From Pariahs to Patriots:
Canadian Communists and the
Second World War
Chris Frazer
ABSTRACT: Official anti-communist policies, adopted by the
Mackenzie King government during the Second World War, were
only partially effective. These policies were implemented by the
RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) and the armed forces high
command, and included internment, banning the Communist Party of
Canada (CPC), and monitoring communists in the armed forces.
These policies. however, were thwarted by the logic of the war, as well
as by opposition from liberal public opinion and the communists
themselves.
Towards the end of the Second World War, the Mounties
were hunting for Bill Walsh, a known communist serving in
the Canadian army. The RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted
Police) wanted to know if there was any danger of Walsh
"leading the Canadian troops over to join the Russians."1
Walsh's trail led an RCMP major to an army battalion engaged
in the assault on Germany's Siegfried Line. Making his way
across mud-churned fields to a cellar headquarters, the
Mountie discovered that the battalion's intelligence officer
was none other than private Bill Walsh. The Mountie promptly
confelTed with Walsh's commanding officer, but the C0 did
not share the RCMP's concerns. According to Walsh, after
"the Mountie left our headquarters our men started firing in
the air and he had to crawl most of the halfmile back to the
jeep on his helly."2
As a civilian, Bill Walsh had been a member of the
Communist Party of Canada (CPC) and an organizer for the
United Auto Workers (UAW) in Windsor, Ontario. Walsh
had also been interned from 1940 to 1942, because of his
membership in the CPC. After his release from internment,
Walsh was forbidden to leave Windsor and was required to
report regularly to the RCMP. Yet Walsh joined the Canadian
Army in 1943, and violated the conditions of his release by
travelling to Normandy and neglecting to report to the
Mounties from the front. Apparently, the RCMP wanted to find
their man.3
Walsh's tale may be apocryphal, but it illustrates the knot
of contradictions in the relationship between Canadian
communists and the Canadian state during the Second World
War. On the basis of its early opposition to the war, the
CPC was banned in 1940. Many of its members were
arrested and interned.4 After Nazi Germany invaded the USSR
in June 1941 , the CPC switched gears to support the war. The
Canadian government eventually allowed communists to
reorganize as the Labor-Progressive Party (LPP). The CPC,
however, remained officially proscribed for the war's duration,
but communist internees were released in 1942.5
This reflected an uneasy truce between Canadian
communists and the state after 1941. The LPP urged total war
mobilization and many communists, including former internees
like Bill Walsh,joined the aimed forces.6 Anti-communists in
the govemment, however, were deeply suspicious ofthe new
communist enthusiasm, and they were extremely reluctant to
relax security measures aimed at controlling communist activity.
Fhe RCMP and military officials were especially worried about
communist subversion in the armed forces. They made
continued efforts to control the activity of all known
communist enlistees.7 The logic of the war, however
produced a gap between official anti-communism and the
demands of prosecuting the war, and this curbed efforts to
restrict communist participation in the war effort.
The Defense of Canada Regulations
German armies invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. Two
days later, Britain and France declared war on Germany. The
Canadian government, under Prime Minister William Lyon
Mackenzie King and the Liberal Party, invoked the War
Measures Act and proclaimed the Defense of Canada
Regulations (DOCR). A week later, on 10 September,
Mackenzie King's government declared war on Germany.
The War Measures Act gave the Canadian government
sweeping authority, and the DOCR expanded that power further,
allowing the exercise of extreme security measures, such as
the waiving of habeas corpus and public trial, internment,
bans on political and religious groups, restrictions on free
speech, and the confiscation of property.8
The DOCR were intended to suppress obstacles to mobilizing
Canadians in support of the war. They were applied to
individuals and orgaizations who supported fascist Germany
and Italy, as well as to so-called enemy aliens: citizens and
immigrants of German, Italian, and Japanese descent.9 The
regulations were also used to suppress those who opposed
the war without actually sympathizing with the enemy, or who
might otherwise subvert the war effort. This included
communists and left-wing ethnic organizations, Technocracy
Incorporated, the Jehovah's Witnesses, and individuals,
including union leaders, sailors, and well-known public figures
like the mayor of Montreal, Camillien Houde, who opposed
conscription.10
The DOCR did not appear overnight. With an eye to the
growing threat of war in Europe, a government committee
began drafting the regulations in March 1938, and submitted
a report to King in July 1939.11 The committee unanimously
recommended adoption of all the DOCR provisions, except
number 21 which allowed for preventive detention and
internment by ministerial order. While some committee
members argued that Regulation 21 was too draconian, other
members, such as RCMP Inspector Charles Rivett-Carnac,
saw the measure as essential to national security.12
Although Canada was not at war with the Soviet Union,
many government officials regarded the USSR as an "'unofficial'
enemy."13 This attitude became especially prominent after
August 1939 when Germany and the USSR signed a non-
aggression pact, and after Soviet troops occupied western
Poland on 17 September 1939.l4 Given the close ties between
the CPC and the Soviet Union, it is no surprise that the RCMP
and government officials regarded Canadian communists as a
threat to national security. Yet, as Reg Whitaker argues, this
explanation for suppressing Canadian communists "wears
thin when considered against the reluctance to release
[communist internees]" and legalize the CPC after the USSR
became an official ally against Hitler.15 Moreover, well before
the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939, many officials defined
Canadian communists as an enemy -even the main enemy.16
Official anti-communism was ultimately based on ideological
considerations, and the outbreak of the war created the
conditions which allowed the state to lump communists with
pro-fascists as security threats subject to the DOCR.17 It is
probable that this attitude was nowhere more entrenched
than in the RCMP. Inspector Riveff-Camac, who helped draft
the DOCR, certainly saw communists as the main threat to
Canadian security. As chief of the RCMP's intelligence section,
Rivett-Camac argued in early 1939 that fascism was a lesser
threat than communism since fascism was a "modified form of
capitalism."18
Rivett-Carnac's opinion corresponded with the anti-
communist and anti-labour views of RCMP Commissioner S.T.
