bases for carrying out terrorist operations. Some examples of assassinations of this kind in which Syrian governmental institutions were involved: In Amman a member of the Syrian embassy’s personnel stood at the head of a death squad which murdered Abed al-Wahab Bakri, exiled leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. (July 1980). In Kuwait Syrian embassy employees were behind an attempted terrorist attack on an organisation of Muslim Brotherhood supporters (November 1980). In Paris, Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a former prime minister of Syria and one of the founders of the Ba'ath party, was assassinated (July 1980). In West Germany the Syrian embassy was involved in an attempt on the life of Muslim Brotherhood leader Issam al-Attar, in which Attar's wife was killed (March 1981).

Terror as a tool for promoting Syrian objectives on the pan-Arab arena

In the pan-Arab arena, frequent use of the “terror weapon” has been made by Syria against Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians, three of the component factors of “Greater Syria” (in the Syrian view). This was done in an attempt to impose Syrian hegemony over them and bring them into line with Syrian policy. Syria also used the “terror weapon” against Egypt and Iraq, its two main rivals in the Arab world, albeit with less successful results. It was used against Egypt at the end of the 1970s because of what the Syrians viewed as Egypt’s departure from its joint strategy with Syria (by agreeing to make a separate peace with Israel after Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem). Iraq, on the other hand, served as a target for terror attacks so long as relations between the competing Baathist regimes were hostile.

What particularly stands out in the pan-Arab arena is the Syrian use of terrorism in Lebanon, mainly against opponents of the “Syrian order”. The main Lebanese leaders killed by Syrian proxies were: Bashir Gemayel (who was accused by Syrian propaganda of being a “Zionist proxy”); and Kamal Jumblatt (accused of being a “traitor” and an “American agent”). Bashir Gemayel, commander of the “Lebanese Forces”, was murdered by Habib Tanius Shartouni, a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), (which has often been used as a “subcontractor” by Syrian ), three weeks after being elected president of Lebanon (September 14, 1982). Kamal Jumblatt, the main Druze leader who stood at the head of the Palestinian and left-wing organizations and was the moving spirit behind the anti-Syrian coalition at the start of the Lebanese war, was murdered by Syrian agents after the Syrian army took over the Shouf mountains and entered Beirut (March 16, 1977). The Lebanese media also came in for special treatment, having shown too much support for Syria’s opponents, in the opinion of the Syrians, during the Lebanese war. For example Salim al-Lawzi, editor of the newspaper Al-Hawadeth, who took an anti-Syrian line in his paper and was forced to flee to London, was brutally murdered during a visit to his homeland. His body was found on March 4, 1980. His fingers had been dissolved in acid, as a warning to all who might dare to write against Syria.

Syrian terror in Lebanon also took the form of collective punishment, not only against opponents of the "Syrian order" from among the Christian population (1978), or in the city of Zahle (1980-81), but even against Muslim inhabitants of Beirut. Immediately following the renewed entry of Syrian forces into Beirut in February 1987 (from where they had been forced to leave by the Israeli army in 1982), the Syrians killed 23 men and women in the Basta quarter in the northern part of the city. The Syrians claimed the victims belonged to Hezbollah and opposed the handover of their base to Syria. Hezbollah labeled it a “massacre in cold blood.” “Voice of Islam” radio, the Hezbollah station, claimed that the pathology report of the doctor who examined the bodies confirmed that all those killed had received gunshots to the head, from behind, from a distance of three meters. Among the dead were 4 women, and 4 youths. All had been shot in a single room. It became clear that all had been subjected to violence and torture before being killed. Their hands had been tied behind their backs (“Voice of Islam”, February 25, 1987). Approximately 50,000 people took part in the victims funerals, chanting “Death to Ghazi Cana’an”, as he was viewed as bearing responsibility for the massacre (Al-Nahar, February 26, 1987).

Not only in Lebanon have the Syrians made use of terror. Jordan was a preferred target for Syrian terrorism in the first half of the 1980's, against the background of the deterioration in relations between the two countries. Egypt became a target after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords as part of a campaign to punish Egypt and isolate it in the Arab world. The PLO and Fatah leadership were also a traditional target for Syrian terror whenever relations became strained, against the background of the ongoing Syrian desire and efforts to become the sponsor and guardian of the “Palestinian cause”.