Wood, who argued later in 1941 that, "it is not the Nazi nor
the Fascist but the radical who constitutes our most
troublesome problem."19 Although the charges were never
substantiated, as early as October 1939 the RCMP Security
Bulletin claimed that "there is more reason to fear ... acts of
espionage and sabotage on the part of the Communist Party
than from Nazi or Fascist organizations."20 The RCMP asserted
that' communists were using unions as fronts for infiltration
and sabotage.21 By November 1939, the RCMP was urgmg the
government to outlaw the CPC.22
There were, however, varying degrees of anti-communism
within government circles. Senior civil servants like Norman
Robertson and Jack Pickersgill argued that the RCMP over-
emphasized the communist threat. In October 1939, Pickersgill
warned Mackenzie King that the RCMP failed to distinguish
between "legitimate social and political criticism and subversive
doctrine," as well as between "facts and hearsay."23 Both
Pickersgill and Robertson urged the RCMP to focus more
attention on the fascist threat.24 On the other hand, key
cabinet members (including Ernest Lapointe, Louis St. Laurent,
and C.D. Howe) strongly endorsed the RCMP's attitude.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King was more equivocal,
veering between a tendency towards liberal moderation and
a deep antipathy to communism. King had been appalled by
the Nazi-Soviet pact, and this had deepened his distrust of
the USSR, and of communists in general.25 Nor did King have
any sympathy for the activities of Canadian communists. In
addition to distrusting the loyalty of the CPC, King regarded
the Party as an obstacle to government efforts to "keep things
on an even keel ... between labour and capital."26 Moreover,
King repeatedly expressed his concern that the war would
unleash the threat of world-wide socialist revolution.27
Mackenzie King was prepared to countenance repressive
actions against the CPC, but he regarded the measures
advocated by Justice Minister Ernest Lapointe and the RCMP
as extreme and reactionary. King approved when communist
newspapers were shut down in mid-November 1939 for
publishing anti-war propaganda. He believed that
communists "are our real enemies and we must not allow
subversive activities to gain headway at this time."28 King,
however, did reject an order-in-council proposed by
Lapointe for suppressing subversive activities. He favoured
the principle, but worried that parliamentary foes like the Co-
operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and New
Democracy might gain political capital in opposing such a
move. The PM was inclined to be more cautious. He felt that
existing state powers were sufficient, and argued that "the
men who drafted the order had gone much too far. I said
frankly I did not trust the judgement of the Mounted Police on
these matters."29 King later expressed surprise at how
reactionary Lapointe was "prepared to become."30
In late November 1939, RCMP Commissioner Wood also
pressed King for expanded powers to fight communist
subversion. Wood warned that the CPC was plotting with the
German government to foment an uprising in Mexico, using
recruits selected from Canadian veterans ofthe Spanish Civil
War.31 The PM, however, once again insisted that RCMP
powers were already sufficient.32
Indeed, emergency legislation had given the RCMP an
expanded role and new powers. The RCMP Intelligence Section
increased from six to more than 100 officers.33 RCMP
Commissioner Wood was named Registrar Ceneral of Enemy
Aliens, and empowered to intern enemy aliens and
subversives.34 The RCMP was represented on the Joint
Intelligence Committee, along with the External Affairs
Department, the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Finally, in
addition to guarding sensitive industrial sites and armed forces
bases, the RCMP was asked to vet security clearances of
armed forces personnel.35
Banning the Communist Party
The CPC was officially suppressed in May 1940, when it was
declared illegal by an Ottawa judge at a trial of three
communists charged with 'printing and distributing subversive
literature."36 The accused included a Canadian Army Service
Force member, a civil servant, and a newspaper employee,
but only one of the defendants was convicted.37 On 6 June
1940, the King cabinet issued an order-in-council banning
the CPC the Young Communist League (YCL), and thirteen
other organizations, including left-wing ethnic groups.38
The RCMP began arresting suspected communists who were
to be held "for the duration" at internment camps in
Kananaskis, Alberta, in Petawawa, Ontario, and at an unused
jail in hull, Quebec. The RCMP cast its net broadly. Its officers
were empowered to act as "justices of the peace for the
purpose of issuing search warrants." They were to arrest any
members of the banned organizations, as well as anyone who
"distributed their literature, or spoke publicly on their
behalf."39
Furthermore, "anyone 'who advocates or defends the acts,
principles or policies' of these organizations would be
presumed guilty 'in the absence of proof to the contrary."'40
Thus the RCMP arrested some prominent CPC members, but it
also interned persons who had little or nothing to do with the
communist movement.41 All this ultimately led to the internment
of 133 persons accused of being communists, and another
120 short-term detentions.42 At the same time, however, the
RCMP failed to arrest the top leadership of the CPC, including
its leader, Tim Buck, who had slipped across the border into
the United States.43
Although the cpc was banned in May 1940, repression
began in November 1939 when the communist newspapers
The Clarion and Clarte' were closed after abandoning their
brief pro-war editorial poolicies.44 When hostilities first broke
out in Europe, CPC leaders perceived the conflict as an
extension of their anti-fascist struggles in the 193Os. In The
Clarion, Tim Buck argued that communists should "strive to
combine with the military defeat of Hitler . .. the political
defeat of his reactionary friends at home."45 Similar positions
were taken by the communist parties of France and Great
Britain.46
The CPC's initial pro-war line, however, was very short-
lived. On 18 September 1939, the Comintern issued a
directive instructing all communist parties to oppose the war
and expose its imperialist character.47 This sparked a debate
in the CPC leadership, leading to a reversal ofpoiicy in mid-
October. The party leadership now concluded that the war
was an imperialist conflict, similar to the First World War.
They doubted that the Allies were sincerely anti-fascist. As
Buck now argued, 'the British and French governments are
not willing to join in a life-and-death struggle against Hitler
and, therefore, on moral grounds and by its own logic, we
must oppose [the war]."44 The CPC began publicizing its new
demand that Canada withdraw from the war in favour of
neutrality. At the same time the King government launched a
general suppression of left-wing and radical publications.49
Buck admitted afterwards that the CPC "took positions and
repeated arguments ... from the [Comintern], rather than
analyzing them strictly on the basis of Canadian conditions.
We made some mistakes as a result."50 Indeed, by endorsing
the Comintern's anti-war directive, the cpc invited disaster.
The party's sudden volte-face resulted in an indefensible
policy which isolated communists in the labour movement
and in the court of public opinion. It also played into the
hands of anti-communists who were eager to grasp a chance
to crush the communist movement. The CPC avoided the fate
of the communist parties in Britain and France, which suffered
serious splits over the policy reversal. The new line, however,
did provoke a factional struggle in the CPC leadership from
1940 to 1941 over whether an anti-war policy meant
revolutionary defeatism or simple neutrality.
Admittedly, the anti-fascist credentials ofthe Mackenzie
King government were less than sterling. Between 1935 and
1939, Canada's foreign policy had been relatively isolationist,
seeking to avoid foreign entanglements. Communists argued
that King's policies had the effect of encouraging the rise of
fascism in Europe: by failing to act against the Italian fascist
invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, by refusing to support the
Spanish Republican government from 1936-39 against
General Franco's fascist uprising, and by supporting the
British policy of appeasing Hitler's territorial ambitions. In
fact the communists suspected that Britain and its allies were
striving to turn Hitler's aggression towards the U55R.51
With respect to Mackenzie King, it is more accurate to say
that the PM had an extremely myopic view of the fascist threat
up to the moment that the war began. By October 1939,
King regarded Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini as totalitarian
dictators cut from the same cloth.52 Previously, King had
admired Hitler as a patriot and an anti-communist
counterweight in Europe, and he clung tenaciously to a policy
of appeasement through the summer of l939.53 Indeed, King
believed the British were provoking Hitler into an avoidable
conflict by abandoning appeasement. King was deeply
distiessed by British and French guaantees to defend Poland.54
As late as 21 August 1939, King was convinced that the only
hope of avoiding war "is in Hitler himself, that he really does
not want unnecessarily to destroy human life."55
King's myopia began to evaporate in September 1939,
but even then the Canadian government did not declare war
in order to fight fascism. J.L. Granatstein has noted that
"Canada had gone to war in September- 1939 because
Britain had gone to war and for 110 other reason. It was not a
war for Poland; it was not a war against anti-Semitism; it was
not even a war against Nazism."56 Mackenzie King's
government did not perceive the war as an anti-fascist struggle
until "the character of the war altered to pose a direct threat
to Britaih and [North America] "57
In choosing to oppose the war, however, the CPC closed its
eyes to the anti-fascist potential of the conflict. The Party
placed itself in a position where its energies would inevitably
be spent fighting for its existence rather than against the
fascist enemy. After publishing the party's anti-war policy, The
Clarion was closed and its business manager, Douglas
Stewart, was arrested on 15 November 1939, for
contravening the DOCR. Clarte' was also closed.58 The
communists, however, had anticipated the government move.
When its newspapers were suppressed, communist leaders
implemented a plan for taking their 16,000 members
underground.59
Well-known party leaders went into hiding, while new
party organizations were set up by members who were less
well-known.60 Party branches were re-organized into small
cells which were again subdivided when a maximum of seven
members was reached.61 Its members provided their homes
as meeting places and safe houses for party leaders. To avoid
attracting attention, comrades were given staggered times to
arrive at meetings.62 Party materials were published
clandestinely, including leaflets and issues of The Clarion
and Clarte'.63 In January 1940, the CPC launched an unofficial
paper, the Canadian Tribune, which carefully sought to
maintain legal status. In addition to known communists such
as A.A. MacLeod and author Margaret Fairley, the Canadian
Tribune editorial hoard boasted well-known non-communists,
such as R.L. Calder (a lawyer and CCF member) and R.A.C.