In the 1970's and '80's the Syrians carried out a large number of terrorist attacks or attempted terrorist attacks against several Arab states, either through direct involvement or by employing Palestinian "subcontractor" organizations. Prominent among these groups was the Saiqa organization (a Palestinian group completely under Syrian control), which operated under the name of the "Revolutionary Eagles". Attacks were also carried out by the Abu Nidal organization led by Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal), which in the 1980s acted as a subcontractor for the Syrians. In 1983-85, after moving his infrastructure from Iraq to Syria, Abu Nidal directed his organization’s terrorist activities against Jordanian diplomats in Jordan and abroad. The attacks ceased in 1985, with the rapprochement between Syria and Jordan.

An additional wave of attacks against Arab targets began at the end of the 1970s, after Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and the beginning of the Israeli-Egyptian peace process. The most prominent terrorist attacks against Arab targets after Sadat’s visit were: The attempt to blow up the Egyptian embassy in Bonn (January 1978); the taking over by Saiqa of the Egyptian embassy in Ankara (July 1979); the unsuccessful attempt on the life of Jordanian Prime Minister Muder Badran (January 1981) the abduction of the Jordanian representative in Beirut, Hisham Muhsan (February 1981); two attempts on the life of Arafat (October 1981); the explosion of a car bomb outside the offices of the pro-Iraqi Lebanese newspaper “Al-Watan al-Arabi” in Paris (April 1982 (in the explosion, a woman was killed and more than 60 passers-by were wounded. Later, two Syrian intelligence officers were expelled by the French from the Syrian embassy in Paris); the killing of Issam Sartawi, a PLO official who initiated dialogue with Israel, was carried out in Portugal by a gunman belonging to the Abu-Nidal group, apparently on behalf of the Syrians. (April 1982). (The statement taking responsibility for the killing of Sartawi was published in Damascus, and the hit squad set out on its mission from Damascus). Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership openly accused Syria of being behind the killing of PLO official and former Mayor of Hebron, Fahd Kawasme, in Jordan (December 1984).

Terror as an instrument for punishing Western states and making political gains

Western targets, mainly American and French, were among the preferred objectives for Syrian terrorism during the 1970s and '80s: The United States was targeted by Damascus primarily as a consequence of Washington's support for Israel; with regard to France, the reasons were more complicated. The Syrians initiated a series of terrorist actions against France due to Paris' attempts to intervene in the Lebanese crisis, its improved relations with Israel and the French-Iraqi rapprochement. The Syrian-controlled Palestinian organization Saiqa (using the cover name of the “Revolutionary Eagles”) functioned as a primary “subcontractor” of terrorism against Western targets, although the Syrians occasionally selected individual assailants. Among others, these terrorist attacks were directed against: The US consulate in Istanbul (1979); the US embassy in Beirut (1979); the French ambassador to Lebanon (1981); French banks in Lebanon (1981) and the French Cultural Center in Lebanon (1982).

Lebanon is the clearest example of how Syria has used the “terror weapon” against Western countries as a means of punishing them and making political gains. By employing the “terror weapon” intensively together with Iran - both during and after the Lebanon war - Syria sought to turn its failed military confrontation with Israel (June 1982) into a political success. In retrospect, it can be said that Syria succeeded. Hezbollah served as an effective tool for Syria and Iran with which to carry out attacks against Western countries. One can view the organization’s establishment in 1982-3 as a joint Syrian-Iranian production. The Syrians allowed Hezbollah to establish itself in the Lebanese Beka’a Valley which was under Syrian control, while undercutting the rival Shi’ite Amal movement. They also permitted the arrival of about 1,500 Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who were deployed in the Ba’albek region of the Beka’a and in the Syrian town of Zebedani near the Syrian-Lebanese border.