Ballantyne (head of the Montreal branch of the Canadian
Civil Liberties Union).64 The Canadian Tribune was briefly
suspended only once, moving the RCMP to complain in March
1940 that "[there] is little in the average issue which is
definitely anti-British. It is rather in the clever headlines, the
well-edited excerpts from reputable papers, that it insinuates
against our system."65
When the internment of suspected communists began in
May 1940, the Political Bureau of the CPC ordered its top
three leaders into exile in the USA. Party leader Tim Buck,
Sam Carr, and Charles Sims headed south. The rest of the
Political Bureau, including Stewart Smith, Leslie Morris, and
Stanley Ryerson ,were also in hiding, but they remained in
Canada to run the party's Operating Centre in Montreal.66
Although these arrangements kept the party leadership out of
RCMP hands, geographical separation and isolation led to
serious policy differences. In a journal published in New
York and distributed clandestinely in Canada, the exiled
party leaders argued against revolutionary defeatism. Buck
and his companions insisted that the CPC continue to advocate
neutrality between the belligerents and advised party members
to concentrate on organizing unions and a wage-hike
movement.67 Smith and the Operating Centre, however,
moved in an extremist direction. They denounced Canada's
"colonial" relationship to Britain, and suggested that the country
was approaching a revolution for independence and
socialism.68
From August 1940 to June 1941, the CPC suffered from
acute political split personality as the leadership factions
battled over party policy. The New York centre was
supported by communist union leaders and activists, the
Canadian Tribune, and Dorise Nielsen who was elected to
the House of Commons in March 1940 as a popular front MP
from Saskatchewan. It is harder to gauge the support for the
Operating Centre, although their position was published in
occasional issues of The Clarion, as well in leaflets produced
for mass distribution. On the other hand, it is clear that the
Smith faction had little support among party members by
March 1941. The Operating Centre toned down its rhetoric
and began to call for the election of an "independent people's
government" and an independent foreign policy.69
Neither the RCMP nor the government showed any
awareness of the struggle over the party's anti-war policy.
Nor is it likely they would have cared. To Wood, communists
were all the same and he wanted them all interned. In April
1941, Wood complained publicly that, while "the enemy
alien is usually recognizable... your 'Red' has the protection
of citizenship" and is theretore "much more difficult to
suppress."71 Radical groups had already been banned and
more than a hundred communists had been interned, but
Wood felt that repressive measures were still too lenient. He
demanded sterner measures to root out communists from
front organniations like youth councils, civil liberties groups,
and unions.71 Wood argued that many of the interned 'trade
union leaders were also Communist leaders who were using
their unions to advance their own and their party's ends by
sabotaging industry and transportation."72
The King government was being pressed by the RCMP, the
media, and manufacturers, to mount greater repression against
radicals and communists. In part, this stemmed from the very
serious nature of the war in 1941. Since the collapse of
France in June 1940, Britain and the Commonwealth faced
the Axis powers alone. They had suffered severe military
reversals, and by the spring of 1941 Britain was enduring the
heaviest German air bombardment of the war.73 On the
home front, the King government faced mounting labour-
shortages, and growing union militancy as workers demanded
wage hikes and legislation to enforce compulsory collective
bargaining. 74
At the outset of the war, the Trades and Labour Congress
(TLC) and the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL), which
included the Congress oflndustrial Organizations (cio) unions,
pledged support for the war effort.75 But pledges did not
translate into firm no-strike promises. Wartime inflation from
1939-41 eroded wages, and when combined with labour
shortages, this sparked an upsurge in union organizing and
militancy from l94l-43. 76 Inline with Mackenzie King's
theories on labour relations, the government pursued a policy
of non-binding conciliation, which often as not resulted in
defeats and "paper victories" for the union movement.77
Moreover, unions regarded the DOCR as a weapon that
was used by employers and police to undermine strikes and
block efforts to organize unions. In December 1939, Canadian
CJo secretary C.H. Millard -who was far from being a
communist-was arrested for telling steelworkers in Tirnrnins,
Ontario, that "[we] should have democracy here in Canada
before we go to Europe to defend it."78 Unions also objected
that the DOCR were being used to charge picketing union
members with "loitering" andt to detain hundreds of union
sailors.79 Left-led unions in the TLC and the CCL were the most
vocal critics ofthe DOCR and the lack of compulsory collective
bargaining, but they were not alone.80
On the other side, big business pushed its point of view
with equal vigour. In May 1941, the Canadian Manufacturing
Association (CMA) met the War Cabinet Committee, and
echoed Wood's call for tougher repression. The CMA claimed
that the CIO was communist-controlled and that it cared "little
what damage is done to Canada's war effort, provided they
secure the power they seek." The manufacturers demanded
stringent measures against the CIO and a ban on strikes and
lockouts. The CMA view was amplified three weeks later
when members ofthe War Cabinet Committee (J.L. Ralston,
Angus Macdonald, C.D. Howe, and others) pressed for a
ban on American CIO representatives, and for repeal of the
eight-hour day.82
Mackenzie King resisted, although he concurred with the
anti-communist sentiments of the CMA and his cabinet
colleagues. King argued that such strict measures, however,
would play into the hands ofcommunists and radicals. He
insisted that it was wiser to rely on voluntary conciliation to
resolve labour disputes. King felt this would strengthen the
hand of labour leaders like Tom Moore of the TLC, who was
a Liberal and a friend of the PM. This, King believed, would
counter-balance the hostility of CIO and CCL unions towards
the govemment.83
The King cabinet and the RCMP believed that communists
were the main threat to achieving labour peace. In the spring
and summer of 1941, the RCMP reported that "the CPC is
concentrating its efforts in the Trade Union field," and that the
party is "exerting its efforts to make the industrial population
...strike-conscious." The RCMP claimed that a handful of
"commuriist agitators" had organized eight strikes in April,
and that these walk-outs were "precursors of an epidemic."
The RCMP believed that the CIO was the main vehicle of
communist "infiltration," although the party was active in the
TCL was well.84
Communists were active in the union movement, but they
were more successful in organizing workers on economic
issues than in popularizing the party's anti-war position (except
in Quebec, where communist policy found a limited
resonance in the anti-war and anti-conscription sentiments
that existed in that province).85 Communists were not only
active rnnk-and-flle union members, but leaders and organizers
of unions like the Canadian Seamens' Union (csu), the United
Electrical Workers (UEw), the International Woodworkers of
America (IWA), the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, the
Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC), and the UAW.
The RCMP, however, erred in its conclusions and failed to
grasp the fact that the communists made little headway in
shifting the pro-war position of labour.86 Whatever the
influence and accuracy Of RCMP reports, King and his cabinet
decided to continue hunting communists in the unions.
Although communists were a minority in the labour movement,
they were strong enough in strategic wartime industries to
cause concern to the govemment.
When they were interned in 1940, communists like Bill
Walsh and Dick Steele were organizing automobile and steel
workers.87 Also in 1940, Pat Sullivan, CSU leader, was
interned while in the midst of contract negotiations.88 Charles
Murray, leader ofthe Fishermen and Fish Handlers' Union in
Nova Scotia, was also interned as his union was beginning
contract negotiations.89 On 20 June 1941, little more than a
month after the CMA meeting with the War Cabinet Connnittee,
the RCMP picked up UEW president, C.S. Jackson, on direct
orders from the Minister of Labour and the Minister of
Munitions and Supply. At the time, the UEW was in the middle
of a strike at the Toronto General Electric Plant and a union
organizing drive at the Westinghouse facility in Hamilton,
Ontario.9
Concurrently with the arrests of communist union leaders,
the King cabinet carried out an investigation of Dorise
Nielsen, the sole communist MP until the election of Fred
Rose in 1943. Nielsen was elected in 1940 as a Unity
candidate in North Battleford, Saskatchewan, and her
campaign had been supported by local communists and
disaffected members of both the CCF and Social Credit
parties.91 In May 1940, King had been charmed by his first
meeting with Nielsen, whom he regarded as "a woman of
real ability." Nielsen's radicalism reminded King of the
attitudes he once had "held so strongly" in his youth.92
A month later King, however, regarded Nielsen as a
threat to the country's security. In June 1940, Nielsen
spoke in Parliament against the Emergency Powers Bill and
the banning of the CPC. Afterwards, King was shown
information "which indicated she is a Communist and her
husband a Communist." As a result, King concluded that
Nielsen was a "dangerous person," and that she had "all the
qualities of a very skilful spy." King promptly ordered the
Justice Department to investigate her.93
Nielsen was a thorn in the side of the King government.
in the House of Commons, she maintained a steady
barrage of opposition to government measures, including
the internment of communists and labour leaders. Outside
Parliament, she joined with another communist, the
Reverend A.E. Smith, to launch a campaign by the
National Council of Democratic Rights (NCDR) against
the internment of anti-fascists. Nielsen's public meetings
drew large audiences, and the RCMP kept a close eye on
her activities.94 In August 1940, the RCMP seized a
pamphlet that Nielsen published to explain why she
opposed the federal budget.95 In March 1941, the
Canadian Tribune was closed after publishing a series
of anti-intemment articles by Nielsen. At about the same
time, the RCMP investigated another Nielsen pamphlet,
which re-printed one of her speeches in Parliament.