The Syrians and Iranian Revolutionary Guards did not participate directly in the fighting against the Israeli Army or in terror attacks against Western targets. However, they did supply vital military, financial and logistical aid to Hezbollah and other armed Shi’ite groups which were established at the same time and which operated on behalf of the Syrians and Iranians under various cover names, such as: “Islamic Jihad”, “Revolutionary Justice Organization”, “Oppressed on the Earth”, and others. The employment of these groups was intended to achieve a wide range of Iranian and Syrian objectives and even some internal Lebanese objectives of Hezbollah itself (which for the most part overlapped even if they were not always convergent). From the Syrian standpoint, employing them was meant to bring about the removal of the multinational force from Lebanon, to damage the West’s influence in Lebanon, to undermine Amin Gemayal’s pro-Western regime, to derail the May 17, 1983 agreement that was achieved under American auspices and ultimately to facilitate the imposition of the “Syrian order” on Lebanon.

The terror attacks against Western targets which were carried out in Lebanon in the 1980s can be divided into two main categories: spectacular suicide attacks in 1983 against Western targets using car bombs driven by Shi’ite suicide bombers and the kidnapping and subsequent release of Western hostages between 1982 and 1992. Following is a brief review of these two types of attacks:

The first suicide car bomb attack against the US Embassy in Beirut was carried out by Hezbollah on April 18, 1983 against the background of Syria’s mounting concern over the impending signing of an Israeli-Lebanese agreement under American auspices (the agreement was signed a month later, on May 17, 1983). This attack was a harbinger of the suicide car-bomb attacks against the US Marine Corps and the French multinational contingent (October 1983). Particularly striking was the terrorist attack at the Marine compound in Beirut, where a truck loaded with about 5,450 kilograms of TNT broke through the barracks of the American force and exploded inside Marine headquarters; the explosion destroyed the building and killed 241 American troops. The forensic laboratories of the FBI described the attack as the largest conventional explosion in the world ever investigated by their experts. (According to the “Marine Corps Gazette” of February 1984, citing the investigation report issued by the US Department of Defense on the attack at Marine headquarters in Beirut).

These terrorist actions, which accounted for about 300 American casualties, and over 40 French ones, served Syria's political objectives by bringing about the departure of the multilateral force from Lebanon and by strengthening Syrian influence over the Lebanese regime. The tracks of the Shi'ite suicide bombers led to the Syrian-controlled Ba'albek region, where the Syrians enabled Iran's Revolutionary Guards to deploy in the area and train Hezbollah and other fundamentalist Shi'ite groups. In “Holy Terror: The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism”, Amir Taheri, an Iranian exile who was editor of the important “Keyhan” daily, argued that the suicide attacks which forced the multinational force to leave Lebanon could not have been carried out without the direct involvement of Syrian intelligence. At the time, Hezbollah did not possess the tools to gather the sort of detailed information that would have been required to attack the well-guarded American and French targets; on the other hand, Syrian intelligence in Lebanon did maintain an extensive network of agents who could have provided such data. Taheri notes that it was convenient for the Syrian regime to cooperate with Hezbollah, since the latter supplied volunteers to carry out suicide missions -- which the Syrians had difficulty in recruiting from among their traditional agents in Lebanon. This modus operandi also prevented direct Syrian involvement, which could have complicated matters for the Syrian regime vis-a-vis the United States.

Of course, the Syrians never explicitly acknowledged their responsibility for these attacks. Still, during the second half of the 1980's, the Syrian media published articles praising these terrorist actions and their perpetrators. Even President Assad highlighted the importance of martyrdom: “We will teach our children to love death which sanctifies God's name,” Assad said, in a speech to Syrian students on 4 May 1985. More outspoken was Assad confidant Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas, who told Der Spiegel (10.09.84),in sympathy and arrogance, about the terrorist attacks in Beirut: “Imagine this -- a single Lebanese has succeeded in sending 200 American Marines to Hell... Another single Lebanese threw 83 Israelis into the air. A third eliminated 78 Frenchmen.” 14 years later, Tlas told the UAE's Al-Bayan newspaper that, in 1983, he prevented strikes against the Italian component of the multi-national force in Lebanon -- in contrast to the permission which he gave for attacks against other units of the force. According to Mustafa Tlas, the strikes against the Italian force, which were also serving in the multinational force, were prevented owing to his admiration for Italian star Gina Lollabrigida (Yediot Ahronot, 02.01.98; AFP, Rome, 01.01.98).

The second type of terror in Lebanon against Western targets was the taking of Western hostages as a means of obtaining political and economic concessions from Western states. In the decade between 1982 and 1992, some 100 Western citizens were systematically kidnapped (among them Americans, British, and French nationals). The kidnappings were carried out by Hezbollah and other Shi’ite groups linked to Iran which used various cover names. The kidnappings were first and foremost a part of Iranian policy and Iranian interests which converged with those of Syria. Syria, for its part, permitted the kidnapping phenomenon to occur in the 1980s as a means of advancing its interests and there are those who claim that Syria was directly involved in the practical aspects of the kidnappings and actively assisted them. When the kidnappings continued in the second half of the 1980s after the end of the Lebanon War, the Syrians made no significant efforts to stop it, despite their growing control in Lebanon which gave them the means to do so. In the Iranian and Syrian view, the usefulness of kidnapping Western hostages came to an end only at the end of the 1980s, and it was then that they began to be released. In a series of staged ceremonies at which hostages were released, some of which took place in Damascus, Syria made an effort to get maximum credit from Western countries for obtaining the releases (though they were not deserving of any such credit).

Terrorist attacks against Israel and Jewish communities abroad

An assessment of the targets against which the Syrian regime used the “terror weapon” in the 1970s and 1980s clearly reveals that Israel did not serve as the only target upon which Syrian efforts were focused. Indeed, at various times, the Syrian regime gave priority to using the “terror weapon” against its opponents in Lebanon, its opposition at home, pro-Western Arab regimes or Western states. This said, Israel and world Jewry did receive “special attention” from the Syrian regime, which frequently targeted them for terror attacks. Most of these attacks were carried out via “proxies”, though some were implemented directly by the Syrians themselves. It should be noted that Syria was strict (as it is now) about keeping the Golan Heights quiet and free of terror attacks in order not to get into a military confrontation with Israel. Hence, terror attacks were launched from the territory of Israel’s neighbors (primarily Lebanon) or abroad (mostly on European soil).

Syrian intelligence, especially the Air Force's “Security Directorate”, the security apparatus head Major General Muhammad Khouli (an Alawi very close to Assad) was responsible for terrorist attacks carried out at that time against Israelis abroad. The Air Force's "Security Directorate" formed the focus of Muhammad Khouli's power base, possessing overall control of the Syrian Air Force, airports in Syria and the Syria airline (which was used to abet terrorist activities). This was the infrastructure used by Muhammad Khouli and his aide Colonel Hissam Said to carry out terrorist acts abroad and in which the Syrian "fingerprints" were found when the terrorist activities against Israel were uncovered.

The Syrians used “terrorist subcontractors” from among the Palestinian organizations under their protection, and sometimes lone individuals and families recruited by Syrian intelligence, to carry out terrorist acts against Israel as well. The Palestinian organizations used by Syria were mainly the PFLP-General Command of Ahmad Jibril, Abu-Nidal's organization, the Saiqa organization and Abu-Mussa's group. Noteworthy among the lone individuals used was Nizar Hindawi, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, who was run by Muhammad Khouli and their Air Force'“Security Directorate”. An analysis of Israeli objectives targeted by Syrian terrorism, clearly shows a focus on Israel's air transportation. The Syrian's most popular targets were El Al planes and installations, and other airlines flying to Israel. In 1970-72, Ahmad Jibril's organization carried out a series of attacks against El Al and other airlines, and even succeeded in blowing up a Swissair plane in flight with all its passengers. Following the organization's failure to attack El Al planes, an eight year hiatus took place in terrorist attempts. In the 1980's, new attempts to attack El Al planes and installations occurred, carried out by Jibril (1980), Abu-Nidal (1985), Abu-Mussa (1986) and even directly by the Syrians (1986). An additional effort to attack planes en route to Israel was foiled when a terrorist network belonging to Jibril was uncovered in Germany in 1988.