Ihe Canadian Tribune had also published this
pamphlet, and the RCMP used the occasion to search the
offices of the Canadian Tribune and Eveready Printers,
and to seize documents.96
At a meeting on 8 May 1941, the War Cabinet Committee
devoted its time to criticizing Nielsen. RCMP harassment had
failed to deter her, and the cabinet considered other measures
to restrain the recalcitrant MP. True to form, King suggested
that "the best way to destroy [Nie1sen's] influence was to get
another woman into Parliament who could answer her." To
this end, King tried to engineer the nomination of a Mrs.
Casselman to contest a federal by-election in Edmonton,
Alberta.97
Fighting to Get Into the War
The attitude of the CPC to the war took another sharp turn
when Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.
The party immediately adopted a pro-war policy. According
to Tim Buck, who secretly returned to Canada in August
1941, the invasion eliminated the communist fear of a
"compromise peace between Hitler and the Allies." Britain
and the Commonwealth were forced into an alliance with the
Soviet Union, and this now made "the extirpation of
fascism" possible. For communists, the "outcome ofthe war
[was] dependant upon whether socialism was victorious" in
the war against Hitler and fascism.98 The party opted to
mobilize for total war, but it had enormous obstacles to
surmount: it was illegal, its newspapers had been suppressed,
some of its leaders were still in exile or in hiding, and many of
its members were interned. They would have to fight to get
into the war.
The govemment regarded the new communist policy with
disbelief and suspicion. Mackenzie King was enormously
relieved by the Soviet entry into the war. King recognized
that it brought a favourable change in the balance of military
forces, but he also hoped an alliance with the USSR would
"lessen communist activities on this continent."99 Yet King
was not prepared to legalize the CPC, agreeing with the RCMP
that the new communist attitude was "'too good to be true,'
and [that] it certainly calls for ... evidence of sincerity
before it can be accepted."100 King was prepared to give
communists some room for public activity. But he doggedly
resisted demands to revoke the ban on the CPC and release
interned communists, demands which came from communists
as well as unions, civil libertarians, some of the media, the
CCF, and from within government and Liberal Party circles.
The communist internees and the left-wing NCDR, mounted
a persistent and vocal campaign for their release, seizing
every chance to demand their separation from enemy POWS
and Canadian fascist sympathizers, with whom they were
interned at Kananaskis and Petawawa. Communists proved
to be nettlesome for the internment camp authorities. One
internee Ben Swankey, recalled that the communists at
Kananaskis were initially housed with the German pows, one
communist to eleven Germans in each hut. It was a situation
that gave rise to a great deal of tension. Finally, after failing to
convince the camp commandant to provide them with a hut of
their own, the communists simply seized a newly-built and
still-unoccupied hut.101
In July 1941, authorities moved the communist internees
from Kananaskis to Petawawa, where fascists were held
along with communists. Petawawa was the scene of a serious
confrontation during the visit by Timothy Eden (brother of the
British Foreign Secretary) in early August 1941. When the
internees assembled for inspection, Joe Wallace, a well-
known communist poet, stepped forward to announce to
Eden that anti-fascists were being held at the camp. Wallace
was sent to an isolation hut, and the communists responded
with a demonstration. The commandant summoned nearby
army troops and ordered the protesters to disperse. Then, on
20 August 1941, the communists were transferred to an
empty jail in Hull.102
There the communists peppered the government with
letters demanding their release so that they could help
mobilize "for all-out economic and military participation in
the war to defeat Hitler['s]Germany."103 In the meantime,
support for legalizing the CPC and releasing the internees
gathered steam. Lester Pearson and Norman Robertson felt
that the communists should be fully harnessed to the war
effort." Liberals like A .R.M. Lower were active in moderate
civil liberties associations which distanced themselves from
the "far left" but which opposed detentions.105 Support for
the communist campaign also emerged from surprising
quarters. Ontario Liberal Premier Mitchell Hepburn, a bitter
anti-communist and union-basher lobbied King for the
communists and even shared the platform with Tim Buck in
October 1942 at a war mobilization rally at Maple Leaf
Gardens in Toronto.106
The campaign crossed the us border in the fall of 1941,
when James Carey of the American CIO visited the Canadian
Legation in Washington and protested the internment of
Canadian UEW leader C.S. Jackson. The CIO lobby was
followed by a letter from the US Department of State which
"advised" the Canadian government that Jackson's
internment was complicating a struggle in the American
CIO between isolationist unions and those, like the UEW,
who supported Roosevelt's lend-lease policy.107
By 1942 the legal status of the CPC was very much a matter
of public debate.108 Still banned, the communists reorganized
as the "Tim Buck Plebiscite Committees" to mobilize yes-
votes in the 1942 referendum on conscription. The Tim Buck
Committees were then changed into Comniunist-Labor Total
War Committees which served as a semi-legal resurrection
of the CPC.109 The Communist-Labor committees campaigned
for "all-out" industrial production and no-strike pledges, in
return for a quid pro quo from the government. The
communists demanded that the government revise its labour
policies, by enacting legislation on compulsory collective
bargaining and the right to organize unions
The CPC also urged its members to join the armed forces in
the most public manner possible Bill Stewart was a YCL
member in Montreal, and a machinist at Fairchild Aircraft
prior to joining the army in January 1942. Stewart vividly
recalled the circumstances of his enlistment. The Communist
Labor Total War Committee organized a mass meeting in
Montreal, attended by 2 000 to 3 000 people Stewart
remembered that "thirty nine members of the Communist
Party stood up and announced their intention to join the army
and there was a representative of the armed forces at the
meeting who took our applications"111
Such public campaigning by the communists, and the
wartime alliance with the USSR, contributed to a shift in public
opinion towards the CPC. Gallup polls in September 1942
showed that public opinion was closely divided over whether
to intern Tim Buck and other leaders of the CPC who emerged
from hiding: 44 per cent favoured internment, 39 per cent
opposed internment, and 17 per cent were undecided. Pro-
internment opinion, however, was concentrated in Quebec,
where 80 per cent favoured detention. Anti-internment
sentiment was strongest in Ontario at 62 per cent, while 57
per cent of all non-Quebeckers felt that the communist leaders
should remain free. On the other hand, 62 per cent of all
Canadians, including Quebeckers, felt that the CPC should not
be legalized.112
In any event, the government began releasing party
internees quietly in January 1942, "one-by-one, two or
three weeks apart," so that all were freed by the autumn.113
In the meantime, under pressure from opposition parties,
the government struck a committee to study the DOCR. The
committee recommended lifting the ban on the CPC. The
cabinet, however, rejected the idea. The RCMP and the
Justice Department insisted that the actual communist aim
was "victory for the Soviet Union over democracy," and
to "subvert the Canadian Armed Forces to that end."114
Characteristically, King added pragmatic political concerns
to the refusal to legalize the CPC. With an eye to the Liberal
base in Quebec, King intended to placate his Quebec power
brokers who in no uncertain terms opposed legalizing the
CPC. In July 1942, King told his cabinet colleagues that lifting
the ban on the CPC would "give rise to bitter religious strife
both in the House and in the province [Quebec]." King
argued that "our Quebec friends have been through a difficult
place. To expect the government to remove a ban on
Communism would be almost too much for them."115 The
issue did not disappear, however, and in January 1943, King
was compelled to reassure the Roman Catholic Archbishops
and Cardinal Villeneuve of Quebec that his government made
a clear distinction between sympathy for the Russian people
during the war, and "the activities of Canadian Communists."