The Syrian terrorist effort against Israel' air transportation reached its peak in the mid 1980's, primarily in three major terrorist acts perpetrated in Western Europe:

The murderous attacks at the Rome and Vienna Airport by terrorists belonging to the Abu-Nidal organization (27 December 1985). 19 people were killed and 119 wounded in these attacks. Among the fatalities in Rome were 5 Americans, 4 Greeks, an Italian, Algerian and two Mexicans, and the wounded included 7 Israelis, an American child and 4 Jordanian children. A terrorist belonging to Abu-Nidal's organization who was arrested in Rome, described during his interrogation how the terrorists had arrived from Damascus and admitted that the Air Force's “Security Directorate” headed by Muhammad al-Khouli assisted the terrorists who carried out the attack by providing training in the Lebanese Beka'a Valley under the supervision of Syrian military personnel. The two terrorists caught in Vienna said that they had entered Europe on a flight from Syria. The interrogation of the Abu-Nidal terrorists exposed the false statements made by Assad and the regime's leaders to the American media (Time Magazine and the Washington Post), which claimed that Abu-Nidal's organization did not carry out terrorist attacks from Syria, had no operational bases in Syria and operates there cultural-political activities only; and statements by Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas "accused" Abu-Nidal of being "an American agent" (see the Syrian News Agency, 13 October 1986 and Radio Damascus, 18 May 1986; see also the Tlas interview with France Pays Arabes, France, July-August, 1985). It should be noted that in the 1990's, Syria makes similar charges regarding the presence of Islamic terrorist organizations on its territory.

The foiling of the attempt to smuggle explosives on to an El Al flight from London with 375 passengers on board in order to blow it up (17 April 1986).The plane was supposed to explode by placing a bag carried by an unwitting accomplice sent by Nizar Hindawi, who was promised 250,000 British pounds for the operation. According to the court record in London, the decision to carry out the attack was made in Damascus at a senior level, and again Major-General Muhammad al-Khouli and his aide Colonel Haytham Said of the Air Force's "Security Directorate" were involved behind the scenes. Syria's direct involvement in the operation included devising the plans to load the bomb onto to the plane, recruiting the terrorist Hindawi, financing and training him, giving him an official Syrian service passport and using the Syrian national airline and diplomatic bag to transport the explosives to London. Following the operation's failure, Hindawi found sanctuary in the Syrian embassy in London.

Foiling the attempt to smuggle explosives on to an El Al flight from Madrid in order to blow it up (26 June 1986). In this case, an attempt to place a booby-trapped suitcase onto an El Al plane by an unwitting accomplice, was foiled. The booby-trapped suitcase exploded at the El Al counter, wounding 13 people. The man who sent the unwitting accomplice was Nasser Khalil Ali, a terrorist belonging to Abu-Mussa's organization (the pro-Syrian Palestinian organization comprised of Fatah dissidents), who carried a Syrian passport. Muhammad al-Khouli was also connected to this attempt. Nasser Khalil Ali was arrested in Madrid and confessed that in April 1986 he received instructions from Syrian intelligence in Damascus to blow up an El Al plane. For this purpose he recruited a Syrian-born Spanish criminal, and enticed him with money to try to insert the booby-trapped suitcase onto the El Al plane, telling him it was heroin being smuggled to Tel Aviv. Due to the alertness of an El Al security guard, a major disaster was averted.

Despite the uncovering of direct Syrian involvement in these three attacks, the Syrians did not halt their terror attempts against targets abroad, in particular Israeli air transportation targets. On 26 October 1988, the West German police uncovered the existence of a wide ranging terrorist infrastructure of PFLP-GC. The German police arrested 16 terrorists, including Haj Muhammad Kassem Dalkamuni (Abu-Muhammad), a senior PFLP activist, who had an impressive "record" in planning terror attacks in Israel and abroad. Considerable quantities of explosive devices were found in their possession, including: a booby-trapped radio with a barometric detonator; another radio under construction; LAW anti-tank missiles; 14 explosive blocks; 6 Kalashnikov assault rifles; a sub-machine gun; 6 automatic pistols; silencers; dozens of grenades and ammunition. The terrorists who were arrested planned to blow up a Spanish Iberian airliner en route to Israel (apparently by inserting the booby-trapped radio into the plane) and to carry out other attacks in Europe, especially West Germany (including an attack on the prison in Frankfurt where Muhammad Ali Hamadeh, a senior Hezbollah activist, was being held for his part in the 1985 hijacking of a TWA plane).