The government, wrote King, would continue to "deal firmly
with all subversive activities tending to discord and disunity.116
At the same time, King needed to satisly those vocal critics
who continued to criticize the ban on the CPC.117 By the spring
of 1943, the government found a way around its dilemma.
After the Comintern was disbanded in June 1943, the CCF
asked Justice Minister Louis St Laurent whether the ban on
the CPC would be lifted. Responding in the House of
Commons, St. Laurent reiterated the government's refusal.
St. Laurent, however, left a door open to the communists by
adding that if "any other party or group should be made up
[of] men who formerly belonged to this organization," the
response of the government "would depend upon the attitude
[the communists] adopted."118 In fact, the communists were
already busy organizing themselves into the LPP, which was
founded inA ugust l943.119
Communists and the Armed Forces
As noted, the RCMP's wartime responsibilities included
vetting security clearances of armed forces personnel. The
RCMP had opposed lifting the ban on the CPC, fearing that
the communists planned to infiltrate and subvert the
Canadian military. Military officials in all three branches of
the armed forces shared the RCMP's fears. Although the
government reluctantly restored the communists to partial
legality in 1943, the RCMP and the military were determined
to keep communists in the armed forces under
surveillance.120
This was an enormous job. There are no firm figures
available, but a reasonable guess is that several hundred
communists joined the armed forces in the Second World
War.121 Perhaps most of these enlistees were not known to
military recruiters or the RCMP as communists. Even those
enlistees who were known communists, like Bill Walsh, often
ended up in places and circumstances beyond the immediate
reach of the Mounties. Although the identification and
surveillance of suspected subversives was intense, resources
were strained by the demands of security screening for a
military force that expanded from less than 10,000 personnel
in 1939 to more than one million by 1945.122 As a result
security checks and controls could be haphazard and
inconsistent.
Throughout the war, the RCMP and the military high
command cooperated closely in the effort to control and
monitor suspected and known communists. The primary
vehicle used for surveillance was a system of mass-
fingerprinting, organized separately by each branch of the
armed forces. By the end of the war, fingerprints had been
obtained from nearly all recruits.123 Normally, the armed
forces sent fingerprint records to the RCMP for vetting only
in cases where enlistees were suspected or known
"subversives."124 Actual investigations were conducted
within the armed forces, but the volume could be very
heavy. According to Larry Hannant, the army's Military
Intelligence Section 3 (M13) carried out "500 in-depth
field checks per month" by January 1945. 125
Where possible, military recruiters were required to act as
gate-keepers, so that possible subversives were screened
before they entered the armed forces. Security screening at
this level was the most haphazard, and the greatest number of
checks were made on personnel who were already enlisted.
In the army, known communists and confirmed subversives
were placed on a "Red list" and the code-word "non-
sensitive" was attached to their personnel files.126 Among
other things, the code indicated that a particular soldier was
not to be promoted or shipped overseas until his case had
been thoroughly reviewed.127 In several cases, enlistments
were refused and recruits discharged when M13 determined
that the individuals under investigation were too dangerous.128
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of security screening in the
armed forces should not be over-estimated. As personnel
policies travelled down the chain of command, those
pertaining to "non-sensitive" personnel were often applied
rather unevenly. Some well-known communists were
promoted to the rank of captain or major. Many communists
were prevented temporarily from serving overseas, in a few
cases permanently.129 On the other hand, a large number of
communists fought with distinction, including Dick Steele,
who was killed in the Falaise Gap.130
To a certain extent the limits on security screening can
be attribLited to the "noise and distortions" that tend to
affect the functioning of any command structure, as well as
to the necessity of allowing commanding officers to apply
policy according to their discretion and within reasonable
limits. Control efforts, however, were also limited by the
logic of the war itself. By the time that communists began
joining the armed forces, it was abundantly clear that
Canada was in a war to the finish. The armed forces
needed highly motivated and disciplined soldiers, and
regardless of all else, communists often fit the bill.131
Perhaps the most forthright expression of this logic
was the secret recruitment, in 1942, of more than 60
Canadian communists by the British Special Operations
Executive (SOE) and the US Office of Strategic Services
(OSS). Mainly of Yugoslav, Hungarian and Bulgarian
descent, these communists were parachuted behind enemy
lines into Yugoslavia and the Balkans, with assignments
to link up with resistance forces, gather intelligence,
carry out sabotage, and attack enemy forces.132
The precise means of recruiting Canadian communists for
these missions remains obscure. SOE recruitment in 1942 for
the Yugoslav missions appears to have involved cooperation
between the British Security Coordination (BSC), the RCMP,
the departments of National Defense and External Affairs in
Canada, and of course, the illegal CPC. According to Roy
MacLaren, the RCMP contacted the CPC with a request for
recruits. Steve Serdar, a Yugoslav-Canadian who was a
party organizer in Val D'Or, Quebec, claimed that enough
communists volunteered to form a brigade. Serdar and
fifteen others were selected in August 1942, and trained
in Canada, Palestine, and Egypt. They were then dropped
into Yugoslavia at intervals after the spring of l943.133
SOE recruitment of Canadian communists of Hungarian
and Bulgarian descent followed a similar pattern, although
contact with the CPC was made through the Department
of National Defense. About eight Hungarian-Canadians
and an unknown number of Bulgarian-Canadians were
chosen. Some were already in the armed forces: Steve
Markos was with the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry,
while Steve Mate was training with the Canadian
Armoured Corps School at Camp Borden. The others
were subsequently enlisted and trained.134
The OSS apparently adopted an even more straightforward
approach. The 0SS worked with Canadian authorities and
the SOE, but it contacted the CPC directly in 1942. According
to Tim Buck, 0SS chief Colonel Donovan met with
Canadian Tribune editor A.A. Macleod to request 15 to
20 CPC volunteers willing to drop behind enemy lines in the
Balkans. According to Buck, the party secured 20
volunteers: twelve Yugoslavs (mainly Croatians), one
Slovenian, one Montenegrin, two Serbians, two Bulgarians,
and two Macedonians.135
Most communist volunteers, however,joined the regular
services of the armed forces. Yet even in the regular military,
security-control policies were often applied arbitrarily, rather
than systematically, which produced mixed results. This may
best be seen through the experiences of communist enlistees
themselves, in their enlistment, training, promotion, and
assignment, as well as in the nature and extent of their
activities as communists within the armed forces.
First, there were inconsistencies in processing the
enlistment applications of known communists. In February
1942, the Communist-Labor Total War Committee sent
Ray Stevenson from Kirkland Lake, Ontario, to Val D'Or
to replace Steve Serdar (who had been recruited by the
SOE). Not long afterwards Stevenson joined the army.
Although Stevenson was a well-known communist, his
enlistment application at Val D'Or was processed
immediately.136 William Stewart had the same experience.137
Likewise, several former-internees signed up with no
trouble.138 On the other hand, Ben Swankey, who had
been interned at Kananaskis, Petawawa and Hull, tried to
enlist in December 1942 at Edmonton, but was told that
his application would have to be cleared by the RCMP. A
month later, in January 1943, Swankey was notified that
his application had been approved, and he was sent to
Grande Prairie, Alberta, for basic training.139 Former
internee, John McNeil, had worse luck when he applied
for the navy in 1942 in Winnipeg. The navy curtly rejected
McNeil as an undesirable recruit. 140
Commanding officers were informed when known
communists were placed in their units, but this knowledge
could have differing results. William Stewart ended up in
Britain as a corporal with the Elgin Regiment of the
Canadian Armoured Corps, attached to the First Canadian
Army Corps. According to Stewart, his CO announced that
he intended to drive Stewart out ofthe army. Stewart retorted
that the colonel was not "man enough to do it," and
ended up having to endure one form or another of penalty
duty. Later, in northwest Africa in 1943, Stewart fell into
another confrontation, with the result that he "carried buckets
of officer shit across the desert in 120 degree temperatures
for a month-and-a-half" until his unit was sent to Italy.141
Ben Swankey and Ray Stevenson had different experiences.