The Syrians, as usual, cynically denied any connection to the terrorist infrastructure that had been uncovered, and publicly denounced terrorism. However, Syrian plans, orders and logistical support to the PFLP's infrastructure in Germany were brought from Damascus. PFLP agents in West Germany trained in PFLP camps in Syria. A Syrian passport was found in Delakmoni's possession, and Syrian intelligence was well aware of the terrorist group's existence and operations. Following the uncovering of the infrastructure, political efforts were begun in Damascus to free the detainees. In this context, a member of the PFLP's political bureau Omar al-Shihab, visited the German embassy in Damascus, requested the detainees' release, and made the false charge to the Germans that the captured weapons were intended for the West Bank and Gaza.

Operations directed against Israel via Lebanon

Besides Syria's worldwide involvement in terrorist activities, Lebanon serves as the special arena where Syria directs terrorist efforts against Israel even as it maintains absolute quiet on the Golan Heights. The main figure directing this effort was Brigadier-General Ghazi Cana’an, an Alawi officer from Qardaha (President Assad's birthplace). Since summer 1983, Ghazi Cana’an has been the director of the military security and intelligence branch of the Syrian Army in Lebanon, a position from which he has garnered expertise as well as a reputation. From his headquarters in the town of Anjar in the central Beka'a Valley, Cana’an is responsible not only for the daily political management of Lebanon (for which he is known by the Lebanese as the “High Commissioner”), but also for activating individual agents, groups, organizations and political parties in Lebanon for intelligence, criminal and terrorist missions on behalf of Syrian interests.

Many guerrillas arrested in the past by IDF and SLA forces have testified to the role of Brig.-Gen. Ghazi Cana’an and Syrian intelligence in the activation of terrorist groups from Lebanon. Two prominent examples of this were:

A terrorist of the“Egyptian Arab Association”, an Egyptian opposition group with a branch operating in Lebanon and assisted by Syria, was sent by Cana’an and his agents to carry out a suicide attack in southern Lebanon in August 1987, and surrendered to the IDF. At his interrogation, the terrorist told of frequent visits he made to Syrian Intelligence headquarters to see Ghazi Cana’an in Anjar, and about the orders and assistance he received from Syrian intelligence to carry out his mission.

In another instance, a detainee of the “Syrian Social Nationalist Party” (SSNP) an organization with a tradition of “contractual terrorism” for the Syrians, was captured in the Security Zone in November 1985 with a “donkey bomb”. At her interrogation, she said that she operated within a framework of a suicide group and that she joined it under pressure placed on her family by Syrian intelligence, who charged them with collaboration with Israel. Ghazi Cana’an was the man who ordered her to carry out the suicide mission, and Syrian intelligence was involved at all planning and implementation of her suicide mission.

Damascus' involvement in initiating and carrying out terrorist acts against Jewish targets worldwide is somewhat less known. Terrorist attacks against Jewish targets were mainly carried out by the pro-Syrian Palestinian organization Saiqa operating under the cover name the “Revolutionary Eagles”. Targets of attack included a train carrying immigrants from the USSR (1973); train travelers in the Netherlands aimed at ending Dutch aid to Jewish immigrants (1975); a Jewish community center and a Jewish shop in West Berlin (1978); a Paris cinema holding a Jewish cultural week (1979); a Jewish restaurant and cosmetics store in Paris (1979) and even a synagogue in Vienna (1979). Preferred locations for terrorism against Jewish targets occurred in Paris, Austria and West Berlin, apparently due to operational considerations as well as the convenience of the targets.