Stevenson was picked out at Camp Borden during training
with the Canadian Armoured Corps, and put on a potential
officer list with several other communists. As Stevenson
recalled, however, "there was a long delay in sending us
through [officer training) while HQ was making up its mind
what to do with some of us." Stevenson became a training
officer, and was assigned to design a curriculum, including a
course on the nature of fascism, for soldiers about to be
sent overseas. Although Stevenson's commanding officer
warned him against "selling the Parry line," Stevenson had a
fairly free hand, and was allowed to select Sam Walsh,
another communist, as an aide. Eventually Stevenson was
promoted to the rank of captain and was, at one point,
invited by General Worthington to lecture the Provost
Corps on industrial relations.142
Swankey enlisted with the Royal Canadian Artillery Corps
and when he arrived at Shilo, Manitoba, he was summoned
for an interview with his commanding officer. The CO was a
Ukrainian-Canadian who expressed sympathy for Swankey's
experience in internment. Swankey's superior was required
to file weekly reports on "non-sensitive" personnel with M13.
The CO delegated that task to another communist in the unit
and Swankey recalled that, "we used to draw them up
together, so I had some very good reports."143
Swankey never saw his personnel file, but he claimed that
it contained a stipulation that he was not to be promoted.
Despite this, Swankey was trained as an instructor and
promoted to the rank of sergeant within three months. He
was then assigned to lecture on topics that included an
analysis of the Italian army. Swankey, however, lost his
rank when he was posted overseas in March 1945, and
he arrived in Britain as a private in the Artillery Corps. 144
While the army sent Swankey and Stewart overseas, it
would not post Ray Stevenson in a military theatre of
operation, despite his repeated requests. Stevenson claimed
to have learned through "a clandestine source in army
intelligence," that he "would not be shipped overseas for
political reasons."145 According to Swankey, commanding
officers were "under orders not to trust"communists".146 The
application of such orders, however, depended on the
inclination of particular officers. William Stewart noted that
the army had "an organized approach to the question of
communists," but that anti-communist attitudes receded after
1942, except among officers who were "ideologically way
to the right" and who insisted on "fighting anti-communist
battles."147 According to Swankey, commanding officers often
discovered that communists "were eager, dedicated, and
very good soldiers."148
It does seem that some commanding officers appreciated
the role that communists could play as morale boosters.
During the Italian campaign, Stewart organized educational
activities in his unit, including discussions about the Red
Army's progress on the eastern front.149 In a more concrete
estimate of the communist contribution to morale- building.
the Canadian Armoured Corps conducted a survey to assess
Ray Stevenson's success in preparing soldiers about to
proceed on draft overseas. The survey indicated that, in
before-and-after sampling, the number of soldiers who felt
prepared to go overseas rose from 59 per cent to 75 per
cent, while the number who felt it was their duty to go
overseas rose from 83 per cent to 94 percent.150
In any event, the communist role in the armed forces was
far from what the RCMP feared. The RCMP seems to have
constantly read the most diabolical intentions into the most
innocuous activity. For example, in February 1943 the RCMP
reported that a committee of trade unionists and soldiers in
New Westminster, British Columbia, was controlled by the
CPC as a vehicle to recruit members and to "render the troops
more sueceptible to the party approach." Among other things,
this committee planned to organize "entertainment for the
troops" and to demand "free or reduced fares [for soldiers]
while travelling and an upward revision of pay and pensions."151
Contrary to RCMP impressions, from 1942-45 the CPC
produced almost no propaganda aimed directly at armed
services personnel. Most of its materials were intended
for broader public consumption and from a communist
perspective strove to improve the war effort. The YCL
protested "the over-crowding of Canadian fliers on
overseas transport" and issued a pamphlet entitled,
'Everything for the Fighting Front!" The YCL also promoted
the less-than-seditious demand that the government
"increase army pay and dependent allowances" and provide
returning soldiers with adequate jobs and pensions.152 Clearly,
communists hoped that such propaganda efforts would
redound to their benefit by improving their standing in public
opinion. These materials, however, revealed no efforts to
inflame revolutionary sentiment.
More importantly, the CPC, and its legal successor the
LPP, instructed its members in the armed forces to sever
formal ties with the party. Thus, communists in the armed
forces paid no membership dues to it, and their names
were removed from LPP membership lists. Ray Stevenson,
William Stewart, and Ben Swankey insist that no party
organization existed in the armed forces, and that they
never received instructions from the party.153 Communists
in the armed forces did not abandon their political ideas.
Nonetheless, they were careful not to violate the letter of
the King's Rules and Regulations for Canada and the
Army Manual of Law. As Ray Stevenson noted, this
protected communists from being "open to a charge of
taking orders from an outside source."154
Yet communists in the armed forces found other ways of
staying politically active. Corporal Les Hunt, one of many
communists who disagreed with the Parry's anti-war stand,
joined the army in 1940 and was shipped almost immediately
to England. Just after D-Day in 1944, Hunt ended up in
Normandy and served for eleven months with a Royal
Canadian Signal Corps reconnaissance unit. In 1942, while
stationed in England, Hunt helped organize an international
youth conference which convened in November. The
conference demanded the opening of a second front to
relieve the pressure on the Red Army. The conference
attracted young Britons and anti-fascist exiles from Europe.
Also attending were some Canadian armed forces
personnel, including Corporal William Stewart and 2
other communists. Most interesting about the conference,
is that the Canadian military tolerated the participation of
their personnel.155
While communists in the armed forces did not form
party cells, they did organize as anti-fascists. Apparently
this satisfied most commanding officers. Based on British
Army practise, military regulations allowed for the creation
of current affairs clubs within units. Communists used this
as the means to conduct anti-fascist education among
military personnel. Les Hunt was one ofthe first to organize
such a club. He recalled that his superiors were initially
unsure of "how to cope with communists as loyal
patriots." In October 1941, Hunt was hauled before his
CO to explain his conduct. Hunt successfully defended his
legal right to organize a current affairs club, and he was
permitted to continue with anti-fascist educational work.
As other Canadian communists arrived in Britain, Hunt
urged them to organize current affairs clubs in their units.
This was the origin of the education meetings organized in
William Stewart's unit in Italy.156
Communists in the military, however, began re-estabhshing
ties with the LPP by the end of the war. In 1945, the armed
forces decided to allow its personnel to run as candidates in
forthcoming Canadian elections. Armed forces candidates
were granted leave and flown to Canada by the Royal
Canadian Air Force. Military personnel were norninated as
candidates in the June federal and Ontario elections by the
Liberals, the Conservatives, the CCF, and the LPP. Ray
Stevenson was one of three armed forces personnel running
for the LPP in the Ontario election, and Ben Swankey was
one of the LPP's nine military candidates in the federal
election.157
The election campaigns, while moderately encouraging
for the LPP, should have put to rest RCMP fears about the
extent of communist influence in the armed forces.
Federally, the LPP collected 110,000, or two per cent of
all votes. The LPP, however, ran close races in some
ridings and elected Fred Rose in Montreal Cartier (Rose
was later deprived of his seat, convicted of conspiracy
under the Official Secrets Act). The LPP received about
5,000 soldiers' votes, or 1.4 per cent of all armed forces
ballots. In Ontario, the party elected two MPPs from
Toronto, Joe Salsberg and A.A. Macleod. The LPP won
71,000 votes (four per cent), and about 4,000 soldiers'
votes. Only Salsberg won a plurality of soldiers' votes for
the LPP. 158
Conclusion
Corporal William Stewart was serving as a wireless
operator in a Sherman Tank with the Ontario Regiment
during the Allied advance on Florence, Italy, in June
1944. Stewart's tank was hit during a German rearguard
action, and he was badly burned. Evacuated to England
and then back to Canada, Stewart received his military
discharge in 1945. The RCMP picked up Stewart's trail
again in May, noting that the veteran had contributed to an
LPP leaflet which urged government measures to provide
"rehabilitation and jobs for returning veterans."159
The Second World War was ending and the Cold War
was about to begin. As communist veterans like Stewart
returned to civilian life, they left the purview of military
authorities charged with maintaining intetnal security in the
armed forces. The activities of civilian communists, however,
were to remain an intense focus of RCMP scrutiny and
surveillance. Throughout the Second World War the RCMP
had been the main vehicle, and a primary exponent, of an
entrenched anti-communist government policy. The RCMP
entered the war years armed with expanded powers and
responsibility under the D0CR, which it had helped develop.
The RCMP had a prior disposition to regard commumsts as a
greater threat to internal security than nazis and fascists, and it
urged the government to take tougher measures against the
CPC.
The government was no less worried about the threat of
communist subversion. King, however, balanced his anti-
communism with a more finely-tuned sense of political
opportunism. When a lower court decision made it
convenient, King agreed to ban the CPC. When the
communists switched to a pro-war policy, and public
opinion mounted in favour of legalizing the CPC, King
manoeuvred to satisfy liberals as well as die-hard anti-
communists. Although the ban on the CPC remained in
force, communists were tolerated but closely monitored in
a no-man's land of quasi-legality.
The communists had been extremely short-sighted and
very ill-advised to adopt an anti-war policy in 1939. The
CPC's decision undermined its own anti-fascist orientation and
encouraged anti-communists in the government to impose
repressive measures against the party. Contrary to the
justifications offered by the RCMP and the government, the
decision to suppress the CPC was based more on ideological
motivations than on a demonstrated threat to the internal
security of Canada. The CPC openly expressed pro-Soviet
loyalties, but Canada was never at war with the USSR. Nor
should later events, such as the feeble advocacy of
revolutionary defeatism by one faction in the CPC during
1940-41 or Fred Rose's postwar conviction, obscure the
fact that the CPC publicly pushed a policy of neutrality and
withdrawal from the war.
That the repression of communists was ideologically
motivated is underscored by the fact that Canada was the
only allied partner to impose such a proscription throughout
the war.160 Despite the party's convoluted logic and twists in
policy during 1939-41, Canadian communists never denied
the need for a genuine anti-fascist war. Nor is there evidence
that the CPC supported the fascist enemy, or organized acts of
sabotage. Nevertheless, the Canadian government, the RCMP,
and the military continued to perceive a subversive threat
even when communists embraced the war in 1941.
The RCMP and military intelligence made determined efforts
to weed out or control the activities of communists who
joined the armed forces after 1941. The logic of the war,
however, also produced friction between official anti-
communism and the exigencies of prosecuting the war.
Despite "Red-lists" and security checks, communists joined
the armed forces and often served with distinction.
Communists in the armed forces cut their official ties with
the party and carefully presented themselves as anti-
fascist patriots. In units where communists served,
commanding officers often concluded that, anti-communist
fears aside, it was better to make good use of communists
and worry about politics later.
1 Larry Hann ant, The Infernal Machine: Investigating the Loyalty of
Canada's Citzens (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995),
128=l29.
2 Bill Walsh, in Dangerous Patriots, eds. William and Kathleen Repka
(Vancouver: New Star Books, 1982), 209.
3 Ibid., 196-210.
4 Reg Whitaker, "Official Repression of Communism During World
War II," Labour/Le Travail 17 (Spring 1986): 145-146.
5 Ibid., 149-152.
6 lbid., 164-165; see also, Tim Buck, Canada Needs a Party of
Communists! (Toronto: National Initiative Committee to Convene a
Communist Constituent Convention, 1943), and Young Communist
League [YCL], Everything for the Fighting Front! (Toronto: YCL, Ca.
1941-1942).
7 Hannant, The Infernal machine, 119-138.
8 Ramsay Cook, "Canadian Freedom in Wartime," in His Own Man:
Essays in Honour of Arthur Reginald Marsden Lower, ed. W.H.
Heick and Roger Graham(McGill: McGill~Qucen's University Prcss,
1974),38.
9 Norman Hillmer, Bohdan Kordan, Lubomyr Luciuket, eds., On Guard
For Thee: War, Ethicity, and the Canadian State, 1939-1945
(Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World
War, 1988).
10 Gregory Kealey and Keg Whitaker, eds., RCMP Security Bulletins:
The War Series, 1939-1941 (St. John's: Canadian Committee on
Labour History, 1989). 295-296 see also, Reg Whitaker, "Official
Repression," 136-137.
11 Ramsay Cook, "Canadian Freedom in Wartime," 37-38.
12 Ramsay Cook, Canadian Liheralism in Wartime: A Study of the
Defense of Canada Regulations (M.A. diss., Queen's University,
1955), 51-66; Whitaker, "Official Repression," 17,50.
13 S.T. Wood, "Tools of Treachery," RCMP Quarterly 8 (4) (April
1941 ):394-395.
14 Kealey and Whitaker. Bulletins, 222-224.
15 Whitaker, "Official Repression," 146.
16 lbid, 136-137.
17 Whitaker, "Introduction," in Bulletins, 11.
18 lbid., 10-11; Whitaker, "Official Repression," 136-137.
19 S.T. Wood, "Tools of Treachery," 395. In 1935, Wood commanded
the RCMP force in Regina that violently suppressed jobless workers
on the On-To-Ottawa Trek. According to Lorne and Caroline Brown,
Wood's role in this event helped facilitate his rise in the RCMP; see,
Lorne and Caroline Brown, An Unauthorized History of the RCMP
(Toronto: JarnesLoriiner, 1978), 77-78.
20 Kealey and Whitaker, Bulletins, 22.
21 lbid.,69,8l-82.
22 lbid., 69.
23 Jack Pickersgill, quoted in Whitaker, "Introduction," 10-14.
24 Whitaker, "Official Repression," 137; Hannant, Infernal Machine,
90.
25 William Lyon Mackenzie King, The Mackenzie King Diaries
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980, text-fiche:), 21 Aug.
1939 and 24 Aug.1939.
26 Ibid., 5 May 1941.
27 lbid.,6 Sept. 1939,8 May 1941,and l8 and 19 Jan. 1943.
28 lbid., l6 Nov. 1939.
29 lbid
30 1bid. 24 Nov.1939.
31 Ibid. Kealey and Whitaker, Bulletins, 227.
32 King Diaries, 24 Nov. 1939.
33 S.W. Horrall, "Canada's Security Service: A Brief History," RCMP
Quarterly 50(Summer 1985): 46.
34 Whitaker, "Introduction." 11
34 lbid., 11-12; C.P. Stacy, Official History of the Canadian Army in
the Second World War, volume 1, Six Years of War (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1955), 149-150; S.W. Horrall, Canada's Security Service,"
46.
36 Kealey and Whitaker, Bulletins, 164-165; Whitaker, "0fficial
Repression," 145.
37 Whitaker, "Official Repression," 145.
38 Norman Penner, Canadian Communism: The Stalin Years and
Beyond (Toronto: Methuen, 1988), 166; Ivan Avakumovic, The
Communist Party in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1975), 142.
39 Whitaker, "Official Repression," 145.
40 Ibid.
41 Repka and Repka, Dangerous Patriots 47-48 and 78-81 Ben
Swankey, interview by author, 11 November 1995 Calgary, Alberta
42 Various sources mention the arrest and detention of about 250
actual and alleged CPC members. It is assumed that this figure includes
not only the internees, but also those who were arrested and detained
for short periods of time; see, Communist Party of Canada [CPC]
Canada's Party of Socialism (Toronto: Progress Books, 1982); 137;
and, Repka and Repka, Dangerous Patriots, 9.