In 1973 and 1975, three major attacks were carried out by Saiqa, with the objective of disrupting Jewish emigration from the USSR. At least two of the attacks were also carried out in order to benefit Syrian strategic and political interests. Following is a short description of the three attacks:

 On 30 August 1973, two Saiqa terrorists were arrested at Beirut airport while carrying explosives. Their intention was to fly to Bratislava in Czechoslovakia, and from there go to Austro-Czech border in order to attack a train carrying Jews from the USSR. The terrorists were freed after a few days.

 On 28 September 1973, Saiqa terrorists (under the cover name "Revolutionary Eagles") seized control of an immigrant train from the USSR while it was waiting at a station on the Austrian side of the border, and took hostages. In exchange for their release, the Austrians declared that they would close the Schannau immigrant transit camp. After the attack, the terrorists boarded a plane that took them to Libya. In 1975, Saiqa's leader at the time, Zuheir Muhsein admitted that the attack, which occurred on close to Yom Kippur, was intended to divert attention away from the Yom Kippur War.

 On 5 September 1975, four Saiqa terrorists, carrying Syrian passports, were arrested in Amsterdam. They had planned to sieze 12 train passengers hostage in order to end Dutch aid for Jewish immigrants. The mission may have been carried out as a result of the interim agreement with Egypt that had been signed shortly before, on 1 September, which Syria adamantly opposed.

With regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria did not attain any political achievements via the use of the “terror weapon”, failing to divert Egypt from its decision to make peace with Israel after the Yom Kippur war. In contrast, Syria chalked up impressive gains in the Lebanese arena, especially during the Lebanon War. The “terror weapon” helped Syria to place its supporters at the top of the Lebanese leadership and to eliminate - physically and politically - those it identified as supporters of the United States and Israel. Syria’s activation of Shi’ite terror together with Iran contributed to the withdrawal of the multinational force from Lebanon (1984) and the imposition of Syrian patronage over Amin Gemayal’s regime and the torpedoing of the May 17, 1983 agreement between Israel and Lebanon. Syria was able to put direct pressure on Israel through attacks on Israeli troops right up to the point of the withdrawal of IDF forces from Lebanon without a political arrangement. Through its use of the terror weapon, Syria succeeded in deriving political windfalls and imposing the “Syrian order” on Lebanon.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Assad regime used the terror weapon frequently and intensively against Arab, Western and Israeli targets, sometimes directly but on most occasions via a “terrorist subcontractor”. Through its use of the terror weapon in so brazen a manner (which in a number of instances included the involvement of leading Syrian officials and direct Syrian aid to those who carried out the attacks) the Syrian leadership took upon itself the risk of a diplomatic imbroglio with Arab or Western countries or even a military deterioration with Israel.

With regard to Assad’s personal involvement, it should be emphasized that in the centralized authoritarian Syrian regime, the policy of using the terrorist weapon could only have been the fruit of President Assad's personal decision. The senior officials in the intelligence and security agencies whose involvement in terrorist attacks were exposed, headed by Muhammad al-Khouli, are Alawites and are among the hard core of Assad’s supporters. Their exposure did not harm their standing in the Syrian hierarchy: al-Khouli was promoted and today serves as Commander of the Syrian Air Force and Air Defense Forces. Assad's supervision and control of Syria's intelligence and security apparatus involved in terrorist attacks was extremely close. It is therefore reasonable to assume, that Assad was personally involved not only in creating the overall policy regarding activating the terrorist weapon, but also in particular decisions regarding specific terrorist attacks, at least the more prominent of them that carried political and military risks for Syria. As noted above, the advantages Assad perceived in using the terrorist weapon, and the successes chalked up by the terror weapon in Lebanon, alongside Syria's strategic weakness in the 1970's and '80s, are what motivated him to take not insignificant risks and frequently use this weapon in adopting a policy of brinkmanship.

In the 1990's, with the stabilization of Assad's domestic situation, the establishment of the “Syrian order” in Lebanon through occupation, the reduction of tensions between Syria and other Arab states, Syrian involvement in the peace process and the loss of its main supporter after the collapse of the Soviet Union -- the Syrian regime was forced to change the manner in which it exploited terrorism. It has not abandoned the use of terror as a way of advancing its strategic objectives, but has had to alter its mode of operation in order to blur its involvement.
 

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