43 Tim Buck, Yours in the Struggle (Toronto: NC Press, 1977), 290-
299.
44 Whitaker, "Official Repression," 140.
45 The Clarion, 26 Sept.1939.
46 Penner, Canadian Communism, 164-165.
47 Ibid., 161-162.
48 Buck, Struggle, 288-289; see also Kealey and Whitaker, Bulletins,
49-50.
49 Whitaker, "Official Repression," 140.
50lbid.
51 CPC, Canada's Party of Socialism, 124-131.
52 Whitaker, "Official Repression," 138.
53 King, Diaries, 1 July 1939,21 July 1939,25 July 1939,20 Aug. 1939,
21 Aug. 1939,22 Aug. 1939,24 Aug. 1939,3 Sept. 1939,and 6 Sept
1939.
54 Ibid., 21-24 Aug.1939.
55 Ibid., 21 Aug.1939.
56 J. L. Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie
King Government, 1939-1945 (Toronto: University ofToronto Press,
1990),420.
57 Ibid., 424.
58 Kealey and Whitaker, Bulletins, 59-60.
59 Avakumovic, Communist Party, 115: Buck, Struggle, 285.
60 Buck, Struggle, 290.
61 Ray Stevenson, interview by author, 18 Oct.1995, Calgary, Alberta.
62 William Stewart, interview by author, 24 Oct.1995, Calgary, Alberta;
Buck, Struggle, 290.
63 Kealey and Whitaker, Bulletins, 185-186 and 116.
64 Ibid.,1l0-111.
65 1bid., 332-333.
66 Penner, Canadian Communism, 166.
67 Buck, Struggle, 294-298.
68 Ibid.; Kealey and Whitaker, Bulletins, 315 and 323-324;CPC,party
of socialism, 138; Penner, Canadian Communists, 166-168.
69 This can be established by examining and comparing materials
published by various cells and bodies of the CPC; see Kealey and
Whitaker. Bulletins, 332-335,344-352.
70 Wood, "Tools of Treachery," 395.
71 Ibid,395-397.
72 lbid. 396.
73 Stacy, Official History, 296.
74 Desmond Morton, Canada and War (Toronto: Butterworth, 1981),
115 and 123.
75 Irving Abella, Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour:
The CIO, the Communist Party, and the Canadian Congress of
Labour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975); Cook,
Liberalism in Wartime, 174-175.
76 Morton, Canada and War, 123; Bryan Palmer, Working Class
Experience ( Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992), 279.
77 Jeremy Webber, "The Malaise of Compulsory Conciliation: Strike
Prevention in Canada During World War II," Labour/Le Travail 15
(Spring 1985): 63-69; Palmer, Working Class Experience, 278-279.
78 Quoted in Cook, Canadian Liberalism, 178-179.
79 Ibid.; Jim Green, Against the Tide (Toronto: Progress Books, 1986),
88: Kealey and Whitaker, Bulletins, 126-127.
80 Cook. ('anadian Liberalism, 175-194.
81 Cabinet War Committee of Canada, Minutes and Documents of the
Cabinet War Committee, "CMA Brief." 5 May 1941; Abella,
Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour. 73.
82 King, Diaries, 30 May 1941.
83 Ibid..5 May 1941, l8 May 1941,and 30 May 1941.
84 Kealey and Whitaker, Bulletins, 362-363.
85 Bill Stewart and Ray Stevenson. interviews.
86 Abella. Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour. 66-85.
87 Walsh, quoted in Repka and Repka, Dangerous Patriots", 196-198.
88 Green, Against the Tide, 74-84.
89 Charles Murray, quoted in Repka and Repka. Dangerous Patriots,
127-129.
90 Cabinet War Commitee of Canada, Minutes of 2 October 1941;
Jackson. quoted in Repka and Repka, Dangerous Patriots, 144-146.
91 Penner. Canadian Communism. 173-174.
92 King, Diaries, 23 May 1940.
93 Ibid., 20 June 1940.
94 Penner, Canadian Communism, 173-175; Kealey and Whitaker,
Bulletins,272-273,289,332-334,336,372,374,397-398,412-413.
95 Kealey and Whitaker, Bulletins, 333-334.
96 lbid., 332-335.
97 King, Diaries, 18 May 1941.
98 Buck, Struggle, 298-299.
99 King, Diaries, 22 June 1941.
100 Kealey and Whitaker, Bulletins, 411.
101 Swankey, interview.
102 lbid.
103 "An Open Letter to Prime Minister King," reprinted in Repka and
Repka, Dangerous Patriots, 247-249.
104 Whitaker, "Official Repression," 148-149; Whitaker, "Introduction,"
17.
105 Cook, 'Canadian Freedom in Wartime," 48-51.
106 Buck, Struggle, 305-307.
107 War Cabinet Committee ofCanada, Minutes of 2 Oct. and 29 Oct.
1941, and Correspondence from the U.S. State Department, 28 Oct.
1941.
108 Whitaker. "Official Repression," 150.
109 Buck, Struggle, 300-301.
110 Tim Buck, Canada in the Coming Offensive (Toronto: Communist-
Labor Total War Committee, 1943), 15-22; Tim Buck, A Labor Policy
for Victory (Toronto: Communist-Labor Total War Committee, 1943),
2-3, 42-49; The Canadian Tribune, The Case for Labor (Toronto:
Canadian Tribune, 1943).
111 Stewart, interview.
112 Kealey and Whitaker. Bulletins, 27-28.
113 Peter Prokop, quoted in Repka and Repka, Dangerous Patriots,
241.
114 Whitaker, "Official Repression," 151.
115 King, Diaries, 25 July 1942.
116 War Cabinet Committee of Canada, Minutes of 21 Jan. 1943, and
Draft Letter From Prime Minister to Cardinal Villeneuve, 20 Jan.1943.
117 Whitaker, "Introduction," 17
118 Louis St. Laurent, quoted in Buck, Canada Needs a Party, 29.
119 Buck, Struggle, 320-324.
120 Hannanet, Infernal Machine. 119-131.
121 Larry Hannant quotes an estimate of 100 communists in the armed
forces as early as Febrnary 1941 in, Infernal Machine, 122.
122 lbid., 120-121.
123 lbid., 125.129-130.
124 lbid., 126.
125 lbid., 127.
126 Stevenson, Stewart, and Swankey, interviews.
127 Hunt and Stevenson, interviews; Hannant, Infernal Machine,
127.
128 Hannant, Infernal Machine, 127.
129 lbid.; Binder quoted in Repka and Repka, Dangerous Patriots,
142.
130 Abella, Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour, 59.
131 Swankey, Stewart, and Stevenson, interviews. In addition, there
was considerable friction at time between the intelligence
sections of the RCMP and the Armed Forces, see Whitaker, "Introduction."
132 CPC, Canada's Party, 145; Roy Maclaren, Canadians Behind
Enemy Lines, 1939-1945 (Vancouver: University ofB ritish Columbia
Press, 1981),3-8.
133 Maclaren, Canadians Behind Enemy Lines, 135-150.
134 lbid., 155-171.
135 Buck, Struggle, 302-304.
136 Stevenson, interview.
137 Stewart, interview; see note 111.
138 Mitch Sago quoted in Repka and Repka, Dangerous Patriots, 195.
139 Swankey, interview.
140 Hannant, Infernal Machine, 119-120.
141 Stewart, interview.
142 Stevenson, interview.
143 Swankey, interview.
144 Ibid.
145 Stevenson, interview.
146 Swankey, interview.
147 Stewart, interview.
148 Swankey, interview.
149 Stewart, interview.
150 Stevenson, interview.
151 Kealey and Whitaker, Bulletins, 45.
152 YCL., Everyting for the Fighting Front!
153 Stewart, and Swankey, interviews.
154 Stevenson, interview.
155 Hunt and Stewart, interviews.
156 Hunt, interview.
157 Stevenson and Swankey, interviews.
158 Kealey and Whitaker, Bulletins, 337-350.
159 lb1d., 352; Stewart, interview.
160 Whitaker, "Official Repression," 151 - 152.
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